Tu quoque

Tu quoque (pronounce to-koh-cue-e)

(1) In philosophy, an appeal to hypocrisy is an informal logical fallacy that intends to discredit the validity of the opponent's logical argument by asserting the opponent's failure to act consistently in accordance with its conclusion.

(2) In international law, a justification of action based on an assertion that the act with which the accused is charged was also committed by the accusing parties.

From the Latin Tū quoque (translated literally as "thou also" and latterly as "you also"; the translation in the vernacular is something like "you did it too", thus the legal slang "youtooism" & "whataboutism". 

An example of the tu quoque fallacy in philosophy

In formal logic, tu quoque is a type of ad hominem argument in which an accused person turns an allegation back on the accuser, thus creating a logical fallacy.  It happens when for example when one charges another with hypocrisy or inconsistency in order to avoid the substantive matter.

Mother: You should stop smoking; it's bad for your health.

Daughter: Why should I listen to you? You started smoking at fourteen.

Lindsay Lohan and her lawyer in court, Los Angeles, December 2011.

The daughter's tu quoque fallacy lies in dismissing or avoiding the argument because she believes her mother is being hypocritical or at least inconsistent.  While both may be true, that has nothing to do with and does not invalidate her argument.  While not quite the same thing, in 2012 Lindsay Lohan tweeted a hint she had some sympathy with the tu quoque defence gambit: "Why did I get put in jail and a nickelodeon star has had NO punishment(s) so far?". 

International Military Tribunal Trial  (IMT) Trial #1, Nuremberg, 1945-1946

At law, the classic tu quoque defense is an attempt by an accused to deny the legitimacy of a charge by alleging those mounting the prosecution committed exactly the same offence and thus stand equally guilty.  An interesting variation was raised by German Grand Admiral Karl Dönitz (1891-1980), appointed head of state in Hitler's will but on trial for his role as head of the Kriegsmarine (the German Navy) between 1943-1945.  Dönitz argued he should be acquitted because the navies of other (victorious) nations had conducted their operations using exactly the same tactics with which he was charged as war crimes but what was novel was the argument that the conduct in dispute (essentially, unrestricted submarine warfare) was, as practiced by both sides, entirely lawful and within the rules of war at sea.  A great many British & US sea captains and admirals agreed (“admirals are a trade union” Anthony Eden (1897-1977; UK prime-minister 1955-1957) would later remark in another context), some of whom provided affidavits for the defense in which they provided the details of they way they had their submarine forces conduct exactly the same operations which were the basis of the charges against Dönitz.

Defendants in the dock. IMT Trial #1, Nuremberg, 1945-1946.  All were guilty of something but three were acquitted by the IMT and later tried by German courts.  Dönitz (wearing dark glasses) is sitting in the back row (left of the photograph). 

The tribunal's aversion to a classical tu quoque being even admitted for discussion was not mere legal pedantry.  Hinted at by the prosecution declining to indict the German air force for their wartime conduct, despite pursuing the army, navy, and many other institutions of state, there was no hunger to offer defense counsel the chance to cite, inter alia, the carpet bombing (then often referred to as "area bombing") of Berlin, Hamburg, Dresden and other German cities (and of course the matter of Tokyo or the later use of atomic bombs).  For the same reason, the Kremlin had no wish to have discussed the secret protocol to the 1939 Nazi-Soviet Pact which had divided the spoils of Poland between Germany and the USSR although, because it had become known to the defense lawyers (who managed to sneak-in a mention) the curious situation came to prevail that the protocol, while not formerly admitted as a document, could be referred to but not in detail.  So, in the narrow technical sense, whether specific acts were justified in law depended (at least for the purposes of the trial) on whether or not they were part of the indictment, a position described by one twenty-first century author as “…hypocrisy permitted by Realpolitik” since the novel and vital ideas behind the creation of Nuremberg trial would have been jeopardized had the IMT cast doubt on the legitimacy of the victors’ actions, strategic or tactical.  That has been criticized but mostly by legal theorists who state, correctly “…there is no moral or legal basis for immunizing victorious nations from scrutiny… [and]… the laws of war are not a one-way street”.  In the abstract they are of course correct but the circumstances and timing of the Nuremburg trial were, and remain, unique and the matters for judgment so grotesquely horrid that it will always be a special case.

Dönitz’s defense appeared to impress the judges (though obviously not the two Russians who were under instruction from comrade Stalin (1878-1953; Soviet leader 1924-1953) to vote to have every defendant hanged).  Although convicted on counts two (crimes against peace) and three (war crimes), he received only a ten-year sentence, the shortest term of the seven imposed on those not hanged or acquitted.  Perhaps tellingly, one has to read the summary of the verdicts to work out against which of the indictment's four counts he had been convicted; it really isn't possible to work it out from the judgment and it wasn't until later it emerged that had been written by a judge who had voted for his acquittal.

Laconic

Laconic (pronounced luh-kon-ik)

(1) Using few words; expressing much in few words.

(2) A reply or phrase of this character.

1580–1590: From the Latin Lacōnicus (Spartan) from the Ancient Greek Λακωνικός (Lakōnikós) (Laconian) from Lakōn (a Laconian).  Laconia was the region inhabited and ruled by the Spartans, noted for their economical use of language.  The alternative spelling laconick is long obsolete.  Because of the long history, there's no exact synonym but words in a similar vein include terse, brusque, pithy, brief, compact, compendious, concise, crisp, curt, sententious, short and sweet, succinct, breviloquent & brevity.  Laconic & laconical are adjectives, laconism is a noun and laconically is an adverb; the noun plural is laconisms.

