Entasis

Entasis (pronounced en-tuh-sis)

(1) In architecture, a slight convexity given to a column or tower, claimed to correct the optical illusion of concavity and create the perception of straight lines.

(2) In medicine and physiology, an involuntary or spasmodic muscular contraction (also called entasia (from the Greek ɛnˈteɪzɪə)).

(3) In typography & calligraphy, the thinning in the waist of a stroke, the technique used to compensate for the visual perception of a stroke with perfectly straight sides appearing slightly to bulge.

1745–55: From the Latin entasis, from the Ancient Greek ἔντασις (éntasis) (tension, straining), from εντείνω (enteínō) (to stretch or strain tight), the construct being enta, variant stem of enteínein (to stretch tight) + teínein (to stretch) + sis.  The –sis suffix was from the Ancient Greek -σις (-sis) and was attached to words in English often via Latin or French.  It was identical in meaning with the Latin –entia and the English –ing and was used (1) to form nouns of action or process (catharsis, dialysis, diagnosis, crisis etc), (2) in medicine to form nouns of condition (psoriasis, sepsis, tuberculosis, psychosis etc) and more generally (3) nouns as required (basis, oasis, thesis, stasis etc).  Entasis is a noun; the noun plural is entases.

The Entasis or Parthenon Principle

The Parthenon in Athens; it's the most celebrated use of entasis.

In modern architecture, entasis is the application of a convex curve to a surface for aesthetic purposes.  Its best-known use is in the columns from antiquity which curve slightly as their diameter is decreased from the bottom upward.  Because no relevant documents have yet been discovered, it’s not known whether the architects in antiquity applied the technique for aesthetic effect or as an engineering technique to enhance strength.  The latter is suggested by the design principle being described by Roman architect Marcus Vitruvius Pollio (circa 75 BC–circa 20 BC) using the Greek word enteino (to stretch or strain tight), suggesting some emphasis on structural strength rather than appearance.  However, until contemporary records are uncovered, their reasons for using entasis remain mysterious, hence the two-thousand odd years of conjecture.  The earliest known documented view of the matter was that written by Greek mathematician and engineer Hero of Alexandria (circa 10-circa 70), is that entasis corrects the optical illusion of concavity in the columns that the human eye would create if the correction were not made.  

Basilica's western front of the Second Temple of Hera, a Greek temple in Paestum, Campania, Italy.

The Second Temple of Hera (circa 55 BC) was built in the Doric order, just north of the first.  For the visual effect of entasis to work, the convex curve has to be so slight as to be imperceptible and it's not known why the Second Temple of Hera has an entasis so pronounced the curvature is obvious; there is illusion of straightness.  The proportions are such that historians have speculated it must have been deliberate (presumably for structural strength) but it's at least possible the architect was afflicted by the desire many of his modern contemporaries share: The wish to produce something "original" and "new", the reason why so many modern buildings are so unpleasing to the eye, architectural awards & prizes handed out not for beauty and elegance but novelty and shock.

For millennia, entasis and its place in the history of architecture has been one of the most persistent tales from Antiquity but there have long been contrarians prepared to argue the concept, while not exactly a myth, is greatly exaggerated in significance.  In September 2026, Belgian mathematician Professor Alain Goriely (b 1967; professor of mathematical modelling at the University of Oxford) published the findings of his study, challenging the belief the Parthenon’s “curves” were included to correct “optical illusions” that would have made pure straight lines appear “distorted”.  What the professor’s modelling was said to reveal was (1) the “curves” are practically imperceptible and the alleged “illusion” they were claimed to correct doesn’t exist; “the illusions are illusory”.  Deconstructing Vitruvius, the study begins with the claim the sides of the Parthenon’s stylobate (base) are not horizontal but form a very flat “V”, rising gently 60 mm (2.36 inches) towards the centre.  According to Vitruvius, this was to correct the illusion that, when viewed as a whole, the base appears to “sag in the middle”.  For centuries, the “sagging effect” was attributed to one of two “tricks of the light”: (1) That because of the way light is interpreted by the human brain, long horizontal lines “appear to slump” towards the centre or (2) That the structure’s marble columns create the illusion; this based on the “Hering illusion” (where in 2D (two dimensions) parallel lines can appear “bowed” when intersected by other lines).  Professor Goriely found nothing to support either proposition, noting the Hering illusion (discovered in 1861 by German physiologist Ewald Hering (1834--1918) is most apparent when lines intersect at acute angles and the Parthenon’s columns are anyway “too close to the vertical” to produce the illusion.  Additionally, extensive modelling produced no proof the effect would manifest on the Parthenon even in 3D (three dimensions), viewed from any angle.

