Assassin

Assassin (pronounced uh-sas-in)

(1) A murderer, especially one who kills a politically prominent person for reason of fanaticism or profit.

(2) One of an order of devout Muslims, active in Persia and Syria circa 1090-1272, the prime object of whom was to assassinate Christian Crusaders (should be used with initial capital).

1525–1535: An English borrowing via French and Italian, from the Medieval Latin assassīnus (assassinī in the plural), from the Arabic Hashshashin (ḥashshāshīn in the plural) (eaters of hashish), the Arabic being حشّاشين, (ħashshāshīyīn (also Hashishin or Hashashiyyin).  It shares its etymological roots with the Arabic hashish (from the Arabic: حشيش (ḥashīsh)) and in the region is most associated with a group of Nizari Shia Persians who worked against various Arab and Persian targets.  The Hashishiyyin were an Ismaili Muslim sect at the time of the Crusades, under leadership of to Hasan ibu-al-Sabbah (known as shaik-al-jibal or "Old Man of the Mountains") although the name was widely applied to a number of secret sects operating in Persia and Syria circa 1090-1272.  The word was known in Anglo-Latin from the mid-thirteenth century and variations in spelling not unusual although hashishiyy (hashishiyyin in the plural) appears to be the most frequently used.  The plural suffix “-in” was a mistake by Medieval translators who assumed it part of the Bedouin word.  Assassin, assassination, assassinator, assassinatress, assassinatrix, assassinism, autassassinophilia and assassinship are nouns, assassining & assassinating are verbs and assassinlike & assassinous are adjectives; the noun plural is assassins.  The number of derived forms seems untypically high and although some are listed various as obsolete or archaic, that they ever existed is an indication the “assassin” may have exerted a special fascination.  A female assassin (there have been a few) was an assassinatress or assassinatrix (assassinatrices the plural) and they inspired a special horror, presumably because, (1) being less often suspected of being a murderer they might strike when least expected and (2) man may have harboured the fear their method of dispatch might be especially gruesome.  Noted assassinatrices include the Biblical Judith whose decapitation of Holofernes has been depicted in some of Renaissance art's most confronting paintings and Valerie Solanas (1936-1988) who in 1968 shot pop-artist Andy Warhol (1928-1987).  Warhol didn't immediately die from his wounds but never did he fully recover and it's believed the would-be assassin hastened his death.

"Fear of" assassination is a condition different from being "turned on" by the fear of being assassinated.

A special use was autassassinophilia (in psychiatry, a paraphilia in which an individual is sexually aroused by the risk of being killed) and despite the name, the condition is not restricted to those imagining being assassinated, the paraphilia instead covering all those sexually by the risk of being killed.  It’s a fetish which can overlap with others involving specific ways of finding death (drowning, decapitation, dehydration etc) and does not of necessity require actual risk of death; merely imagining it can be sufficient.  The paraphilia could for example be as specific as being sexually aroused by the thought of being murdered by the Freemasons but that is distinct from a fear of being murdered by the Freemasons (an instance of foniasophobia (fear of being murdered)) which was a condition once suffered by Lindsay Lohan while being stalked by "a schizophrenic Freemason".  The condition was first described by John Money (1921–2006), a New Zealand-born professor of psychology at Johns Hopkins University who listed it as the “reciprocal condition” to erotophonophilia (in which one sexually is aroused by “stage-managing and carrying out the murder of an unsuspecting sexual partner”, both paraphilias under the rubric of the “sacrificial/expiatory type”.  Neither have ever been listed as a separate diagnosis in the American Psychiatric Association's (APA) Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) but both, depending on the patient, could variously be “bolted into” the criteria for Sexual Masochism Disorder or Paraphilic Disorder.

Whether in personal, political or family relations, assassination is one of the oldest and, done properly, one of the most effective tools known to man.  The earliest known use in English of the verb "to assassinate" in printed English was by Matthew Sutcliffe (circa 1548-1629) in A Briefe Replie to a Certaine Odious and Slanderous Libel, Lately Published by a Seditious Jesuite (1600), borrowed by William Shakespeare (circa 1564-1616) for Macbeth (1605).  Among the realists, it’s long been advocated, Sun Tzu in the still read The Art of War (circa 500 BC) arguing the utilitarian principle: that a single assassination could be both more effective and less destructive that other methods of dispute resolution, something with which Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527), in his political treatise Il Principe (The Prince, written circa 1513 & published 1532), concurred.  As a purely military matter, it’s long been understood that the well-targeted assassination of a single leader can be much more effective than a battlefield encounter whatever the extent of the victory; the “cut the head off the snake” principle.  Idiomatic uses include (1) “great assassin” which sarcastically was in September 1896 bestowed by William Ewart Gladstone (1809–1898; prime-minister 1868–1874, 1880–1885, Feb-July 1886 & 1892–1894) on the Ottoman Empire’s Sultan Abdul Hamid II (1842–1918; sultan of the Ottoman Empire 1876-1909) as a dark reference to the massacres of Ottoman Armenians, (2) “smiling assassin” (can be applied literally but is usually a figurative form meaning “one who maintains a friendly and pleasant visage but really is a back-stabber) and (3) “baby-faced assassin” (one whose youthful or innocent appearance belies their ruthless character).

Modern history

The assassination in July 2022 of Abe Shinzō san (安倍 晋三 (Shinzo Abe, 1954-2022, prime minister of Japan 2006-2007 & 2012-2020) came as a surprise because as a part of political conflict, assassination had all but vanished from Japan.  That’s not something which can be said of many countries in the modern era, the death toll in Asia, Africa, the Middle East and South & Central America long, the methods of dispatch sometimes gruesome.  Russia’s annals too are blood-soaked although it’s of note perhaps in that an extraordinary number of the killings were ordered by one head of Government.  The toll of US presidents is famous and also documented are some two-dozen planned attempted assassinations.  Even one (as far as is known) prime-minister of the UK has been assassinated, Spencer Perceval (1762–1812; Prime-Minister of the UK 1809-1912) shot dead (apparently by a deranged lone assassin) on 11 May 1812, his other claim to fame that uniquely among British premiers, he served at times also as solicitor-general and attorney-general.  Conspiracy theorists note also the death of Pope John-Paul I (1912–1978; pope Aug-Sep 1978).