Taking Hemlock with Socrates, gracefully

In Antiquity, Laconia was the region inhabited and ruled by the Spartans, known for their brevity in speech and in English, the meaning "concise, abrupt" emerged in the 1580s (although laconical was created and went extinct a decade earlier).  The origin of this sense was when Philip II of Macedon (382–336 BC; king (basileus) of Macedonia 359-336) threatened the Spartans with the words: "If I enter Laconia, I will raze Sparta to the ground." to which the Spartans' replied: "If."  Although allied when faced with the threat of Persian invasion, Athens and Sparta had a long tradition of enmity, realized most famously in the Peloponnesian War (431–404 BC).  Their differences were cultural as well as political for while the Spartans were known for their dry, understated wit (which we now call "laconic humor"), the Athenians more readily displayed their "Attic wit" (the Attic peninsula the region encompassing the city of Athens), something refined, poignant and delicate, though often not brief.

Death of Socrates (1787), oil on canvas by Jacques-Louis David (1748–1825), Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York.

In Ancient Greece, it was in Athens that art, education and literature was most valued, virtues never forgotten by modern historians, many of whom contrast the earthier Spartans unfavorably although, at the time, perhaps not all Athenians shared the view.  Socrates (circa 470–399 BC), in Plato's (circa 427-348 BC) dialogue Protagoras, detected some cleverness in the Spartans' economy of language which hid their wisdom, revealing sometimes with a brief remark a sophistication of thought and understanding.  Scholars tend however to take this with a grain of Attic salt, noting Socrates’ fondness for a little gentle irony.

Lindsay Lohan and her lawyer in court, Los Angeles, December 2011.

The Laconia Order

The Laconia-Befehl (Laconia Order) was one of the more controversial documents submitted by the prosecution to the International Military Tribunal (IMT) which in 1945-1946 presided over the trial of the leading Nazis.  The order was issued in 1942 by Grand Admiral Karl Dönitz (1891–1980; head of the German Navy 1943-1945, German head of state 1945) which he was commanding officer of the Kriegsmarine's (the German Navy) Befehlshaber der Unterseeboote (BdU) (U-boat or submarine) fleet and was pursuant to what became known as the Laconia Incident.  RMS Laconia was a Cunard ocean liner which the British Admiralty had converted to an armed merchant cruiser, making her a legitimate military target.  On 12 September 1942, she was sunk in a U-Boat attack and in the aftermath, while several U-Boats were rescuing survivors with the intention of transferring them to other vessels, they were attacked by US bombers, despite having informed Allied forces by radio that both the Allied soldiers and women and children had been rescued and were sheltering on the decks of the submarines.

In response, the Germans abandoned the rescue operation and cast the survivors adrift.  The new policy was formalized on 17 September when the Laconia Order was signalled to the fleet, dictating, inter alia, henceforth no rescue attempts of survivors were to be attempted unless it was to secure prisoners of military value (captains or ships' engineers) and then only if there was no risk to the U-Boat.  The British prosecution team introduced the order as evidence of a war crime ordered by Dönitz which effectively amounted to ordering the murder of shipwrecked survivors and treated it as the beginning of "unrestricted submarine warfare".  However, the British seem genuinely to have been unaware of the circumstances which led to the issuing of the order and the Americans certainly didn't wish to discuss the conduct of their air-crews, some of whom had been awarded medals for the attack, even though their claim to have sunk the U-Boat were erroneous (though understandable, a crash dive and a sinking visually similar when viewed from the air.  The IMT noted the ambiguity in the order but in the circumstances granted Dönitz the benefit of the doubt and they were further swayed by the affidavit of Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz (1885–1966) who commanded US forces in the Pacific.  Nimitz's submission, supported by others was that the US had conducted unrestricted submarine warfare from the point of the nation's entry into the conflict in December 1941 and that such a policy was wholly lawful under the rules of war at sea.

Defendants in the dock at Nuremberg, Dönitz (in sun glasses), sitting in the back row.

Thus the partial success of Dönitz's sophisticated variation of a tu quoque defense, an attempt by an accused to deny the legitimacy of a charge by alleging those mounting the prosecution committed exactly the same offence and thus stand equally guilty.  The IMT had explicitly banned the use of tu quoque but allowed the argument in this one case because it hung on the notion that unrestricted submarine warfare was, as practiced by both sides, entirely lawful and within the rules of war at sea.  A great many British & US sea captains and admirals agreed (“admirals are a trade union” Anthony Eden (1897-1977; UK prime-minister 1955-1957) would later remark in another context).  The judges must have been impressed but the eventual judgement was certainly murky.  Although convicted on counts two (crimes against peace) and three (war crimes), he received only a ten-year sentence, the shortest term of the seven imposed on those not hanged or acquitted.  Perhaps tellingly, one has to read the summary of the verdicts to work out against which of the indictment's four counts he had been convicted; it really isn't possible to work it out from the judgment and it wasn't until later it emerged it had been written by one of the judges who had voted for his acquittal.

Tango

Tango (pronounced tang-goh)

(1) A syncopated ballroom dance of Latin-American origin, danced in duple time by couples, having many varied steps, figures, and poses and characterized by long gliding steps with sudden pauses

(2) A piece of music composed for or in the rhythm of this dance

(3) A word used in communications to represent the letter "T", most famously in the NATO phonetic alphabet.

(4) In military and paramilitary slang, a code for the enemy, derived from the abbreviation of target using the NATO phonetic alphabet.

(5) A dark orange color shade; deep tangerine.

1913: From the Argentine Spanish tango, originally the name of an African-South American drum dance and most likely of Niger-Congo origin and usually thought derived from the Ibibio tamgu (to dance).  The phrase “it takes two to tango” was from a 1952 popular song; tango first used as a verb in 1952.  Tango & tangoist are nouns, the verbs (used without object) are tangoed & tangoing, the noun plural being tangos.  A 1913 University of Michigan publication noted tango was pronounced either tahn-go or tan-go “depending on your social status”.

