Corporal

Corporal (pronounced kawr-per-uhl or kaw-pruhl)

(1) Of the human body; bodily; physical

(2) In zoology, of the body proper, as distinguished from the head and limbs.

(3) As corporeal, belonging to the material world (mostly obsolete except for historic references although still used as a technical term in philosophy).

(4) In ecclesiastical accoutrements, a fine cloth, usually of linen, on which the consecrated elements are placed or with which they are covered during the Eucharist (also called the communion cloth).

(5) In Christian theology, as the seven Corporal Works of Mercy, the practical acts of compassion, as distinct from the seven Spiritual Works (the contemplative acts).

(6) In military use, a non-commissioned officer ranking above lance corporal (private first class (PFC) in US Army) and below a sergeant; in the Royal Navy, a petty officer who assists the master-at-arms; similar use in the armed services of many countries.

1350–1400: From the Middle English corporall, from the Anglo-French corporall, from the Latin corporālis (bodily, of the body) from corpus (body), the construct being corpor- (stem of corpuscorpus) + -ālis (the third-declension two-termination suffix (neuter -āle), used to form adjectives of relationship from nouns or numerals, from the primitive Indo-European -li-, which later dissimilated into an early version of -aris).  The use describing alter cloths was derived from the Medieval Latin corporāle pallium eucharistic (altar cloth) and replaced corporas, itself inherited from Classical Latin under the influence of Old French.  The pronunciation is kaw-pruhl in military use and kawr-per-uhl for all other purposes.  The adoption by the military dates from 1570–1580 but the origin is uncertain.  It may have come from the Old French (via Italian) into Middle French as a variant of caporal, from the Italian caporale, apparently a contraction of phrase capo corporale (corporal head) in the sense of the head of a body (of soldiers).  Source was the Latin caput (head), perhaps influenced also by the Old French corps (body (of men)).  Corporal is a noun & adjective, corporality, corporalcy & corporalship are nouns and corporally is an adverb; the noun plural is corporals.

The strategic corporal

The idea of the “strategic corporal” was first explained in a paper published in 1999 by USMC (US Marine Corps) General Charles Krulak (b 1942).  Based on both practical experience and his analysis of the likely evolution of conflicts into localized, small-scale but intense theatres of operation, he described what he called the “three block war” in which the Marines could be involved in conventional fire-fights, peacekeeping operations and humanitarian aid, all conduced in a geographical area no bigger than three city blocks and undertaken either sequentially or, more challengingly, simultaneously and in an environment in which hostile, friendly & neutral forces are intermeshed.  The reference to the “three city blocks” was included for didactic purposes to illustrate his point that the training of military personnel needed to be refined better to encompass those required to make independent decisions, including the non-commissioned officers (NCOs) & junior officers actually commanding small numbers of troops on the ground.  Just as the term “three blocks” wasn’t a literal limitation but a way of illustrating a change of mindset from the traditional focus on divisional & brigade level deployment, the phrase “strategic corporal” was chosen because in the military that is the lowest rank at which a soldier is in command of others and thus in a position to make decisions which could have some strategic significance.  Typically, a “strategic corporal” might be a lieutenant who in modern warfare, must be trained to make major decisions without the benefit of direction from the chain of command.

The concept has been influential in many militaries and has been compared with the idea of the “man on the ground” doctrine which emerged in the nineteenth century when the early technologies of long-distance communication meant that for the first time it was practical for military commanders in remote locations to seek and receive instructions from perhaps thousands of miles away.  It would however be decades before those interactions habitually became real-time so the idea of the “strategic corporal” would not then have been unfamiliar and there was an at least tacit acknowledgement that the man on the ground would often be the one making critical decisions rather than anyone in the high command or even the headquarters staff in theatre.  This could of course mean a bad decision could theoretically trigger a war but as "the Fashoda Incident" (1898 and the retrospective re-naming of what was at the time in Paris and London thought of as “the Fashoda Crisis”) illustrated, the man on the ground having the necessary background and training to make a decision based on factors beyond what was militarily possible could have far-reaching consequences.

So the idea of the strategic corporal is that training in such matters needs to extend to the layers of command where such decisions need to be made, not to the point at which formerly they’re delegated or devolved.  In a sense that of course is a mere recognition of reality but the elevation of the concept into a doctrine has been criticized as becoming “mythologized within the military culture [and] forever associated with negative consequences”, the result of the ultimate responsibility for decisions being seen through legal filters, leaders now too “…concerned with the perceived risk..” and as a means to manage that “…senior leaders have elevated decision authorities far away from anyone but themselves”.

Military analysts have noted that military operations conducted in the Gaza Strip provide the perfect example of a “three block war”, one that has the potential to unfold as a series of “three block” theatres.  In these urban environments in which a civilian population co-exists still in high-density with paramilitary forces and irregular combatants, decisions taken by a soldier in direct command of fewer than a dozen troops in the invading army can have a strategic significance well beyond the particular three blocks in which they’re operating.  Complicating this is the suspicion expressed by some that a high civilian death-toll is actually an outcome desired by the Hamas (Hamas the acronym of the Arabic  حركة المقاومة الإسلامية (Ḥarakah al-Muqāwamah al-ʾIslāmiyyah) (Islamic Resistance Movement); HMS glossed in the Hamas Covenant (1998) by the Arabic word ḥamās (حماس) (which translates variously as “strength”, “zeal” or “bravery”)).  The evidence to support this is strong in that the nature of the attack staged by the Hamas on Israeli civilians on 7 October 2023 was of such a nature that retaliation by the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) would be bound to result in civilian causalities in Gaza; there are not effective alternative military tactics available, the choices being only to retaliate or not.

