Dynasty

Dynasty (pronounced dahy-nuh-stee (US English); din-uh-stee (UK English)

(1) A sequence of rulers from the same family, stock, or group.

(2) The rule of such a sequence.

(3) A series of members of a family who are distinguished for their success in business, wealth creation etc.

(4) In sport, a team or organization which has an extended period of success or dominant performance (technically unrelated to family links or even and great continuity in personnel).

(5) As used specifically in East Asian history, the polity or historical era under the rule of a certain dynasty.

1425-1475: From the Middle English dynastia, from the Middle French dynastie, from the Late Latin dynastia, from the Ancient Greek δυναστεία (dunasteía) (power, dominion, lordship, sovereignty) from dynasthai (have power), of unknown origin.  The adjective dynastic (from 1800) is used when speaking or, relating to or pertaining to a dynasty; dynastical attested since 1730.  A dynast (hereditary ruler) is from the 1630s, from the Late Latin dynastes, from the Greek dynastes (ruler, chief, lord, master).  The synonyms include house & lineage.  Dynasty & dynast are nouns, dynastic & dynastical are adjectives and dynastically is an adverb; the noun plural is dynasties.

The word is widely used of the ruling families of nations associated with royalty (Hapsburg dynasty, Romanov dynasty, Hohenzollern dynasty etc) and remains the standard term in the historiography of Imperial China (Ming dynasty, Qing dynasty, Song dynasty, Tang dynasty, Yuan dynasty etc).  In political science it’s a popular use (verging on a slur) to describe the political arrangements concocted when a ruler attempts (sometimes with success) to pass the office (and thus their country) to a descendent (usually the eldest or most demonstrably ruthless son), examples including the Congo, Syria, Cambodia and the Islamic Republic of Iran.  Sometimes, polities organized in this manner can give rise to what is known as a subdynasty (which seems never to hyphenated), an idea borrowed from European history when royal families routinely would provide offspring to serve as kings of other states, thereby creating a new dynasty; sometimes this worked well, sometimes not.

In politics, families which some characterize as appearing dynastic can be very sensitive to anything which seems even to hint at the suggestion and the Lee family in Singapore is the standard case study.  Between the rule of Lee Kuan Yew (1923–2015; Prime Minister of Singapore 1959-1990) and that of his son Lee Hsien Loong (b 1952; Prime Minister of Singapore since 2004-2024) there was gap of over a dozen years (which must not be called an interregnum) and there was of some interest in whether a similar mechanism would be engineered to enable a third generation to assume office, the previous successor designate having been removed from the plan because of “some unsuitability”.  According to certain Western commentators, Mr Lee delayed stepping down from the premiership (to become "Senior Minister", the same path taken by his father and not wholly different for the approach of Benedict XVI (1927–2022; pope 2005-2013, pope emeritus 2013-2022)) so a “long runway” cold be laid onto which the next prime minister can emerge (the word “runway” used in the modern sense of the “catwalk” on which models strut their stuff rather than anything to do with aviation).

Something in common: Lee Hsien Loong and Klyie Jenner.

As things turned out, in 2024, Lawrence Wong Shyun Tsai (b 1972) became the city state's fourth prime minister.  While Li Hongyi (b 1987; first-born child of Lee Hsien Loong), has disavowed any interest in a political career, there’s still plenty of time and if, in the fullness of time, “drafted” by the ruling PAP (the People’s Action Party which has been in power since independence in 1959), he may feel it his duty to be “be persuaded”.  Li Hongyi may however believe his lineage is too great a disadvantage to overcome.  Earlier, Lee Hsien Loong dismissed suggestions his stellar career (becoming at becoming at 32 the youngest brigadier-general in the history of the Singapore military and prime minister at 53) owed anything to family connections, claiming being the prime minister’s son actually hindered him because people were so anxious to avoid accusations of favoritism.  Interestingly, entertainment personality Kylie Jenner (b 1997) made much the point, claiming it was belonging to a famous family which saw her denied some modelling work.  The Lee family though do seem unusually sensitive to suggestions the scions might unduly benefit from the connection, the Financial Times in 2007 even having to apologize for having published not anything libellous (actually easily done in Singapore) but simply a list of Lee family members appointed to high positions in the state.  The current derogatory slang is “nepo baby”, a clipping of "nepotism baby", a term one is unlikely to read in the Singaporean press.

Kim I, II & III: The Kim Dynasty, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, aka North Korea)

Kim I: Kim Il-Sung (1912-1994; The Great Leader of DPRK, 1948-1994, left).  Like his descendants, The Dear Leader and The Supreme Leader, The Great Leader enjoyed food.  He’s pictured here at lunch with another foodie, comrade Stalin (1878-1953; Soviet leader, 1924-1953, right).

Kim Il-Sung held an array of titles during his decades as the DPRK’s dictator, the proliferation not unusual in communist nations where the ruling party’s structures are maintained alongside the formal titles of state with which governments conduct relations with foreign powers.  In office for a remarkable 45 years, he was designated premier (head of government) between 1948-1972 and president 1972-1994.  He was head of the WPK (Workers' Party of Korea) between 1949-1994 and in that role successively was styled as Chairman (1949-1966) and General Secretary (after 1966).  During his 45-year rule, there were ten US presidents, six RoK (Republic of Korea (South Korea)) presidents, nine British prime ministers and ten Australian prime ministers.  He tenure in office also spanned the era of the Soviet Union from its apotheosis under comrade Stalin to its collapse in 1991.  Being dead however proved no obstacle to The Great Leader extending his presidency, the collective office Chuch'ejosŏnŭi yŏngwŏnhan suryŏng (Eternal leaders of Juche Korea) created in 2016 by the insertion of an enabling line in the preamble to the constitution.  What this amendment did was formalise the position of The Great Leader and his late son comrade Kim Jong-Il (1941–2011; The Dear Leader of DPRK 1994-2011)) as the “eternal leaders” of the DPRK.  Juche is the term used to describe the DPRK’s national philosophy, a synthesis of The Great Leader’s interpretation of (1) Korean tradition and (2) Marxist-Leninist theory.

Funeral cortege of The Great Leader, 1994.