Death by katana.

Samuri Ultranationalist activist Otoya Yamaguchi (1943-1960), about to stab Socialist Party leader Inejiro Asanuma san (1898-1960) with his yoroi-dōshi ("armor piercer" or "mail piercer"), a short sword, fashioned with particularly thick metal and suitable for piercing armor and using in close combat; it was carried by the samurai class in feudal Japan.), Hibiya Public Hall, Tokyo, 12 October 1960.  The assassin committed suicide while in custody.

Historically however, political assassinations in Japan were not unknown, documented since the fifth century, the toll including two emperors.  In the centuries which unfolded until the modern era, by European standards, assassinations were not common but the traditions of the Samurai, a military caste which underpinned a feudal society organized as a succession of shogunates (a hereditary military dictatorship (1192–1867)), meant that violence was seen sometimes as the only honorable solution when many political disputes were had their origin in inter and intra-family conflict.  Tellingly, even after firearms came into use, most assassinations continued to be committed with swords or other bladed-weapons, a tradition carried on when the politician Asanuma Inejirō san was killed on live television in 1960.

Most remembered however is the cluster of deaths which political figures in Japan suffered during the dark decade of the 1930s.  It was a troubled time and although Hara Takashi san (1856-1921; Prime Minister of Japan 1918-1921) had in 1921 been murdered by a right-wing malcontent (who received a sentence of only three years), it had seemed at the time an aberration and few expected the next decade to assume the direction it followed.  However in an era in which the most fundamental aspects of the nation came to be contested by the politicians, the imperial courtiers, the navy and the army (two institutions with different priorities and intentions), all claiming to be acting in the name of the emperor, conflict was inevitable, the only thing uncertain was how things would be resolved.

Hamaguchi Osachi san (1870–1931; Prime Minister of Japan 1929-1931) was so devoted to the nation that when appointed head of the government’s Tobacco Monopoly Bureau, he took up smoking despite his doctors warnings it would harm his fragile health.  His devotion was praised but he was overtaken by events, the Depression crushing the economy and his advocacy of peace and adherence to the naval treaty which limited Japan’s ability to project power made him a target for the resurgent nationalists.  In November 1930 he was shot while in Tokyo Railway station, surviving a few months before succumbing an act which inspired others.  In 1932 the nation learned of the Ketsumeidan Jiken (the "League of Blood" or "Blood-Pledge Corps Incident"), a nationalist conspiracy to assassinate liberal politicians and the wealthy donors who supported them.  A list on twenty-two intended victims was later discovered but the group succeeded only in killing one former politician and one businessman.

The death of Inukai Tsuyoshi san (1855–1932; Prime Minister of Japan 1931-1932) was an indication of what was to follow.  A skilled politician and something of a technocrat, he’d stabilized the economy but he abhorred war as a ghastly business and opposed army’s ideas of adventures in China, something increasingly out of step with those gathering around his government.  In May 1932, after visiting the Yasukuni Shrine to pay homage to the Meiji’s first minister of war (assassinated in 1869), nine navy officers went to the prime-minister’s office and shot him dead.  Deed done, the nine handed themselves to the police.  At their trial, there was much sympathy and they received only light sentences (later commuted) although some fellow officers feared they may be harshly treated and sent to the government a package containing their nine amputated fingers with offers to take the place of the accused were they sentenced to death.  In the way the Japanese remember such things, it came to be known as “the May 15 incident”.

Nor was the military spared.  Yoshinori Shirakawa san (1869–1932) and Tetsuzan Nagata san (1884–1935), both generals in the Imperial Japanese Army were assassinated, the latter one of better known victims of the Aizawa Incident of August 1935, a messy business in which two of the three army factions then existing resolved their dispute with murder.  Such was the scandal that the minister of army was also a victim but he got of lightly; being ordered to resign “until the fuss dies down” and returning briefly to serve as prime-minister in 1937 before dying of natural cause some four years later.

Lindsay Lohan as assassin nun in Machete (2010).  The revolver is a Smith & Wesson .50 Magnum with 8.38" barrel (S&W500: SKU 163501).

All of the pressures which had been building to create the political hothouse that was mid-1930s Japan were realized in Ni Ni-Roku Jiken (the February 26 incident), an attempted military coup d'état in which fanatical young officers attempted to purge the government and military high command of factional rivals and ideological opponents (along with, as is inevitable in these things, settling a few personal scores).  Two victims were Viscount Takahashi Korekiyo san (1854–1936; Prime Minister 1921-1922) and Viscount Saitō Makoto san (1858–1936; admiral in the Imperial Japanese Navy & prime-minister 1932-1934 (and the last former Japanese Prime Minister to be assassinated until Shinzo Abe san in 2022)).  As a coup, it was a well-drilled operation, separate squads sent out at 2am to execute their designated victims although, in Japanese tradition, they tried not to offend, one assassin recorded as apologizing to terrified household staff for “the annoyance I have caused”.  Of the seven targets the rebels identified, only three were killed but the coup failed not because not enough blood was spilled but because the conspirators made the same mistake as the Valkyrie plotters (who sought in 1944 to overthrow Germany’s Nazi regime (1933-1945)); they didn’t secure control of the institutions which were the vital organs of state and notably, did not seize the Imperial Palace and thus place between themselves between the Emperor and his troops, something they could have learned from Hernán Cortés (1485–1547) who made clear to his Spanish Conquistadors that the capture of Moctezuma (Montezuma, circa 1466-1520; Emperor of the Aztec Empire circa 1502-1520) was their object.  As it was, the commander in chief ordered the army to suppress the rebellion and within hours it was over.

However, the coup had profound consequences.  If Japan’s path to war had not been guaranteed before the insurrection, after it the impetus assumed its own inertia and the dynamic shifted from one of militarists against pacifists to agonizing appraisals of whether the first thrust of any attack would be to the south, against the USSR or into the Pacific.  The emperor had displayed a decisiveness he’d not re-discover until two atomic bombs had been dropped on his country but, seemingly convinced there was no guarantee the army would put down a second coup, his policy became one of conciliating the military which was anyway the great beneficiary of the February 26 incident; unified after the rebels were purged, it quickly asserted control over the government, weakened by the death of its prominent liberals and the reluctance of others to challenge the army, assassination a salutatory lesson.

