Oligarch

Oligarch (pronounced ol-i-gahrk)

(1) In political science, one of the rulers in an oligarchy (a system of government characterized by the institutional or constructive rule of a few and the literal or effective exclusion of the many); a member of an oligarchy.

(2) A very rich person involved in business in a manner which interacts intimately with the organs of government, the nature of the relationship varying between systems but usually with the implication of mutually beneficial corrupt or improper (if sometimes technically lawful) conduct.

(3) In cosmogony, a proto-planet formed during oligarchic accretion.

1600-1610: From the French oligarque & olygarche, from the Late Latin oligarcha, from the Ancient Greek ὀλιγάρχης (oligárkhēs) and related to oligarkhia (government by the few), the construct being olig- (few) (from stem of oligos (few, small, little) (a word of uncertain origin)) +‎ -arch (ruler, leader) (from arkhein (to rule)).  The noun plural was oligarchs.  In English, an earlier form of oligarchy was the circa 1500 oligracie, a borrowing from the Old French.  Oligarch & oligarchy are nouns, oligarchal, oligarchical & oligarchic are adjectives, and oligarchically is an adverb; the noun plural is oligarchs.  The playful minigarch (the offspring of an oligarch) and oligarchette (a female oligarch or an aspiring oligarch not yet rich enough to be so described are both non-standard while oligarchie & oligarchisch are sometimes used to convey a deliberate sense of the foreign.  Oligarch is now almost never used in its classical sense to refer to rulers of a political entity but instead to describe the small numbers of those who have become exceedingly rich, usually in some improper (even if technically lawful) way with the corrupt and surreptitious cooperation of those in government, the implication being they too have benefited.  Words like plutocrat, potentate and tycoonocrat are sometimes used as synonyms but don’t covey the sense of gains improperly and corruptly achieved.

Oligarchs are sometimes described in the press as "colorful characters", something a bit misleading because many seek a low profile, something often advisable in Mr Putin's Russia.  In a movie about oligarchs Netflix presumably would focus on some of the more colorful.

In modern use, an oligarch is one of the select few people who have become very rich by virtue of their close connections to rule or influence leaders in an oligarchy (a government in which power is held by a select few individuals or a small class of powerful people).  Unlike the relationship between “monarch” & “monarchy”, “oligarch” & “oligarchy” are not used in the literature of political science in quite the same way.  A monarch’s relationship to their monarchy is a thing defined by the constitutional system under which they reign and that may be absolute, despotic or theocratic but is inherently directly linked.  However, even in a political system which is blatantly and obviously an oligarchy, the members of the ruling clique are not referred to as oligarchs by virtue of their place in the administration, the more common descriptors being autocrat, despot, fascist, tyrant, dictator, totalitarian, authoritarian, kleptocrat or other terms that to varying degrees hint at unsavoriness.  Instead, the word oligarch has come to be used as a kind of encapsulated critique of corruption and economic distortion and the individual oligarch a personification of that.  The modern oligarch is one who has massively profited, usually by gaining in some corrupt way either the resources which once belonged to the state or trading rights within the state which tend towards monopolistic or oligopolistic arrangements.  Inherent in the critique is the assumption that the corrupt relationship is a symbiotic one between oligarch and those in government, the details of which can vary: oligarchs may be involved in the political process or entirely excluded but a common feature to all such arrangements is that there is a mutual enrichment at the expense of the sate (ie the citizens).  The word oligarch has thus become divorced from oligarchy and attached only to oligopoly.

The word oligopoly dates from 1887, from the Medieval Latin oligopolium, the construct being the Ancient Greek ὀλίγος (olígos) (few) + πωλεῖν (poleîn) (to sell) from the primitive Indo-European root pel (to sell) and describes a market in which an industry is dominated by a small number of large-scale sellers called oligopolists (the adjectival form oligopolistic from a surprisingly recent 1939).  Oligopolies, which inherently reduce competition and impose higher prices on consumers do not of necessity form as a result of improper or corrupt collusion and may be entirely organic, the classic example of which is two competitors in a once broad market becoming increasingly efficient, both achieving such critical mass that others are unable to compete.  At that point, there is often a tendency for the two to collude to divide the market between them, agreeing not to compete in certain fields or geographical regions, effectively creating sectoral or regional monopolies.  If competitors do emerge, the oligopolists have sufficient economic advantage to be able temporarily to reduce their selling prices to below the cost of production & distribution, forcing the completion from the market, after which the profitable price levels are re-imposed.