The idea used by Hamas is not new.  In 1942, the Czechoslovak government-in-exile (which in 1940 had shifted from Paris to London), had become especially disturbed by the success SS-Obergruppenführer (general) Reinhard Heydrich (1904–1942; head of the Reich Security Main Office 1939-1942) was enjoying as Deputy Protector of Bohemia and Moravia, a role in which he was effectively the Nazi’s “governor of Czechoslovak”.  Using the Nazi’s tradition method of governing conquered territories by “carrot & stick” Heydrich had not spared the stick early in his administration (1941-1942) but been remarkably successful with the inducements he offered and had achieved an unexpectedly high degree of cooperation with the local population.  With little signs of an effective resistance movement operating, the government in exile took the decision, in cooperation with the British Special Operations Executive (SOE), to send an assassination squad to Prague, knowing full well the retribution against the population would be severe but the object was to use that to stimulate local resistance.  More than a thousand Czechs were killed in revenge for Heydrich’s death.

So in the awful business of war, civilian deaths can be thought of as useful political devices, something which in Islamic theology is regarded as the noble sacrifice of martyrdom.  The Hamas, having concluded (not unreasonably) that 75 years on, the leaders of many Arab states had tired of the Palestinian “problem” and were moving on, regarding the Jewish state as a permanent part of the region’s political geography with the advantages of détente greater than those of conflict, needed to be back on the agenda.  The Hamas understand a resort to diplomacy is unlikely much to influence the Arab rulers but the spilling of Muslim blood at the hands of the IDF will bring protest to the streets in the region and beyond.  This of course makes inevitable that when the strategic corporals proceed, however cautiously, through the rubble of Gaza’s blocks, they’ll be encouraged by their opponents to make decisions and these decisions can have consequences which ripple far and perhaps for a generation.  What one strategic corporal decides to do really does matter.  By comparison, most of the statements and resolutions, issued or passed by politicians, ex-politicians and other worthies around the planet will be noted with equal interest by those in Tel Aviv, the Hamas to the south, the Hezbollah to the north, the Ayatollahs to the east and the fish to the west.

Corporal and Spiritual Works of Mercy

The Bible reduces the New Testament’s conception of mercy to seven practical (corporal) and seven spiritual (contemplative) acts, each said to be a virtue influencing one's will to have compassion for, and, if possible, ameliorate another's misfortune.  Italian Dominican friar & philosopher Saint Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) thought that although mercy is, as it were, the spontaneous product of charity, it must be thought a special virtue adequately distinguishable from its effects.  Later theologians noted its motive is the misery which one discerns in another, particularly in so far as this condition is deemed to be, in some sense at least, involuntary but even if not, the necessity is to offer succor of either body or soul.

Corporal works of mercy

To feed the hungry
To give drink to the thirsty
To clothe the naked
To harbor the harborless
To visit the sick
To ransom the captive
To bury the dead

Spiritual works of mercy

To instruct the ignorant
To admonish sinners
To bear wrongs patiently
To forgive offences willingly
To comfort the afflicted
To pray for the living and the dead
To counsel the doubtful

The Gospel of Matthew (Matthew 25:34-41) makes clear those who offer mercy “…are righteous and their souls will be granted eternal life…” whereas those who do not “…shall be cursed, cast into everlasting fire and given over to the devil.”

34 Then shall the King say unto them on his right hand, Come, ye blessed of my Father, inherit the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world:

35 For I was an hungred, and ye gave me meat: I was thirsty, and ye gave me drink: I was a stranger, and ye took me in:

36 Naked, and ye clothed me: I was sick, and ye visited me: I was in prison, and ye came unto me.

***

41 Then shall he say also unto them on the left hand, Depart from me, ye cursed, into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels:

42 For I was an hungred, and ye gave me no meat: I was thirsty, and ye gave me no drink:

43 I was a stranger, and ye took me not in: naked, and ye clothed me not: sick, and in prison, and ye visited me not.

46 And these shall go away into everlasting punishment: but the righteous into life eternal.

Tony Abbott (b 1957; Australian prime-minister 2013-2015) visited Cardinal George Pell (1941-2023) in prison (a corporal work of mercy).  In this act, come Judgement Day, he will be found to have acted righteously.

Pope Francis (b 1936; pope since 2013) didn't visit Cardinal Pell in prison but did remember him in his prayers (a spiritual work of mercy).  In this act, come Judgement Day, he will be found to have acted righteously.

Lindsay Lohan 6126 wool blend military coat in black.

Military uniforms have long influenced fashion and in the 1960s, the counter culture adopted them with some sense of irony.  Camouflage patterns have always been popular but the dress uniforms are also used as a model, the insignia, sometimes in elaborated form added as embellishments.  The insignia of a corporal is a two-bar chevron, depicted variously upwards or downwards, depending on the service.

Bulge

Bulge (pronounced buhlj)

(1) A rounded projection, bend or protruding part; protuberance; hump; to swell or bend outward; to be protuberant.

(2) Any sudden increase, as of numbers, often used in economics or demography.

(3) In the maritime sciences, a rising in small waves on the surface of a body of water, caused by the action of a fish or fishes in pursuit of food underwater.

(4) As bulging, to describe a box or similar container, the shape of which is distorted by being filled beyond its nominal capacity.

(5) In colloquial use, the outline of male genitals visible through clothing, a form especially popular in the states & micro-states of Melanesia and used also (by analogy with the bulge caused by a wallet) as a descriptor of wealth.

