Vexillology (pronounced vek-suh-lol-uh-jee)
The
study of and the collection of information about flags.
1957
(and in print since 1959): The construct was vexill(um) + -ology. Vexillum (the plural vexilla) was from the
Latin vēxillum (flag, banner), from
the Proto-Italic wekslolom (and
synchronically a diminutive form of vēlum),
from the Proto-Italic wekslom, from
the primitive Indo-European wegslom,
from weg- (to weave, bind) and
cognate with the English wick. The Latin
vexillum translated literally as
“flag; banner” but in English was used to mean (1) a flag, banner, or standard,
(2) in military use a formation company of troops serving under one standard,
(3) the sign of the cross, (4) in botany, the upper petal of a papilionaceous
flower and (5) in ornithology, the rhachis and web of a feather taken together. The suffix -ology was formed from -o- (as an
interconsonantal vowel) +
-logy. The origin in English of the
-logy suffix lies with loanwords from the Ancient Greek, usually via Latin and
French, where the suffix (-λογία) is an integral part of the word loaned (eg
astrology from astrologia) since the
sixteenth century. French picked up -logie from the Latin -logia, from the Ancient Greek -λογία (-logía).
Within Greek, the suffix is an -ία (-ía)
abstract from λόγος (lógos) (account,
explanation, narrative), and that a verbal noun from λέγω (légō) (I say, speak, converse, tell a story). In English the suffix became extraordinarily
productive, used notably to form names of sciences or disciplines of study,
analogous to the names traditionally borrowed from the Latin (eg astrology from
astrologia; geology from geologia) and by the late eighteenth
century, the practice (despite the disapproval of the pedants) extended to
terms with no connection to Greek or Latin such as those building on French or
German bases (eg insectology (1766) after the French insectologie; terminology (1801) after the German Terminologie). Within a few decades of the intrusion of
modern languages, combinations emerged using English terms (eg undergroundology
(1820); hatology (1837)). In this
evolution, the development may be though similar to the latter-day
proliferation of “-isms” (fascism; feminism et al). Vexillology, vexillologist vexillographer, vexillophilia,
vexillophile & vexillolatry are nouns, vexillological & vexillologic
are adjectives; the most common noun plural is vexillologists.
A
vexillographer is one who designs flags, standards & banners, a
vexillophile is (1) someone who collects and displays flags and (2) one who
studies flags, their history and meaning.
Although there are vexillophiles, there is in medicine no recognized
condition known as vexillophilia (which would be a paraphilia describing the sexualized
objectification of flags (ie flag) although following the convention
established in recent revisions to the American Psychiatric Association's (APA)
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) (DSM-5 (2013) &
DSM-5-TR (2022)), the correct clinical description would now be "foot
partialism"; vexillophiles anyway prefer to describe themselves as
"flag nerds". Nor is there any
record of there being instances of vexillophobia (a morbid fear of flags);
there are those opposed to what flags represent
but that's not the same as being a vexillophobe which would be something
specific about this type of bunting in general.
In political science, there is the word flagophobe (also as flagphobe),
a derogatory term used usually by those on the right (and other nationalists)
as a slur suggesting a want of patriotism in an opponent they’ve usually already labelled as “liberal”. It's based on a
metaphorical connection between a national flag and pride in one's country and
is thus not a reference to a fear of flags in general. To vexillize (or vexillate) can mean (1) to
gather or to lead an army under a flag, (2) to organize or to lead people under
a common cause or goal, (3) to make a flag (sewing, printing, digitally
distributing etc), (4) to design a flag or (5) to introduce a specific
depiction on a flag.
Wrapped:
Vexillologist Lindsay Lohan and the stars & stripes. The phrase “wrapping themselves self in the flag”
is used of politicians who attempt to disguise their self-serving motives by presenting something as being in the national interest or being done
for patriotic reasons. The companion
term is “patriotism is the last refuge of the scoundrel”, a observation made in
1775 by Samuel Johnson (1709-1784) of the hypocrisy of William Pitt (1708-1778
(Pitt the Elder); First Earl of Chatham & UK prime-minister 1766-1768).