The persistent claims of entasis.

Those details were really footnotes in architecture textbooks, entasis the most famous of the legends.  What that suggests is “bulges” in the Parthenon’s columns (the curvature called entasis) were included by the builders to correct an optical illusion that would make them appear “too narrow” in the middle.  Not only did Professor Goriely found no evidence the illusion exists but the columns bulge by a mere 18 mm (less than ¾ inch) which, at that scale, is simply not perceptible to the human eye at a typical viewing distance.  What he doesn’t dispute is the architects may have had some reason to include variations in the dimensions; it’s just he found no evident they were there as “optical correctives”, the slopes on the base perhaps there for a reason as mundane as preventing puddles forming after rain; as every builder knows, only a very slight incline is needed for water to flow.  The very minor increase in width in the columns’ centre sections is more mysterious and may have been something to do with what would have been a very labor-intensive production process but there seems to be no optical effect.

Beyond the math, Professor Goriely speculates the reason the myth has proved so enduring was the extraordinary level of veneration granted to the engineers, philosophers and architects of Antiquity when, in the late Medieval period and (especially) the Renaissance, so many of the texts were “re-discovered” and a the perception emerged of Ancient Greece as a supremely knowledgeable and ingenious civilisation.  For centuries, in Western Europe, the Classical World was idealized and unless explicitly disproved (as came to be done of their medicine, cosmology and such), the texts were treated with great respect, thought something of “Civilization’s gold standard”.  In the modern age, the veracity of what Vitruvius wrote tended to be reinforced by internet users repeating the tale, search engines affording a greater credibility to “facts” appearing in the greatest volume.  Now of course, AI (artificial intelligence) bots have centuries of architectural texts from which to harvest information and given what Vitruvius who wrote about the Parthenon (400 years after its construction), came to be treated as something “scriptural” (despite the loss of loss of the many Greek texts about their temple architecture he claimed to have read when preparing his own), the authority was strengthened.  Untypically for an academic paper, the professor recommends not too much dwelling on his findings but commending instead: “Trust your own eyes, question what you see and decide for yourself whether the theory of optical corrections holds up.”  Professor Goriely concluded entasis “might be the oldest myth that we have” before mischievously adding “apart from religion.”

1964 Rolls-Royce Silver Cloud III Flying Spur; coachwork by H.J. Mulliner Park Ward.

One orthodoxy to emerge in the twentieth century was the famous Rolls-Royce radiator grille owed as much to Classical architecture as to being something there to prevent stones damaging the fragile core behind; if Rolls-Royce was going to be influenced by anyone, it’d be the architects of Antiquity.  According to chapter 4 of The Lexicon of Rolls‑Royce (the company doesn’t have web pages, it has chapters), what it styles as the “Pantheon Grille” was “…inspired by Rome’s imposing Pantheon temple, the Rolls-Royce grille is iconic. The Pantheon’s majestic columns were purposefully built with wider middle sections so that the human eye perceives each long pillar to be completely straight. It’s a perfect optical illusion and a genius stroke of design.  Taking inspiration from this, the Rolls-Royce grille is tactfully arranged using wider columns at the edge and thinner columns towards the middle to create an aesthetic illusion of symmetry when admired from the front. It’s a design that appears more perfect than nature intended.”  The days are gone when Rolls-Royce’s documents were characterized by understatement (it once described its engines’ power outputs as “adequate”), the vulgar numbers revealed only when German regulators humorlessly insisted.

