Sovereign

Sovereign (pronounced sov-rin (U), sov-er-in (non U) or suhv-rin)

(1) A monarch; a king, queen, or other supreme ruler.

(2) A person who has supreme power or authority.

(3) A group or body of persons or a state having sovereign authority.

(4) A gold coin of the United Kingdom, the value set at 22s 6d in the fifteenth century and re-valued to £1 sterling; it was removed from circulation after 1914.  In UK slang, “sov” (“sovs” the more commonly used plural) endures among certain classes to describe £1 sterling.   

(5) Belonging to or characteristic of a sovereign or sovereign authority; royal.

(6) Supreme; preeminent; indisputable.

(7) In clinical pharmacology, of a medicine or remedy, extremely potent or effective (archaic).

(8) A former Australian gold coin, minted 1855–1931, with a face value of £1 Australian.

(9) A large champagne bottle with the capacity of about 25 liters, equivalent to 33⅓ standard bottles.

(10) Any butterfly of the tribe Nymphalini, or genus Basilarchia, as the ursula and the viceroy.

(11) In regional UK, slang, a large, garish ring.

1250-1300: From the Middle English soverain (alteration by influence of reign) & sovereyn, from the Old French soverain (sovereign, lord, ruler (noun use of the adjective meaning "highest, supreme, chief")) (which exists in modern French as souverain), from the Vulgar Latin superānus (chief, principal (and source also of the Italian soprano & sovrano and the Spanish soberano)) from the classical Latin super (over; above) from the primitive Indo-European uper (over).  The spelling was influenced by folk-etymology association with reign and Milton spelled it sovran, perhaps a nod to the Italian sovrano and scholars caution that though widely accepted, the link to the Vulgar Latin superānus is unattested.  The now obsolete medical sense of “remedies or medicines potent in a high degree" was from the fourteenth century.

In law, there are strands of meaning:  In a constitutional monarchy, a king or queen can be known as the sovereign while the state itself is sovereign and sovereignty is said often to reside in some elected assembly which, being representative of the people, can be said to derive it from them.  The noun sovereignty emerged in the late fourteenth century to designate "pre-eminence".  It was from the Anglo-French sovereynete, from the Old French souverainete, from soverain and referenced "authority, rule, supremacy of power or rank".  The modern meaning as “sovereign state” which is defined literally as "existence as an independent state" is from 1715 and remains an exact meaning, the state of statehood a binary in that a state is either independent (and thus sovereign) or not.  Attempts therefore by sub-state entities like defined regions of federal states to asset sovereignty under the guise of state’s rights are usually doomed to fail either because, like the Australian states, they were non-sovereign colonies prior to federation or have always been part of a larger whole.  That is not to say that powers and authority cannot be shared and some heads of it may exclusively be vested in a sub-national construct but that is a constitutional arrangement within a sovereign state; sovereignty is indivisible.  The concept of “personal sovereignty” invoked by those resisting such thing as COVID-19 related face-mask or vaccine mandates is drawn from the theories of natural law but has no basis in positive law.

Lindsay Lohan, Vanity Fair photo shoot, Marina del Rey, California, October 2010.  The location was the Sovereign, a motor yacht built in 1961 for the film star Judy Garland (1922-1969).

The noun suzerain (sovereign, ruler) dating from 1807, was from French suzerain, from the fourteenth century Old French suzerain (noun use of the adjective meaning "sovereign but not supreme") from the adverb sus (up, above) on analogy of soverain.  The Old French sus is from the Vulgar Latin susum, from the Classical Latin sursum (upward, above), a contraction of subversum, from subvertere.  It was the French suzerain which vested the English sovereign it’s meaning in the political sense.  In international it came to mean a “dominant nation or state that has control over the international affairs of a subservient state which otherwise has domestic autonomy”, a sense similar but different from “client state” or relationships such as those of Moscow to the states of the former Warsaw Pact.  Historically the suzerain was the feudal landowner to whom vassals were forced to pledge allegiance.

In May 1910, European royalty gathered in London for the funeral of Edward VII and among the mourners were nine reigning kings.  This is believed the only photograph ever taken of nine sovereign kings and would be the last gathering of the old European order before the Great War.  The photograph circulated widely in both monochrome and sepia tones and recently has been colorized.  Notable absentees include Tsar Nicholas II of Russia (overthrown in 1917), Victor Emmanuel III of Italy and Emperor Franz Joseph (died in 1916, the dual monarchy abolished and the empire dissolved in 1918) of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

Standing, left to right: King Haakon VII of Norway, Tsar Ferdinand of the Bulgarians, King Manuel II of Portugal and the Algarve, Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany and Prussia, King George I of the Hellenes and King Albert I of the Belgians.

Seated, left to right: King Alfonso XIII of Spain, King George V of the United Kingdom and King Frederick VIII of Denmark.

Norway – Monarchy still going.

Bulgaria – Monarchy overthrown in 1946.

Portugal – Monarchy overthrown in 1910.

Germany – Monarchy extinct since the act of abdication in 1918.

Greece – Monarchy overthrown in 1924, restored in 1935, overthrown in 1973.