Assassins both:  David Low’s (1891-1963) Rendezvous, Evening Standard, 20 September 1939. 

The Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact (usually styled as the Nazi-Soviet Pact), was a treaty of non-aggression between the USSR and Nazi Germany and signed in Moscow on 23 August 1939.  A political sensation when it was announced, it wouldn't be until the first Nuremberg Trial (1945-1946) that the Western powers became aware of the details of the suspected secret protocol under which the signatories partitioned Poland between them.   Low's cartoon was published shortly after the Soviets (on 17 September) invaded from the east, having delayed military action until convinced German success was assured.

Low's work satirizes the cynicism of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, Adolf Hitler (1889-1945; Führer (leader) and German head of government 1933-1945 & head of state 1934-1945) and comrade Stalin (1878-1953; Soviet leader 1924-1953) bowing politely, words revealing their true feelings.  After returning to Berlin from the signing ceremony, Joachim von Ribbentrop (1893–1946; Nazi foreign minister 1938-1945) reported the happy atmosphere to Hitler as "…like being among comrades" but if he was fooled, comrade Stalin remained the realist.  When Ribbentrop proposed a rather effusive communiqué of friendship and a 25 year pact, the Soviet leader suggested that after so many years of "...us tipping buckets of shit over each-other", a ten year agreement announced in more business-like terms might seem to the peoples of both nations, rather more plausible.  It was one of a few occasions on which comrade Stalin implicitly admitted even a dictator needs to take note of public opinion.  His realism served him less well when he assumed no rational man fighting a war against a formidable enemy would by choice open another front of 3000-odd kilometres (1850 miles) against an army which could raise 500 divisions.  Other realists would later apply their own calculations and conclude that however loud the clatter of sabre rattling, Mr Putin (Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin; b 1952; president or prime minister of Russia since 1999) would never invade Ukraine.

Cloak and axe of Giovanni Battista Bugatti (1779–1869), official executioner for the Papal States 1796-1864, Criminology Museum of Rome.

Woodcuts and other depictions from the era suggest the blood-red cloak wasn't always worn during executions.  At various points popes have hired assassins to do the Lord’s work (and many more have been contracted “on behalf of His Holiness (both with and without his knowledge) but (as far as is known), none have been on the payroll for at least two centuries.  The last executioner employed was Giovanni Battista Bugatti began his career at a youthful 17 under Pius VI (1717–1799; pope 1775-1799) and diligently he served six pontiffs before being pensioned off by Pius IX (1792–1878; pope 1846-1878).  His retirement induced not by the Holy See losing enthusiasm for the death penalty because one Antonio Balducci succeeded him in the office which fell into disuse only with the loss of the Papal States (756-1870; a conglomeration of territories in the central & northern Italian peninsula under the personal sovereignty of the pope), after the unification of Italy.  Unlike his illustrious predecessor, history has recorded little about Signor Balducci although it’s known he performed his final execution in 1870.  Signor Bugatti was by far the longest-serving of the Papal States’ many executioners and locals dubbed him Mastro Titta, a titular corruption of maestro di giustizia (master of justice) and his 69 year tenure in his unusual role can be accounted for only by either (1) he felt dispatching the condemned a calling or (2) he really enjoyed his work, because his employers were most parsimonious: he received no retainer and only a small fee per commission (although he was granted a small, official residence).  His tenure was long and included 516 victims (he preferred to call them pazienti (patients), the term adopted also by Romans who enjoyed the darkly humorous) but was only ever a part-time gig; most of his income came from his work as an umbrella painter (a part of the labour market which still exists in an artisan niche).  Depending on this and that, his devices included the axe, guillotine, noose and mallet(!) while the offences punished ranged from the serious (murder, conspiracy, sedition etc) to the petty (habitual thieves and trouble-makers).

Cardinal Pietro Gasparri (1852–1934; Cardinal Secretary of State 1914-1930, left) and Benito Mussolini (1883-1945; Duce (leader) & prime-minister of Italy 1922-1943, right), signing the Lateran Treaty, Lateran Palace, Rome, 11 February 1929.

Although as early as 1786 the Grand Duchy of Tuscany became the first Italian state to abolish the death penalty (torture also banned), the sentence remained on the books in the Papal States; then as now, the poor disproportionately were victims of the sanction, similar (or worse) crimes by the bourgeoisie or nobility usually handled with less severity, “hushed-up” or just ignored.  With the loss of the Papal States, the pope’s temporal domain shrunk to little more than what lay around St Peter’s Square; indeed between 1870 and the signing of Lateran Treaty (1929) after which the Italian state recognized Vatican City as a sovereign state, no pope left the Vatican, their status as self-imposed prisoners a political gesture.  The Lateran treaty acknowledged the validity of the sentence (Article 8 of the 1929 Vatican City Penal Code stating anyone who attempted to assassinate the pope would be subject to the death penalty) although this provision was never used, tempted though some popes must have been.  Paul VI (1897-1978; pope 1963-1978) in 1969 struck capital punishment from the Vatican's legal code and the last reference to the sanction vanished in 2001 under Saint John Paul II (1920–2005; pope 1978-2005).

In contemporary Russia, such is the volume of deceased prominent citizens with a cause of death reported as: “Falling from window of high building” the mode of death is known on the streets as the “oligarch elevator”; predating even the Tsarist state, grim humor has a long tradition in Russia.  It may thus be assumed the Kremlin has on the books at least one “state assassin” but there may be more because there’s only so much one assassin or assassinatrix can do and the workload clearly is heavy.  Of other nations, there are the “usual suspects” assumed also to have such a contractor (although the DPRK (Democratic Republic of Korea (North Korea)) seems also on occasion to outsource “jobs” in a most imaginative way) and these positions are not advertised, appointees doubtlessly selected for their demonstrated skills.  Whether in the West there are still many state assassins isn’t known although in the not too distant past the activities of some have been documented.

Fidel Castro enjoying a fine Havana cigar.  At 90, he died in his bed.