Lindsay Lohan in white Kritik sweatsuit, practicing tango moves with instructor, Pacific Palisades, 2007.  It was preparation for her role in Alfonso Arau's Dare to Love Me (2008).

Because of the paucity of documentary evidence, etymologists have long argued over the origin of tango.  Some scholars credit African culture, suggesting the word evolved from the Yoruba shangó which refers to the Nigerian God of Thunder.  This theory holds shangó was morphed through the dilution of the Nigerian language once it reached South America via slave trade.  An alternative theory is that tango is derived from the Spanish tambor (drum) which subsequently was mispronounced by inhabitants of the more impoverished areas of Buenos Aires to become first tambo then ultimately tango.  Less supported is a Portuguese connection, the theory that tango is derived from the Portuguese tanger (to play a musical instrument), a variation of which is the Portuguese tangomão, a combination of the verb tanger (to touch) and the noun mão (hand), resulting in the meaning "to play a musical instrument with one's hands.”  Despite these speculations, most prefer the Niger-Congo origin story.

It takes two.

The phrase "it takes two to tango" is used often by lawyers, moral theologians (amateur and professional), politicians and diplomats.  It applied usually as a way either of spreading blame for something or (often inaccurately) as shorthand for variations of a Tu quoque (you did it too (literally "and you also")) defense.

President Mobutu in Mercedes-Benz 600 Landaulet.

That it takes two to tango was a point made more than once by President Mobutu Sese Seko (Mobutu Sese Seko Kuku Ngbendu Wa Za Bangaa, born Joseph-Désiré Mobutu, 1930-1997; President of Zaire 1965-1997) when responding to accusations of bribe taking and corruption by African dictators in general and him in particular.  He had a point, up to a point.

Apostolic

Apostolic (pronounced ap-uh-stol-ik)

(1) Of or characteristic of an apostle.

(2) Pertaining to or characteristic of the twelve apostles.

(3) Derived from the apostles in regular succession as bishops.

(4) Of or relating to the pope as being chief successor of the apostles.

1540–1550: From the French apostolique (pertaining to, related to, or descended from the apostles), from the Church Latin apostolicus (apostolic), from the Ancient Greek ἀποστολικός (apostolikós) (apostolic), from apostolos.  The derived form apostolical emerged also in the fifteenth century.  The construct in the Church Latin apostolicus was apóstol(os) + -ic.  The suffix -ic is from the Middle English -ik, from the Old French -ique, from the Latin -icus, from the primitive Indo-European -kos & -ḱos, formed with the i-stem suffix -i- and the adjectival suffix -kos & -ḱos.  The form existed also in the Ancient Greek as -ικός (-ikós), in Sanskrit as -इक (-ika) and the Old Church Slavonic as -ъкъ (-ŭkŭ); A doublet of -y.  In European languages, adding -kos to noun stems carried the meaning "characteristic of, like, typical, pertaining to" while on adjectival stems it acted emphatically; in English it's always been used to form adjectives from nouns with the meaning “of or pertaining to”.  A precise technical use exists in physical chemistry where it's used to denote certain chemical compounds in which a specified chemical element has a higher oxidation number than in the equivalent compound whose name ends in the suffix -ous; (eg sulphuric acid (H₂SO₄) has more oxygen atoms per molecule than sulphurous acid (H₂SO₃).

Apostolic succession

Apostolic succession is the term describing the method through which the ministry of the Roman Catholic Church is held to derive its unique validity by virtue of an unbroken chain of succession from the twelve apostles (or disciples) of Christ.  The mechanics of this are that every bishop is ordained by a previously ordained bishop and that linkage reaches back two millennia to the apostles.  The purity of apostolic succession is an important part of the mystique of the Roman Catholic Church and the Vatican maintains the linkage is exclusive to them, the schism of 1534, in which Henry VIII (1491–1547; King of England 1509-1547) separated the English Church from Rome, sundering also the apostolic succession.  Fearing some doubts might exist, Pope Leo XIII (1810–1903; pope 1878-1903) in 1896 delivered Apostolicae Curae, stating all the Church of England’s ordinations were "…absolutely null and utterly void…".

In terms of canon law, it’s not hard to see the pontiff’s point but the English archbishops soon issued their retaliatory Saepius officio, a highly technical piece, offering a kind of elaborate Tu quoque defense which did little except answer questions nobody had asked.  Almost a century later, the Anglicans offered another, admittedly more convincing but still legalistic, argument based on Anglican consecrations since the 1930s being co-performed by bishops recognized by Rome, so, given the effluxion of time, all Anglican bishops were now also in the old Catholic succession; Apostolicae curae, while not invalid, had been rendered obsolete by events, most obviously the bishops in dispute having by then dropped dead.

The view probably never had any chance of being accepted by the Holy See but the Anglicans’ ordination of women and embrace of gay clergy ended all discussion.  In 1998, Cardinal Ratzinger (1927–2022; pope 2005-2013, pope emeritus 2013-2022), head of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (the old Holy Office or Inquisition) issued a statement confirming Leo XIII’s view, adding ominously that anyone who denies such truths "... would be in a position of rejecting a truth of Catholic doctrine and would therefore no longer be in full communion with the Catholic Church".  There the matter has since rested.

Cardinal George Pell (1941-2023) places hands on the head of newly ordained bishop Peter Bryan Wells (b 1963; apostolic nuncio to South Africa and Botswana, apostolic nuncio to Lesotho and Namibiaand & titular Archbishop of Marcianopolis since 2016) of the United States.  St Peter's Basilica, the Vatican, 19 March 2016.