A classic game theory model of oligopolistic behavior.

Although not thought desirable by economists, they’ve long attracted interest interest because they create interesting market structures, especially when they interact with instruments of government designed to prevent their emergence or at least ameliorate the consequences of their operation.  The most obvious restriction governments attempt to impose is to prevent collusion between oligopolists in an attempt to deny them the opportunity to set prices of particular goods.  Even if successful, this can only ever partially be done because most prices quickly become public knowledge and with so few sellers in a market, most of which tend to operate with similar input, production & distribution costs, each oligopolist can in most cases predict the actions of the others. This has been of interest in game theory because the decisions of one player are not only in reaction to that of the others but also influences their behavior.

Dartz Prombron: The Prombron is now typical of the preferred transport for an oligarch, the traditional limousine not able to be configured to offer the same level of protection against attacks with military-grade weapons.  Prombrons were originally trimmed with leather from the foreskins of whale penises but the feature was dropped after protests from the environmental lobby.

Oligarchs in the modern sense operate differently and the Russian model under Mr Putin has become the exemplar although some on a smaller scale (notably Lebanon since 1990) are probably even more extreme.  The Russian oligarchs emerged in the 1990s in the chaos which prevailed after the dissolution of the old Soviet Union.  They were men, sometime outside government but often apparatchiks within, well-skilled in the corruption and the operations of the black market which constituted an increasingly large chunk of the economy in the last decade of the USSR and these skills they parlayed into their suddenly capitalistic world.  Capitalism however depends on there being private property and because the USSR was constructed on the basis of Marxist theory which demanded it was the state which owned and controlled the means of production and distribution, there was little of that.  So there was privatization, some of it officially and much of it anything but, the classic examples being a back-channel deal between the oligarch and someone in government purporting to be vested with the authority to sell the assets of the state.  Few in government did this without a cut (often under the guise of a equity mechanism called “loans for shares”) and indeed, some apparatchiks sold the assets to themselves and those assets could be nice little earners like oil & gas concessions or producers, electricity generators, transport networks or financial institutions.  One of the reasons the assets were able to be sold at unbelievably bargain prices was a product of Soviet accounting: because the book value of assets had so little meaning in communist accounting, in many cases recorded asset values hadn’t be updated in decades and were in any case sometimes only nominal.  There were therefore sales which, prima facie, might have appeared to verge on the legitimate.

2021 Aurus Senat, now the official presidential car of the Russian state.

Few were and in any event, even if the aspiring oligarch didn’t have the cash, somewhere in government there would be found an official able to arrange the state to loan the necessary fund from the resources of the state, if need be creating (effectively printing) the money.  From that point, newly acquitted assets could be leveraged, sold to foreign investors at huge profit or even operated in the novelty of the free market, an attractive proposition for many given the asset obtained from the state might be a natural monopoly, competition therefore of no immediate concern.  Thus was modern Russian capitalism born of what were economic crimes on a scale unimaginable to the legions condemned to death or years in the Gulag under comrade Stalin.  Even before becoming prime-minister in 1999, Mr Putin was well aware of what had happened, being acquainted with some of the players in the process but shortly after assuming office, he had small a team of lawyers, accountants and economists undertake a forensic analysis to try more accurately to quantify who did what and who got how much.  Although the paperwork his investigative project produced has never been made public, it was reputed to have been reduced to a modestly-sized file but the contents were dynamic and put to good use.