While Professor Goriely’s computer models could find no evidence of the effect, a century-odd earlier, Rolls-Royce’s designers were convinced by the optical tricks of the Greeks and in 1925 integrated one of their optical techniques their new grille.  Although the “squared-off” shell dates from shortly after the company’s formation in 1904, not until 1928 did the now familiar grille with its upright bars become standardized.  Prior to 1925, the radiators were fronted by horizontal “slats” best thought of as “louvers” in that they functioned like “venetian blinds” (controlled by a lever next to the driver) to enable the airflow to be controlled (thus regulating engine temperature).  By the time of the release of the model Twenty in 1928, improvements in thermal-management technology meant the slats were no longer needed so the designers could start with a “clean sheet” and, being Rolls-Royce, the went neo-classical and built their own Pantheon, refining the ideas first seem in 1925 on the “New Phantom” (known retrospectively as the “Phantom I” (1925-1931) after new generations of the model followed).  So, although Professor Goriely’s math couldn’t detect any evidence entasis produced a detectable effect for those looking at the Parthenon, what Rolls-Royce does has been modelled and although slight, the effect of their trick is real.

Lindsay Lohan in Rolls-Royce Phantom Drophead Coupé (2007-2017).  By the 1970s factory (mostly) had ceased to use the historic terms FHC (Fixed-Head coupé) and DHC (Drop-Head Coupé (DHC) and the revival in 2007 for the Phantom Drophead Coupé has proved (thus far) a nostalgic one-off.  Over the decades, the designers generally were successful in their adaptations as they were required to make the grille wider and lower but the Phantom would have benefited aesthetically if a more traditional approach had been taken with the headlamps (centre) and even hidden units (right) would have been more pleasing.  Still, twenty-first century customers seem more accommodating of stylistic innovation than earlier generations.

According to opticians, what the design does (wider bars at the edges, more slender towards the centre) is create the illusion of symmetry when viewed straight on (at even a slight angle there will be no effect).  That’s said to be because when viewing such a structure, the brain processes the image as a whole (not a sequence of individual bars) and, paradoxically, what the slight difference in width does is render an “artificial equalization”.   Because of the way the brain processes the sight of a series of “parallel bars”, were they equally-spaced and equally wide, there would be a “hollowing” effect with a “pinching” towards the centre, caused by the natural human tendency to perceive outer edges as tapering away.  The eye is an outgrowth of the brain and it’s the brain doing the processing; while “looking at a grill” might sound a simple task, in the Rolls-Royce grille there’s a lot of “information” and processing it all is an act of high-level cognition.

Hi-rise Pantheon: 1965 Rolls-Royce Phantom V.  This was about at tall as the grille got; it appeared on the Phantom V (1959-1968) & VI (1968-1990).

All else being equal, the brain tends first to focus on an image’s centre (that information sent to the fovea centralis (the part of the retina handling “sharp central vision”)) with the edges simultaneously entering the “peripheral vision” where spatial resolution decreases (the brain therefore gathering less precise detail about the outer dimensions).  All this happens in a fraction of a second but does still happen sequentially, the brain using “predictive modelling” to “fill in the blanks” and there is much to process, the grille a large, highly reflective three-dimensional object with repeating lines.  The brain’s visual cortex has much to do understand the contrasting light patterns and depth cues and that it does all this in a fraction of a second in an indication of how powerful a machine it is.  Additionally, Rolls-Royce further assists the brain in “manufacturing perfection by machining each bar with a very slight outward curve, not detectable to the naked eye.  The combination of this functionally imperceptible “width-shifting & curvature” uses the way the brain operates to induce the required corrective “shortcuts”.

The Pantheon Temple, Rome (left) and 1985 Rolls-Royce Camargue (right).