It was an interesting move.  Constitutionally, the office of president in its executive form was codified only in 1972; prior to that the role of head of state had been purely ceremonial and held by trusted party functionaries, all power exercised by The Great Leader in his capacity as premier and WPK general secretary.  However, merely by being president The Great Leader vested the office with such an aura that upon his death in 1994, the position was left vacant, The Dear Leader not granted the title.  That nuance of semi-succession for a while absorbed the interest of the DPRK watchers but attempts to invest the move with any significance abated as DPRK business, though in the more straitened circumstances of the post Soviet world, continued as usual.  The constitution was again revised in 1998.  Being a godless communist state, no fine theological points stood in the way of declaring The Great Leader the DPRK’s "Eternal President", the latest addition to the preamble declaring:

Under the leadership of the Workers' Party of Korea, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Korean people will hold the great leader Comrade Kim Il-Sung in high esteem as the eternal President of the Republic.

The constitution, as revised and promulgated after the death of The Dear Leader, again referred to The Great Leader as "Eternal President of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea" but in 2016 (The Dear Leader having apparently been dead for what must have been judged a decent duration), another amendment to the preamble changed the administrative nomenclature of executive eternity to "eternal leaders of Juche Korea", the honor now jointly held by the leaders great & dear, one dead, one alive.  It was another first for the Kims.

Kim II: Kim Jong-Il (1941–2011; The Dear Leader of DPRK, 1994-2011) in Prussian blue pantsuit, 593 Military Unit's Commander School (secret location undisclosed), 21 June, 2010.

DPRK generals wear big hats and always carry a notebook in case the closest Kim says something interesting.  They write it down and because every thing said is interesting, all in the entourage go through many notebooks.  DPRK watchers have concluded that because of the nature of the regime, it's unlikely any of these notebooks have been discarded so there must be a large number of them stored around the country. 

As a political construct, the DPRK is best thought of as a hereditary theocracy because what's expected of citizens is not mere veneration of the Kims but a form of worship.  Although opaque, its dynamics are now better understood but when in 1994 The Great Leader died, neither within the country nor beyond was there wide understanding how much of the power structure he controlled had passed to The Dear Leader.  Following the collapse of the Soviet Union which had provided the DPRK with much financial and other aid, the economic circumstances were hardly propitious but there seems never to have been any doubt about the formal succession, The Dear Leader having been anointed for more than a decade.  The DPRK’s propaganda machine, while not in the conventional Western sense having a middle class to be made “quite prepared”, did have the had the rest of the country to work on and for years Kim Jong-Il had gradually been eased into photo opportunities with The Great Leader, eventually making even solo appearances, sometimes in the role of Supreme Commander of the KPA (Korean People's Army) to which he’d been appointed in 1991, despite having no military background.  However, given most of the generals and admirals (despite their impressive display of decorations and other medals) also have little experience of active combat, this was less of a problem than it might have seemed.

There must in the mind of the Great Leader been some concerns a dynasty might not evolve because, perhaps now aware of his own mortality, The Great Leader in the years before death made the effort to "clear the decks" for the succession, purging the military and civilian ranks of any difficult types who might prove potential obstacles in the path of Kim Jong-Il's ascent.  Some of the purged went into enforced retirement while the deaths of others (presumably suspected recalcitrants) was announced although that may have been a coincidence; the DPRK may be a theocracy but its military and political elite are gerontocracies so senior figures dropping dead from old age is not rare.  Anyway, the path was smoothed and, the military command settled, in 1992, The Great Leader announced Kim Jong-Il was now in charge of all the DPRK’s internal affairs.  Curiously, shortly after that, the media began using of him the honorific “Dear Father” instead of “Dear Leader” but for whatever reason, all official communications soon reverted to the latter which first had appeared a couple of years earlier.

Kim Jong-Il with the judging committee at the annual "DPRK Biggest Watermelon Competition", Pyongyang, August, 2010.

Despite all the dynastic help, indications are it took The Dear Leader sometime fully to assert his authority.  Seriously weird it may appear but, the WPK is just another political party and it too has factions; in the difficult post-Soviet environment of the 1994 succession, DPRK-watchers detected signs of genuine internal debates about how to deal with the economic problems faced.  The adjustments frankly didn’t go well for many North Korean citizens (some of whom starved to death) but while The Dear Leader may not have learned much economic theory, he proved adept at consolidating his power, adopting the Songun (military first) policy, granting the military priority in resource allocation and political influence, not out of any concern about foreign invasion but to ensure the loyalty of what was, in effect, a giant police apparatus tasked with protecting the Kim dynasty from "problems from within", the slightest hint of dissent met with the "good, hard crackdown" which is a signature tactic of dictatorships in managing their highest priority: regime survival.  Secure in office, spasmodically, The Dear Leader did attempt the implement the odd economic reform but the results were not impressive; despite that, efficient internal repression ensured the family's business as usual continued.

Dynastic family planning.

Kim Jong-Il shaking hands with Japanese-born singer Ko Yong-hui (aka Takada Hime, 1952-2004) circa 1972.  She became his consort and would later give birth to Kim Jong-Un.  Within the DPRK, her name must never be spoken and she's referred to only by honorific forms, the most commonly used being: “The Respected Mother who is the Most Faithful and Loyal 'Subject' to the Dear Leader Comrade Supreme Commander”.

By 1997, The Dear Leader sufficiently was entrenched in power to engineer his appointment to The Great Leader's old post as General Secretary of the WPK and, a year later, a constitutional amendment declared his role as chairman of the NDC (National Defence Commission) was "the highest post of the state", presumably among those still alive because the same constitutional reform proclaimed The Great Leader to be the DPRK’s "Eternal President".  Complicating things further, the Dear Leader's career progression was mapped onto the 2012 constitutional amendments in which The Dear Leader’s had been declared "Eternal General Secretary of the WPK and Eternal Chairman of the National Defence Commission".  In any other country this may have been thought an anomaly to be clarified but in the DPRK it's all part of the mystique of the personality cults of the Kims.  In 2016, after a decent period of mourning, the new title "Eternal Leaders of Juche Korea" was created and conferred on both The Great Leader & Dear Leader, the internal logic again perfect.