In either 2003 or 2004, Mr Putin, assisted by officers of the FSB (successor to the alphabet-soup of similar agencies (Cheka, GPU, OGPU, NKGB, NKVD, SMERSH, MGB & (most famously) KGB)) experts in such things, “arranged” a series of interviews with the oligarchs whose conduct in the privatizations of 1990s had been most impressive (or egregious depending on one’s view).  Well aware of the relationship between wealth and political influence, Mr Putin’s explained that the oligarchs had to decide whether they wished to be involved in business or politics; they couldn’t do both.  Mr Putin then explained the extent of their theft from the state, how much was involved, who else facilitated and profited from the transactions and what would be the consequences for all concerned were the matters to come to trial.  Then to sweeten the deal, Mr Putin pointed out that although the oligarchs had stolen their wealth on the grandest scale, “they had stolen it fair and square” and could keep it if they agreed to refrain from involvement in politics.  The Russian oligarchy understood his language, the lucidity of his explanation perhaps enhanced by oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky (b 1963; then listed as the richest man in Russia and in the top-twenty worldwide) being arrested on charges of fraud and tax evasion, shortly before the meetings were convened (he was convicted in 2005 and sentenced to nine years in prison and while serving his sentence was charged with and found guilty of embezzlement and money laundering.  Mr Putin later pardoned Khodorkovsky and he was released to self-imposed exile in late 2013).  Few failed to note the significance of Mr Khodorkovsky having been "meddling in politics".

Alastair Campbell (b 1957; Downing Street Director of Communications & official spokesperson (1997–2003) rear) with Vladimir Putin (b 1952; Prime-Minister of Russia 1999-2000 & 2008-2012, President of Russia 1999-2008 & since 2012, left) and Tony Blair (b 1953; UK Prime Minister 1997-2007, right).  Mr Putin in recent years has stretched plausible deniability well beyond the point at which plausibility can be said to have become implausible and the not infrequently seen: "cause of death: falling from window of high building" is known by Russians as the "oligarch elevator".  Predating even the Tsarist state, grim humor has a long tradition in Russia.     

Mr Putin being taken for a drive by George W Bush (b 1946; George XLIII, US president 2001-2009) in the Russian president's GAZ M21 Volga and admiring his 2009 Lada Niva.

In a sign the oligarchs were wise to comply, it was estimated by Bill Browder (b 1964; CEO and co-founder of the once Moscow-linked Hermitage Capital Management) during his testimony to the US Senate Judiciary Committee in 2017 that the biggest single increase in Mr Putin’s personal wealth happened immediately after Mr Khodorkovsky was jailed.  Given the history, Mr Browder is perhaps not an entirely impartial viewer but the pact between the autocrat and the oligarchy has been well-understood for years but what has always attracted speculation is the possibility that attached to it was a secret protocol whereby Mr Putin received transactional fees, imposing essentially a license to operate in Russia, alleged by some to be a cut of as much as 50%, based apparently on assessed profits rather than turnover.  Even if a half-share is too high and his cut is a more traditional 10%, the amount payable over the years would have been a very big number so there’s been much speculation about Mr Putin’s money, some estimates suggesting he may have a net wealth in the US$ billions.  That would seem truly impressive, given the Kremlin each year publishes a disclosure of their head of state’s income and assets and the last return disclosed Mr Putin enjoys an annual salary of US$140,000 and owns an 800-square-foot (74 m²) apartment, his other notable assets being three cars: a 1960 (first series) GAZ M21 Volga, a 1965 (second series) GAZ M21P Volga and a 2009 Lada Niva 4x4.  Keen on the outdoors, he also owns a camping trailer.

A country cottage on the Black Sea coast alleged to be owned by Mr Putin.  The large grounds surrounding the cottage are an indication why Mr Putin needs his 2009 Lada 4x4 & camping trailer.