Belgium – Monarchy still going and notably more predictable than the local parliamentary politics in that while it’s often not possible for the politicians to agree on who should be prime-minister, the line of succession to the throne is not disputed.

Spain – Monarchy overthrown in 1931, re-established in 1975 and still going (with the odd scandal).  One quirk of Spanish constitutional history and one about which not all lawyers agree (political scientists and historians finding the arguments either tiresome or amusing) is that despite the proclamation of a republic in 1931, between then and 1975 when the monarchy was said to have been restored, Spain may anyway have continued to be a monarchy because, whatever the outcome on the streets or later Franco's battlefields, there may never have been executed the necessary legal mechanism of dissolution.

When the king (Alfonso XIII 1886–1941; King of Spain 1886-1931) went (with a fair chunk of his nation's exchequer) into exile in 1931, he departed the soil but did not abdicate which most regard of no constitutional significance, the subsequent declaration of the Second Spanish Republic thought sufficient and most agree this abolished both monarchy and kingdom, sovereignty residing with the republican state which General Franco (1892-1975; Caudillo of Spain 1939-1975) took over in 1939.  In curious twist however, in 1947 Franco re-established Spain as a Kingdom which he ruled as head of state of the Kingdom of Spain through the Law of Succession.  A sovereign kingdom thus but without a king on the throne on which, figuratively at least, Franco sat until peacefully he died in 1975.  A king then returned to the kingdom because, again amending the Law of Succession, Franco appointed Alfonso XIII's grandson, Juan Carlos I de Borbón (b 1938; King of Spain 1975-2014, styled Rey Emérito (King Emeritus) since) as his successor and he assumed the throne in 1975, the nature of the new, constitutional monarchy, promulgated in 1978 after a referendum.  Despite the fine technical points raised, most agree Spain was a republic 1931-1947, the kingdom was restored in 1947 and monarchical rule has existed since 1975, its constitutional form assumed in 1978.  Sovereignty was probably vested successively in the republic (1931-1939), Franco personally (1939-1975), Juan Carlos personally 1975-1978 and the Spanish state since.    

United Kingdom – Monarchy still going though not without the odd squabble at the margins.  Although having undergone the occasional change in dynastic management, it has since the ninth century existed continuously except for the uncharacteristic republican interregnum (1649-1660).  Territorially, it has been a shifting jigsaw, comprised of various permutations of all or part of England, Ireland, Scotland & Wales, the odd temporary European augmentation and of course the colonies, territories and Dominions linked to the old British Empire and the still extant Commonwealth.  The relationship between the monarchy and the Commonwealth varies from state to state and even in those independent states where the UK monarch remains the head of state, sovereignty in almost all cases resides wholly somewhere in the local political construct.

Dating from 21 April 1926, a two-part prediction was made by Henry "Chips" Channon (1897-1958), a US born resident of the UK who became a member of parliament (1935-1958) and in his last years, a knight of the realm (although the peerage he coveted eluded him.  In the way of such things, in many ways he became more English than many Englishmen.  On the day of the birth of the future Queen Elizabeth II (1926-2022; Queen of the UK 1952-2022) he noted in his diary that he expected the child to become "Queen of England and perhaps the last sovereign".  Channon thought the Prince of Wales (Prince Edward 1894–1972; briefly (in 1936) King Edward VIII of the United Kingdom & Emperor of India), whom he knew, to be so temperamentally unsuitable for the role of king he would either renounce his claim to the throne or abandon it once crowned.  His first part of the prediction proved accurate although he was diffident about the second and the monarchy has thus fare endured.  Channon's diaries, published in the 1960s (in heavily redacted form) were amusing enough but the (mostly) unexpurgated editions (in three volumes 2021-2022) are as juicy as any published in the past century.

Denmark – Monarchy still going.

That early in the twenty-first century a dozen European nations (Andorra, Belgium, Denmark, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom & Vatican City (the pope the only absolute sovereign and the city-state a theocracy)) remain monarchies would have surprised some.  In 1948, the already embattled (and soon to be overthrown) King Farouk (1920–1965; King of Egypt 1936-1952) gloomily predicted that soon only five kings would remain: "The King of England and the kings of hearts, clubs, diamonds and spades".  While prescient about his own fate, he was wrong in that but while there are certainly fewer than there were, the institution, while on paper a pretty silly basis on which to depend for a head of state, has proved durable in those cases where royal families have been sufficiently adaptable to evolve into reliable ciphers and become frequent, if sometimes unscripted, content providers for pop culture platforms.

End of the Jaguar 3.8 era.  Jim Clark and Jack Sears in the Ford Galaxie 427s ahead of Graham Hill and Roy Salvadori in Jaguar 3.8s, Guards Trophy Race, Brands Hatch, 1963.

A blend of the ancient and modern which characterized much of what Jaguar produced until well into the twenty-first century, the Daimler Sovereign was the final evolution of the Jaguar 2.4, introduced in 1955 as the “small” car of the range and known retrospectively as the Mark 1 after 1959 when a revised model was released as the Mark 2.  The bigger-engined versions of the Mark 2 were the outstanding sports saloons of their day and dominated production car racing until the new generation of fast Fords, the Lotus Cortina, the Mustang and, somewhat improbably, the big Galaxies began to prevail but, as road cars, the power delivered by the 3.8 litre XK-Six was probably close to the limit of the platform’s capability.  This was addressed in 1963 when a version of the more capable independent rear suspension introduced in 1961 on the Mark X and E-Type (XK-E) was grafted to a slightly enlarged structure and released as the S-Type.  The new sophistication was appreciated but the unusual combination of styling techniques was less admired, the front and rear generally felt discordant and tellingly, the Mark 2 was not discontinued and continued to sell well.