The reputation of the DPRK as a hermit state cloaked in secrecy is not wholly undeserved but what was published by the energetic and highly productive KCNA (Korean Central News Agency) was an official biography of The Dear Leader and it must from his earliest years have been obvious he was extraordinary.  He was born inside a log cabin beneath Korea’s most sacred mountain and in the moment of delivery, a shooting star brought forth a spontaneous change from winter to summer and there appeared in the sky, the biggest, brightest rainbow ever seen.  The Dear Leader turned out to be not subject to bowel movements, never needing to defecate or urinate (although evidence suggests this is not a genetic characteristic of the dynasty and not shared by his son & successor).  He had a most discriminating palette so prior to his meals being prepared, several staff assiduously by hand inspected every grain of rice to ensure each was of uniform length, plumpness, and color, The Dear Leader eating only "perfect" rice.  Although he only ever played one round of golf and that on the country’s notoriously difficult 7,700 yard (7040 metre) course at Pyongyang, he took only 34 strokes to complete the 18 holes, a round which included five holes-in-one.  Although the scorecard was verified by all 17 of the bodyguards on duty at the course, experienced golfers have cast doubt on the round of 34 (not commenting on the holes-in-one) but the diet of individually inspected & polished grains of rice was thought "at least plausible".  

Funeral cortege of The Dear Leader, 2011.

The funeral cars were 1975 or 1976 Lincoln Continentals, built by Moloney Standard Coach Builders on an extended wheelbase.  Lincoln experts say it's a different car to the similar model used in The Great Leader's funeral, the dynasty said to own several and it's believed they were obtained "through sources in Japan".  Nor are the big Lincolns are the only machines of note in the state mews.  Uniquely, the Kim dynasty is the only family believed also to own a brace of Mercedes-Benz 600 (M100; 1963-1981) long-roof Landaulets, only twelve of which were built.  Fittingly, these variants with an extended length folding top casually are known as the "presidentials" but the factory never officially used the designation.  There were also 47 "standard" Landaulets with a shorter fabric soft-top.  

The Kims certainly are the subjects of some of the most elaborate personality cults ever but it’s not only the DPRK administration that creates retrospective honours to acknowledge the uniqueness of a special individual. George Washington (1732–1799; POTUS, 1789-1797) will forever be the first POTUS so that distinction was always secure but he retired from the army as a lieutenant general; that others since have been appointed to more senior ranks did disturb some in the military, concerned his primacy in the hierarchy wasn’t adequately honoured.  Perhaps surprisingly, in the US military, the system was finalized only this century and prior to 1944, the matter of stars and titles for generals had been a little confused, the whole order of precedence in the army since the Declaration of Independence only properly codified with some retrospective creations in 1976 and 2024.  Historically, the most senior rank in the US Army had been lieutenant general with first significant change effected in the post Civil War (1861-1865) era when the rank of “General of the Army” was gazetted and while nominally a four star appointment, structurally, it was the equivalent of what would in 1944 be formalized as five star rank.  However, in 1866, the significance of the title “General of the Army” was it reflected the appointee being the general with authority over the whole army which meant there could be only ever be one in active service.  In other words, that meant the four star general was commander-in-chief of the army and the paperwork had years earlier been prepared for Washington to be raised thus but this was never done because of concern among lawyers it might set a precedent and be seen to impinge upon a president’s authority as commander in chief of all forces.  Indeed, although later the US military would use titles such as “Commander in Chief, US Pacific Command”, Donald Rumsfeld (1932–2021: US defense secretary 1975-1977 & 2001-2006) in 2002 ended the practice (and use of the acronym CINC) by re-asserting there was in the US: “only one commander in chief in America - the president”, spelled out in Article II, Section 2 of the US Constitution: “The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States."  The matter of civilian authority over the military was one of the founding principles of the republic.

The next change came when General John "Black Jack" Pershing (1860–1948) who had commanded the US expeditionary forces in World War I (1914-1918) was in 1919 appointed to the then unique rank of “General of the Armies of the United States”.   At the time, the war was known as the "World War" (a suggestion by Woodrow Wilson (1856–1924; POTUS 1913-1921)), the vast and bloody conflict already regarded as “the war to end all wars” and the feeling was the conflict had in scale and awfulness been unique so some special recognition was deserved.  Pershing however remained a four star general and confusingly, when the spate of five star appointments was made between 1944-1950, the old wording “General of the Army” was revived with the pecking order based on the gazetted date of appointment to the rank which no longer implied an individual having authority over the entire army.  There have since been no five star creations (although many other armies have continued to appoint field marshals which is the equivalent).  In the US, some historians and many in the military fretted over the untidiness of it all and in 1976, George Washington formerly was gazetted “General of the Armies of the United States with rank and precedence over all other grades of the Army, past or present”, meaning he will for all time be the US Army’s senior officer.  In 1944, there was also an amusing footnote which, according to legend, resulted in the decision to use the style “general” and not “marshal” (as many militaries do) because the first to be appointed was George Marshall (1880–1959; US Army chief of staff 1939-1945) and it was thought “Marshal Marshall” would be a bit naff, something Joseph Heller’s (1923-1999) character “Major Major” in Catch-22 (1961) would prove.  So, retrospective adjustments to hierarchies are not unique to the DPRK.

Kim III: Kim Jong-Un (b circa 1982; The Supreme Leader (originally The Great Successor) of DPRK since 2011).  The Supreme Leader is pictured here with South Korean foreign minister, Chung Eui-yong (b 1946).  In the North, the KCNA refers to South Korea as "the puppet state" [of the US].

Inheriting the family business, the country and its population at a much younger age than The Dear Leader, The Supreme Leader, didn’t benefit (or suffer) from the long public gestation period his father was provided by The Great Leader.  It was in 2009, about two years before The Dear Leader’s death that the media began reporting the youngest son was to be the DPRK’s next leader although at that stage, he was referred to as The Brilliant Comrade, the honorific The Great Successor not adopted until after The Dear Leader’s death and it was soon replaced by The Supreme Leader.  For whatever reason, and the speculation and conspiracy theories are many, Kim III more quickly assumed his panoply of offices and titles than his immediate ancestor.

The Supreme Leader leads the bowing ceremony before the portraits of the Great Leader (left) and Dear Leader (right), 9^th Congress of the WPK (Workers' Party of Korea), April 25 House of Culture, Pyongyang, 19-25 February 2026.  Unanimously, delegates paid tribute to the Supreme Leader and declared it the “best congress ever”.

Portraits of the Kims are of great significance to the regime.  In August 2023, with tropical storm Khanun bearing down on the DPRK coast, state media issued instructions that all citizens must “with urgency” and “at any cost” focus on “ensuring the safety” of items depicting the three members of the Kim dynasty.  Presumably because they would be more susceptible to the storm’s heavy rain and strong winds than sturdier objects like statues, the Rodong Sinmun (official newspaper of the ruling WPK) emphasized citizens’ “foremost focus” must be ensuring the preservation of portraits of the Kims although they did caution the need also to safeguard the large number of statues, mosaics, murals and other monuments to the dynasty which has ruled North Korea since its foundation in 1948.

