Leftover

Leftover (pronounced left-oh-ver)

(1) Food remaining uneaten at the end of a meal, especially when saved for later use (usually in the plural: "leftovers").

(2) Anything left or remaining from a larger amount; remainder.

(3) A casual (and disparaging) term used in the PRC (People's Republic of China) to describe women still un-married after the age of twenty-six (sometimes quoted as "late twenty-something"). 

1878: A compound word, the construct being left + over (a noun use of verb phrase left over).  The meaning is always in the sense of left (“remaining, abandoned”) + over (“excess”).  Left was from the Middle English left, luft, leoft, lift & lyft, from the Old English left & lyft (air, atmosphere) from the Proto-Germanic luft with which may be compared the compared the Scots left (left), the North Frisian lefts, left & leefts (left), the West Frisian lofts (left), the dialectal Dutch loof (weak, worthless) and the Low German lucht (left).  Over was from the Middle English over from the Old English ofer from the Proto-Germanic uber (over), from the primitive Indo-European upér, a comparative form of upo; akin to the Dutch over, the German ober & über, the Danish over, the Norwegian over, the Swedish över, the Icelandic yfir, the Faroese yvir, the Gothic ufar, the Latin super, the Ancient Greek ὑπέρ (hupér), the Albanian upri (group of peasants) and the Sanskrit उपरि (upári).  The hyphenated left-over (remaining, not used up) was in used by at least 1890 as a noun meaning "something left over" is from 1891.  The sense of (the almost always plural) leftovers “excess food after a meal" (especially if re-served later) dates from 1878 and in this sense, the Old English had metelaf.  Leftover is a noun & adjective; the noun plural is leftovers.

Leftover women

Sheng nu (剩女; shèngnǚ), most often translated as "leftover women", is a phrase (usually considered derogatory) describing Chinese women who remain unmarried by their late twenties.  First promulgated by the ACWF (All-China Women's Federation) when promoting government programmes, it’s been used in other countries but remains most associated with the PRC .  As a demographic phenomenon, it was once unexpected because the conjunction of the PRC's one-child policy and the disproportionate abortion of female foetuses had led to a distortion in the historic gender balance; births in China since the one-child policy was introduced in 1979 have averaged 120 males for every 100 females, compared to a global ratio of 103:107.  In theory, this should of course have meant women were more able to find partners to marry but other circumstances combined to create a pool of "leftover women" and, because in the PRC the population is so large (believed now to be slightly in excess of 1.2 billion), that pool is a "big number". 

A bride with four suspected leftovers, looking enviously on.

The term appears to have entered general use in 2005-2006 and seems first to have appeared in the Chinese edition of Cosmopolitan (the PRC proved a receptive market for the glossiest forms of Western decadence).  Unlike most of Cosmopolitan’s editorial content, the CCP (Chinese Communist Party) took Sheng nu seriously and instructed the ACWF (a kind of cross between the Australian CWA (Country Women’s Association) and the PLA (the PRC's People’s Liberation Army) to publish articles stigmatizing women still unwed by their late twenties.  Borrowing from Maoist tradition (if not theory), the ACWF provided a useful analysis of the problem, concluding that while “pretty girls” didn’t need much education to find a rich partner, “average or ugly” ones who seek higher degrees thinking it will “increase their competitiveness” in the marriage market are delusional; all that happens is they become old “…like yellowed pearls."  The rhetorical flourishes aside, they had a point and in London, New York, Paris & Turin, the editorial staff of Cosmopolitan and other glossies probably shared their view although, of course, in the West, such heresies can be spoken only in hushed tones and certainly never printed.  As the numbers of highly educated women rose, the cohort  of potential husbands they found acceptable did not for what the distorted gender balance created by the one-child policy and the selective-sex abortion preferences had produced was an increasingly educated and middle-class female minority, not much impressed by the available pool of a less schooled and more rural male majority. 

Geographic distribution of leftover women, PRC, 2022.

“Leftover women” seemed the choice in print but on the internet, the punchier 3S or 3SW (Single, Seventies (referring to the then prominent 1970s birth cohort) and Stuck) was also used instead of sheng nu.  There is an equivalent term for men, guang gun (bare branches (ie men who do not marry and thus do not add branches to the family tree)); shengnan (leftover men) does exist but is rare.

As early as 1993, the CCP's demographers had expressed concerns about the social and economic implications of the one-child policy but "bureaucratic inertia" built into the institutions of the Chinese state is stubbornly resistant to change and it wasn't until the new century, the policy was first selectively relaxed, then revised to permit additional children for those selected by the CCP as desirable breeders before, on 31 May, 2021, at a meeting of the of the CCP's Politburo, the three-child policy (三孩政策) was announced.  The session, chaired by Xi Jinping (b 1953; CCP general secretary 2012- & PRC president 2013-), followed the release of the findings of the seventh national population census that had shown the number of births in mainland China in 2020 (some 12 million), would be the lowest since 1960, a marker of the demographic trend causing the ageing of the population.  The Xinhua state news agency then announced the three child policy would be accompanied by supportive measures to “maintain China's advantage in human resources” but surveys suggested the section of the population the CCP would like to see produce three children per household were generally unwilling to have even two, the reasons overwhelmingly the high cost of living in Chinese cities and the costs inherent in raising children.  The subsequent announcement on 26 July, 2021 permitting Chinese couples to have any number of children, was thus greeted by most with restrained enthusiasm.

Leftover no longer: Lindsay Lohan's engagement ring.  Ms Lohan announced her engagement in 2021, marring the following year.  In 2023, a post confirmed reports of her pregnancy. 