The most interesting example is the US but the answer to the question of whether Washington DC still “does assassinations” ultimately is: “Well, it depends how one defines ‘assassination’”.  Unambiguously, US administrations certainly did assassinate tiresome people and documents relating to some of the plots made good reading, especially the “exploding cigars” with which the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) planned to kill Fidel Castro (1926–2016; prime-minister or president of Cuba 1959-2008).  The conduct of Richard Nixon’s (1913-1994; US president 1969-1974) administration weakened the authority of the executive and US Congress in the mid-1970s took steps to prohibit unlawful assassinations by government agencies, this prompted by revelations about the CIA’s involvement in plots to assassinate foreign leaders.  In response to the congressional nudge, Gerald Ford (1913–2006; US president 1974-1977) in 1976 issued Executive Order (EO) 11905, explicitly prohibiting political assassinations by US government personnel: “No employee of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, political assassination.”  This was later reaffirmed and expanded by Jimmy Carter’s (b 1924; US President 1977-1981) EO 12036 (1978) and Ronald Reagan’s (1911-2004; US president 1981-1989) EO 12333 which in 1981 sought to close the “outsourcing” loophole with the words: “No person employed by or acting on behalf of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, assassination.”  Despite the impression which seems afoot, Congress never passed a law banning assassinations and while EO 12333 remains active and binding on the executive branch it can, at the stroke of a pen, be amended or revoked by any POTUS (President of the United States).

So scope exists for an imaginative POTUS to act and the obvious device is a new EO.  While most EOs are published (gazetted) in the Federal Register and are thus publicly available, if a POTUS issues a certificate classifying an EO as being related to national security, they can be unpublished and their existence not even disclosed, meaning any change in an administration’s interpretation of the restriction (or even the word “assassination”) can remain unknown outside a small circle.  As the words are presumed still to be operative include: “No person employed by or acting on behalf of the US Government...” that would include the military, CIA personnel and many others but there are certain legal and operational ambiguities including:

(1) The targeted killing of enemy combatants during armed conflict: The phrase “armed conflict” is significant because the US last declared war on another country in 1942, despite which, they’ve hardly been militarily inactive since.  What is means is that “armed conflict” has proved pleasingly flexible and of great utility in the age of drone strikes which has allowed the US precisely to target individuals, something justified subsequently as “self-defense”.

(2) Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMFs): In the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the AUMF (2001) gives administrations broad powers to target individuals linked to 9/11 (or “associated groups”) and much use of the term “associated groups” has since been made as a legal justification for drone strikes in a number of countries.

(3) Covert Activities vs Military Operations: Covert operations by the CIA (or any other organ) require a “Presidential Finding” and a formal notification to the congressional intelligence committees (a legacy of the restrictions imposed during the 1970s) while the military are not subject to the same degree of oversight though are covered by the rules of war (the Geneva Conventions, the implications of the finding of the Nuremberg tribunals etc).

(4) The psychological effect of the UAV (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, commonly called "drone"): From a legal standpoint, the use of drones to kill people really added no new factors but in the political and public mind they seemed a “game changer” and with each high-profile “hit” there’s usually an intense (if brief) debate, an example of which followed the 2020 killing of Lieutenant General Qasem Soleimani (1957-2020) of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).  As was usually the case, the “debate” was formulaic, the administration claiming a military act of self-defense while critics labeled it a political assassination.  After both sides let off some steam, life returned to business as usual.

While not something often discussed by the administration, the DoD (Department of Defense) does have a (sort of) codified doctrine in their War Manual (last updated in 2015 with the title retained despite no declarations of war since 1942 and there having been no secretary of defense in cabinet since 1947).  While DoD avoids reducing things to a single definition, it does distinguish between “assassination” and “lawful targeting”: “The term assassination has been interpreted to mean an unlawful killing of a specific individual for political or ideological reasons”, to which is added: “The lawful targeting of an enemy combatant is not assassination.”  What that would appear to imply is (1) killing enemy combatants or terrorist leaders during an armed conflict or in self-defense is not considered assassination and (2) killing a civilian political leader, or someone not engaged in hostilities, especially outside armed conflict may constitute an assassination.  Presumably, being an army officer (albeit not one on a battlefield (in the conventional sense of the word)) General Soleimani would be defined “an enemy combatant”.  Some deaths since have been rather more in the realm of a “gray area” but the strikes continue.

Mike Pompeo before & after.

Mr Pompeo told interviewers he had in six months achieved a 90 lb (41 kg) weight loss through rigorous adherence to a D&E (diet & exercise) schedule.  It was an impressive outcome but in the Ozempic age, some were sceptical, suspecting there may have been surgical or chemical assistance.  Being a politician does have the general effect of generating an air of doubt about their assertions and those accessing the likelihood of truthfulness have to weigh up variables like "possible", "plausible" and "unbelievable".  Generously, what Mr Pompeo claimed was "plausible" and a 90 lb shred, however done, a reasonable achievement.

One who seemed anxious to explore gray areas was Mike Pompeo (b 1963; director of the CIA 2017-2018 and US secretary of state 2018-2021).  Although an evangelical Christian, one-time church deacon and Sunday school teacher on the record as saying “…politics is a never-ending struggle... until the Rapture.”, Mr Pompeo seems to believe the sixth commandment is open to interpretation.  While General Soleimani was a military figure, WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange (b 1971) unambiguously was a civilian and one with no position in any government or Quango.  Despite that, Mr Pompeo was reported as have requested “options” which would provide a legal justification for killing Assange, his interest prompted by WikiLeaks’ publication of details of the CIA’s “Vault 7” hacking tools, said by the agency to be its worst ever data loss.  The possibilities Mr Pompeo could have been offered apparently included both abduction and assassination and Mr Pompeo, a trained lawyer, had in 2017 laid the groundwork for a bit of escalation, describing WikiLeaks as a “non-state hostile intelligence service”, a term thought to be a declaration of his intent rather than a formal step up a rung on the ladder of legal possibility.  As things turned out, politics triumphed and a deal was done whereby Mr Assange pleaded guilty to something and was set free.

Pistanthrophobia

Pistanthrophobia (pronounced piss-an-thruh-foh-bee-uh)

(1) The fear of trusting one's partner in a romantic relationship.

(2) A fear of trusting people because of dreadful past experiences.