Cardinal Pell’s appointment as a bishop was in an unbroken chain of apostolic succession from the twelve apostles of Jesus; by touch, he’s able to add links to the chain.  Within the Roman Curia (a place of Masonic-like plotting & intrigue and much low skulduggery), Cardinal Pell's nickname was “Pell Pot”, an allusion to Pol Pot (1925–1998, dictator of communist Cambodia 1976-1979) who announced the start of his regime was “Year Zero” and all existing culture and tradition must completely be destroyed and replaced.

Succedaneum

Succedaneum (pronounced suhk-si-dey-nee-uhm)

(1) Something used as a substitute, especially any medical drug or agent that may be taken or prescribed in place of another (obsolete).

(2) One who takes the place of another.

1635–1645: From the New Latin succēdāneum, a noun use of the neuter singular of the Classical Latin succēdāneus (succeeding, following after; acting as substitute), the construct being suc(cēdō) (succeed, follow) +‎ -āneus (the composite adjectival suffix).  The notion of a succedaneum exists in many contexts and there are descriptions which are exactly synonymous and some which are merely similar or functionally overlap to some extent surrogate, backup, understudy, replacement, stand-in, locum, alternate, deputy, expediency, proxy, stopgap, body-double, sub, makeshift, fill-in, delegate, temporary, assistant, nominee, replica, successor and substitute.  Succedaneum is a noun and succedaneous is an adjective, the noun plural is succedanea.

Lindsay Lohan body-doubles: The Parent Trap (1998) (left) and Irish Wish (2023 (right).

The understudy is a term from the performing arts (theatre, ballet, opera etc) and describes someone who rehearses a part and is available to perform if the designated character becomes unavailable (illness, injury, tantrum, death etc).  In some cases an understudy may become a replacement if a temporary substitution becomes permanent.  A backup is essentially the same concept as an understudy but is used more generally.  Locum was a seventeenth century adoption of the Medieval Latin locum tenens (literally “one holding a place”) and has evolved as a class-based description of “a temporary replacement”, being by convention restricted to the professions (doctors, dentists, lawyers, vets etc (and for historic reasons the clergy)) whereas a replacement plumber is simply a replacement.  A body-double is used in film & television production to take the place of an actor for a variety of reasons (dangerous stunt work, scheduling conflicts, nudity scenes etc).  Alternates are usually those appointed to some sort of deliberative body, typically a judge appointed to some sort of enquiry or tribunal expected to last a long time, the idea being that in the case the primary judge becomes unavailable (illness, injury, tantrum, death etc), the matter may proceed without interruption.  In this context a nominee is someone nominated to fulfill some role which is for whatever reason (ex-officio, inheritance etc) in the gift of the nominator.  A proxy is particular example of a nominee who is authorized to exercise some right (usually a vote or votes) on behalf of the nominator.  A stopgap or makeshift is a description of something or someone temporarily substituted until a permanent arrangement is made. A delegate is an appointment made to exercise authority held by another but also carries the special value in that the extent of the delegation can be split.  In granting authority to a delegate, the delegated authority can be restricted to a single instance with all other matters reserved for the delegator.  In many cases a deputy or assistant will be able to exercise all or some of the authority held by the higher office but there are no set rules and things will vary from place to place.  As successor is simply a replacement and such situations the word substitute usually isn’t applied.

The issue of the appropriateness of the notion of succedaneum in legal proceedings was explored in the hearings of the International Military Tribunal (IMT) during the first trial of the leading Nazis at Nuremberg (1945-1946).  The first matter considered was whether others could be substituted if a preferred defendant wasn’t available for trial (ie they were dead or missing).  Because of the teleological nature of the trial insisted on by the Americans (who were providing the bulk of the resources and paying most of the bills) which was best served by a thematic approach to the choice of defendants, at least one representative of each defined area of interest was needed.  In the case of the army and navy that was simple because senior officers were to hand and the matter of the air force was fudged by indicting Hermann Göring (1893–1946; leading Nazi 1922-1945 and Reichsmarschall 1940-1945) although his role as notional head of the Luftwaffe’s and indeed its role in the war received very little attention during the trial; given the Allies carpet bombing campaign had laid waste to German cities which indisputably were treated as civilian targets, it wasn’t something on which the prosecution wished to dwell although the opening address did include the admission the Germans not alone in reducing European cities to rubble and that “… the ruin that lies from the Rhine to the Danube shows that we have not been dull pupils”.  Despite that prosecutorial gesture however, it was make clear to counsel the defense of tu quoque (best translated as “you did it too” (literally “and you also”)) would not be permitted.

The defendants in the dock listening to Kaltenbrunner’s cross-examination, Nuremberg, 1946.

Dead or missing however were three of the most notorious figures from the security apparatus: Heinrich ("Gestapo") Müller (1900-1945 (presumed); head of the Gestapo 1939-1945), Reinhard Heydrich (1904–1942; head of the Reich Security Main Office 1939-1942) and Heinrich Himmler (1900–1945; Reichsführer SS 1929-1945).  However it was unthinkable a trial of the Nazis could be conducted without the Gestapo and the SS being represented so Ernst Kaltenbrunner (1903–1946; head of the Reich Security Main Office 1943-1945) was substituted and it proved a wise choice because of all the defendants, he was the one with absolutely no defense, his guilt established beyond any doubt by the wealth of documents signed in his own hand (his cross-examination a remarkably brief 2½ days).  He was a trained lawyer and simply denied everything although given the evidence his protests didn’t convince even the others in the dock.  He also wasn’t happy about the use of succedaneum, saying more than once he was not prepared “…to be an ersatz for Himmler” although that did him no good and he was condemned to hang.