The Pantheon's Latin inscription M·AGRIPPA·L·F·COS·TERTIVM·FECIT isn't all that poetic and reads like a note the draftsman might have put on the blueprint (had there then been blueprints): it translates as "Marcus Agrippa, son of Lucius, made [this building] when consul for the third time.", crediting the Roman statesman & general, Marcus Vipsanius Agrippa (circa 63 BC–12 BC) who commissioned the construction during his third consulship in 27 BC.  The Pantheon that stands today was rebuilt by Emperor Hadrian (Publius Aelius Hadrianus, 76–138; Roman emperor 117-138) circa 126 AD after the original structure suffered severe damage in a blaze; Hadrian chose to retain Agrippa's inscription as a tribute (not all the emperors were narcissists).  Since 609 AD, the Pantheon has been a Roman-Catholic church and is known as the Basilica Santa Maria ad Martyres (Basilica of St. Mary and the Martyrs).   In 1975, when the Camargue (1975-1986) was released, the novelty of it being the first Rolls-Royce designed using exclusively metric measurements (except for the odd carry-over component) attracted little attention but there was much comment about it being the first built with anything but a perfectly vertical grille.  The Camargue's grille was slanted at a (for mid-century Rolls-Royce) rakish 7^o.

Waftability

Parthenon Grill, Murfreesboro, Tennessee.

Understandably, the malapropism “Parthenon grill” is sometimes heard (and there is a well-reviewed Greek restaurant in Murfreesboro, Tennessee of that name) and despite occasional claims, the Pantheon grille doesn't feature a classic entasis (slight swelling in the middle of a column to counteract the alleged illusion of concavity) but the slight curve of the bars is real and can be checked with equipment no more complex than a “straight-edge” (a 12 inch (300 mm)) metal ruler ideal for the purpose.  Although for much of the twentieth century Rolls-Royce was much associated with straight lines (the “knife-edge” models bodied by coach-builder Hooper between 1935-1959 the high point of the brief era of  blending of a severe rectilinearly with the flowing lines of the pre-war aesthetic although, despite the mix, the approach was not within the lineage of post-modernism) curves have often been a component and in 2009 Tom Purves (b 1949; CEO of Rolls-Royce Motor Cars 2008-2010) announced the neologism “waftability” was “the essence of the brand”.  That, he defined as “calm perfect motion and accelerating quickly without fuss”.  Back then (and 2009 seems now little less remote than the days of the Cold War (1947-1991)), the CEO was describing the relationship between the appearance of a static Rolls-Royce as something that embodied that definition, revealing the internal name for the “gentle, upswept line of the sill” on the new Ghost model was a “waftline” (actually borrowed from the fashion business), the idea being it created “a powerful, poised stance and makes the car appear to be moving when stationary.”

1988 Rolls-Royce Corniche Convertible.  Although rendered redundant by electric motors, the Pantheon Grille will endure; it will be wider and lower (as has already happened) and some functional use may even be found but as an essential element in “brand identity” it won't go away.

The significance of “waftability” was Rolls-Royce was then still in the business of making large-displacement engines running on fossil fuels sound and behave as if they were electric motors but, by 2023, the company announced the Spectre, the brand’s first purely electric car.  So it had taken a while but the interest in electric energy predated even the formation of the company in 1904.  Sir Henry Royce (1863–1933) was an engineer who had designed dynamos, electric crane motors and patented the bayonet-style light bulb fitting while Charles Rolls (1877–1910) as early as 1900 drove an electric car declaring it the almost ideal form of propulsion, observing: “The electric car is perfectly noiseless and clean. There is no smell or vibration, and they should become very useful when fixed charging stations can be arranged.  But for now, I do not anticipate that they will be very serviceable – at least for many years to come.”  So it proved.  By 2023 however, the technology was ready and so (more debatably) was the infrastructure and there is nothing better at waftability than something large, luxurious and electric, Rolls-Royce saying that some time in the next decade, their last car running on fossil fuel will leave the assembly line.  Nothing lasts forever and, having spent more than a century trying to make ICEs (internal combustion engine) as smooth and silent as electric motors, the times seem now to suit Rolls-Royce.  For others (such as Ferrari, Porsche, Dodge etc), selling to a customer base with an emotional attachment to the howl, throb & scream of gasoline (petrol) exploding in six, eight or twelve combustion chambers, the challenge is to find a way to make them content with a piped soundtrack.  Engineers have conquered matters of performance and even range but nostalgia may prove harder to package.  For Rolls-Royce however, the task is simpler because it’s purely visual: While an electric car needs no radiator and thus no protective grill, it can be guaranteed Pantheon Grilles, severely cut in stainless steel, will continue to appear.