1963 Jaguar S-Type 3.8.

The aesthetic objections were noted and in 1966, a new nose, reminiscent of that on the Mark X, was grafted on to the S-Type and the result, while clearly not modernist in the manner of a contemporary like the NSU Ro80, was generally acknowledged to be more harmonious.  The new model, acknowledging the fitment for the first time in the platform of the 4.2 litre XK-Six, was called the 420 and, in a (brief) attempt to create a naming convention with some familial relationship, the big Mark X was re-named 420G and the Mark 2 became the 240 or 340 depending on engine capacity, the 3.8 litre version discontinued although a few were built to special order (albeit still badged as 340s).  Strange as it seems, for a number of reasons, the 240, 340, S-Type and 420 all remained available until all were replaced by the XJ6, introduced in 1968.  Only the 420G received a stay of execution, the flagship lingering until 1970 by which time production had slowed to a trickle.

1968 Daimler Sovereign.

Launched simultaneously in 1966 with the 420 and around 7% more expensive was the Daimler Sovereign.  The Sovereign was essentially the 420 with all the Jaguar’s optional extras fitted as standard, a higher grade of timber and leather for the interior fittings and the traditional details distinguishing the marquee, most notably the elegant fluting atop the grill and the rear number plate valance.  Unfortunately, unlike the earlier Daimler version of the Mark 2 (later named 250 to align with the 240 & 340) which was powered by Daimler’s fine 2.5 litre V8, the Sovereign was mechanically identical to the 420, the opportunity to create something special by using the 4.6 litre version of the V8 not taken, the same mistake which may have doomed the Mark X and 420G to their indifferent sales performance; although excessively large for many markets, a V8 Mark X would have been ideal in the US.  Nonetheless, although nothing more than a fancy Jaguar, it was a success and despite the higher price, Sovereign sales totaled more than six-thousand, the 420 managing only four-thousand odd more.

1967 Daimler Sovereign.

The 420-based Sovereign continued to be offered well into 1969 because the high demand for the XJ6 meant there was not immediately the capacity to produce a Daimler version of the new car.  It was finally retired in 1969 (the last survivor of the platform introduced in 1955) when an XJ6-based Sovereign was released in 2.8 and 4.2 litre versions, notionally replacing the Mark 2-based 250 and the previous Sovereign respectively.  Jaguar continued to use the Sovereign name on the six-cylinder Daimlers until 1983 when they were re-badged simply as “Daimler” although the name would for years be applied to various up-market XJs, especially in overseas markets where others held the trademark to the Daimler name.  When equipped with the Jaguar's 5.3-litre V12, the Sovereign was named Double Six, a revival of a name Daimler used between 1926-1938 for an earlier twelve cylinder model.  The Sovereign name was the choice of the Jaguar board; although the chairman had suggested “Royal” it seemed he was persuaded Sovereign was a better fit.

1976 Daimler Sovereign two door.

Most memorable of the Sovereigns were the elegant coupés offered between 1975-1977; the factory insisting they were a “two door” and not a coupé.  The vinyl-roof, one of the many unfortunate aspects of style which so afflicted the 1970s, attracted criticism even at the time of release, the suspicion being it might have been glued on to hide some rather obviously hasty welding used to create the lovely roofline, a expedient Plymouth adopted in 1970 for the Superbird and Ford Australia repeated on the Landau three years later.  However, it transpired the necessity was not the finish of the sheet metal but the inability of the paints of the era to accommodate the slight flexing of the roof caused by using the same gauge of steel on the pillar-less coupé as the saloon which was a little more rigid.  With the availability of modern paints, many have since taken the opportunity to ditch the vinyl and allow the lovely lines to appear unspoiled.  Being produced under the ownership of British Leyland, predictability, roof-flex wasn’t the only flaw.  The sealing of the frameless windows was never perfected so wind noise is more intrusive than the saloon and, over time, the heavy doors will sag, Jaguar using the same hinges as those which supported the saloon’s smaller, lighter pressings.  

Picture of the sovereign on a 1963 mock-up of the proposed Australian Royal.

Royal as a name seemed not to be popular in other places (although Chrysler did use it for a while and it's applied to a few alcoholic beverages), earlier rejected in the antipodes as the name for a new legal tender.  In early 1963, Robert Menzies (1894–1978; Prime-Minister of Australia 1939-1941 & 1949-1966) had said Australia would adopt a decimal currency and later in the year it was announced its name would be “the royal”.  Said to be the preferred choice of the prime-minister himself, cabinet had been persuaded, presumably because the other suggestions including "kwid", "champ", "deci-mate", "austral" and "emu", were thought worse.  Proving that social media isn’t necessary for public opinion to become quickly known, within days the derision expressed was enough to convince the government to change.  The cabinet documents (released in 1993 under the (then) thirty-year rule) recorded the treasurer telling the cabinet “…royal had been a terrible mistake” and in September, it was announced the pound would be replaced by the Australian dollar; it was introduced on Valentine’s Day 1966.