1200-1250: From the Middle English bulge (leather bag; hump), from the Old Northern French boulge & bouge (leather bag), from the Late Latin bulga (leather sack), from the Gaulish bulga & bulgos, from the Proto-Celtic bolgos (sack, bag, stomach).  It was cognate with the various English forms bilge, belly, bellows & budget, the French bouge, the Irish bolg (bag) and the German Balg; a doublet of budge.  Ultimate source was the primitive Indo-European bhelgh (to swell), an extended form of the root bhel (to blow, swell).  The sense of "a swelling, a rounded protuberance" is first recorded in the 1620s and it’s likely the later bilge is a nautical variant.  The later, more familiar military meaning "bulging part of a military front" was first noted in 1916, the Admiralty variation to refer to the shape a warship’s hull assumed after the addition of anti-torpedo armor appearing in the records of naval architects a year later.  The famous phrase "battle of the bulge" has been re-purposed by the weight-loss industry.  Synonyms and related words include wart, lump, nodule, protrude, swell, sag, bloat, projection, bump, swelling, promontory, growth, excrescence, dilation, bunch, protrusion, salient, hump, sac & blob.  Bulge, bulger & bulginess are nouns, bulging & bulgy are adjectives, bulged is a verb and bulgingly is an adverb; the noun plural is bulges.

Increasing bulginess: Lindsay Lohan's baby bump.  English phrases emerge organically and women seem much to prefer "baby bump" to "baby bulge", a Google search for the former returning 33,300,000 hits against a mere 35,000 for the latter.  "Baby bulge" does however have (usually unwanted) role in the process, the "postpartum baby bulge" a description of an abdomen which stubbornly resists post-delivery inducements to return to it's pre-pregnancy shape.

The hood (bonnet) bulge

1957 Jaguar XKSS (left), 1955 Mercedes-Benz 300 SLR (W196S) Uhlenhaut coupé) (centre) and Mercedes-Benz 300 SL (W198, 1954-1963, right).

A hood (bonnet) bulge differs from a hood scoop in that the former exists purely for the purpose of providing clearance for some piece of machinery beneath.  What needs to be accommodated typically will be an inconveniently tall part of the engine, a supercharger or some other component in the induction system.  Jaguar added a bulge to the D-Type (1954-1957) because after lowering the profile of the hood in the quest for aerodynamic efficiency, the XK-six wouldn't quite fit, even with the addition of a dry sump which gained a few inches.  The bulge was carried over to the XKSS, the road-going version of the D-Type.  On the Jaguars, the bulge was centrally placed but Mercedes-Benz, adopting the same expedient for the 300 SLRs needed theirs to exist on only one side where it also acted as an air-intake for the mechanical fuel-injection, an example of a bulge doing also some scooping.  Asymmetry is common on racing cars where function rules but the factory apparently couldn't in those days bring themselves to do it on road cars.  Although the 300 SLs (both the gullwings and the roadsters) needed only the bulge on the right-hard side (the tall, dry-sumped engine canted 50^o to the left) to accommodate the fuel-injection's ram-tubes, a matching bulge was included, thus ensuring the symmetry prized by the Germans.

MG MGC-GT (1967-1969, left), Iso-Grifo Can-Am (1968-1972, centre) and Ford Falcon BA XR8 (2002-2004, right).

Mercedes-Benz may have been disturbed by asymmetry but it didn't worry the pragmatists at MG who, having shoe-horned into the MGB (1962-1980) a big iron lump of a straight-six which necessitated using a torsion bar arrangement for the front suspension, found even their first attempt at a bulge still wasn't enough.  A dry sump would have solved the problem but that would have been expensive so a "blister" was added at the offending point on the bulge; a bulging bulge as it were.  Apparently a matching blister on the right was never considered and the MGC has one of the industry's more admired bonnets although that feeling didn't extend to the rest of the car, the model not even a modest success in the market and it lasted but two seasons.  The later V8 version (1973-1976) was both a better car and one that needed no bulge at all but it fell victim to the first oil shock.  There are those who claim the rectilinear protrusion on the hood of the big-block Iso Grifos can't be called a bulge at all and many etymologists might agree but such pedantry should be agreed with and ignored.  Nicknamed the "penthouse", the neo-brutalist construction is one of the industry's great bulges and it's entirely functional, affording clearance to the induction system and providing airflow, in & out.  Not functional at all was the bulge Ford in Australia added to the XR8 Falcons when the BA model was released in 2002.  Cheerfully admitting it was unnecessary and there just for looks, the factory later took advantage of its presence to advertise things like the V8's power output, a juvenile pleasure much appreciated by the target market.

Battle of the Bulge, Dec 1944-Jan 1945

The Ardennes Offensive, (Wacht am Rhein (Watch on the Rhine) was the German code-name) popularly known in the West as the Battle of the Bulge, was the last major German strategic offensive of World War II and ironically, Watch on the Rhine was the title of a play by Lillian Hellman (1905-1984) which debuted on Broadway in 1941, the theme being the need for an international alliance to oppose the Nazis.  After many delays, it began on 16 December 1944 and lasted officially until 25 January but had been repulsed by Allied forces weeks earlier.  It wasn't the first use of "bulge" in a battlefield context, the phrase documented in June 1940 in discussions about the German offensive in France and many generals over the centuries would have seen bulges represented on their situation maps.  One especially well-known One of the best known was Unternehmen Zitadelle (Operation Citadel), the German operation conducted in July 1943 against Soviet forces in the Kursk salient although, unlike the Ardennes Offensive, the Battle of Kursk was staged along a very long front and is best understood as a series of shifting bulges and the theatre evolved rapidly into a huge, dusty, swirling mass of tanks, artillery assaults and air attacks.  It remains history's largest tank battle.  

The bulge, December 1944.