On the basis of that, income and net wealth seem not at all out of alignment but intriguingly, he’s been photographed with some high-end watches on his wrist, including an A. Lange & Söhne 1815 Tourbograph which sells for around US$500,000.  He is rumored to be the owner of a 190,000 square-foot (17,650 m²) mansion which sits atop a cliff overlooking the Black Sea (reputedly Russia’s largest private residence and known, in a nod to the understated manner of the rich, as “Putin’s country cottage”) which has an ice hockey rink, a casino, a nightclub with stripper poles, an extravagantly stocked wine cellar and the finest furniture in Louis XIV style, the toilet-roll holders apparently at US$1,250 apiece (although, given the scale of the place, he may have received a bulk-purchase discount).  It demands a full-time staff of forty to maintain the estate, the annual running costs estimated at US$2-3 million.  Designed by Italian architect Lanfranco Cirillo (b 1959), and officially owned (though alleged to be held under a secret trust of which Mr Putin is the sole beneficiary) by oligarch Alexander Ponomarenko (b 1964), the construction cost was estimated to be somewhere around a US$ billion which seems expensive but a yacht currently moored in Italy and alleged also to belong to Mr Putin is said to have cost not much less to launch so either or both may actually represent good value and to assure privacy, the Russian military enforces a no-fly zone around the property.  Like many well-connected chaps around the world, a few of Mr Putin’s billions figured in the release of the Panama Papers in 2016.

1962 GAZ-M21 (rebuilt to KGB (V8) specifications).

Apart from the Black Sea palace, there are unverified reports Mr Putin is the owner of 19 other houses, 58 aircraft & helicopters and 700 cars (although it’s not clear if that number includes his two Volgas and the Lada).  No verified breakdown of the 700 cars has ever been published but given Mr Putin’s apparent fondness for Volgas, it may be his collection includes the special-variant of the GAZ-M21 Volga, 603 (as the GAZ-M23) of which were produced between 1962-1970 for the exclusive use of the KGB and other Soviet “special services”.  Equipped with the 5.53 litre (337 cubic inch) V8 engine from the big GAZ-13 Chaika (Gull) (1959-1981 and in the Soviet hierarchy, second only to the even bigger ZIL limousines (1936-2012)), the car was said to be a not entirely successful piece of engineering but it was certainly faster than the four-cylinder model on which it was based.  It’s never been clear just what was the top speed because the speedometer was calibrated only to 180 km/h (112 mph) but one intrepid KGB apparatchik claimed to have achieved that and reported the Volga was “still accelerating”.  Known to be nostalgic for the old ways of the KGB (with all that implies), it’s hoped Mr Putin has preserved at least one.

Separated at birth: 1962 GAZ-M21 V8 (left) and 1964 Pontiac GTO.

Although barely acknowledged by US collectors,  the V8 GAZ-M21 actually predated by Pontiac GTO by more than a year and it's the GTO which is usually cited as "the first muscle car" (a concept defined as "a big engine from the full-sized line installed in the smaller intermediate platform") but the KGB's project was exactly that.  In a sense, the true ancestor of the muscle cars of the 1960s was probably the 1936 Buick Century, a revised version of the model 60, created by replacing the 233 cubic inch (3.8 litre) straight eight with the 320 cubic inch (5.2 litre) unit from the longer, heavier Roadmaster.  It wasn’t exactly a transplant into an “intermediate” (a concept unknown until the 1960s) but the process was not dissimilar.  Still, if one sticks to the accepted the definition, it’s the V8 GAZ which came first and not the GTO and that the Soviet vehicle rates not even a mention in Mike Mueller’s otherwise comprehensive Muscle Car Source Book (2015, Quarto Publishing Group) is that’s publication’s only omission of note.  Mr Mueller’s book is unusual in the field in that it seems to contain not a single error, a rarity in such publications where misinformation is rife; it’s highly recommended.  If Mr Mueller ever produces a revised edition, hopefully the KGB’s unacknowledged contribution to the muscle car ecosystem will gain a footnote. 

Mr Putin agitprop.

Mr Putin has admitted: "I am the wealthiest man, not just in Europe but in the whole world: I collect emotions. I am wealthy in that the people of Russia have twice entrusted me with the leadership of a great nation such as Russia. I believe that is my greatest wealth."  Quite how rich Mr Putin might be is such a swirl of estimates, rumors, supposition and doubtlessly invention (lies) that it's unlikely anyone except those disinclined to discuss the matter really know and after all, if he's rich as his detractors claim, he probably isn't exactly sure himself.  Given that, his statement seemed intended to clear up any misunderstandings.