Currency matters had troubled Menzies before.  He’d been much criticized in 1952 when, upon Elizabeth II’s accession, the inscription FD abruptly was omitted from Australian coins.  FD (Defender of the Faith (the Latin Fidei Defensor (feminine Fidei Defensatrix)), had been in use since 1507 when the title "Protector and Defender of the Christian Faith" was granted by Pope Julius II (1443–1513; pope 1503-1513) to James IV of Scotland (James VI and I (1566–1625) King of Scotland as James VI (1567-1625) & King of England and Ireland as James I (1603-1625)) and had been inscribed on all English (and subsequently UK) coins minted since the Medici Pope Leo X (1475–1521; pope 1513-1521) in 1521 conferred it on Henry VIII (1491–1547; King of England (and Ireland after 1541) 1509-1547).  A grateful Leo had been most impressed by Henry’s book Assertio Septem Sacramentorum (Defense of the Seven Sacraments), a powerful assertion of both the sacramental nature of marriage and the supremacy of the pope, his words at the time celebrated in Rome as the "Henrician Affirmation".  Although Henry would go on to interpret the marriage ritual, papal authority and the defense of the faith in his own way, FD nevertheless remains on the UK's to this day.  There, it is not without constitutional significance, the sovereign, Queen Elizabeth, being supreme governor (ie the titular head) of the Church of England, the nation's established (ie the official state) church.  

A year is a long time in politics: the 1953 & 1954 Australian florins.

In the Australia of 1952, then a country still marked by the sectarian divide between Catholic and Protestant, there was much outrage, Anglicans calling it an affront to Her Majesty and their church and nothing but a cynical ploy by a (Presbyterian) prime-minister to curry favor with Roman Catholics in search of their votes.  Surprisingly to some, prominent among the affronted was the former high court judge, Dr HV Evatt (1894–1965; leader of the opposition 1951-1960) who, although condemned by the right-wing fanatics of the day as the “arch defender of the godless atheistic communists” was a staunch Anglican who proved a doughty opponent of the change.  It at the time was quite a furore with questions in parliament, strident editorials, letters (of outrage) to the editor (the social media of the era) and ecclesiastical denouncements from a number of reverend and very reverend gentlemen.  Menzies relented and intervened personally to ensure the mint secured Fidei Defensor dies in time for a commemorative florin (the modern 20c coin, then often referred to as "two bob") to be struck for the 1954 royal visit.

Cede

Cede (pronounced seed)

(1) To yield or formally surrender to another; to transfer or make over something (especially physical territory or legal rights).

(2) To allow a point in an argument, negotiation or debate (technically as a synonym of concede).

1625-1635: From the Old & Middle French céder, from the Latin cēdere (to yield, give place; to give up some right or property (and originally "to go from, proceed, leave”)), from cēdō (to yield), (from the Proto-Italic kesd-o- (to go away, avoid), from the primitive Indo-European ḱyesd- (to drive away; to go away), from ked- (to go, to yield).  The original sense in English (to go from, proceed, leave) is long archaic; the transitive meaning “yield or formally surrender (something) to another” dating from 1754.  The sense evolution in Latin was via the notion of “go away, withdraw, give ground” and cēdere, with the appropriate prefix bolted-on, proved extraordinarily in English, yielding forms such as accede, concede, exceed, precede, proceed, recede, secede, antecedent, intercede, succeed & supercede.  Cede (in one context or another) can be vested with specific meanings in law but relinquish, abandon, grant, transfer & convey can sometimes be used as synonyms.  Cede, cedes, ceded & ceding are verbs and ceder & cedents are nouns; the noun plural is ceders.

Senator Lidia Thorpe.

The “debate” between the “yes” and “no” cases for the upcoming referendum to amend the Australian constitution to include a “Voice” to make representations to the parliament and executive on matters concerning Indigenous Australians has evolved to the interesting position of the no case being split between (1) those who argue the Voice would have too much power and (2) those who claim it would possess not enough.  Politics being what it is, that split might be unremarkable except the yes case simultaneously is disagreeing with both while trying hard to avoid having to descend to specifics and by far the interesting position among the noes is that advocated by Lidia Thorpe (b 1973; senator (Independent though elected for the Green Party) for Victoria since 2020).  What Senator Thorpe describes as the basis of the “radical no case” is that (1) colonial settlement of the Australian land mass was effected by an invasion, (2) Indigenous Australians never ceded their sovereignty over that land mass and (3) Indigenous sovereignty is not only ongoing but exclusive and does not co-exist with the claimed sovereignty of the Crown (ie the construct which is the Australian state).  This is the position of the Blak sovereign movement (BSM) which says Indigenous Australians “…are the original and only sovereign of these lands” which would seem to imply the Australian government should be considered an “occupying power”.  Whether that’s an “illegal occupation” or the natural consequence of a successful invasion which extinguished Indigenous sovereignty depends less on what one thinks happened in the past and more on what one would like to happen in the future.  Either way, the Australian government is continuing to promise the matter of a treaty (or treaties) will be pursued “sometime” after the Voice referendum passes; any thought of a failed referendum seems to be unthinkable.  The spelling blak existed in Middle English and several Germanic languages; in all cases meant “black” and it’s used by the movement as a point of political differentiation, “black” being a “white” construct.