Because of the disparity in military and economic strength between the German and Allied forces, in retrospect, the Ardennes Offensive appears nonsensical but, at the time, it made strategic and political sense.  Adolf Hitler (1889-1945; Führer (leader) and German head of government 1933-1945 & head of state 1934-1945) knew, confronted as he was by attacks from the west, east and south, continuing to fight a defensive war could only delay the inevitable defeat.  An offensive in the east was impossible because of the strength of the Red Army and even a major battlefield victor in the south would have no strategic significance so it was only in the west that opportunities existed.

For many reasons, by late 1944 the Allied advance in the west had stalled after remarkable progress since the D-Day landings 6 June 1944) and defensive lines had been formed, the most lightly defended being those in the Ardennes Forest, the very region which had been the conduit for the German’s stunningly successful blitzkrieg campaign in 1940.  Despite that history, 1944’s rapid advance through collapsing German lines had convinced Allied intelligence their enemy was no longer capable of major offensive operations.  It was this compliancy which made the German attack possible and in military colleges this problem, created by what in the psychology literature is called "Bayesian perception" (from the probability theories developed by English statistician Thomas Bayes (circa 1700-1761)), is often more helpfully described as "top-down processing" which tends to overwhelm the inherently more accurate "bottom-up processing".  The idea is that a "Bayesian brain" will use prior knowledge and assumptions which will influence perceptions meaning we see what we expect to see and fail to observe what is not expected and the more intensely something is focused upon, the more acute becomes the tendency.  Thus, because the phrase "Paris in the spring" is so well known, a single glance will confirm the brain's perception and the duplicate "the" will remain unseen.

In the last great example of the professionalism and tactical improvisation which was a hallmark of their operations during the war, the Wehrmacht (the German military) secretly assembled a large armored force, essentially under the eyes of the Allies and staged a surprise attack through the Ardennes, aided immeasurably by the cover of heavy, low clouds which precluded both Allied reconnaissance and deployment of their overwhelming strength in air-power.  Hitler’s audacious strategic objective, which, given the forces available, none of his generals though possible, was to advance to the Belgium port of Antwerp, splitting the Allied lines in a pincer movement, destroying their four armies.  This he hoped would force the Western Allies out of the war, permitting the Germans to focus their entire strength against the Soviet Union in the east.

Initially successful, the Wehrmacht’s advance punched several holes in the line, the shape of which, when marked on a map, lent the campaign the name Battle of the Bulge.  Within days however, the weather cleared and the Allies were able to unleash almost unopposed their overwhelming superiority in air power.  This, combined with their vast military and logistical resources, doomed the Ardennes Offensive, inflicting losses from which the Wehrmacht never recovered.  From mid-January on, German forces never regained the initiative, retreating on all fronts until the inevitable defeat in May.

The IDF, Hamas and the Hezbollah, October 2023

Mr Netanyahu.  His friends, (both of them) call him "Bibi".

Already, comparisons with 1944 are being made with the apparent failure of the much vaunted Israeli intelligence machine, either to detect or act upon indications of the activities which would have been a prelude to the audacious attacks launched on 7 October 2023 by the Hamas into Israeli territory.  Although low-tech by comparison with a conventional military operation, the scale of what the Hamas managed to stage would still have demanded movements of materiel and personnel, an exercise in logistics which should have been noticed.  In an echo of the Yom Kippur War (6-25 October 1973), presumably, some activity would have been noticed but clearly it wasn't interpreted as an imminent threat so the inevitable review will have to focus on both the gathering and analysis of intelligence and one thing which will be considered is whether, as in the winter of 1944, assumptions were allowed to prevail over facts on the ground.  Any inquiry can be expected to be rigorous but only within the terms of reference the government will provide and those parameters are unlikely to allow any consideration of the consequences of the recent actions of Benjamin Netanyahu (b 1949; Israeli prime minister 1996-1999, 2009-2021 and since 2022).  Mr Netanyahu has for some time been attempting to make structural changes to Israel's courts, allegedly because he wishes to avoid any judicial scrutiny of the corruption charges which he faces.  The proposed changes to the courts are would actually align the way things are done in Israel with those used in many Western, democratic nations but it's the political context which has made them controversial and part of the widespread and long-lasting public protest has included large numbers of military reservists (on which the security of the Jewish state depends) refusing to serve while the government continues the legal manoeuvres which would have the effect of shielding the prime minister from prosecution.  Mr Netanyahu is one of the great survivors of modern politics and his longevity in office has been a remarkable achievement in one of the world's more difficult neighborhoods but it's unpredictable whether he can turn the shock of the Hamas incursion to his advantage and that is likely to depend upon managing any perception his being distracted by his own legal difficulties made Israel unusually vulnerable.

Securing any advantage will of course depend on Israel gaining what can be presented as a victory, something which in recent conflicts, north & south, has been as elusive on the battlefield as on social media.  Nor is the Hamas attack the only thing which will absorb the resources of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF).  In the north, there is the even more formidable Hezbollah and few in the intelligence community have cast doubt on reports the Shi'ite militia (which out-guns the armed forces of Lebanon and has more political influence) have some hundred-thousand short & medium range rockets available for deployment south of the Litani River (the Qasimiyeh or River Leontes).  Within hours of the Sunni Hamas launching their operation, the Hezbollah targeted Israeli military positions in the disputed Shebaa Farms, announcing it was acting "in solidarity" with the Palestinian people and in response, the IDF responded with artillery barrages.  No casualties were reported and at this stage the attack in the north seems to be thought a supportive gesture rather than anything strategic and the consensus is the Hezbollah will act at scale only if the situation in Gaza evolved to offer a particularly attractive opportunity and even then it would require approval from Tehran; in an unsubtle waring directed at the Ayatollahs, the Pentagon announced the movement of an aircraft carrier into the region.  The Hamas have seemingly timed their high-risk attack with some thought.  With the war in Ukraine demanding much military, political and financial support from the West (something already beginning to fray as Moscow predicted it would in any battle of attrition), the US government in political & fiscal paralysis and Israeli support for its own government at a historic low, the Hamas will have sniffed blood.  Nor will they be unaware the most long-lasting legacy of the Yom Kippur War fifty years earlier was the Arab oil embargo and the spike in the price which ended the long post-war prosperity in the West and triggered the political and economic upheavals which would last a decade.  The structure of the world economy and the imperatives of governments are not in 2023 quite what they were in 1973 but these things will be on the minds of many in many places.