1990s: A compound word, the construct being the Ancient Greek πίστις (pístis) (trust; faith in others; belief; truth), from the primitive Indo-European béydtis (equivalent to πείθω (peíthō) (I persuade) +‎ -τις (-tis) (the suffix added to verb stems to form abstract nouns or nouns of action, result or process)) + anthro- (a  (non-standard) alternative form of anthropo- (a combining form of the Ancient Greek ἄνθρωπος (ánthrōpos) (man, human being) +‎ -phobia (fear of a specific thing; hate, dislike, or repression of a specific thing) from the New Latin, from the Classical Latin, from the Ancient Greek -φοβία (-phobía); it was used to form nouns meaning fear of a specific thing (the idea of a hatred came later)).  Pistanthrophobia is a noun; the noun plural is pistanthrophobias.

Pistanthrophobia is one of the “phobias” which owes its existence to the internet and may even have pre-dated the world-wide-web because some archived bulletin boards (there were several devoted to phobias which is something of a hint about the nature of the obsessives who stalked the boards at 2400 baud) includes entries for the word although it difficult to work out quite when first it appeared.  With the arrival of social media, self-help pages flourished and, of course, few need as much help as pistanthrophobics.  Whether, prior to the internet, there were many fewer phobias as exist today isn’t known but since the 1990s many more have been described, some obviously for jocular effect and while some seem only to state the obvious (atomosophobia said to be the “fear of atomic explosions”) pistanthrophobia surely is a helpful addition because it must be a common condition.  It’s not however a medical diagnosis and has never appeared in any edition of the American Psychiatric Association's (APA) Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), those who clinicians find to be pistanthrophobic handled with whatever is thought to be an appropriate diagnosis under the DSM’s five criteria for categorizing phobias: (1) animal type, (2) natural environment type, (3) blood-injection-injury type, (4) situational type & (5) other types.

Although originally applied to those who avoided romantic attachments because of a traumatic experience in a prior relationship, the term is also applied to those unable to trust others because of instances of rejection or betrayal.

Pistanthrophobia was first defined as the fear of being hurt by someone were one to enter into a romantic relationship and from the start the condition was thought something induced by a painful experience in a prior relationship.  The consequence of such traumas manifest as a fear of again suffering hurt and as an avoidance strategy, intimacy with others is avoided.  Like many phobias, the symptoms can vary in nature and extent but they may include (1) panic and fear, which can excessive, persistent, and wholly disproportional to the level of threat, (2) escape desires which typically manifest as a strong urge to get away from the triggering event or individual, (3) a shortness of breath (or hyper ventilation for those prone to panic attacks), (4) a racing heartbeat and (5) trembling and the onset of cold sweats.  Sufferers will change their patterns of behavior to the point of avoiding not only close contact but even casual conversations with anyone who might be a potential partner.  They will be seen to become guarded and socially withdrawn and at the very least, unresponsive to flirtation although it’s more likely they’ll become stressed and attempt to disengage from the interaction.  Flirtation is to a pisanthrophobe a threat and they become hyper-vigilant to the point where their heightened sensitivity will mean they misinterpret even benign conversations.  However, there are those who merely have no wish, for whatever reason, to enter into any romantic arrangements even when there’s been no preceding trauma and they are not pistanthrophobic.  The phobia is specific to the reactions and can exist even where there’s no history of trauma.

Vladimir Putin (b 1952; president or prime minister of Russia since 1999, centre) and Yevgeny Prigozhin (b 1961, noted multi-faceted Russian oligarch, left).

Mr Putin might find it hard again to trust others after his recent experience with Mr Prigozhin.  The president probably thinks he’s entitled to feel betrayed because Mr Prigozhin, as a billionaire oligarch and CEO of Mr Putin’s private army really was a thing of his creation and in sending a military convoy along the highway to threaten Moscow (a revolt, mutiny or insurrection depending on one’s interpretation), Mr Prigozhin was showing at least ingratitude.  Also not very trusting is likely to be Mr Prigozhin who may have little faith in the deal he agreed to: political exile in Russia’s neighboring vassal state of Belarus and an indemnity from prosecution in exchange for ending his quixotic revolt.  It’s certainly plausible he’ll avoid a Russian courtroom but his thoughts have probably turned to things such as accidents like falling from a tall building, being run over by several trucks, inadvertently ingesting poison or being exposed to a nerve agent like Novichok.  As Ernst Röhm (1887–1934; chief of the Nazi Sturmabteilung (the stormtroopers (the SA)) discovered in 1934, there can be consequences even for the things one hasn’t done but people think one might and as Mr Prigozhin probably impressed on Wagner’s troops more than once: “For everything you do there’s a price to be paid.”

Oligarch

Oligarch (pronounced ol-i-gahrk)

(1) In political science, one of the rulers in an oligarchy (a system of government characterized by the institutional or constructive rule of a few and the literal or effective exclusion of the many); a member of an oligarchy.

(2) A very rich person involved in business in a manner which interacts intimately with the organs of government, the nature of the relationship varying between systems but usually with the implication of mutually beneficial corrupt or improper (if sometimes technically lawful) conduct.

(3) In cosmogony, a proto-planet formed during oligarchic accretion.

1600-1610: From the French oligarque & olygarche, from the Late Latin oligarcha, from the Ancient Greek ὀλιγάρχης (oligárkhēs) and related to oligarkhia (government by the few), the construct being olig- (few) (from stem of oligos (few, small, little) (a word of uncertain origin)) +‎ -arch (ruler, leader) (from arkhein (to rule)).  The noun plural was oligarchs.  In English, an earlier form of oligarchy was the circa 1500 oligracie, a borrowing from the Old French.  Oligarch & oligarchy are nouns, oligarchal, oligarchical & oligarchic are adjectives, and oligarchically is an adverb; the noun plural is oligarchs.  The playful minigarch (the offspring of an oligarch) and oligarchette (a female oligarch or an aspiring oligarch not yet rich enough to be so described are both non-standard while oligarchie & oligarchisch are sometimes used to convey a deliberate sense of the foreign.  Oligarch is now almost never used in its classical sense to refer to rulers of a political entity but instead to describe the small numbers of those who have become exceedingly rich, usually in some improper (even if technically lawful) way with the corrupt and surreptitious cooperation of those in government, the implication being they too have benefited.  Words like plutocrat, potentate and tycoonocrat are sometimes used as synonyms but don’t covey the sense of gains improperly and corruptly achieved.