Meeting of the WPK to commemorate the Supreme Leader’s tenth anniversary of his assumption of leadership of the party, Pyongyang, April 2022.  The Supreme Leader’s portrait is displayed in an oval which is not unusual in DPRK Kim iconography.

The order was an interesting insight into the way the regime regards the symbolism of representational objects as a part of its legitimacy but they have set the population an onerous task given the sheer volume of portraits which exist.  At least one each of the Great Leader & Dear Leader are known to hang in every house, café, bus, train carriage or shop and in larger public buildings there might literally be dozens.  In whatever form, the depictions are regarded as not merely symbolic but as sacred icons; just as every citizen must be willing (anxious even) to die protecting the leader, so must they be prepared to sacrifice themselves to save his portrait.  It's never been revealed whether any of the Kims read Oscar Wilde's (1854–1900) The Picture of Dorian Gray (1890) but if so, they've learned well. 

Coriaceousness on legs: The Supreme Leader in black leather.

Fashionistas note the perception of black as a “slimming color” but caution the effect is attained through the interplay of optics, contrast perception and even cultural expectations rather than the color’s inherent properties.  Done well, it can work but success depends on design and fit; there are limitations so expectations have to be “realistic”.  Essentially, what use of solid black can do is: (1) Reduce visible contour information (although something really shiny like patent leather can make things worse) because less light is reflected, meaning shadows, folds and changes in body shape appear less are less visually distinct, details to some degree “flattened out”; (2) Minimize edge definition and contrasts in hues, human vision (for sound evolutionary reasons) drawn to highlights & boundaries so while light-colored fabrics generate stronger visual cues of volume and curvature, these black tends to suppress; (3) Exploit a trick from visual art in which darker tones appear to “recede” while the lighter “advance”.  The technicalities however operate in conjunction with the long-established cultural expectation; because the notion “black is a slimming color” has become a popular orthodoxy, viewers perceptions can be “pre-conditioned” and appearances interpreted accordingly.  Fashion critics suggest the effect is overstated and all else being equal, design and the quality of fabric is much more significant than the color, a well-cut garment in a light shade able to be more “slimming” that anything ill-fitting or of poor design in black.  They note the effect anyway can to some extent be achieved with other solid, dark colors (Prussian blue, charcoal, deep olive etc) because again, the uninterrupted expanse reduces visual segmentation.  Perceptions are also sometime gleaned from professional photography with angles and lighting optimized whereas IRL (in real life) there’s movement so expectations must be tempered down to the art of the possible.

Official portrait of the Supreme Leader, issued by the KCNA at 7th Congress of the the WPK, 6-9 May 2016, April 25 House of Culture, Pyongyang.

Announced by the KCNA on state television as The Great Successor, The Supreme Leader was appointed General Secretary of the WPK, Chairman of the Central Military Commission, and President of the State Affairs Commission, followed soon afterwards by a promotion to the army’s highest military rank, Marshal of the Korean People's Army, adding to his position as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (exactly the same constitutional arrangement adopted by Hitler as commander-in-chief of both OKH (Oberkommando des Heeres (High Command of the Army)) and OKW (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (High Command of the Armed Forces)).  Great minds do think alike.  Confusingly, having already morphed from The Brilliant Comrade to The Great Successor to The Supreme Leader, references also appeared calling him The Dear Respected Leader but thankfully the proliferation seems now to have stopped and for more than a decades it's been "The Supreme Leader" all the way.  In office, he has pursued 병진 (byungjin (literally "parallel development")), a refinement of The Great Leader’s policy simultaneously to develop both the economy and the military, his particular emphasis in the latter a focus on nuclear weapons and inter-continental delivery systems.  It may be an attempt to avoid the problems inherent in the “Waffen und Butter” (guns and butter) programme pursued seriously by the Nazi regime (1933-1945) only by as late as 1938, the latter element loosing resource allocation after 1943 as fortunes turned in World War II (1939-1945).

Kim Jong-Un, looking through binoculars across the DMZ (Demilitarized Zone), observing the “provocative maneuvers” of the South Korean Army.

While Kim III is no longer referred to as The Great Successor, there have been great successes.  Despite Western propaganda, there are elections in the DPRK and when The Supreme Leader sought a seat in the Supreme People's Assembly, there was a record turnout of voters and he received 100% of the votes cast.  Although it’s hard to determine the veracity of many of the reports, it’s suggested also he’s an innovator in matters of military discipline, new methods used by firing squads said to include flame throwers, and anti-aircraft cannons, both said to make quite a mess although it's difficult to know how high is the body count, some reported executed later turning up alive and well.  Worth a mention though is the assassination in 2017 of his exiled half-brother Kim Jong-Nam (1971-2017), killed with the nerve agent VX while walking through Kuala Lumpur International Airport, a novel twist on the extra-judicial execution being the use of two aspiring starlets to deliver the toxin; they believed they were being filmed as part of a reality TV show (as assassinations go, genuinely that was innovative and yet another first for the Kims). Most celebrated has been the nuclear programme and the increasingly bigger and longer-range missiles paraded from time to time.  Underground nuclear tests being hard to monitor, it remains unclear whether some of the devices tested are the long de rigueur plutonium weapons or, for the first time since the one-off A-Bomb used in Hiroshima in 1945, made using uranium.  Most impressively, the KCNA reported an almost complete success in the DPRK for some time avoiding outbreaks of COVID-19 with no cases reported in the republic so, on any basis of calculation, The Supreme Leader supervised the most successful COVID-19 strategy on Earth.  Unfortunately, because of neglect by lazy and incompetent officials (who were executed with the next two generations of their families consigned to labor camps) an outbreak did happen and the DPRK's borders remain almost wholly closed, only small number of carefully vetted tourists from Russia and the PRC (People's Republic of China) permitted entry for carefully supervised visits.   