In the short term, within the Israeli intelligence establishment, there will be an admission the military specialists will have to share more of the space with the political analysts.  With a death toll on both sides already in the thousands, the focus is of course on bullets and bombs but what Hamas has also done is stake their claim for support (1) in the region, (2) among the Arab & Palestinian diaspora and (3) from those governments willing to fund proxies for their campaigns against the West.  In this sense, the Hamas is advertising themselves as a muscular resistance to Israeli (ie Western) oppression and occupation, contrasting themselves with Fatah, the faction controlling the Palestinian Authority which exercises nominal authority over what is left of the Left Bank territories.  The Hamas regard Fatah as as least accommodative while some use the slur "collaborators".  Thus positioning the contrast as something like the Marquis vs Vichy, October's assault has a political aspect and in that they identified their target market rather as the Republican Party's "House Freedom Caucus" focused on those dissatisfied with the direction of their own leadership.

What Hamas are practicing is politics with a high civilian death toll, the rationale for that being every Palestinian who is killed will have died a martyr's death with all that implies, theologically and socially.  As a tactic, what Hamas are doing is a kind of political intervention into what they see as the increasingly disturbing trend of Arab nations moving towards normalization of relations with the state of Israel without any settlement of the "Palestinian problem".  If the IDF can be induced to respond with such severity that the civilian death toll in Gaza rises to the point where the pressure from the so called "Arab street" is of such intensity that Arab states are forced to retreat from their recent rapprochements, for Hamas, that would be progress.  There was a time when the strategists in Gaza might have imagined the regional reaction would be something more tangible on the ground but as they've noticed, winds of change can blow in both directions and now it's only in Tehran there's much support for their long-standing position that the only final solution for the Palestinians is the destruction of the state of Israel.

Vexillology

Vexillology (pronounced vek-suh-lol-uh-jee)

The study of and the collection of information about flags.

1957 (and in print since 1959): The construct was vexill(um) + -ology.  Vexillum (the plural vexilla) was from the Latin vēxillum (flag, banner), from the Proto-Italic wekslolom (and synchronically a diminutive form of vēlum), from the Proto-Italic wekslom, from the primitive Indo-European wegslom, from weg- (to weave, bind) and cognate with the English wick.  The Latin vexillum translated literally as “flag; banner” but in English was used to mean (1) a flag, banner, or standard, (2) in military use a formation company of troops serving under one standard, (3) the sign of the cross, (4) in botany, the upper petal of a papilionaceous flower and (5) in ornithology, the rhachis and web of a feather taken together.  The suffix -ology was formed from -o- (as an interconsonantal vowel) +‎ -logy.  The origin in English of the -logy suffix lies with loanwords from the Ancient Greek, usually via Latin and French, where the suffix (-λογία) is an integral part of the word loaned (eg astrology from astrologia) since the sixteenth century.  French picked up -logie from the Latin -logia, from the Ancient Greek -λογία (-logía).  Within Greek, the suffix is an -ία (-ía) abstract from λόγος (lógos) (account, explanation, narrative), and that a verbal noun from λέγω (légō) (I say, speak, converse, tell a story).  In English the suffix became extraordinarily productive, used notably to form names of sciences or disciplines of study, analogous to the names traditionally borrowed from the Latin (eg astrology from astrologia; geology from geologia) and by the late eighteenth century, the practice (despite the disapproval of the pedants) extended to terms with no connection to Greek or Latin such as those building on French or German bases (eg insectology (1766) after the French insectologie; terminology (1801) after the German Terminologie).  Within a few decades of the intrusion of modern languages, combinations emerged using English terms (eg undergroundology (1820); hatology (1837)).  In this evolution, the development may be though similar to the latter-day proliferation of “-isms” (fascism; feminism et al).  Vexillology, vexillologist vexillographer, vexillophilia, vexillophile & vexillolatry are nouns, vexillological & vexillologic are adjectives; the most common noun plural is vexillologists.

A vexillographer is one who designs flags, standards & banners, a vexillophile is (1) someone who collects and displays flags and (2) one who studies flags, their history and meaning.  Although there are vexillophiles, there is in medicine no recognized condition known as vexillophilia (which would be a paraphilia describing the sexualized objectification of flags (ie flag) although following the convention established in recent revisions to the American Psychiatric Association's (APA) Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) (DSM-5 (2013) & DSM-5-TR (2022)), the correct clinical description would now be "foot partialism"; vexillophiles anyway prefer to describe themselves as "flag nerds".  Nor is there any record of there being instances of vexillophobia (a morbid fear of flags); there are those opposed to what flags represent  but that's not the same as being a vexillophobe which would be something specific about this type of bunting in general.  In political science, there is the word flagophobe (also as flagphobe), a derogatory term used usually by those on the right (and other nationalists) as a slur suggesting a want of patriotism in an opponent they’ve usually already labelled as “liberal”.  It's based on a metaphorical connection between a national flag and pride in one's country and is thus not a reference to a fear of flags in general.  To vexillize (or vexillate) can mean (1) to gather or to lead an army under a flag, (2) to organize or to lead people under a common cause or goal, (3) to make a flag (sewing, printing, digitally distributing etc), (4) to design a flag or (5) to introduce a specific depiction on a flag.