Oligarchs are sometimes described in the press as "colorful characters", something a bit misleading because many seek a low profile, something often advisable in Mr Putin's Russia.  In a movie about oligarchs Netflix presumably would focus on some of the more colorful.

In modern use, an oligarch is one of the select few people who have become very rich by virtue of their close connections to rule or influence leaders in an oligarchy (a government in which power is held by a select few individuals or a small class of powerful people).  Unlike the relationship between “monarch” & “monarchy”, “oligarch” & “oligarchy” are not used in the literature of political science in quite the same way.  A monarch’s relationship to their monarchy is a thing defined by the constitutional system under which they reign and that may be absolute, despotic or theocratic but is inherently directly linked.  However, even in a political system which is blatantly and obviously an oligarchy, the members of the ruling clique are not referred to as oligarchs by virtue of their place in the administration, the more common descriptors being autocrat, despot, fascist, tyrant, dictator, totalitarian, authoritarian, kleptocrat or other terms that to varying degrees hint at unsavoriness.  Instead, the word oligarch has come to be used as a kind of encapsulated critique of corruption and economic distortion and the individual oligarch a personification of that.  The modern oligarch is one who has massively profited, usually by gaining in some corrupt way either the resources which once belonged to the state or trading rights within the state which tend towards monopolistic or oligopolistic arrangements.  Inherent in the critique is the assumption that the corrupt relationship is a symbiotic one between oligarch and those in government, the details of which can vary: oligarchs may be involved in the political process or entirely excluded but a common feature to all such arrangements is that there is a mutual enrichment at the expense of the sate (ie the citizens).  The word oligarch has thus become divorced from oligarchy and attached only to oligopoly.

The word oligopoly dates from 1887, from the Medieval Latin oligopolium, the construct being the Ancient Greek ὀλίγος (olígos) (few) + πωλεῖν (poleîn) (to sell) from the primitive Indo-European root pel (to sell) and describes a market in which an industry is dominated by a small number of large-scale sellers called oligopolists (the adjectival form oligopolistic from a surprisingly recent 1939).  Oligopolies, which inherently reduce competition and impose higher prices on consumers do not of necessity form as a result of improper or corrupt collusion and may be entirely organic, the classic example of which is two competitors in a once broad market becoming increasingly efficient, both achieving such critical mass that others are unable to compete.  At that point, there is often a tendency for the two to collude to divide the market between them, agreeing not to compete in certain fields or geographical regions, effectively creating sectoral or regional monopolies.  If competitors do emerge, the oligopolists have sufficient economic advantage to be able temporarily to reduce their selling prices to below the cost of production & distribution, forcing the completion from the market, after which the profitable price levels are re-imposed.

A classic game theory model of oligopolistic behavior.

Although not thought desirable by economists, they’ve long attracted interest interest because they create interesting market structures, especially when they interact with instruments of government designed to prevent their emergence or at least ameliorate the consequences of their operation.  The most obvious restriction governments attempt to impose is to prevent collusion between oligopolists in an attempt to deny them the opportunity to set prices of particular goods.  Even if successful, this can only ever partially be done because most prices quickly become public knowledge and with so few sellers in a market, most of which tend to operate with similar input, production & distribution costs, each oligopolist can in most cases predict the actions of the others. This has been of interest in game theory because the decisions of one player are not only in reaction to that of the others but also influences their behavior.

Dartz Prombron, produced in Latvia and manufactured to much the same standard of robustness which during Great Patriotic War (1941-1945) made the Soviet-built T-34 tank so formidable.

The Prombron is now typical of the preferred transport for an oligarch, the traditional limousine not able to be configured to offer the same level of protection against attacks with military-grade weapons.  Prombrons were originally trimmed with leather from the foreskins of whale penises but the feature was dropped after protests from the environmental lobby.  It was a rare victory for the greenies in their battles with the Kremlin, usually a most unequal contest. 

Oligarchs in the modern sense operate differently and the Russian model under Mr Putin has become the exemplar although some on a smaller scale (notably Lebanon since 1990) are probably even more extreme.  The Russian oligarchs emerged in the 1990s in the chaos which prevailed after the dissolution of the old Soviet Union.  They were men, sometime outside government but often apparatchiks within, well-skilled in the corruption and the operations of the black market which constituted an increasingly large chunk of the economy in the last decade of the USSR and these skills they parlayed into their suddenly capitalistic world.  Capitalism however depends on there being private property and because the USSR was constructed on the basis of Marxist theory which demanded it was the state which owned and controlled the means of production and distribution, there was little of that.  So there was privatization, some of it officially and much of it anything but, the classic examples being a back-channel deal between the oligarch and someone in government purporting to be vested with the authority to sell the assets of the state.  Few in government did this without a cut (often under the guise of a equity mechanism called “loans for shares”) and indeed, some apparatchiks sold the assets to themselves and those assets could be nice little earners like oil & gas concessions or producers, electricity generators, transport networks or financial institutions.  One of the reasons the assets were able to be sold at unbelievably bargain prices was a product of Soviet accounting: because the book value of assets had so little meaning in communist accounting, in many cases recorded asset values hadn’t be updated in decades and were in any case sometimes only nominal.  There were therefore sales which, prima facie, might have appeared to verge on the legitimate.

2021 Aurus Senat, now the official presidential car of the Russian state.

Few were and in any event, even if the aspiring oligarch didn’t have the cash, somewhere in government there would be found an official able to arrange the state to loan the necessary fund from the resources of the state, if need be creating (effectively printing) the money.  From that point, newly acquitted assets could be leveraged, sold to foreign investors at huge profit or even operated in the novelty of the free market, an attractive proposition for many given the asset obtained from the state might be a natural monopoly, competition therefore of no immediate concern.  Thus was modern Russian capitalism born of what were economic crimes on a scale unimaginable to the legions condemned to death or years in the Gulag under comrade Stalin (1878-1953; Soviet leader 1924-1953).  Even before becoming prime-minister in 1999, Mr Putin was well aware of what had happened, being acquainted with some of the players in the process but shortly after assuming office, he had small a team of lawyers, accountants and economists undertake a forensic analysis to try more accurately to quantify who did what and who got how much.  Although the paperwork his investigative project produced has never been made public, it was reputed to have been reduced to a modestly-sized file but the contents were dynamic and put to good use.