The Supreme Leader has also at times drawn the interest of the pro ana community because of his weight loss has at times been striking and achieved before the general availability of GLP-1s (glucagon-like peptide-1).  Whether his motivation was (1) concerns about his health, being a bit chubby, (2) a wish to look more sexy and attractive to younger women or (3) display solidarity with his subjects, many of whom were suffering food shortages, his weight-loss regimes have on occasions been an obvious success, experts estimating (on the basis of photographic evidence), as much as 25-30 kg (65-80 lb) may have be shed.  That was commendable but did elsewhere create a problem for the small number of people in the entertainment business working as as Kim Jong-il impersonators, some of whom sought guidance from the pro ana community.  For security reasons, the regime employs "Supreme Leader body doubles" (doppelgangers) and it's not known if, during his "slim phases" they're starved until the meet the required dimensions or simply shot and replaced with thinner models.  Conspiracy theorists in the West did speculate the "slimmed down version" may really be a body-double who was paraded for the cameras just to assure hungry citizens the Supreme Leader was sharing (at least to some extent) their deprivations.  The KCNA does have "a bit of previous" in being "economical with the truth" so who knows?  However, regardless of his weight, The Supreme Leader seems in such rude good health that, still barely 40, he may well rule the DPRK even longer than his grandfather’s 45 years.  Ever since the demise of the USSR in 1991, analysts have been predicting the imminent demise of the communist regimes in both Pyongyang and Havana but they seem to muddle through, the DPRK of late enjoying new sources of foreign exchange, branching out from industrial-scale drug production and the smuggling of oil and minerals to the new field of cybercrime; even in the niche market of fake news they're said to run a small operation.

Doppelgangish.

US actor Elizabeth Gillies (b 1993) appeared as Fallon Carrington in the television drama Dynasty (2017–2022), a revival of the 1980s soap opera; it was shown in the US on the CW Television Network (episodes streamed internationally on Netflix the next day).  She appeared (far left) in Ariana Grande's (b 1993) music video Thank U, Next (2019), taking the part of Lindsay Lohan in the segment which was a homage to Mean Girls (2004).  While not technically a doppelganger, the degree of resemblance was sufficient for the theme to work.  The concept of Ms Grande's Thank U, Next could be applied to the DPRK's succession model ("just one Kim after another" as it were).

An artist’s depiction of how a statute in bronze of Daniel Andrews might be cast.

News the ALP (“Australian Labor Party” although more cynical souls prefer “Agitprop, Lies & Propaganda”) government in the Australian state of Victoria was allocating some Aus$134,000 (US$95,000) to erect a bronze statue of Daniel Andrews (b 1972; Premier of Victoria 2014-2023) was greeted by most taxpayers with a resigned indifference although at least some presumably would have preferred attention be devoted to violent crime, crumbling transport infrastructure and the troubled health system.  However, from the usual suspects in the commentariat came the predictable critique that given Victoria’s debt level and other acknowledged "issues", this might not be the most propitious moment to announce so much (borrowed) money was being spent for the aggrandizement of the politician under whom so much debt was accumulated and billions apparently squandered.  Unimpressed by such carping, Premier Jacinta Allan (b 1973; Premier of Victoria since 2023) defended the move, calling Mr Andrews “a fantastic premier” and didn't bother to deny suggestions her government was so resigned to losing the next election the focus had shifted to looting the exchequer for funds to build monuments to themselves.  Nor did she refer to analysis concluding the last ALP administration (under John Cain (1931–2019; Premier of Victoria 1982-1990) & Joan Kirner (1938–2015; Premier of Victoria 1990-1992)) had left the state in an even worse financial position so maybe she really has stopped trying.  Politically, though, she must find the similarities striking: a woman handed the job because the situation is hopeless and all that remains is for her to go down with the sinking ship, most of the men having already taken to the (taxpayer-funded) lifeboats.

A visiting tour group of Australians from Victoria bow before the three statues.  As the bronze of comrade Dan's statue weathers, it will appear in the same, darker hue as his illustrious companions.

However, the announcement from Melbourne was described as “long overdue” by Kim Jong-Un who in 2023 presided over the unveiling of a statue of Mr Andrews, erected on a plinth beside those of Kim Il-Sung & Kim Jong-Il.  The three statues, cast in bronze and 22 metres (72 feet) high, stand as the centre-piece of 만수대대기념비 (Mansudae Grand Monument), a complex in central Pyongyang at which have been erected over 200 other (appropriately smaller) statues of figures from the DPRK’s heroic past.  At the unveiling ceremony, 10,000 invited citizens were able to enjoy listening to an untypically brief oration by the Supreme Leader before two hours of extracts from speeches by Mr Andrews (in the original English, followed by a Korean translation) were broadcast over loudspeakers.  Topics covered by Mr Andrews included “modern techniques in debt management”, “fiscal discipline” and “locking citizens in tower blocks for their own good”.  At several points, the broadcast was for some minutes paused so citizens could applaud.  Unfortunately, the outdoor ceremony was conducted on what proved to be Pyongyang’s coldest day in 44 years and several dozen in the audience died after succumbing to hypothermia while there were at least hundreds of cases of frostbite but the KCNA reported interviewed survivors saying that was a small price to pay to be able to hear in his own voice the thoughts of the one they called “The Great Leader of Victoria”.  Closing the ceremony from his double-glazed, centrally-heated, booth, the Supreme Leader concluded things with words that were at once inspiring and modest: “For a thousand generations, the people the eternal nation of the DPRK will honor the memory of comrade Daniel Andrews and his untiring assaults on decadent bourgeois values such as freedom of assembly, privacy and free speech.  Comrade Dan was the great dictator that I aspire to become and deserves to stand on the plinth next to our Great Leader and Dear Leader.  If I can do to the DPRK what comrade Dan did to Victoria, perhaps one day a statue of me will be placed on the plinth.”

Unrestricted

Unrestricted (pronounced uhn-ri-strik-tid)

(1) Not restricted or confined.

(2) In the classification of documents, having no security classification.