The problem of re-production is not restricted to the PRC, the birth rate in the RoK (Republic of Korea (South Korea)) now down to around .8 per woman (2.1 is necessary for a population to be sustained).  What exacerbates the problem in the PRC is the simple lack of women of child-bearing age, caused by the distorted male/female live-birth rates in the decades following the imposition of the one-child policy and any vague hope the long stretches of pandemic-era lock-downs may have encouraged procreation were not realized; like those in the West, Chinese couples preferred television and the internet.  Despite that disappointment, the CCP wasn't discouraged and embarked on a new propaganda campaign, making it clear to young women that having babies was part of their patriotic duty to the motherland: pregnancy was now compulsory.  That seems not to have had much effect and in the West, the decline in the birth rate has for some time been thought a problem, largely because of the impending acceleration in the distortion between those of working age (paying into the system) and those not generating income (extracting from the system).  Of late however, influenced by the un-anticipated rapidity in the advances in AI (artificial intelligence) and robotics, theorists are re-visiting the models and pondering the implications.  Given it's at least possible vast numbers of us will be able to be replaced by robots or AI agents, it may be the falling birth-rate will be, in a sense, demographically self-correcting because the only humans who may be "needed" will be a tiny elite and their servants (mechanics, technicians, bodyguards, prison wardens and "personal service workers", the latter category including sex workers but especially weighted towards nurses and specialist medical staff). 

The thoughts of Chairman Mao, 1973.

The problem of China’s “leftover women” is not new, Dr Henry Kissinger (1923-2023; US national security advisor 1969-1975 & secretary of state 1973-1977) in The White House Years (1979) recalling one revealing conversation with comrade Chairman Mao (Mao Zedong 1893–1976; chairman of the CCP, 1949-1976) during a meeting in Beijing in 1973:

“And yet for all his preoccupation with foreign policy, the Chairman could not avoid the obsession of his last years with Peking’s internal problems, which as so often in China’s history seemed to follow their own momentum.  Repeatedly Mao warned me about the pressures on him from radicals, but he did it so allusively that my dense Occidental mind did not immediately follow his meaning. ‘You know China is a very poor country,’ said Mao.  ‘We don’t have much. What we have in excess is women.’  Thinking that Mao was joking, I replied in kind: ‘There are no quotas for those, or tariffs.’  ‘So if you want them we can give a few of those to you, some tens of thousands,’ shot back Mao.  ‘Of course, on a voluntary basis,’ interrupted Zhou [Zhou Enlai (1898–1976; premier of the People's Republic of China (PRC) 1949-1976)].  ‘Let them go to your place,’ Mao continued. ‘They will create disasters.  That way you can lessen our burdens.’  He laughed uproariously.  But Mao was not yet sure that I had got the point; he returned to the theme a few minutes later.  ‘Do you want our Chinese women? [W]e can let them flood your country with disaster and therefore impair your interests.’

Whether Dr Kissinger long considered the comrade Chairman’s offer is something he seems never to have discussed but he may have mused over the advantages of an increase in the US “woman supply”.  Although he’d probably prefer to be remembered for his profound observations on foreign policy or diplomacy, his best known quote probably remains “Power is the ultimate aphrodisiac” and upon becoming a “political celebrity”, he became a fixture on the international cocktail party circuit, seemingly never short of glamorous female companions; presumably there were also a few unlucky “leftovers”.  Within the White House he was dubbed the “playboy of the western wing” but the well-connected socialite Barbara Howar (1934-2024, who’d often been seen on his arm) complained he was a bad date, advising anyone going out with him to “…not start to get dressed until the third time he’s called to say he’s on his way.”  She also claimed their well-publicized relationship was “strictly platonic”, explaining: “The reason Henry goes out with me is that he knows I’m one woman who is not husband hunting” but also quipped “Henry’s idea of sex is to slow the car down to 30 mph when he drops you off at the door.”  Clearly, she was no leftover but their relationship must be thought a “strategic ambiguity”.

Lord Kitchener Wants You, the famous British Army recruitment poster (1914) created by graphic artist Alfred Leete (1882–1933).  Immensely influential, for many purposes, the technique has since widely been used, its effect achieved by Kitchener’s gaze and pointing finger appearing to be directed straight at a viewer, regardless of the angle at which they stood.

As Dr Kissinger noted, the comrade Chairman’s concerns were not motivated only by aggregate numbers, conditions in China by 1973 “…far from being as stable as they looked [with] women… stirring up China and challenging the prevailing policy.”  Central to this unrest was Mao’s (fourth) wife (Jiang Qing (1914–1991)) who would in the aftermath of the chairman’s death emerge as one of the “Gang of Four” who attempted to seize power.  After her arrest was ordered by the dominant CCP faction, she was in 1980 tried and sentenced to death but a two-year stay was issued and later this was commuted to life imprisonment.  She died in 1991, reputedly by suicide and it was an interesting example of the difference between the way things were once done in Beijing and Moscow.  Had comrade Stalin (1878-1953; Soviet leader 1924-1953) been having troubles with a bolshie wife, he’d have known what to do; wife would have understood his language.  It’s a shame comrade Chairman Mao never had a chance to meet the UK’s Lord Kitchener (Field Marshal Horatio Herbert Kitchener, 1850–1916; secretary of state for war, 1914-1916) because they’d have had much about which to chat.  When, after the battle of Omdurman (1898), Kitchener visited Balmoral to meet Queen Victoria (1819–1901; Queen of the UK 1837-1901), he explained that in the aftermath of the conflict he’d been “rather inconvenienced by having some 2,000 women on his hands”.  Intrigued by anything “exotic”, Princess Beatrice (1857-1944) asked: “What were the women like?” to which Kitchener replied: “Very like all women.  They talked a great deal.”  As the chairman and field marshal would have agreed, on a case-by-case basis, “women are always a problem, it’s just a matter of working out why”.