In either 2003 or 2004, Mr Putin, assisted by officers of the FSB (successor to the alphabet-soup of similar agencies (Cheka, GPU, OGPU, NKGB, NKVD, SMERSH, MGB & (most famously) KGB)) experts in such things, “arranged” a series of interviews with the oligarchs whose conduct in the privatizations of 1990s had been most impressive (or egregious depending on one’s view).  Well aware of the relationship between wealth and political influence, Mr Putin’s explained that the oligarchs had to decide whether they wished to be involved in business or politics; they couldn’t do both.  Mr Putin then explained the extent of their theft from the state, how much was involved, who else facilitated and profited from the transactions and what would be the consequences for all concerned were the matters to come to trial.  Then to sweeten the deal, Mr Putin pointed out that although the oligarchs had on a grand scale stolen their wealth, because “they had stolen it fair and square”, they could keep it if they agreed to refrain from involvement in politics.  The Russian oligarchy understood his language, the lucidity of his explanation perhaps enhanced by oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky (b 1963; then listed as the richest man in Russia and in the top-twenty worldwide) being arrested on charges of fraud and tax evasion, shortly before the meetings were convened (he was convicted in 2005 and sentenced to nine years in prison and while serving his sentence was charged with and found guilty of embezzlement and money laundering.  Mr Putin later pardoned Khodorkovsky and he was released to self-imposed exile in late 2013).  Few failed to note the significance of Mr Khodorkovsky having been "meddling in politics".

Alastair Campbell (b 1957; Downing Street Director of Communications & official spokesperson (1997–2003) rear) with Vladimir Putin (b 1952; Prime-Minister of Russia 1999-2000 & 2008-2012, President of Russia 1999-2008 & since 2012, left) and Tony Blair (b 1953; UK Prime Minister 1997-2007, right).  Mr Putin in recent years has stretched plausible deniability well beyond the point at which plausibility can be said to have become implausible and the not infrequently seen: "cause of death: falling from window of high building" is known by Russians as the "oligarch elevator".  Predating even the Tsarist state, grim humor has a long tradition in Russia.     

Mr Putin being taken for a drive by George W Bush (b 1946; George XLIII, US president 2001-2009) in the Russian president's GAZ-21 Volga (left) and casting an admiring glance at his 2009 Lada Niva (right).

In a sign the oligarchs were wise to comply, it was estimated by Bill Browder (b 1964; CEO and co-founder of the once Moscow-linked Hermitage Capital Management) during his testimony to the US Senate Judiciary Committee in 2017 that the biggest single increase in Mr Putin’s personal wealth happened immediately after Mr Khodorkovsky was jailed.  Given the history, Mr Browder is perhaps not an entirely impartial viewer but the pact between the autocrat and the oligarchy has been well-understood for years but what has always attracted speculation is the possibility that attached to it was a secret protocol whereby Mr Putin received transactional fees, imposing essentially a license to operate in Russia, alleged by some to be a cut of as much as 50%, based apparently on assessed profits rather than turnover.  Even if a half-share is too high and his cut is a more traditional 10%, the amount payable over the years would have been a very big number so there’s been much speculation about Mr Putin’s money, some estimates suggesting he may have a net wealth in the US$ billions.  That would seem truly impressive, given the Kremlin each year publishes a disclosure of their head of state’s income and assets and the last return disclosed Mr Putin enjoys an annual salary of US$140,000 and owns an 800-square-foot (74 m²) apartment, his other notable assets being three cars: a 1960 (first series) GAZ-21 Volga, a 1965 (second series) GAZ-M21P Volga and a 2009 Lada Niva 4x4.  Keen on outdoor pursuits, he also owns a camping trailer.

A country cottage on the Black Sea coast alleged to be owned by Mr Putin.  The large grounds surrounding the cottage are an indication why Mr Putin needs his 2009 Lada 4x4 & camping trailer.

On the basis of that, income and net wealth seem not at all out of alignment but intriguingly, he’s been photographed with some high-end watches on his wrist, including an A. Lange & Söhne 1815 Tourbograph which sells for around US$500,000.  He is rumored to be the owner of a 190,000 square-foot (17,650 m²) mansion which sits atop a cliff overlooking the Black Sea (reputedly Russia’s largest private residence and known, in a nod to the understated manner of the rich, as “Putin’s country cottage”) which has an ice hockey rink, a casino, a nightclub with stripper poles, an extravagantly stocked wine cellar and the finest furniture in Louis XIV style, the toilet-roll holders apparently at US$1,250 apiece (although, given the scale of the place, he may have received a bulk-purchase discount).  It demands a full-time staff of forty to maintain the estate, the annual running costs estimated at US$2-3 million.  Designed by Italian architect Lanfranco Cirillo (b 1959), and officially owned (though alleged to be held under a secret trust of which Mr Putin is the sole beneficiary) by oligarch Alexander Ponomarenko (b 1964), the construction cost was estimated to be somewhere around a US$ billion which seems expensive but a yacht currently moored in Italy and alleged also to belong to Mr Putin is said to have cost not much less to launch so either or both may actually represent good value and to assure privacy, the Russian military enforces a no-fly zone around the property.  Like many well-connected chaps around the world, a few of Mr Putin’s billions figured in the release of the Panama Papers in 2016.

A GAZ-23 Volga at a Moscow car show, 2006.

Apart from the Black Sea cottage, there are unverified reports Mr Putin is the owner of 19 other houses, 58 aircraft & helicopters and 700 cars (although it’s not clear if that number includes his two Volgas and the Lada).  No verified breakdown of the 700 cars has ever been published but given Mr Putin’s obvious fondness for Volgas, it may be his collection includes the limited-production variant of the GAZ-21 Volga, 603 (as the GAZ-M23 Volga) of which were produced between 1962-1970 for the exclusive use of the KGB (Комитет государственной безопасности (Komitet gosudarstvennoy bezopasnosti), the Committee for State Security) and other Soviet “special services”.  Equipped with the 5.5 litre (337 cubic inch) V8 engine from the big GAZ-13 Chaika (Gull) (1959-1981 and in the Soviet hierarchy, second only to the even bigger ZiL limousines (1936-2012)), the car was said to be a not entirely successful piece of engineering but it was certainly faster than the four-cylinder model on which it was based.  It’s never been clear just what was the top speed because the speedometer was calibrated only to 180 km/h (112 mph) but one intrepid KGB apparatchik claimed to have achieved that and reported his Volga was “still accelerating”.  Known to be nostalgic for the old ways of the KGB (with all that implies), it’s hoped Mr Putin has preserved at least one.