1766: The construct was un-+ restrict + -ed.  The un- prefix was from the Middle English un-, from the Old English un-, from the Proto-West Germanic un-, from the Proto-Germanic un-, from the primitive Indo-European n̥-.  It was cognate with the Scots un- & on-, the North Frisian ün-, the Saterland Frisian uun-, the West Frisian ûn- &  on-, the Dutch on-, the Low German un- & on-, the German un-, the Danish u-, the Swedish o-, the Norwegian u- and the Icelandic ó-.  It was (distantly) related to the Latin in- and the Ancient Greek ἀ- (a-), source of the English a-, the Modern Greek α- (a-) and the Sanskrit अ- (a-).  The verb restrict was in use by at least the 1530s in the sense of “to limit, bound, confine (someone or something), prevent from passing a certain limit in any kind of action” and was from the Latin restrictus, past participle of restringere (bind fast, restrain) and perfect passive participle of restringō (draw back tightly; restrain, restrict), the construct being re- (back, again) + stringō (press, tighten, compress); as an adjective, it was a doublet of ristretto. By the eighteenth century, the word had come to be regarded as a Scotticism but the infection spread quickly to Standard English.  As the past-participle adjective from restrict (in the sense of “limited, confined”), restricted has become associated with the classification of government documents, in the sense of “not for public release”, use seems not to have been routine until 1944 when a system of classification was codified by the US government.  Prior to that, although restrictions of distribution were common, concepts such as “Restricted to [names or designations]”, “Secret”, “Top Secret” etc were used but there was no standardization within departments or even between branches of the military.  When used as a suffix to form possessional adjectives from nouns, -ed was from the Middle English -ed, from the Old English -od (the adjectival suffix), from the Proto-Germanic -ōdaz, from the primitive Indo-European -ehtos.  It was cognate with the Latin -ātus. 

Glory road: A “Derestricted” sign in Australia's Northern Territory from the days of “no speed limits”.

In use, the older adjectival use was simply “restrict” and although “unrestricted” would seem an absolute (ie something either is restricted or it is not), dictionaries confirm the comparative is “more unrestricted” and the superlative “most unrestricted” although at least one style guide notes those forms can be regarded in a similar way as “very unique” (ie technically incorrect but widely used and well-understood.  The related adverb “restrictedly” was and remains rare.  In the US, well into the twentieth century, the appearance of the word “restricted” in advertisements, signage and such was verbal shorthand for (depending on context and location): “No Jews”, “No coloreds” etc.  Although the words “unrestricted” & “derestricted” describe similar states, different histories are implied and that’s a product of the ways in which the absence of restrictions came about.  Unrestricted means literally “no restrictions” (access to something or somewhere; rights to engage in trade etc).  “Derestricted” means that previously restrictions must have been imposed but those have since been removed.  The use applies to document classifications and in the now rare cases of roads with no speed limits (although some of those were something of a linguistic outlier because in many cases they never had any restrictions to be derestricted.  For obvious reasons, in English, “unrestricted” is the more commonly used form.  Unrestricted, unrestrictive & unrestrictable are adjectives, unrestrictedness is a noun and unrestrictedly is an adverb.

1978 Mercedes-Benz 450 SEL 6.9 on the Northern Territory's derestricted roads.  

Although the factory only ever claimed 225 km/h (140 mph), top speed of a UK-delivered “Euro spec” 6.9 (ie one not fitted with the power-sapping anti-emission devices fitted to those built for sale in the US or Australia) turned out to be a verified 237 km/h (147 mph) which reflected the experience of European testers who achieved 238 km/h (148 mph) on the German Autobahns.  Unexceptional now, such pace was in the 1970s a reasonable achievement for a heavy cruiser with pre-modern aerodynamics; at high-speed, the fuel consumption was as awe inspiring as one might expect from a 6.8 litre (417 cubic inch) V8 at full throttle.  The most powerful of the W116 range (1972-1980), technically the 6.9 was a V116 (the "V" denoting the 100 mm (4 inch) longer wheelbase) and was the spiritual successor to the old (W109) 300 SEL 6.3 (1967-1972) which adopted the classic muscle car formula for the 1964 Pontiac GTO by taking the 6.3 litre (386 cubic inch) V8 (M100) from the huge 600s (W100, 1963-1981) and putting it in a mid-sized car previously powered by nothing larger than a 3.0 litre (183 cubic inch) straight-six.  The distinct "hot rod" flavor of the 6.3 made it a more entertaining drive than the 6.9 but the latter was a vastly improved machine and the template on which the factory would build decades of success.  One quirk of the 6.9 was the use of a dry sump; with the lower hood (bonnet) line of the W/V116, the V8 was simply too tall to fit if conventionally lubricated.   

Idealistic lawyers (they do exist) and others have for centuries argued it is the existence of and adherence to laws which makes possible civilized societies, the alternative often expressed as “the law of the jungle”, best understood in the vernacular “kill or be killed” world in which life of man was “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short”, memorably described in Leviathan (1651) by the very clever and deliciously wicked English philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679).  However, what the lawyers, at least privately, acknowledge is the extent of adherence to laws closely is tied to (1) their enforcement and (2) a layered system of punishments for transgressions.  In domestic legal systems, this is comprehended as the apparatus extending from receiving a fine for overstaying one’s time at a parking meter to being hanged for murder; the existence of laws does not prevent crime but the perception of the chance of detection and the subsequent penalty for many operates as a deterrent and the debates about relationship between certain penalties and their deterrent effect continue.

Mahan's The Influence of Sea Power upon History 1660-1783.  In the last decade of the nineteenth century, probably no book was more read in palaces, chancelleries & admiralties.

In war, although usually the opposing sides have geo-political objectives, for those doing the fighting, historically the business was about killing each other and in practice that of course quickly and understandably came to imply “by whatever means possible” but for many centuries there have been conventions which form of “rules of war”, the most celebrated the various chivalric codes (codified during of the Middle Ages) which sought to regulate the behaviour of soldiers, particularly towards civilians.  However, as US Navy Captain Alfred Mahan (1840–1914) pointed out in the epoch-making The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783 (1890), it’s impossible by mere agreement to outlaw the use of a militarily effective weapon so is it any more plausible for a statute, treaty or agreement to limit “mission creep” in the methods?  Whatever knightly codes may have existed, there seems little doubt that on the battlefield (or the towns subject to rape & pillage) habits do tend towards “unrestricted warfare”, military historians and legal theorists often pondering whether in “existential conflicts”, law reasonably can be expected to retain its intended force.