Pistanthrophobia

Pistanthrophobia (pronounced piss-an-thruh-foh-bee-uh)

(1) The fear of trusting one's partner in a romantic relationship.

(2) A fear of trusting people because of dreadful past experiences.

1990s: A compound word, the construct being the Ancient Greek πίστις (pístis) (trust; faith in others; belief; truth), from the primitive Indo-European béydtis (equivalent to πείθω (peíthō) (I persuade) +‎ -τις (-tis) (the suffix added to verb stems to form abstract nouns or nouns of action, result or process)) + anthro- (a  (non-standard) alternative form of anthropo- (a combining form of the Ancient Greek ἄνθρωπος (ánthrōpos) (man, human being) +‎ -phobia (fear of a specific thing; hate, dislike, or repression of a specific thing) from the New Latin, from the Classical Latin, from the Ancient Greek -φοβία (-phobía); it was used to form nouns meaning fear of a specific thing (the idea of a hatred came later)).  Pistanthrophobia is a noun; the noun plural is pistanthrophobias.

Pistanthrophobia is one of the “phobias” which owes its existence to the internet and may even have pre-dated the world-wide-web because some archived bulletin boards (there were several devoted to phobias which is something of a hint about the nature of the obsessives who stalked the boards at 2400 baud) includes entries for the word although it difficult to work out quite when first it appeared.  With the arrival of social media, self-help pages flourished and, of course, few need as much help as pistanthrophobics.  Whether, prior to the internet, there were many fewer phobias as exist today isn’t known but since the 1990s many more have been described, some obviously for jocular effect and while some seem only to state the obvious (atomosophobia said to be the “fear of atomic explosions”) pistanthrophobia surely is a helpful addition because it must be a common condition.  It’s not however a medical diagnosis and has never appeared in any edition of the American Psychiatric Association's (APA) Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), those who clinicians find to be pistanthrophobic handled with whatever is thought to be an appropriate diagnosis under the DSM’s five criteria for categorizing phobias: (1) animal type, (2) natural environment type, (3) blood-injection-injury type, (4) situational type & (5) other types.

Although originally applied to those who avoided romantic attachments because of a traumatic experience in a prior relationship, the term is also applied to those unable to trust others because of instances of rejection or betrayal.

Pistanthrophobia was first defined as the fear of being hurt by someone were one to enter into a romantic relationship and from the start the condition was thought something induced by a painful experience in a prior relationship.  The consequence of such traumas manifest as a fear of again suffering hurt and as an avoidance strategy, intimacy with others is avoided.  Like many phobias, the symptoms can vary in nature and extent but they may include (1) panic and fear, which can excessive, persistent, and wholly disproportional to the level of threat, (2) escape desires which typically manifest as a strong urge to get away from the triggering event or individual, (3) a shortness of breath (or hyper ventilation for those prone to panic attacks), (4) a racing heartbeat and (5) trembling and the onset of cold sweats.  Sufferers will change their patterns of behavior to the point of avoiding not only close contact but even casual conversations with anyone who might be a potential partner.  They will be seen to become guarded and socially withdrawn and at the very least, unresponsive to flirtation although it’s more likely they’ll become stressed and attempt to disengage from the interaction.  Flirtation is to a pisanthrophobe a threat and they become hyper-vigilant to the point where their heightened sensitivity will mean they misinterpret even benign conversations.  However, there are those who merely have no wish, for whatever reason, to enter into any romantic arrangements even when there’s been no preceding trauma and they are not pistanthrophobic.  The phobia is specific to the reactions and can exist even where there’s no history of trauma.

Vladimir Putin (b 1952; president or prime minister of Russia since 1999, centre) and Yevgeny Prigozhin (b 1961, noted multi-faceted Russian oligarch, left).