Dead too was Dr Joseph Goebbels (1897-1945; Nazi propaganda minister 1933-1945) but the trial was not simply about the armed conflict which was fought between 1939-1945; the Americans in particular wanted the trial to be a platform to explore the role of propaganda in totalitarian societies and the way it was exploited by the Nazis in the 1930s.  Goebbels however had been a dominant figure in propaganda and the only official from the ministry of any status who could be found was Hans Fritzsche (1900–1953) who while not exactly “the newsreader” some claimed, was not someone ever concerned with matters of high-policy and he was available for the trial only because, in the haphazard ways things happened at the end of the war, he’d fallen into the hands of the Russians.  Certainly, his voice was well-known to Germans but nobody on the British or US prosecution teams had heard of him and, perhaps more tellingly, neither had some of his fellow defendants.  Despite this unpromising background however, a case was prepared but compared with the mass-murderers and plunderers which whom he shared the dock, the tribunal wasn’t convinced he could be convicted of war crimes or crimes against humanity and ordered his acquittal.  Unlike the substituted Kaltenbrunner who was guilty as sin of horrific crimes, Fritzsche seemed little more than a clerk, guilty of something but not war crimes.  Arrested shortly afterwards by the German authorities, he was convicted as a “major offender” by a denazification court and sentenced to nine years imprisonment.  In the early Cold War however, attitudes were shifting and like many others, he was soon released.

Courtroom during the Krupp trial, Nuremberg, 1947.

By far the most troubling act of (attempted) succedaneum was that of Alfried Krupp (1907–1967).  Krupp was an industrialist and had been head of the Krupp concern (steel works and related production) which was a major supplier of weapons and other materiel to the Nazi war machine, much of it produced using slave labor under appalling conditions.  It was important to ensure a representative of industry be included in the trial and no operation was more dominant in the Nazi economy than Krupps.  In one of those curious mistakes which just can’t be fixed, although it had been intended to indict Alfried Krupp, at some point in the process, a filing error or something happened and instead his father Gustav Krupp (1870–1950) was listed.  The father had actually been “retired” to the titular position of Chairman because of physical and mental incapacity and the error wasn’t noticed until it was too late and the indictment had been issued.  Were it in any other context, an apology could have been made and the paperwork amended but “substitution” in criminal law is a special case and no civilized legal system permits it.  The court had already been made aware that the elder Krupp was physically and mentally not fit to attend a trial which prompted the suggestion he might be tried in absentia but this the tribunal declined.  The prosecution’s alternative plan was therefore to “add” the name of the son to the indictment but this appalled the tribunal even more because it was so obviously as substitution.  By now it was too late to run the argument that the “addition” was simply to correct the earlier filing error and the trial proceeded without either Krupp.

At things turned out, the mistake merely delayed things.  At the time, it wasn’t certain there would be subsequent trials but the success of the main trial encouraged the prosecutors and twelve hearings (referred to usually as the "Subsequent Nuremberg Trials") were conducted including three concerned with the crimes committed in the course of industrial production (Krupp, Flick & IG Farben).  After the trial (1947-1948), Alfried Krupp received a twelve year sentence and the forfeiture of property although he served only a few years before the sentence was commuted.

Unrestricted

Unrestricted (pronounced uhn-ri-strik-tid)

(1) Not restricted or confined.

(2) In the classification of documents, having no security classification.

1766: The construct was un-+ restrict + -ed.  The un- prefix was from the Middle English un-, from the Old English un-, from the Proto-West Germanic un-, from the Proto-Germanic un-, from the primitive Indo-European n̥-.  It was cognate with the Scots un- & on-, the North Frisian ün-, the Saterland Frisian uun-, the West Frisian ûn- &  on-, the Dutch on-, the Low German un- & on-, the German un-, the Danish u-, the Swedish o-, the Norwegian u- and the Icelandic ó-.  It was (distantly) related to the Latin in- and the Ancient Greek ἀ- (a-), source of the English a-, the Modern Greek α- (a-) and the Sanskrit अ- (a-).  The verb restrict was in use by at least the 1530s in the sense of “to limit, bound, confine (someone or something), prevent from passing a certain limit in any kind of action” and was from the Latin restrictus, past participle of restringere (bind fast, restrain) and perfect passive participle of restringō (draw back tightly; restrain, restrict), the construct being re- (back, again) + stringō (press, tighten, compress); as an adjective, it was a doublet of ristretto. By the eighteenth century, the word had come to be regarded as a Scotticism but the infection spread quickly to Standard English.  As the past-participle adjective from restrict (in the sense of “limited, confined”), restricted has become associated with the classification of government documents, in the sense of “not for public release”, use seems not to have been routine until 1944 when a system of classification was codified by the US government.  Prior to that, although restrictions of distribution were common, concepts such as “Restricted to [names or designations]”, “Secret”, “Top Secret” etc were used but there was no standardization within departments or even between branches of the military.  When used as a suffix to form possessional adjectives from nouns, -ed was from the Middle English -ed, from the Old English -od (the adjectival suffix), from the Proto-Germanic -ōdaz, from the primitive Indo-European -ehtos.  It was cognate with the Latin -ātus. 

Glory road: A “Derestricted” sign in Australia's Northern Territory from the days of “no speed limits”.

In use, the older adjectival use was simply “restrict” and although “unrestricted” would seem an absolute (ie something either is restricted or it is not), dictionaries confirm the comparative is “more unrestricted” and the superlative “most unrestricted” although at least one style guide notes those forms can be regarded in a similar way as “very unique” (ie technically incorrect but widely used and well-understood.  The related adverb “restrictedly” was and remains rare.  In the US, well into the twentieth century, the appearance of the word “restricted” in advertisements, signage and such was verbal shorthand for (depending on context and location): “No Jews”, “No coloreds” etc.  Although the words “unrestricted” & “derestricted” describe similar states, different histories are implied and that’s a product of the ways in which the absence of restrictions came about.  Unrestricted means literally “no restrictions” (access to something or somewhere; rights to engage in trade etc).  “Derestricted” means that previously restrictions must have been imposed but those have since been removed.  The use applies to document classifications and in the now rare cases of roads with no speed limits (although some of those were something of a linguistic outlier because in many cases they never had any restrictions to be derestricted.  For obvious reasons, in English, “unrestricted” is the more commonly used form.  Unrestricted, unrestrictive & unrestrictable are adjectives, unrestrictedness is a noun and unrestrictedly is an adverb.