For something which is the fundamental tenet of the international order, the modern understanding of sovereignty is a surprisingly recent thing and though political arrangements which are recognizable as “nations” have existed for thousands of years, the concept of the nation-state began to coalesce only in the late Middle Ages.  In international law, sovereignty encapsulates the supreme authority and independence of a state but it depends not only on an assertion but also recognition by other sovereign entities.  Internally, it implies a government enjoys an exclusive right to exercise authority and make decisions within its borders, free from control or influence by other states but in its purest form it now rarely exists because so many states have entered into international agreements which to some degree impinge on their sovereignty.  Externally, it means that a state is recognized by other sovereign states and is thus able to conduct foreign policy, enter into agreements with other states and participate in international organizations.  It also implies non-interference in a state's domestic affairs by others.  All of this illustrates why sovereignty is so important and why the ongoing existence matters to the BSM activists.  Only sovereign entities can enter into legally binding treaties with others which is why Senator Thorpe observed: “Treaty is so important because we don’t want to cede our sovereignty. We have maintained our sovereign status in our own country since forever. We are not about to cede our sovereignty.”  However, as many “sovereign citizens” have discovered when attempting to evade their speeding tickets using arguments invoking everything from scripture, the writings of medieval natural law theorists and the Magna Carta, sovereignty is determined not by assertion but by recognition.

In the case of the Indigenous Australians, quite how a conception of their sovereignty at the point of the colonial invasion should be constructed is interesting, not only in the abstract but because the BSM wants treaty negotiations to begin rather than the creation of “a Voice” on the grounds the latter might be seen to imply an acquiescence to the sovereignty of the Australian state, thus extinguishing Indigenous Australian sovereignty.  The rapidity with which the government moved to assure all the Voice would not have this effect suggests not a statement of constitutional law but an indication they don’t take the BSM position too seriously.  However, sovereign entities can enter into treaties and although as a pre-literate culture, there are no pre-1788 written records (in the Western sense), the work of anthropologists has established the first peoples did have a concept of sovereignty over their lands.  Importantly though, implied in the phrase “first nations”, the peoples were organized into tribes (“mob” the preferred modern slang) and their understanding of sovereignty related to each of the tribal lands.  In a legal sense, that is thought not to be a problem because the Western concept of sovereignty is quite compatible and for treaty purposes could be considered equivalent (indeed there was nineteenth century colonial case law which said exactly that).  In a practical sense however, there is one sovereign Australian state and (at least) hundreds of first nations so the mechanics of the treaty process would seem onerous although almost all the other former colonies of the British Empire have managed, however imperfectly, to execute treaties.  However, it seem inevitable the Australian government would prefer to enter into one treaty, even one with hundreds of signatories but as the Voice discussions have proved (and the very existence of the BSM has emphasized), Indigenous Australia is not monolithic and a treaty process could be long and involved.

An outgrowth of a small music store which in 1976 opened in the Swiss town of Winterthur selling vinyl records and cassettes, the Music Box added Compact Discs (CD) and Digital Versatile Discs (DVD) as the new formats became available and in 1997 became one of the pioneers of Swiss e-commerce, launching CeDe.com (pronounced see-dee-dot-com) as an online shop.  That might have been a bad choice as the CD faded from use but CeDe gained sufficient market presence to become an established brand-name and has transcended its etymology.

Regalia

Regalia (pronounced ri-gey-lee-uh or ri-geyl-yuh)

(1) The emblems, symbols, or paraphernalia indicative of royalty or any other sovereign status; such as a crown, orb, sceptre or sword.

(2) The decorations, insignia, or ceremonial clothes of any office or order.

(3) A casual term for fancy, or dressy clothing; finery.

(4) Royal rights, prerogatives and privileges actually enjoyed by any sovereign, regardless of his title (emperor, grand duke etc).

(5) Sumptuous food (obsolete except in the odd literary novel).

(6) A large cigar of the finest quality (obsolete except in the odd literary novel). 

1530–1540: From the Medieval Latin rēgālia (royal privileges; things pertaining to a king), noun use of neuter plural of the Latin rēgālis (regal).  The word stems from the Latin substantivation of the adjective rēgālis, itself from rex (king).  Regalia is a Latin plurale tantum (plural as such, plural only) word that has different definitions. In one ancient (but now rare) definition, it refers to the exclusive privileges of a sovereign, a concept which remains codified in Scots law as Inter regalia (something inherently that belongs to the sovereign) and this may include property, privileges, or prerogatives.  The term is a direct borrowing from the Latin inter (among) and regalia (things of the king).  In Scots law, the division is between (1) regalia majora (major regalia), which are inseparable from the person of the sovereign and (2) regalia minora (minor regalia), which may be conveyed to a subject.  The word originally referred to the formal dress of a sovereign, but is now used of any type of elaborate formal dress or accessories and is applied especially to academic and ecclesiastical robes.  Although regalia is a Latin plurale tantum (plural as such, plural only) which, in the grammar of Latin is a noun (in any specific sense) that has no singular form (eg scissors) in most usage, in Modern English, it’s sometimes used in the singular: regale.  Further to complicate, the plural form of the grammatical descriptor is pluralia tantum.  Regalia is a noun and regalian is an adjective; the noun plural is regalias.