Quite when the first flag was flown is not known but so simple is the concept and so minimal the technology required for fabrication that as forms of identification or communication they may have been among the earliest examples of symbolic representation. Although the nation-state as its now understood is a relatively new creation (barely a thousand years old), prior to that there had for millennia been organized settlements with distinct identities and there is evidence from surviving works of art and drawings that something like a flag existed in the Mediterranean region as long ago as the fourth century BC and it’s possible such things were in use in China even earlier. The familiar concept of the national flag evolved as the modern nation state emerged in Europe in the late Middle Ages and early modern period and traditionally, Denmark's Dannebrog is cited as the oldest national flag extant, having being in continuous use (though not always as the symbol of state) since the thirteenth century.
The legend is that during a battle on 15 June 1219 in what is modern-day Estonia, the Danish army was on the defensive and defeat seemed imminent when suddenly, a red banner with a white cross fell from the sky. As a result, the fortunes of war shifted, the Danish army won the battle and Denmark gained a flag.
Inherently,
a small piece of colored glass three metres in the air can have no effect on a
passing car yet the use of red, amber & green traffic lights is what makes
modern road systems function as efficiently as they do. They work because people (usually) respond as
they should through the lens of semiotics, the signifier being the color of the
light, the signified the instructions conveyed (green=”go”; amber=”prepare to
stop or proceed with caution” & red=”stop”) and the referent the physical
need to go, proceed only with caution or stop.
The power of the glass lies wholly in its symbolism and the implied
consequences of ignoring its message.
Flags, mere pieces of fabric, have no inherent political or military
force yet have for millennia been among the most valued and contested of
symbols; men have died defending pieces of bunting which could have been
replaced with a tick of a supply sergeant’s pen, simply because of the
symbolism. Symbolism has always been integral
to the appeal of Nazism (and fascism in general) and by the early summer of
1942, on a map, the military position of Nazi Germany looked impressive, its
forces still maintaining a presence in North Africa, most of Western Europe
occupied from Norway to the south of France and the territorial gains from
Operation Barbarossa reaching well into the Soviet Union. However, the map substantially reflected the
gains which had been made in 1941 and by mid-1942 it was clear to the German
military they had under-estimated the ability of the Soviet armies to absorb losses
and recover. It was clear Germany no
longer had the strength successfully to advance along the massive front created
in 1941 and even Adolf Hitler (1889-1945; Führer (leader) and German head of
government 1933-1945 & head of state 1934-1945) realized that, at least
temporarily, more modest strategic aims would have to be pursued.
What Hitler set in train was a multi-pronged operation which would have been strategically sound had (1) the resources been available to sustain it and (2) there had not been such a gross under-estimation of the available Soviet military capacity. Originally, the plan had been to advance on the Caucasus after the encirclement and destruction of the defending forces in the Stalingrad region and the occupation of the city itself. This was changed, splitting the attacking force to allow the city and the Caucasus simultaneously to be conquered and the area envisaged was vast, including the eastern coast of the Black Sea, the forbidding Caucasian mountain passes and the oil fields of Grozny & Baku, far to the south. The German generals didn’t need much more than the back of an envelope to work out it simply couldn’t be done and that rather than undertaking sound planning based on reliable intelligence, the Führer was indulging in little more than wishing & guessing. “Wishing & guessing” was General George Marshall’s (1880–1959; US Army chief of staff 1939-1945) critique of Winston Churchill’s (1875-1965; UK prime-minister 1940-1945 & 1951-1955) dabblings in military matters and the comment wasn’t unjustified but the difference was that while the Allied high command was able to restrain (and if need be, veto) the prime-minister’s romantic (essentially Napoleonic) adventurism, the Wehrmacht’s generals and admirals had by 1942 long been dominated by Hitler. The German army was however generally the most effective ground force of the war and remarkably, achieved some early tactical gains but such were the distances involved and the disparity of forces available that the offensive was not only doomed but culminated in the loss of some 230,000 troops at Stalingrad, a calamity from which the army never quite recovered and among the German people damaged the prestige of the regime to an extent no previous setback had done.