Mr Putin might find it hard again to trust others after his recent experience with Mr Prigozhin.  The president probably thinks he’s entitled to feel betrayed because Mr Prigozhin, as a billionaire oligarch and CEO of Mr Putin’s private army really was a thing of his creation and in sending a military convoy along the highway to threaten Moscow (a revolt, mutiny or insurrection depending on one’s interpretation), Mr Prigozhin was showing at least ingratitude.  Also not very trusting is likely to be Mr Prigozhin who may have little faith in the deal he agreed to: political exile in Russia’s neighboring vassal state of Belarus and an indemnity from prosecution in exchange for ending his quixotic revolt.  It’s certainly plausible he’ll avoid a Russian courtroom but his thoughts have probably turned to things such as accidents like falling from a tall building, being run over by several trucks, inadvertently ingesting poison or being exposed to a nerve agent like Novichok.  As Ernst Röhm (1887–1934; chief of the Nazi Sturmabteilung (the stormtroopers (the SA)) discovered in 1934, there can be consequences even for the things one hasn’t done but people think one might and as Mr Prigozhin probably impressed on Wagner’s troops more than once: “For everything you do there’s a price to be paid.”

Plausible

Plausible (pronounced plaw-zuh-buhl)

(1) Having an appearance of truth or reason; seemingly worthy of approval or acceptance; credible; believable; possibly or probably true.

(2) Well-spoken and apparently, but often deceptively, worthy of confidence or trust.  Obtaining approbation; specifically pleasing; apparently right; specious.

(3) Worthy of being applauded; praiseworthy; commendable; ready (obsolete).

1535–1545: From the Middle English, from the Latin plausibilis (deserving applause, praiseworthy, acceptable, pleasing), the construct being plausus (past participle of plaudere (to applaud)) + ibilis (ible) (the Latin adjectival suffix (now usually in a passive sense) which creates meanings "able to be, relevant or suitable to, in accordance with" or expressing capacity or worthiness in a passive sense). The meaning "having the appearance of truth" is noted from the 1560s.  The plausible has become nuanced (the comparative more plausible, the superlative most plausible) but synonyms (of the historic meaning) include credible, probable, persuasive, possible, logical, valid, conceivable, tenable, creditable, likely, presumable, sound & supposable.  Plausible is an adjective, plausibly is an adverb, plausibility is a noun; the noun plural is plausibilities (although the antonym implausibilities is probably the more often heard form.

Cynicism is nothing new and in English the meaning "having a specious or superficial appearance of trustworthiness" had been appended as early as the 1560s.  The noun has been documented since the 1590s in the sense of "quality of being worthy of praise or acceptance" although it too was soon co-opted and by at least the 1640s was also used to suggest "a specious or superficial appearance of being right or worthy of acceptance".  The adjective implausible (not having an appearance of truth or credibility) dates from the 1670s although as late as earlier in the century it was still being used in its original sense of "not worthy of applause".  There's a prejudice that "implausible" and related forms are used more often than "plausible" and its relations nut it may simply we we notice the former more and "plausible deniability" is really just a loaded way of saying "implausible".

Plausible Deniability

Plausible deniability is a construct of language to be used in situations where it’s possible to tell lies because it’s not possible for others to prove the truth.  In common law jurisdictions, it exists also as a legal concept given the evidential onus of proof falls (usually) not upon the defendant so if the opponent cannot offer evidence to support an allegation, variously beyond reasonable doubt or on the balance of probabilities, accusations can plausibly be denied regardless of the truth.  Most associated with politicians or public officials but practiced also by those in corporate chains of command, it’s used usually to deny knowledge of or responsibility for anything unlawful, immoral or in some way disreputable.  Depending on the circumstances, it can protect institutions from damage or, more typically, shift blame (and consequences) from someone senior to others lower in the hierarchy.  While the art & science of plausible deniability doubtlessly has been practiced since the origins of humanity, the phrase was coined within the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), apparently as early as the 1950s although it seems not to have appeared in any printed source available to the public until 1964 and became part of general use only during the Watergate crisis (1973-1974).  Some sources credit Allen Dulles (1893–1969; Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) 1953-1961) himself with the first public use but, like his brother (John Foster Dulles (1888–1959; US Secretary of State 1953-1959)), he's blamed for much.