Wrapped: Vexillologist Lindsay Lohan and the stars & stripes.  The phrase “wrapping themselves self in the flag” is used of politicians who attempt to disguise their self-serving motives by presenting something as being in the national interest or being done for patriotic reasons.  The companion term is “patriotism is the last refuge of the scoundrel”, a observation made in 1775 by Samuel Johnson (1709-1784) of the hypocrisy of William Pitt (1708-1778 (Pitt the Elder); First Earl of Chatham & UK prime-minister 1766-1768).

Quite when the first flag was flown is not known but so simple is the concept and so minimal the technology required for fabrication that as forms of identification or communication they may have been among the earliest examples of symbolic representation.  Although the nation-state as its now understood is a relatively new creation (barely a thousand years old), prior to that there had for millennia been organized settlements with distinct identities and there is evidence from surviving works of art and drawings that something like a flag existed in the Mediterranean region as long ago as the fourth century BC and it’s possible such things were in use in China even earlier.  The familiar concept of the national flag evolved as the modern nation state emerged in Europe in the late Middle Ages and early modern period and traditionally, Denmark's Dannebrog is cited as the oldest national flag extant, having being in continuous use (though not always as the symbol of state) since the thirteenth century.

Denmark's Dannebrog (usually translated as "the cloth of the Danes").

The legend is that during a battle on 15 June 1219 in what is modern-day Estonia, the Danish army was on the defensive and defeat seemed imminent when suddenly, a red banner with a white cross fell from the sky.  As a result, the fortunes of war shifted, the Danish army won the battle and Denmark gained a flag.

Inherently, a small piece of colored glass three metres in the air can have no effect on a passing car yet the use of red, amber & green traffic lights is what makes modern road systems function as efficiently as they do.  They work because people (usually) respond as they should through the lens of semiotics, the signifier being the color of the light, the signified the instructions conveyed (green=”go”; amber=”prepare to stop or proceed with caution” & red=”stop”) and the referent the physical need to go, proceed only with caution or stop.  The power of the glass lies wholly in its symbolism and the implied consequences of ignoring its message.  Flags, mere pieces of fabric, have no inherent political or military force yet have for millennia been among the most valued and contested of symbols; men have died defending pieces of bunting which could have been replaced with a tick of a supply sergeant’s pen, simply because of the symbolism.  Symbolism has always been integral to the appeal of Nazism (and fascism in general) and by the early summer of 1942, on a map, the military position of Nazi Germany looked impressive, its forces still maintaining a presence in North Africa, most of Western Europe occupied from Norway to the south of France and the territorial gains from Operation Barbarossa reaching well into the Soviet Union.  However, the map substantially reflected the gains which had been made in 1941 and by mid-1942 it was clear to the German military they had under-estimated the ability of the Soviet armies to absorb losses and recover.  It was clear Germany no longer had the strength successfully to advance along the massive front created in 1941 and even Adolf Hitler (1889-1945; Führer (leader) and German head of government 1933-1945 & head of state 1934-1945) realized that, at least temporarily, more modest strategic aims would have to be pursued.

What Hitler set in train was a multi-pronged operation which would have been strategically sound had (1) the resources been available to sustain it and (2) there had not been such a gross under-estimation of the available Soviet military capacity.  Originally, the plan had been to advance on the Caucasus after the encirclement and destruction of the defending forces in the Stalingrad region and the occupation of the city itself.  This was changed, splitting the attacking force to allow the city and the Caucasus simultaneously to be conquered and the area envisaged was vast, including the eastern coast of the Black Sea, the forbidding Caucasian mountain passes and the oil fields of Grozny & Baku, far to the south.  The German generals didn’t need much more than the back of an envelope to work out it simply couldn’t be done and that rather than undertaking sound planning based on reliable intelligence, the Führer was indulging in little more than wishing & guessing.  “Wishing & guessing” was General George Marshall’s (1880–1959; US Army chief of staff 1939-1945) critique of Winston Churchill’s (1875-1965; UK prime-minister 1940-1945 & 1951-1955) dabblings in military matters and the comment wasn’t unjustified but the difference was that while the Allied high command was able to restrain (and if need be, veto) the prime-minister’s romantic (essentially Napoleonic) adventurism, the Wehrmacht’s generals and admirals had by 1942 long been dominated by Hitler.  The German army was however generally the most effective ground force of the war and remarkably, achieved some early tactical gains but such were the distances involved and the disparity of forces available that the offensive was not only doomed but culminated in the loss of some 230,000 troops at Stalingrad, a calamity from which the army never quite recovered and among the German people damaged the prestige of the regime to an extent no previous setback had done.

Third Reich War Flag, Mount Elbrus, August 1942.

Hitler, at least in 1942, wasn’t delusional and understood he was running a risk but his gambler’s instincts had for twenty years served him well and he still clung to the belief a strength of will could overcome many disadvantages, even on the battlefield.  Early in the war, that had worked when he was facing divided, unimaginative or week opponents but those days were over and he was well-aware he was playing for high stakes from a position of weakness.  That he was under great pressure and wracked by uncertainty (whatever might have been his outward displays of confidence) was probably the cause of a celebrated over-reaction to what was one of the war’s more trivial incidents: the planting of the Nazi war flag on the peak of Mount Elbrus, at 5,642 m (18,510 feet) the highest point in Europe.  Hitler thought pursuits like mountain climbing and skiing absurd but, like any practical politician, he liked a good photo-opportunity and had in peacetime been pleased to be photographed with those who had raised the swastika on some mountain or other (something which dedicated Nazis had been doing since the 1920s, long before the party gained power in 1933.  On 21 August 1942, the Third’s Reich’s war flag, along with the divisional flags of the 1st and 4th Divisions fluttered in the wind on the roof of Europe and news of the triumph was transmitted to FHQ (Führer Headquarters).