Hitler,
at least in 1942, wasn’t delusional and understood he was running a risk but his
gambler’s instincts had for twenty years served him well and he still clung to
the belief a strength of will could overcome many disadvantages, even on the
battlefield. Early in the war, that had
worked when he was facing divided, unimaginative or week opponents but those
days were over and he was well-aware he was playing for high stakes from a
position of weakness. That he was under
great pressure and wracked by uncertainty (whatever might have been his outward
displays of confidence) was probably the cause of a celebrated over-reaction to
what was one of the war’s more trivial incidents: the planting of the Nazi war
flag on the peak of Mount Elbrus, at 5,642 m (18,510 feet) the highest point in
Europe. Hitler thought pursuits like mountain
climbing and skiing absurd but, like any practical politician, he liked a good
photo-opportunity and had in peacetime been pleased to be photographed with
those who had raised the swastika on some mountain or other (something which
dedicated Nazis had been doing since the 1920s, long before the party gained
power in 1933. On 21 August 1942, the Third’s
Reich’s war flag, along with the divisional flags of the 1st and 4th Divisions fluttered
in the wind on the roof of Europe and news of the triumph was transmitted to
FHQ (Führer Headquarters).
In the
throes of the offensive driving towards Stalingrad and the Caucases, the alpine
troops who climbed the peak to plant the flag doubtless though they were “working
towards the Führer” and providing him a priceless propaganda piece. They probably expected medals or at least
thanks but Hitler was focused on his military objectives and knew he needed
every available man to be devoted to his job and upon hearing two-dozen soldiers had decided to ignore their orders and instead climb up a hill of no strategic
value, just to climb down again, his reaction was visceral, recalled in his
memoirs by Albert Speer (1905–1981; Nazi court architect 1934-1942; Nazi
minister of armaments and war production 1942-1945), then at FHQ:
“I often saw Hitler furious but seldom did
his anger erupt from him as it did when this report came in. For hours he raged
as if his entire plan of the campaign had been ruined by this bit of sport.
Days later he went on railing to all and sundry about “those crazy mountain
climbers” who “belong before a court-martial.” They were pursuing their idiotic
hobbies in the midst of a war, he exclaimed indignantly, occupying an idiotic
peak even though he had commanded that all efforts must be concentrated upon
Sukhumi.”
The Germans never made it to Sukhumi and the high-altitude sideshow by a handful of troops of course in no way affected the campaign but the reaction at FHQ was an indication of the pressure felt by Hitler. The planting of a symbolic flag was also though symptomatic of the arrogance which had permeated the German military under the Nazis and it anyway proved a pyrrhic act of conquest, the standard torn down and replaced by the Soviet flag within six months; that the Russian army took the trouble to do that amid the clatter of war illustrates potency of national flags as propaganda devices. One of the most famous photographs of the conflict was that of the Soviet flag in May 1945 being placed over the Reichstag in Berlin, a symbol of defeat of Nazism. Interestingly, so important to the Kremlin was the image that the act was actually re-staged the next day, this time with a photographer in place to shoot a roll of film so the perfect shot could be selected and the Russians are not the only ones to have re-staged famous flag raisings.
The flag of the Hezbollah (right), the public display of which is banned in some jurisdictions where both the organization's political & military wings are listed as "terrorist organizations" includes a depiction of Kalashnikov AK-47 assault rifle but that of Mozambique (left) is the only national flag to feature the famous weapon and the Africans fixed a bayonet to the barrel which was a nice touch. Mozambique gained independence from Portugal in 1975 although the flag wasn’t officially adopted until 1983 as a modified version of what was essentially the battle flag of the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO, the Mozambique Liberation Front, the Marxist (later styled “democratic socialist”) resistance movement which fought a war of liberation (1964-1974) against the Portuguese colonial forces). Artistically, just as Marxism (notably often in Stalinist form) had been politically influential in post-colonial Africa, the hammer & sickle exerted an artistic appeal. The flag of Mozambique has an AK-47 crossed by a hoe sitting atop an open book and is the only national flag upon which appears a modern firearm, the handful of others with guns all using historic relics like muskets or muzzle-loaded cannons. The Angolan flag has a machete crossing a half gear wheel and both these African examples follow the symbolic model of the hammer and sickle, representing variously the armed struggle against repression, the industrial workers and the peasantry.