Lindsay Lohan and her lawyer in court, Los Angeles, December 2011.

Within the CIA, it described the withholding of information from senior officials in order to protect them from repercussions in the event that illegal or unpopular activities became public knowledge.  This was a time when the CIA was lawfully permitted to assassinate people, especially uncooperative politicians in troublesome countries.  It's obviously a murky business but the consensus seems to be the CIA still kills people but never uses the word assassination and, dating from an executive order issued by Gerald Ford (1913–2006; US president 1974-1977), the agency is no longer allowed to kill heads of state.  This prohibition was presumably a kind of "professional courtesy" on the part of President Ford and one which he must have hoped would be reciprocated.  It's not difficult to guess which countries definitely have at least one executioner silently on the payroll and which almost certainly don't but most are in that grey area of uncertainty.

Alastair Campbell (b 1957; Downing Street Director of Communications & official spokesperson (1997–2003) rear) with Vladimir Putin (b 1952; Prime-Minister of Russia 1999-2000 & 2008-2012, President of Russia 1999-2008 & since 2012, left) and Tony Blair (b 1953; UK Prime Minister 1997-2007, right).  Mr Putin in recent years has stretched plausible deniability well beyond the point at which plausibility can be said to have become implausible and the not infrequently seen: "cause of death: falling from window of high building" is known by Russians as the "oligarch elevator".  Predating even the Tsarist state, grim humor has a long tradition in Russia.    

One fine practitioner of the art was one-time tabloid journalist Alastair Campbell, spokesman for the New Labour government during most of Tony Blair’s premiership.  Campbell added a post-modern twist in that he dealt mostly with journalists who knew when he was lying and they knew that he knew they knew.  Things evolved to the point where Campbell came to believe this was proof of his cleverness and some suspected he began to lie, even when the truth would have been harmless, just to show-off his cynical contempt for just about everyone else.  It worked for a while and certainly suited the New Labour zeitgeist but later, when employed as press officer for the British & Irish Lions on their 2005 tour of New Zealand, his effectiveness was limited because even when telling the truth, which, in fairness, he often did, the baggage of his past made everything sound like spin and lies.  The Lions lost the test series 3-0, the first time in 22 years they lost every test match on tour but nobody suggested Campbell was in anyway responsible for the on-field performance.  Still, plausibility deniability remains an essential skill in modern media management.  An example would be:

(1) You run a government in some country about which, for a variety of reasons, Western governments tend not to make tiresome complaints.  Here, you can do just about anything you wish.

(2) One of your people has run away to another country and is being really annoying.  You arrange to have him invited home for discussions over a cup of coffee.

(3) They crew sent to issue the invitation botch the job, murdering him in a quite gruesome manner (ie the method not far removed from how they dispatch them on home soil).

(4) You deny it was an execution, suggesting death happened when an argument about football or something became heated.  (Plausible denial #1).

(5) Didn’t work.  You now deny ordering any connection with the operation, saying it was an unauthorized rogue team.  (Plausible denial #2).

(6) The other country lists nineteen suspects involved in the murder and demands extradition for trial.

(7) You work out which of the suspects is most expendable and it's announced he had died in "an accident" (that and "natural causes" often a grey area you've noticed).  You hope the sacrifice will satisfy honor on both sides.  (Plausible denial #3).

(8) Problem isn’t going away, even though kind folks in many countries are helping you try to make it go away.  You have the remaining eighteen suspects arrested and locked-up somewhere reasonably pleasant and most secret.

(9) Other country is still being tiresome, maintaining people who kill others should be tried for murder in country where crime was committed.  You understand the legal point but still can't see what all the fuss is about.

(10) You arrange it to be announced the eighteen suspects are dead, all SWATE (shot while attempting to escape).  (Plausible denial #4).  The system works.