In the throes of the offensive driving towards Stalingrad and the Caucases, the alpine troops who climbed the peak to plant the flag doubtless though they were “working towards the Führer” and providing him a priceless propaganda piece.  They probably expected medals or at least thanks but Hitler was focused on his military objectives and knew he needed every available man to be devoted to his job and upon hearing two-dozen soldiers had decided to ignore their orders and instead climb up a hill of no strategic value, just to climb down again, his reaction was visceral, recalled in his memoirs by Albert Speer (1905–1981; Nazi court architect 1934-1942; Nazi minister of armaments and war production 1942-1945), then at FHQ:

“I often saw Hitler furious but seldom did his anger erupt from him as it did when this report came in. For hours he raged as if his entire plan of the campaign had been ruined by this bit of sport. Days later he went on railing to all and sundry about “those crazy mountain climbers” who “belong before a court-martial.” They were pursuing their idiotic hobbies in the midst of a war, he exclaimed indignantly, occupying an idiotic peak even though he had commanded that all efforts must be concentrated upon Sukhumi.”

The famous (and subtlety edited) photograph of the Soviet flag being raised over the Reichstag on 30 April 1945 during the Battle of Berlin (actually a staged-shot  taken on 2 May).

The Germans never made it to Sukhumi and the high-altitude sideshow by a handful of troops of course in no way affected the campaign but the reaction at FHQ was an indication of the pressure felt by Hitler.  The planting of a symbolic flag was also though symptomatic of the arrogance which had permeated the German military under the Nazis and it anyway proved a pyrrhic act of conquest, the standard torn down and replaced by the Soviet flag within six months; that the Russian army took the trouble to do that amid the clatter of war illustrates potency of national flags as propaganda devices.  One of the most famous photographs of the conflict was that of the Soviet flag in May 1945 being placed over the Reichstag in Berlin, a symbol of defeat of Nazism.  Interestingly, so important to the Kremlin was the image that the act was actually re-staged the next day, this time with a photographer in place to shoot a roll of film so the perfect shot could be selected and the Russians are not the only ones to have re-staged famous flag raisings.

The flag of the Hezbollah (right), the public display of which is banned in some jurisdictions where both the organization's political & military wings are listed as "terrorist organizations" includes a depiction of  Kalashnikov AK-47 assault rifle but that of Mozambique (left) is the only national flag to feature the famous weapon and the Africans fixed a bayonet to the barrel which was a nice touch.  Mozambique gained independence from Portugal in 1975 although the flag wasn’t officially adopted until 1983 as a modified version of what was essentially the battle flag of the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO, the Mozambique Liberation Front, the Marxist (later styled “democratic socialist”) resistance movement which fought a war of liberation (1964-1974) against the Portuguese colonial forces).  Artistically, just as Marxism (notably often in Stalinist form) had been politically influential in post-colonial Africa, the hammer & sickle exerted an artistic appeal.  The flag of Mozambique has an AK-47 crossed by a hoe sitting atop an open book and is the only national flag upon which appears a modern firearm, the handful of others with guns all using historic relics like muskets or muzzle-loaded cannons.  The Angolan flag has a machete crossing a half gear wheel and both these African examples follow the symbolic model of the hammer and sickle, representing variously the armed struggle against repression, the industrial workers and the peasantry.

Ayatollah

Ayatollah (pronounced ah-yuh-toh-luh)

In Shiʿite Islam, a high title in the religious hierarchy achieved by scholars who have demonstrated advanced knowledge of Islamic law and religion.

1300s: A Persian word from the Arabic āyat (sign, testimony, miracle, verses of the Qurʿān) and allāh (God).  The Arabic ayatu-llah is literally "miraculous sign of God", the word Ayatollah (āyatullāh) best translated as “sign of God” although there are variations.  Word originates from passage 51:20–21 in the Qurʿān which the Shi'a, unlike the Sunni, interpret to mean human beings can be regarded as “signs” or “evidence” of God.  It’s most familiar now from the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Persian آیت‌الل romanized as āyatollāh where it’s an honorific title for high-ranking Twelver Shia clergy in Iran (and now also Iraq) that came into widespread use in the mid-late twentieth century.  There are variants: āyatallāh fī al-anām (آية الله في الأنعام), literally “Sign of God among mankind”, āyatallāh fī al-ʿālamayn (آية الله في العالمَین‎), literally “Sign of God in the two worlds”, fī al-ʿālamīn (في العالمین‎), literally “in the worlds” and āyatallāh fī al-warā (آية الل في الوراء), literally “Sign of God among mortals”.

Ayatollah (āyatullāh) is an honorific title in the clerical hierarchy in Twelver Imamite Shiism, bestowed by popular usage on those who have demonstrated outstanding scholarship both in Islamic jurisprudence and the holy Qur’ān.  Although the title had existed since medieval times, until well into the twentieth century, use was restricted to senior clerics (mujtahids) of Persian origin.  An imitation of the title ẓill Allāh (shadow of God) was traditionally applied to Persian Islamic rulers, which was confirmed by the use of āyat Allāh zādah (son of ayatollah), a counterpart of shāh zādah (son of the shah).  The first reputed bearer, Ibn al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī (d 1374), was styled Ayatollah in the twelfth century but it remained rare and didn’t come into general use until the late Qājār period (1796-1925) when, in 1922, Abd al-Karīm Ḥāʿirī-Yazdī founded the new theological centre of Qom.