In what was a rhetorical flourish rather than a substantive legal point, in the dock before the IMT (International Military Tribunal) which in 1945-1946 sat in Nuremberg to try 22 of the surviving senior Nazis, Hermann Göring (1893–1946; leading Nazi 1922-1945, Hitler's designated successor & Reichsmarschall 1940-1945) claimed to be quoting Winston Churchill (1875-1965; UK prime-minister 1940-1945 & 1951-1955) in citing: “In the struggle for life and death there is in the end no legality.”  Like William Shakespeare (1564–1616), a few phrases have been attributed to Churchill on the basis of “sounding Churchillian” and although there’s nothing in the record to support the case those exact words ever passed his lips, Göring’s paraphrase was not unreasonable.  After the fall of France in 1940, Churchill did make clear his view “there could be no justice if, in a mortal struggle, the aggressor tramples humanity while those resisting remain bound by violated conventions” by which he meant if the Nazis ignored international law, it was an absurdity for the Allies fully to remain constrained by it while fighting for their very survival.  Churchill was not advocating the rejection of established law as a principle; he was saying when a state faces the prospect of destruction at the hand of an enemy ignoring the accepted rules of war, strict legalism must not be allowed to prevent an effective defence.  That wasn’t a novel idea Churchill formed upon assuming the premiership.  Months earlier, when serving as First Lord of the Admiralty (minister for the navy), he’d discussed whether the UK should regard itself still restricted by the legal conventions Germany’s forces were ignoring: “The Germans have torn up the conventions and the usages of war.  We cannot allow ourselves to be bound by rules which the enemy does not observe if by doing so we place our country in mortal danger.”  While not exactly the words used by Göring in the dock, he captured the spirit of Churchill’s meaning.

Lindsay Lohan on the cover of Vogue Arabia, March 2026.  Among the topics raised in discussion about her not uneventful life was “…coming of age in the spotlight in a time of unrestricted paparazzi access and near-constant tabloid scrutiny.”

Of course on 15 March 1946, borrowing the thoughts of “…one of our greatest, most important, and toughest opponents…” to support his argument modern, industrial, total war had rendered irrelevant traditional legal restraints, he was still harbouring the (faint) hope he might escape the noose and thus has a good motive in seeking to undermine the moral authority of the tribunal by suggesting even Churchill had acknowledged that in existential war, legal rules collapse.  This was not the construction of legal theory in the abstract, just as Churchill was explaining the pragmatic nature of military necessity because as he pointed out: “without victory there is no survival” and were the UK unilaterally to obey the rules while its opponents did not, the nation might lose the war.  Neither man ever sought to maintain that in war laws vanish, only that as demanded in extraordinary and reprehensible circumstances, they may need to be ignored.  Essentially, Churchill was asserting he wasn’t prepared to behave with the propriety of Caesar’s wife while Göring cavorted with Caesar’s whores; with that the Reichmarshall gleefully would have agreed and although his hopes the tribunal might find his paraphrased defence exculpatory were by then faint indeed, he still had an eye on the figure he hoped to cut in the history books.  

The doctrine of military necessity of course dates from the first time some prehistoric character picked up a stick or rock to gain tactical advantage in an argument and despite the various codes of warfare promulgated over millennia by philosophers, priests and politicians, that doctrine survived into the age of musketry and later, atomic bombs.  It’s the Prussian general and military theorist Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831) who often is quoted because, with his commendable economy of phrase, succinctly he explained why necessity so often prevails over legality in existential war.  In On War (1832), he observed “War is an act of force, and there is no logical limit to the application of that force” and, anticipating the idealists, added: “Kind-hearted people might of course think there was some ingenious way to disarm or defeat an enemy without too much bloodshed… Pleasant as it sounds, it is a fallacy.”  What Clausewitz called Kriegsräson (necessity in war) meant in practice was (1) war has an inherent tendency toward escalation, because each side must use whatever means are necessary to defeat the other and (2) “arms races” will tend to ensue.

Imperial Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg in field uniform including the famous Prussian Pickelhaube (spiked helmet, the construct being Pickel (pimple, pickaxe) +‎ Haube (hood, cap)), Berlin, 1915.  Even when serving as chancellor (prime minister) von Bethmann Hollweg sometimes wore military uniform; Germans adore uniforms (note the jackboots).

Later in the century, German military jurists expressed this logic through the principle Kriegsräson geht vor Kriegsmanier (military necessity overrides the customary rules of war) by which they meant the laws and customs of war could be followed only to the extent adherence did not impose an unacceptable military cost; if survival (and in practice: “immediate advantage”) demanded those rules be violated, necessity prevails.  What was at the time the most outrageous admission of the application of the doctrine came in 1914 after Germany violated Belgium’s neutrality and was delivered by Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg (1856–1921) who between 1909-1917 served as one of a series of inadequate replacements of Otto von Bismarck (1815-1989; chancellor of the German Empire (the “Second Reich”) 1871-1890); imperial chancellor of the German Empire 1909-1917).  In what must remain among the more ill-advised statements delivered by a politician, von Bethmann Hollweg on 4 August 1914 stood in the Reichstag (lower house of the imperial parliament) and explained to assembled members the German war-plan required the army marching Belgium to attack France and that Germany being a signatory to the Treaty of London (1839) which guaranteed Belgium’s neutrality had been rendered irrelevant by military necessity, the always quoted passage being: “We are violating international law, but necessity knows no law.”  Not all historians agree Realpolitik held a greater fascination for Germans than others but for students of the art, the chancellor’s speech appears in just about every text-book on the subject.  Warming to his theme, when the British ambassador to Germany protested the violation, von Bethmann Hollweg responded it would be an absurdity were Britain to go to war “just for a scrap of paper” (that scrap being the treaty the Germans had in 1839 signed as co-guarantors of Belgian neutrality).  That cynical turn of phrase was echoed a generation later when, under cross-examination in the dock at Nuremberg, Göring almost gloatingly admitted he and the other leading Nazis had regarded the many treaties they’d signed as “just so much toilet paper.”

Like many a defendant, the defrocked Reichmarshall was at times evasive or dissembling but on the matter of the regime’s attitude to treaties, he was truthful.  A highlight of the 50^th birthday celebration for Joachim von Ribbentrop (1893–1946; Minister of Foreign Affairs of Nazi Germany 1938-1945) had been the presentation to the minister of a diamond-studded casket containing facsimiles of all the treaties he had signed during (his admittedly busy if not productive) tenure.  When one of his aides remarked that there were only “a few treaties we had not broken”, Ribbentrop was briefly uncertain how to react until he saw “…Hitler’s eyes filled with tears of laughter.”  It was said to be a good party which must have been welcome because by 1943 there wasn't much to celebrate in Berlin.  Like Göring, Ribbentrop, was convicted on all four counts (planning aggressive war, waging aggressive war, war crimes & crimes against humanity) and sentenced to be hanged; his life did end on the gallows, unlike Göring who, in circumstances never explained, cheated the hangman by taking poison.

Periscope cam: Footage of USN submarine strike on the Iranian Navy’s frigate IRIS Dena (released by the Pentagon (unclassified)).