1978 Mercedes-Benz 450 SEL 6.9 on the Northern Territory's derestricted roads.  

Although the factory only ever claimed 225 km/h (140 mph), top speed of a UK-delivered “Euro spec” 6.9 (ie one not fitted with the power-sapping anti-emission devices fitted to those built for sale in the US or Australia) turned out to be a verified 237 km/h (147 mph) which reflected the experience of European testers who achieved 238 km/h (148 mph) on the German Autobahns.  Unexceptional now, such pace was in the 1970s a reasonable achievement for a heavy cruiser with pre-modern aerodynamics; at high-speed, the fuel consumption was as awe inspiring as one might expect from a 6.8 litre (417 cubic inch) V8 at full throttle.  The most powerful of the W116 range (1972-1980), technically the 6.9 was a V116 (the "V" denoting the 100 mm (4 inch) longer wheelbase) and was the spiritual successor to the old (W109) 300 SEL 6.3 (1967-1972) which adopted the classic muscle car formula for the 1964 Pontiac GTO by taking the 6.3 litre (386 cubic inch) V8 (M100) from the huge 600s (W100, 1963-1981) and putting it in a mid-sized car previously powered by nothing larger than a 3.0 litre (183 cubic inch) straight-six.  The distinct "hot rod" flavor of the 6.3 made it a more entertaining drive than the 6.9 but the latter was a vastly improved machine and the template on which the factory would build decades of success.  One quirk of the 6.9 was the use of a dry sump; with the lower hood (bonnet) line of the W/V116, the V8 was simply too tall to fit if conventionally lubricated.   

Idealistic lawyers (they do exist) and others have for centuries argued it is the existence of and adherence to laws which makes possible civilized societies, the alternative often expressed as “the law of the jungle”, best understood in the vernacular “kill or be killed” world in which life of man was “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short”, memorably described in Leviathan (1651) by the very clever and deliciously wicked English philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679).  However, what the lawyers, at least privately, acknowledge is the extent of adherence to laws closely is tied to (1) their enforcement and (2) a layered system of punishments for transgressions.  In domestic legal systems, this is comprehended as the apparatus extending from receiving a fine for overstaying one’s time at a parking meter to being hanged for murder; the existence of laws does not prevent crime but the perception of the chance of detection and the subsequent penalty for many operates as a deterrent and the debates about relationship between certain penalties and their deterrent effect continue.

Mahan's The Influence of Sea Power upon History 1660-1783.  In the last decade of the nineteenth century, probably no book was more read in palaces, chancelleries & admiralties.

In war, although usually the opposing sides have geo-political objectives, for those doing the fighting, historically the business was about killing each other and in practice that of course quickly and understandably came to imply “by whatever means possible” but for many centuries there have been conventions which form of “rules of war”, the most celebrated the various chivalric codes (codified during of the Middle Ages) which sought to regulate the behaviour of soldiers, particularly towards civilians.  However, as US Navy Captain Alfred Mahan (1840–1914) pointed out in the epoch-making The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783 (1890), it’s impossible by mere agreement to outlaw the use of a militarily effective weapon so is it any more plausible for a statute, treaty or agreement to limit “mission creep” in the methods?  Whatever knightly codes may have existed, there seems little doubt that on the battlefield (or the towns subject to rape & pillage) habits do tend towards “unrestricted warfare”, military historians and legal theorists often pondering whether in “existential conflicts”, law reasonably can be expected to retain its intended force.

In what was a rhetorical flourish rather than a substantive legal point, in the dock before the IMT (International Military Tribunal) which in 1945-1946 sat in Nuremberg to try 22 of the surviving senior Nazis, Hermann Göring (1893–1946; leading Nazi 1922-1945, Hitler's designated successor & Reichsmarschall 1940-1945) claimed to be quoting Winston Churchill (1875-1965; UK prime-minister 1940-1945 & 1951-1955) in citing: “In the struggle for life and death there is in the end no legality.”  Like William Shakespeare (1564–1616), a few phrases have been attributed to Churchill on the basis of “sounding Churchillian” and although there’s nothing in the record to support the case those exact words ever passed his lips, Göring’s paraphrase was not unreasonable.  After the fall of France in 1940, Churchill did make clear his view “there could be no justice if, in a mortal struggle, the aggressor tramples humanity while those resisting remain bound by violated conventions” by which he meant if the Nazis ignored international law, it was an absurdity for the Allies fully to remain constrained by it while fighting for their very survival.  Churchill was not advocating the rejection of established law as a principle; he was saying when a state faces the prospect of destruction at the hand of an enemy ignoring the accepted rules of war, strict legalism must not be allowed to prevent an effective defence.  That wasn’t a novel idea Churchill formed upon assuming the premiership.  Months earlier, when serving as First Lord of the Admiralty (minister for the navy), he’d discussed whether the UK should regard itself still restricted by the legal conventions Germany’s forces were ignoring: “The Germans have torn up the conventions and the usages of war.  We cannot allow ourselves to be bound by rules which the enemy does not observe if by doing so we place our country in mortal danger.”  While not exactly the words used by Göring in the dock, he captured the spirit of Churchill’s meaning.

Lindsay Lohan on the cover of Vogue Arabia, March 2026.  Among the topics raised in discussion about her not uneventful life was “…coming of age in the spotlight in a time of unrestricted paparazzi access and near-constant tabloid scrutiny.”