Cardinal George Pell (1941-2023) in ecclesiastical regalia (left) and a deconstruction of the layers (right).  The nature of the garments' layers assumed significance in the matter of the cardinal's trial on charges of sexual abuse of a minor, a discussion about the ease and speed with with "accessibility" was physically possible (within the constraints of time and place) being among the evidence offered in defense.

In his original trial the cardinal was convicted, the verdict upheld on appeal to a full bench of the Court of Appeal.  However, upon final appeal to the High Court of Australia (HCA), the conviction was quashed, the judges ruling that the Crown had not beyond reasonable doubt proved the acts alleged happened as described, in the circumstances, in the place and at the time mentioned in the indictment.  Quash means to nullify, void or declare invalid and is a procedure used in both criminal and civil cases when irregularities or procedural defects are found.  In a unanimous (7-0) judgment (Pell v The Queen [2020] HCA 12)) quashing Cardinal Pell’s conviction in the Supreme Court of Victoria (Pell v The Queen [2019] VSCA 186), the High Court set aside the verdict and substituted an acquittal; in a legal sense it is now as if the original verdict never happened. 

Lindsay Lohan being adorned with prom queen regalia (Mean Girls (2004)).

A depiction of Peter Dutton (b 1970; leader of the opposition and leader of the Australian Liberal Party since May 2022) in the regalia of a Freemason Grand Master (digitally altered image).

Although no documentary evidence has ever emerged, Mr Dutton has never denied being a Freemason.  Masonic Grand Masters wear specific regalia signifying their high rank within the cult.  The details of the garments & accessories vary between the sects of Freemasonry but the core elements are:

Apron: The Grand Master wears an ornate apron which historically was fabricated from natural fibres such as silk or lambskin but it may be some now use modern synthetics which offer some advantages although they lack the same quality of tactility.  The aprons feature intricate embroidery, including Masonic symbols such as the Square and Compasses and may feature gold or silver fringes are common.

Collar: A grand and elaborate collar made of a wide ribbon is worn around the neck, often with a grand master's jewel or other symbol of office attached.  Most ribbons are still the traditional blue with gold or silver embroidery & embellishments.

Jewel: A grand master's jewel is a distinctive medallion or emblem (usually attached to the collar) which includes symbols denoting the authority of the office such as the square, compass, eye or other Masonic insignia.

Gloves: White gloves are a standard part of Masonic regalia (worn not only by a grand master).  The origin of the white gloves was their (alleged) use by stone masons when working on porous materials such as marble, symbolizing purity and the craftsman's clean hands.

Sash or Girdle: In some Masonic temples, grand Masters wear a sash or girdle around the waist, again, often adorned with the cult’s symbols and colors.  Some temples don’t use sashes as part of the regalia because it’s said to be a modern addition with no real link to Masonic tradition.

Hat: The hats, while distinctive, seem to be a fashion choice more than a general tradition.  The most popular seem to be tricorn, bowler or top-hats although evidence suggest regional factors may influence the choice, a wide array of ceremonial caps existing in the photographic record.  In some sects, a specific, unique hat is reserved for use by the Grand Master who may wear it only during ceremonies and rituals.

Prerogative

Prerogative (pronounced pri-rog-uh-tiv)

(1) An exclusive right, privilege, etc, exercised by virtue of rank, office, or the like; having a hereditary or official right or privilege.

(2) A right, privilege, etc, limited to a specific person or to persons of a particular category.

(3) A power, immunity, or the like restricted to a sovereign government or its representative.

(4) Characterized by lawless state actions (refers to the prerogative state)

(5) Precedence (obsolete except in the legal sense of the hierarchy of rights).

(6) A property, attribute or ability which gives one a superiority or advantage over others; an inherent (though not necessarily unique) advantage or privilege; a talent.

(7) In constitutional law, a right or power exclusive to a head of state (often derived from the original powers of a monarch) or their nominee exercising delegated authority, especially the powers to appoint or dismiss executive governments.

1350-1400: From the Anglo-Norman noun prerogatif, from the Old French prerogative, from the Latin praerogātīva (previous verdict; claim, privilege), noun use of the feminine singular of praerogātīvus (having first vote; privileged), in Anglo-Latin as prerogativa from late thirteenth century.  The origin lay in a statute in the civil law of Ancient Roman which granted precedence to the tribus, centuria (an assembly of one-hundred voters who, by lot, voted first in the Roman comita).  The law guaranteed them a praerogātīvus (chosen to vote first) derived from praerogere (ask before others).  The construct of praerogere was prae (before) + rogare (to ask, ask a favor), apparently a figurative use of a primitive Indo-European verb meaning literally "to stretch out (the hand)" from the root reg- (move in a straight line).  In Middle English, the meaning "an innate faculty or property which especially distinguishes someone or something" was added.  The alternative spelling prærogative is long obsolete.  Prerogative is a noun & adjective, prerogatived is an adjective and prerogatively is an adverb; the noun plural is prerogatives.