Besides being a fully qualified mujtahid, the scholarship and theological authority of an aspiring ayatollah must be acknowledged by both his peers and followers.  In the period between the end of the Ottoman Empire in 1922 and the 1979 Iranian revolution, the title ayatollah became (although rare until the 1940s) clerically more ubiquitous, extended even (against their own traditions) to Sunnī religious dignitaries although, in Iran, the Sunni community does not use the title and it remains rare outside of Iran although in Iraq, is remains available to clerics of Iranian origin.  After the 1979 Iranian revolution, there were significant changes.  The title became more exclusive and a seven tier hierarchy was codified, including the role of nāyib-i imām (lieutenant of the imam), reflecting the assumption of both temporal and spiritual power by Ayatollah Khomeini who anyway removed any suggestion of collective theocratic rule with his adoption of the title imām, something historically unusual in Twelver Shīʿī.  Until then, the concept of niyābat (general vicegerency of the Hidden Imam) was purely theoretical.

Thoughts of Ayatollahs

"An Islamic regime must be serious in every field. There are no jokes in Islam. There is no humor in Islam. There is no fun in Islam. There can be no fun and joy in whatever is serious."

Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (1900-1989; Supreme Leader, Islamic Republic of Iran, 1979-1989).

"The Victorian government must be serious in every field. There are no jokes in Victoria. There is no humor in Victoria. There is no fun in Victoria. There can be no fun and joy in whatever is serious."

Grand Ayatollah Daniel Andrews (b 1972), premier of the Australian state of Victoria since 2014.

The title Grand Ayatollah (Ayatollah al-Uzma) (Great Sign of God) is sometimes misunderstood and in none of the strains of Islam does a defined hierarchical clerical structure exist in the manner of the classical theocratic model employed in the Roman Catholic Church.  Being a Grand Ayatollah is not necessarily an indication of a place of high authority in any administrative structure.  Grand Ayatollah was a (historically rarely granted) honor and one afforded to an Ayatollah whose contribution to learning and knowledge of the holy Koran is such they are considered Marja'-e-Taqlid, (Grand Ayatollah now the usual form).  Although, practices have varied, for the title to be conferred, an Ayatollah would have been expected to have produced a substantial body of Islamic scholarship but analysts have concluded the favored works have tended to be those reflecting Koranic orthodoxy and of practical application rather than abstract explorations of the esoteric.  Again, because it’s not a centralized system, the number of active Grand Ayatollahs in Iran isn’t clear but they’re said to number in the dozens.

As a formal prelude to achieving the status, a treatise (risalah-yi'amaliyyah) (practical law treatise) is usually published, almost always a work which draws on and reinforces earlier traditions rather than anything new or controversial.  In this it’s more like the modern Western PhD dissertation, many of which appear not a genuinely new contribution to much.  The convention however works in conjunction with the political structures of state which in 1979 were absorbed by the revolution.  Upon assuming office as Supreme Leader in 1989, Ali Khamenei (b 1939) was granted the title Ayatollah although there appears to be no great history of Koranic scholarship and certainly not the customary risalah-yi'amaliyyah.  In recent years, there seems also to have been a bit of a nudge by the state-controlled media which sometimes refer to him as Grand Ayatollah or even Imam.  Foreign monitoring agencies however have reported the Iranian people seem unresponsive to the prodding and use of “Imam” seems still a historic reference only to the late Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.

There has been a bit clerical inflation since the death of the Imam.  Although there exists in Shia Islam no codified hierarchical structure of ecclesiastical offices, observers have identified shifting conventions which move with the political climate of the day.  Possession of the more exalted titles used to depend on popular assent, granted only to the most prominent religious figures and those who were of necessity a Mujtahid, an important pre-condition being a demonstrable superiority in learning (aʿlamīyat) and authority (riyāsat) the latter definitely demanding popular support.  Not unrelated too, as structuralists like to point out, it helped if one was good at raising religious taxes (Khums).  Plus ça change...

Some presumably un-intended mission-creep resulted from the Imam’s educational reforms intended to secure the primacy to Koranic teaching.  The restructuring of the Shia seminaries created four layers of structured scholarship, those clerics attaining the highest qualification styled as Dars-e-Kharej (beyond the text) and thus assuming the title of Ayatollah.  Being an Islamic state, bureaucratic progression in the state bureaucracy was assisted by the qualification and the numbers graduating increased, the dynamic driven also by (1) a worsening economy which made state-sector employment increasingly attractive and (2) the unlimited ability of the seminaries to offer course to fee-paying students.  By 2017, it was estimated over three thousand clerics in Iran were calling themselves Ayatollah.

To mark “Mean Girls Day” on 3 October 2019, the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) took to X (the app then known as Twitter) and trolled Iran's supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah (b 1960) and then Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani (1957-2020), photoshopping the trio into a well-known scene from the film, labeling the image “There’s no one meaner than the mean girls of the Middle East” and advising the twitterati: “Don’t sit with them”.  It wasn’t the first time the Jewish state had deployed the movie against the ayatollahs: In 2018, in response to Ayatollah Khamenei calling the Jewish state a “cancerous tumor” which “must be eradicated,” the Israeli embassy in Washington posted a Mean Girls GIF asking “Why are you so obsessed with me?”  On both occasions, the ayatollahs ignored the IDF's provocations.