One of the intriguing legal matters explored before the IMT was the matter of the lawfulness of “unrestricted submarine warfare” and those discussions were recalled when, early in March, 2026, the Pentagon announced a USN (US Navy) submarine had torpedoed and sunk the Iranian Navy’s IRIS Dena (a Moudge-class frigate) with the loss of more than half the ship’s compliment of 130-odd.  Pete Hegseth (b 1980; US Secretary of Defense (and War) since 2025) described the act as one of “quiet death” although that was a reference to the torpedo’s stealthy approach rather than the explosions which doomed ship and crew.  It was the USN’s first sinking of an enemy warship by torpedo since World War II (1939-1945) and because (1) the US and Iran undeniably are in a “state of armed conflict” (any legal distinction between that and “war” as traditionally defined ceasing decades earlier much to matter), (2) the Dena was a warship and (3) the action took place in international waters, the attack doubtlessly was within the rules of war and the reaction of Tehran in branding it an “atrocity at sea” was a political rather than legal claim.

Defendants in the dock, Nuremberg, 1946.  All were guilty of something and a dozen were sentenced to be hanged (including one in absentia) but the IMT acquitted three who subsequently were prosecuted by German courts.

What however remains of interest is the recent change in tactics by the US which now uses military-level missiles to target and sink what appear to be civilian vessels from Central America, the White House claiming the boats are being used to smuggle narcotics.  When considering the lawfulness of “unrestricted submarine warfare”, the IMT in 1946 held that while international law did limit the conduct of navies in their interactions with non-military (ie merchant craft, fishing boats etc) vessels, because the British merchantmen were from the beginning of the war armed and captains had been ordered by the Admiralty to if possible ram U-boats, they were not entitled to the warning provisions of the protocol.  Beyond that, with reference to the failure on the part of German U-boat (submarine) commanders to rescue their shipwrecked victims, the tribunal observed:

“The evidence further shows that the rescue provisions [of the Protocol] were not carried out and that the defendant [Großadmiral Karl Dönitz (1891–1980; head of the German Navy 1943-1945, German head of state 1945)] ordered that they not be carried out.  The argument of the defense is that the security of the submarine is, as the first rule of the sea, paramount to rescue and that the development of aircraft made rescue impossible.  This may be so, but the Protocol is explicit.  If the commander cannot rescue, then under its terms he cannot sink a merchant vessel and should allow it to pass harmless before his periscope.  These orders, then, prove Doenitz is guilty of a violation of the Protocol.”  Had the judgement at that point ended the legal position would have been clear in that having at least tacitly conceded the defense’s point that rescue was no longer practicable in light of the limitations of the submarine and modern technological developments, the use of submarines as commerce destroyers would have been deemed against international law.  However Doenitz’s counsel introduced evidence (including affidavits from Allied admirals) that the USN & Royal Navy had from the outbreak of hostilities also practiced the “unrestricted submarine warfare” of which the Germans were being accused and this was not a classic Tu quoque gambit (in international law, a justification of action based on an assertion that the act with which the accused is charged was also committed by the accusing parties.  It was from the Latin Tū quoque (translated literally as “thou also” and latterly as “you also”; the translation in the vernacular is something like “you did it too”, thus the legal slang “youtooism” & “whataboutyouism”)).  What counsel argued was that in practicing “unrestricted submarine warfare”, all navies were acting in accordance with international law because such law makes sense only if it is cognizant of the prevailing circumstances (ie reality).  The IMT’s judgement in the Doenitz case was difficult to read (it was only later it was revealed to have been written by a judge who voted for his acquittal) but what it said was (1) the defendant had violated the protocols which were the rules of international law as they at the time stood but (2) the nature of total war had so changed the reality of war at sea that those protocols were no longer law, rendered obsolete and thus defunct.  That was as close as the tribunal came to allowing a tu quoque defense.

Unclassified footage released by the Pentagon of one of dozens of strikes on alleged “narco-terrorist” boats by US Southern Command.  The video included a message from Secretary of War Pete Hegseth: “TO ALL NARCO-TERRORISTS WHO THREATEN OUT HOMELAND - IF YOU WANT TO STAY ALIVE, STOP TRAFFICKING DRUGS.”  As far as is known, in all cases of these strikes, all on board the boats were killed.

So, while the US military (and for this purpose that includes the Coast Guard, National Guard etc) have a free hand to attack on the high seas warships of a hostile combatant, does the doctrine of “unrestricted warfare” extend to civilian vessels allegedly being used for unlawful activities?  Legal scholars have explored this novel development (something genuinely new and introduced during the second administration of Donald Trump (b 1946; US president 2017-2021 and since 2025)) and the consensus seems to be sinking manned civilian vessel with missiles as an instance in peacetime law enforcement is of dubious legality unless strict conditions are met.  The first thing to consider is whether it’s a matter of (1) peacetime law enforcement in international waters (something governed by the UNCLOS (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea)), customary international law and any bilateral interdiction agreements and thus a criminal matter rather than an act of war or (2) armed conflict at sea (and thus coming under the laws of naval warfare) which depends of a “state of armed conflict” existing between sovereign states.

However, whichever is held to be operative, as a general principle, civilian vessels are protected from missile attacks and enjoy freedom of navigation (certainly on the high seas); forces from warships may board, inspect, and arrest, but not arbitrarily destroy and under the UNCLOS there are explicit provisions under which a warship can stop a vessel suspected of statelessness or certain crimes but use of force must be necessary and proportionate.  Conceptionally, the notion of “proportionality” is little different from what is the domestic law of many states concerning matters such as self-defense: (1) there is no reasonable alternative and (2) force must not exceed what is needed to achieve a lawful objective.  Because these are events happening “on the water” there are also “graduations” in the use of force which are unique to the nautical environment including signals and warnings, maneuvering to compel a stop, warning shots (the classic “shot across the bows”) and disabling fire.  When civilian vessels are involved, historically, only in extremis (presenting a clear & present threat) would lethal force be deemed appropriate.  In other words, using missiles, without warning, to sink a civilian vessel would, in the context of law enforcement, be thought “disproportionate” especially if the crew’s lives are put at serious risk (inherent in missile attacks).  That’s all based on the precept that whether on land or at sea, states are expected to respect the right to life under international human rights law.  Because the adoption of this technique was so sudden, legal theorists are still working through the implications but it would appear an extension of the concept of “unrestricted warfare” beyond military targets.