In English law, a court classified as “a prerogative court” was one through which the discretionary powers, privileges, and legal immunities reserved to the sovereign could be exercised.  The best known of these courts was the Court of Exchequer, the Court of Chancery and the Court of the Star Chamber (the latter one of those institutions formed to rectify injustice but which was later the source of much; the Court of the Star Chamber may be used as a case-study explaining the phrase: “the road to hell is paved with good intentions”).  In time, clashes between the prerogative courts and common law courts became something of a proxy-theatre in the contest between the king and parliament.  The way that worked out was that the ancient (essentially personal) prerogative rights of the monarch weren’t abolished but rather exercised by parliament or institutions (including courts) to which the powers were delegated.  Whether any prerogative power remains in the hands of the sovereign to be used in “extraordinary and reprehensible circumstances” remains a matter of debate.  There were also ecclesiastical prerogative courts under the authority of the archbishops of Canterbury and York but they existed only to handle probate matters in cases where estates beyond a certain defined value were spread between the two dioceses but they also handled many wills of those who died in colonial or other overseas service.  As part of the great reforms of the late nineteenth century undertaken in the Judicature Acts (1873-1899) the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical prerogative moved to the common law courts, being finally vested in the Family Division of the High Court of Justice.

In English law, the still sometimes invoked prerogative writ (the best known of which were habeas corpus (from the Latin habeas corpus ad subjiciendum (usually translated as “bring up the body (ie the prisoner))), a demand a prisoner being held by an organ of the state be brought before a court to determine whether there was lawful authority for the detention) and mandamus (from the Latin mandāmus (we command)), an order issued by a higher court to compel or to direct a lower court or a government officer correctly to perform mandatory duties) was a class of six orders available to the crown for the purpose of directing the action of an organ of government (including courts, officials or statutory bodies).  The name was derived from the authority these exercised being traceable ultimately to the discretionary prerogative & extraordinary power of the monarch and the principle remains in use in many common law jurisdictions which evolved from the old British Empire, notably those of the Raj of colonial India.

The woman's prerogative

For a man incautiously to use the phrase “a woman's prerogative”, the risk would be “cancellation” (or worse) although it’s probably still acceptable if there’s a layer of irony.  The phrase is a clipping of the full: “it’s a woman’s prerogative to change her mind”, the implication being women have the right to change their minds or make decisions based on their own preferences and need provide no explanation or justification.  Wise men (and the pussy-whipped) accept this without demur.  It is of course a reflection of a cultural stereotype and seems to have come into use in the mid-nineteenth century, an era in which gender roles were more rigidly defined and women were thought to be more capricious or whimsical in their actions.  However, in law, the “woman's prerogative” was once enforceable, granting them rights not available to men, a most unusual development in Western jurisprudence.

Well into the twentieth century, it was legal orthodoxy in common law jurisdictions for an offer of marriage to be enforceable under the rules of contract law.  While courts didn’t go as far as ordering “specific performance” of the contract (ie forcing an unwilling party to marry someone), they would award damages on the basis of a “breach of promise”, provided it could be adduced that three of the four essential elements of a contract existed: (1) offer, (2) certainty of terms and (3) acceptance.  The fourth component: (4) consideration (ie payment), wasn’t mentioned because it was assumed to be implicit in the nature of the exchange; a kind of “deferred payment” as it were.  It was one of those rarities in common law where things operated wholly in favor of women in that they could sue a man who changed his mind while they were free to break-off an engagement without fear of legal consequences though there could be social and familial disapprobation.  Throughout the English-speaking world, the breach of promise tort in marriage matters has almost wholly been abolished, remaining on the books in the a handful of US states (not all of which lie south of the Mason-Dixon Line) but even where it exists it’s now a rare action and one likely to succeed only in exceptional circumstances or where a particularly fragrant plaintiff manages to charm a particularly sympathetic judge.

The royal prerogative and the reserve powers of the crown

The royal prerogative is the body of customary authority, privilege, and immunity and the means by which (some of) the executive powers of government are exercised in the governance of the state.  These powers are recognized in common law (and in some civil law) jurisdictions are held to vest wholly in the sovereign alone, even if exercised through either appointees (of which governors, governors-general & viceroys are the best-known) constitutional government.  In the narrowest sense of technical theory, the recognition of the personal powers of a sovereign exists in most common law systems where the concept is relevant but has long since mostly been reduced to legal fiction and in most constitutional monarchies, almost all individual prerogatives have been abolished by parliaments.  Some republican heads of state also possess similar powers but they tend to be constitutionally defined and subject to checks and balances.  A notable exception to this is a US president’s un-trammeled right to grant pardons to those convicted of offences under federal law and that’s interesting because it’s the only power in the US Constitution not subject to a check or balance.  A US president thus personally continues to exercise a prerogative in a way a British monarch (or their appointees as governors & governors-general), from whom the power is derived, no longer can.