Of course on 15 March 1946, borrowing the thoughts of “…one of our greatest, most important, and toughest opponents…” to support his argument modern, industrial, total war had rendered irrelevant traditional legal restraints, he was still harbouring the (faint) hope he might escape the noose and thus has a good motive in seeking to undermine the moral authority of the tribunal by suggesting even Churchill had acknowledged that in existential war, legal rules collapse.  This was not the construction of legal theory in the abstract, just as Churchill was explaining the pragmatic nature of military necessity because as he pointed out: “without victory there is no survival” and were the UK unilaterally to obey the rules while its opponents did not, the nation might lose the war.  Neither man ever sought to maintain that in war laws vanish, only that as demanded in extraordinary and reprehensible circumstances, they may need to be ignored.  Essentially, Churchill was asserting he wasn’t prepared to behave with the propriety of Caesar’s wife while Göring cavorted with Caesar’s whores; with that the Reichmarshall gleefully would have agreed and although his hopes the tribunal might find his paraphrased defence exculpatory were by then faint indeed, he still had an eye on the figure he hoped to cut in the history books.  

The doctrine of military necessity of course dates from the first time some prehistoric character picked up a stick or rock to gain tactical advantage in an argument and despite the various codes of warfare promulgated over millennia by philosophers, priests and politicians, that doctrine survived into the age of musketry and later, atomic bombs.  It’s the Prussian general and military theorist Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831) who often is quoted because, with his commendable economy of phrase, succinctly he explained why necessity so often prevails over legality in existential war.  In On War (1832), he observed “War is an act of force, and there is no logical limit to the application of that force” and, anticipating the idealists, added: “Kind-hearted people might of course think there was some ingenious way to disarm or defeat an enemy without too much bloodshed… Pleasant as it sounds, it is a fallacy.”  What Clausewitz called Kriegsräson (necessity in war) meant in practice was (1) war has an inherent tendency toward escalation, because each side must use whatever means are necessary to defeat the other and (2) “arms races” will tend to ensue.

Imperial Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg in field uniform including the famous Prussian Pickelhaube (spiked helmet, the construct being Pickel (pimple, pickaxe) +‎ Haube (hood, cap)), Berlin, 1915.  Even when serving as chancellor (prime minister) von Bethmann Hollweg sometimes wore military uniform; Germans adore uniforms (note the jackboots).

Later in the century, German military jurists expressed this logic through the principle Kriegsräson geht vor Kriegsmanier (military necessity overrides the customary rules of war) by which they meant the laws and customs of war could be followed only to the extent adherence did not impose an unacceptable military cost; if survival (and in practice: “immediate advantage”) demanded those rules be violated, necessity prevails.  What was at the time the most outrageous admission of the application of the doctrine came in 1914 after Germany violated Belgium’s neutrality and was delivered by Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg (1856–1921) who between 1909-1917 served as one of a series of inadequate replacements of Otto von Bismarck (1815-1989; chancellor of the German Empire (the “Second Reich”) 1871-1890); imperial chancellor of the German Empire 1909-1917).  In what must remain among the more ill-advised statements delivered by a politician, von Bethmann Hollweg on 4 August 1914 stood in the Reichstag (lower house of the imperial parliament) and explained to assembled members the German war-plan required the army marching Belgium to attack France and that Germany being a signatory to the Treaty of London (1839) which guaranteed Belgium’s neutrality had been rendered irrelevant by military necessity, the always quoted passage being: “We are violating international law, but necessity knows no law.”  Not all historians agree Realpolitik held a greater fascination for Germans than others but for students of the art, the chancellor’s speech appears in just about every text-book on the subject.  Warming to his theme, when the British ambassador to Germany protested the violation, von Bethmann Hollweg responded it would be an absurdity were Britain to go to war “just for a scrap of paper” (that scrap being the treaty the Germans had in 1839 signed as co-guarantors of Belgian neutrality).  That cynical turn of phrase was echoed a generation later when, under cross-examination in the dock at Nuremberg, Göring almost gloatingly admitted he and the other leading Nazis had regarded the many treaties they’d signed as “just so much toilet paper.”

Like many a defendant, the defrocked Reichmarshall was at times evasive or dissembling but on the matter of the regime’s attitude to treaties, he was truthful.  A highlight of the 50^th birthday celebration for Joachim von Ribbentrop (1893–1946; Minister of Foreign Affairs of Nazi Germany 1938-1945) had been the presentation to the minister of a diamond-studded casket containing facsimiles of all the treaties he had signed during (his admittedly busy if not productive) tenure.  When one of his aides remarked that there were only “a few treaties we had not broken”, Ribbentrop was briefly uncertain how to react until he saw “…Hitler’s eyes filled with tears of laughter.”  It was said to be a good party which must have been welcome because by 1943 there wasn't much to celebrate in Berlin.  Like Göring, Ribbentrop, was convicted on all four counts (planning aggressive war, waging aggressive war, war crimes & crimes against humanity) and sentenced to be hanged; his life did end on the gallows, unlike Göring who, in circumstances never explained, cheated the hangman by taking poison.

Periscope cam: Footage of USN submarine strike on the Iranian Navy’s frigate IRIS Dena (released by the Pentagon (unclassified)).

One of the intriguing legal matters explored before the IMT was the matter of the lawfulness of “unrestricted submarine warfare” and those discussions were recalled when, early in March, 2026, the Pentagon announced a USN (US Navy) submarine had torpedoed and sunk the Iranian Navy’s IRIS Dena (a Moudge-class frigate) with the loss of more than half the ship’s compliment of 130-odd.  Pete Hegseth (b 1980; US Secretary of Defense (and War) since 2025) described the act as one of “quiet death” although that was a reference to the torpedo’s stealthy approach rather than the explosions which doomed ship and crew.  It was the USN’s first sinking of an enemy warship by torpedo since World War II (1939-1945) and because (1) the US and Iran undeniably are in a “state of armed conflict” (any legal distinction between that and “war” as traditionally defined ceasing decades earlier much to matter), (2) the Dena was a warship and (3) the action took place in international waters, the attack doubtlessly was within the rules of war and the reaction of Tehran in branding it an “atrocity at sea” was a political rather than legal claim.