Restored GAZ-23 Volga.

Identified as 1962 model (still in the "transitional" bodywork used between the second and third series) the car is claimed to be a genuine, fully-restored GAZ-23 and while there were some sites which suggested it was a “Russian restromod” (ie a M-21 built to M-23 specifications), a hard-to-replicate detail like the special locking mechanism which permitted the trunk (boot) to be opened only when the passenger’s side back door was ajar (said to prevent the prevents the penetration of anyone unauthorized) does lend credence to the claims of authenticity.  Additionally, the supplied documents do support the claim and tie in with the extant license plates (5487 ЮБЯ).  This car wasn’t allocated to the KGB and the 20 years it was in government service were spent as a courier vehicle, transporting people or packages between Moscow and one of the space institutes and period photographs suggest that while white-wall tyres did exist behind the iron curtain, they were rare and not all M-23s seem to have been fitted with either the “chrome package” (the “keels” & “arrows” on the fenders) or the amber turn signals (used on export models).  While a million odd of the four-cylinder versions were produced, between 1962-1970, only 603 V8 M-23s left the factory and in the era, none were ever offered for general sale, availability restricted to the select few organs of the state deemed to require the inconspicuous hotrod.  As far is known, 19 still exist, mostly in museums or private collections although whether any remain stashed away in the Kremlin’s garages has never been disclosed which may seem strange but much in Mr Putin’s Russia remains a state secret.

The origins of the M-23 lie in a commission the KGB in 1960 issued to the Gorky Automobile Plant for the design of a vehicle able to be used for pursuits, VIP escorts and other “special missions”, the KGB doing a great many of the latter.  On the same basis “plain clothes” police in many jurisdictions use cars visually indistinguishable from those run by private citizens, the KGB specified that externally, their special model had to look exactly the same as the standard Volga GAZ-21 but be more powerful and thus faster.  In other words, KGB Volgas were to be “equal to” and yet “more equal” than the others.  In the commission, it was specified the car must be able to attain a top speed of 170 km/h (106 mph) and achieve 100 km/h (62 mph) within 16 seconds which may not now sound impressive but in the Warsaw Pact of 1960, it would have been supercar stuff.

GAZ 5.5 litre V8 in M-23.

The Chaika’s V8 was a tight fit in the smaller engine bay of the M-21 and the engineers were compelled to align it 2º off centre of the crankshaft and even after redesigning the right-side chassis member, the clearance between parts of the structure and the engine was in places just a few millimetres.  The V8 was by Western standards inefficient and generated much heat so the use of the Chaika’s large radiator was essential, meaning the frontal internal panels had to be changed, the opportunity taken also to strengthen the front cross-members, better to support the V8’s greater weight.  As was to become the practice when Detroit did such things, the suspension was upgraded using springs coiled from steel bars of increased diameter and heavy-duty shock absorbers were fitted.  Being a V8, there were of course two manifolds and thus two exhaust pipes but to disguise the identity of the thing, the two pipes terminated near the rear bumper but did not protrude into view.  As the US manufacturers also discovered, when it came to putting big, wide V8s in cars designed originally to house something more narrow, few components were as troublesome as exhaust manifolds and the performance of some muscle cars (notably the big-block (383 & 440 cubic inch (6.3 & 7.2 litre) Dodge Darts and second generation Plymouth Barracudas) was compromised by the need to use more restrictive systems.

Separated at birth: 1962 GAZ-23 (left) and 1964 Pontiac GTO (right).

Although barely mentioned by collectors, the GAZ-23 pre-dated the Pontiac Pontiac GTO (1963-1974) by more than a year though it's the GTO which usually is cited as "the first muscle car" (a concept defined as "a big engine from the full-sized line installed in the smaller intermediate platform") but the KGB's project was exactly that.  In a sense, the true MRCA (most recent common ancestor) of the muscle cars of the 1960s was probably the 1936 Buick Century, a revised version of the model 60, created by replacing the 233 cubic inch (3.8 litre) straight eight with the 320 cubic inch (5.2 litre) unit from the longer, heavier Roadmaster.  It wasn’t exactly a transplant into an “intermediate” (a concept unknown until the 1960s) but the process was not dissimilar.  Still, if one sticks to the accepted the definition, it’s the V8 GAZ-23 which came first and not the GTO but the Soviet vehicle rates not even a mention in Mike Mueller’s (b 1959) otherwise comprehensive Muscle Car Source Book (2015, Quarto Publishing Group), something which is that’s publication’s only omission of note.  Mr Mueller’s book is unusual in that it appears to contain not a single error, a rarity in a field in which misinformation is rife.  His book is data-dense and highly recommended though should Mr Mueller ever release a revised edition, hopefully the KGB’s seemingly thus far unacknowledged contribution to the muscle car ecosystem will gain a footnote.  While chief engineer of GM's (General Motors) PMD (Pontiac Motor Division), shamelessly John DeLorean (1925–2005) stole the GTO's name (Gran Turismo Omologato) from the Italians so it's at least not impossible he pinched the concept from the Soviets. 

Mr Putin agitprop.

Mr Putin has admitted: "I am the wealthiest man, not just in Europe but in the whole world: I collect emotions. I am wealthy in that the people of Russia have twice entrusted me with the leadership of a great nation such as Russia. I believe that is my greatest wealth."  In conventional (ie money) terms, quite how rich Mr Putin might be is such a swirl of estimates, rumors, supposition and doubtlessly invention (lies) that it's unlikely anyone except those disinclined to discuss the matter really know and after all, if he's rich as his detractors claim, he probably isn't exactly sure himself.  Given that, his statement seemed intended to clear up any misunderstandings.