In Britain, prerogative powers were originally exercised by the monarch (at least in theory and the role of the Church needs also to be noted) acting alone but after the Magna Carta (1215, from the Medieval Latin Magna Carta Libertatum (Great Charter of Freedoms) which divided power among the ruling class, there had to be sought the consent of others and this ultimately became parliamentary consent granted to an executive (exercising powers derived from the absolute authority of the monarch) responsible to the parliament.  This took centuries to evolve and eventually meant, in practical terms, the king got the money he needed for his wars and other ventures in exchange for the parliament getting his signature to pass the laws they wanted.

Watched by the courtiers Lord Mulgrave & Lord Morpeth, Lord Melbourne serves King William IV a blackbird pie (1836), lithograph with watercolour by John Doyle (1797-1868), Welcome Collection, London.  The text is a re-arranged selection of lines from the eighteenth century English nursery rhyme “Sing a Song of Sixpence” and reads: “Sing a song of six pence a bag full of rye, four and twenty black birds baked in a pie, when the pie was opened, the birds began to sing, was not this a pretty dish to set before a king.”  The blackbirds sing “Justice for Scotland!” and “No tithes!”, controversial issues of the age.  Nineteenth century cartoonists were sometimes more harsh in their treatment of politicians and royalty. 

In Australia, the royal prerogative is limited (but not defined) by the constitution and those powers which vest a monarch’s authority in a governor-general don’t alter the nature of the prerogative, only its detail; the prerogative is exercised by the governor-general but only on the advice of “their” ministers.  The most obvious exception to this is the reserve power of the monarch (and there are those who doubt whether this still exists in the UK) to dismiss a government enjoying the confidence of the lower house of parliament.  In the UK, it’s not been done since William IV (1765–1837; King of the United Kingdom 1830-1837) dismissed Lord Melbourne (1779–1848; Prime Minister of Great Britain 1834 & 1835–1841) in 1834 (some dispute that, saying it was more of a gentleman’s agreement and the last termination was actually that of Lord North (1732–1792; Prime Minister of Great Britain 1770-1782) by George III (1738–1820) King of Great Britain 1760-1820) in 1782) but Australia has seen two twentieth-century sackings; that in 1932 of NSW premier Jack Lang (1876–1975; Premier of New South Wales 1925-1927 & 1930-1932) by Governor Sir Philip Game (1876–1961; Governor of NSW 1930-1935) and, in 1975, when governor-general Sir John Kerr (1914–1991; Governor-General of Australia 1974-1977) sundered Gough Whitlam’s (1916–2014; Prime Minister of Australia 1972-1975) commission.

Dr HV Evatt in his office at the United Nations, New York, 1949.

The 1975 business provoked much academic discussion of the reserve powers but the most lucid read remains Dr HV Evatt’s (1894–1965; ALP leader 1951-1960) book from decades earlier: The King and His Dominion Governors (1936).  Evatt’s volume was published a hundred odd-years after William IV sacked Melbourne and is useful because in that century there had been more than a few disputes about reserve powers.  Evatt’s central point was that the powers exist but proper rules by which they may be exercised are by no means clear.  The legal power is vested in the governor as the representative of the monarch and when it may properly be used depends on usage and convention.  It seems therefore scarcely possible to say confidently of any case when the Crown has intervened that its intervention was or was not correct for the only standard of correctness in each episode is its consistency with episodes of a similar character, none of which in themselves lay down any principle in law.  Further, Evatt notes, in looking to precedent, support for almost any view can be found in the authorities.  Lofty theoretical purity is also not helpful.  The view the sovereign automatically acts in all matters in accordance with the advice of his ministers rests entirely upon assertion and, Evatt observed, the reserve powers are still, on occasion, properly exercisable and that the Sovereign or his representative may have to exercise a real discretion.  Given that, it really might be impossible that the prerogative could be codified in a document which envisages all possible political or other circumstances.  Evatt nevertheless argued the principles which should guide a sovereign should be defined and made clear by statute.

Nor is practical political reality all that much help, however satisfactory an outcome may prove.  What the exercise of the reserve powers, both in 1932 and 1975, did was enable impasses described, however erroneously as constitutional crises to be resolved by an election, rather than other means.  The result of an election however does not conclude the matter for the correctness of the sovereign's action is not measured by his success as a prophet, any post-facto endorsement by the electorate having not even an indirect bearing on the abstract question of constitutionality.

Although variously a high court judge, attorney-general, foreign minister, opposition leader and Chief Justice of NSW, all Dr Evatt asked for on his gravestone was President of the United Nations, noting his service as president of the general assembly (1948-1949).

Evatt’s core argument therefore was reserve powers should be subject to the normal and natural process of analysis, definition and reduction to the rules of positive law, which, by 1936, had in some places been done.  Evatt considered section 33 (10) of the Western Nigerian constitution which codified things thus: The Governor shall not remove the Premier from office unless it appears to him that the Premier no longer commands the support or a majority of the members of the House of Assembly.  Other sections went on to detail the mechanisms of the exercise of the power, thereby attempting to do exactly what Evatt suggests.  However, the Nigerian example cited by Evatt did not prove a solution because the exercise of the power under the constitution became in 1962 a matter of dispute and the case proceeded though the courts, finally ending up before the Privy Council as Adegbenro v. Akintola (1963 AC 614), an indication even the most explicit codification can remain something imperfect.