Defendants in the dock, Nuremberg, 1946.  All were guilty of something and a dozen were sentenced to be hanged (including one in absentia) but the IMT acquitted three who subsequently were prosecuted by German courts.

What however remains of interest is the recent change in tactics by the US which now uses military-level missiles to target and sink what appear to be civilian vessels from Central America, the White House claiming the boats are being used to smuggle narcotics.  When considering the lawfulness of “unrestricted submarine warfare”, the IMT in 1946 held that while international law did limit the conduct of navies in their interactions with non-military (ie merchant craft, fishing boats etc) vessels, because the British merchantmen were from the beginning of the war armed and captains had been ordered by the Admiralty to if possible ram U-boats, they were not entitled to the warning provisions of the protocol.  Beyond that, with reference to the failure on the part of German U-boat (submarine) commanders to rescue their shipwrecked victims, the tribunal observed:

“The evidence further shows that the rescue provisions [of the Protocol] were not carried out and that the defendant [Großadmiral Karl Dönitz (1891–1980; head of the German Navy 1943-1945, German head of state 1945)] ordered that they not be carried out.  The argument of the defense is that the security of the submarine is, as the first rule of the sea, paramount to rescue and that the development of aircraft made rescue impossible.  This may be so, but the Protocol is explicit.  If the commander cannot rescue, then under its terms he cannot sink a merchant vessel and should allow it to pass harmless before his periscope.  These orders, then, prove Doenitz is guilty of a violation of the Protocol.”  Had the judgement at that point ended the legal position would have been clear in that having at least tacitly conceded the defense’s point that rescue was no longer practicable in light of the limitations of the submarine and modern technological developments, the use of submarines as commerce destroyers would have been deemed against international law.  However Doenitz’s counsel introduced evidence (including affidavits from Allied admirals) that the USN & Royal Navy had from the outbreak of hostilities also practiced the “unrestricted submarine warfare” of which the Germans were being accused and this was not a classic Tu quoque gambit (in international law, a justification of action based on an assertion that the act with which the accused is charged was also committed by the accusing parties.  It was from the Latin Tū quoque (translated literally as “thou also” and latterly as “you also”; the translation in the vernacular is something like “you did it too”, thus the legal slang “youtooism” & “whataboutyouism”)).  What counsel argued was that in practicing “unrestricted submarine warfare”, all navies were acting in accordance with international law because such law makes sense only if it is cognizant of the prevailing circumstances (ie reality).  The IMT’s judgement in the Doenitz case was difficult to read (it was only later it was revealed to have been written by a judge who voted for his acquittal) but what it said was (1) the defendant had violated the protocols which were the rules of international law as they at the time stood but (2) the nature of total war had so changed the reality of war at sea that those protocols were no longer law, rendered obsolete and thus defunct.  That was as close as the tribunal came to allowing a tu quoque defense.

Unclassified footage released by the Pentagon of one of dozens of strikes on alleged “narco-terrorist” boats by US Southern Command.  The video included a message from Secretary of War Pete Hegseth: “TO ALL NARCO-TERRORISTS WHO THREATEN OUT HOMELAND - IF YOU WANT TO STAY ALIVE, STOP TRAFFICKING DRUGS.”  As far as is known, in all cases of these strikes, all on board the boats were killed.

So, while the US military (and for this purpose that includes the Coast Guard, National Guard etc) have a free hand to attack on the high seas warships of a hostile combatant, does the doctrine of “unrestricted warfare” extend to civilian vessels allegedly being used for unlawful activities?  Legal scholars have explored this novel development (something genuinely new and introduced during the second administration of Donald Trump (b 1946; US president 2017-2021 and since 2025)) and the consensus seems to be sinking manned civilian vessel with missiles as an instance in peacetime law enforcement is of dubious legality unless strict conditions are met.  The first thing to consider is whether it’s a matter of (1) peacetime law enforcement in international waters (something governed by the UNCLOS (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea)), customary international law and any bilateral interdiction agreements and thus a criminal matter rather than an act of war or (2) armed conflict at sea (and thus coming under the laws of naval warfare) which depends of a “state of armed conflict” existing between sovereign states.

However, whichever is held to be operative, as a general principle, civilian vessels are protected from missile attacks and enjoy freedom of navigation (certainly on the high seas); forces from warships may board, inspect, and arrest, but not arbitrarily destroy and under the UNCLOS there are explicit provisions under which a warship can stop a vessel suspected of statelessness or certain crimes but use of force must be necessary and proportionate.  Conceptionally, the notion of “proportionality” is little different from what is the domestic law of many states concerning matters such as self-defense: (1) there is no reasonable alternative and (2) force must not exceed what is needed to achieve a lawful objective.  Because these are events happening “on the water” there are also “graduations” in the use of force which are unique to the nautical environment including signals and warnings, maneuvering to compel a stop, warning shots (the classic “shot across the bows”) and disabling fire.  When civilian vessels are involved, historically, only in extremis (presenting a clear & present threat) would lethal force be deemed appropriate.  In other words, using missiles, without warning, to sink a civilian vessel would, in the context of law enforcement, be thought “disproportionate” especially if the crew’s lives are put at serious risk (inherent in missile attacks).  That’s all based on the precept that whether on land or at sea, states are expected to respect the right to life under international human rights law.  Because the adoption of this technique was so sudden, legal theorists are still working through the implications but it would appear an extension of the concept of “unrestricted warfare” beyond military targets.