Leftover

Leftover (pronounced left-oh-ver)

(1) Food remaining uneaten at the end of a meal, especially when saved for later use (usually in the plural: "leftovers").

(2) Anything left or remaining from a larger amount; remainder.

(3) A casual (and disparaging) term used in the PRC (People's Republic of China) to describe women still un-married after the age of twenty-six (sometimes quoted as "late twenty-something"). 

1878: A compound word, the construct being left + over (a noun use of verb phrase left over).  The meaning is always in the sense of left (“remaining, abandoned”) + over (“excess”).  Left was from the Middle English left, luft, leoft, lift & lyft, from the Old English left & lyft (air, atmosphere) from the Proto-Germanic luft with which may be compared the compared the Scots left (left), the North Frisian lefts, left & leefts (left), the West Frisian lofts (left), the dialectal Dutch loof (weak, worthless) and the Low German lucht (left).  Over was from the Middle English over from the Old English ofer from the Proto-Germanic uber (over), from the primitive Indo-European upér, a comparative form of upo; akin to the Dutch over, the German ober & über, the Danish over, the Norwegian over, the Swedish över, the Icelandic yfir, the Faroese yvir, the Gothic ufar, the Latin super, the Ancient Greek ὑπέρ (hupér), the Albanian upri (group of peasants) and the Sanskrit उपरि (upári).  The hyphenated left-over (remaining, not used up) was in used by at least 1890 as a noun meaning "something left over" is from 1891.  The sense of (the almost always plural) leftovers “excess food after a meal" (especially if re-served later) dates from 1878 and in this sense, the Old English had metelaf.  Leftover is a noun & adjective; the noun plural is leftovers.

Leftover women

Sheng nu (剩女; shèngnǚ), most often translated as "leftover women", is a phrase (usually considered derogatory) describing Chinese women who remain unmarried by their late twenties.  First promulgated by the ACWF (All-China Women's Federation) when promoting government programmes, it’s been used in other countries but remains most associated with the PRC .  As a demographic phenomenon, it was once unexpected because the conjunction of the PRC's one-child policy and the disproportionate abortion of female foetuses had led to a distortion in the historic gender balance; births in China since the one-child policy was introduced in 1979 have averaged 120 males for every 100 females, compared to a global ratio of 103:107.  In theory, this should of course have meant women were more able to find partners to marry but other circumstances combined to create a pool of "leftover women" and, because in the PRC the population is so large (believed now to be slightly in excess of 1.2 billion), that pool is a "big number". 

A bride with four suspected leftovers, looking enviously on.

The term appears to have entered general use in 2005-2006 and seems first to have appeared in the Chinese edition of Cosmopolitan (the PRC proved a receptive market for the glossiest forms of Western decadence).  Unlike most of Cosmopolitan’s editorial content, the CCP (Chinese Communist Party) took Sheng nu seriously and instructed the ACWF (a kind of cross between the Australian CWA (Country Women’s Association) and the PLA (the PRC's People’s Liberation Army) to publish articles stigmatizing women still unwed by their late twenties.  Borrowing from Maoist tradition (if not theory), the ACWF provided a useful analysis of the problem, concluding that while “pretty girls” didn’t need much education to find a rich partner, “average or ugly” ones who seek higher degrees thinking it will “increase their competitiveness” in the marriage market are delusional; all that happens is they become old “…like yellowed pearls."  The rhetorical flourishes aside, they had a point and in London, New York, Paris & Turin, the editorial staff of Cosmopolitan and other glossies probably shared their view although, of course, in the West, such heresies can be spoken only in hushed tones and certainly never printed.  As the numbers of highly educated women rose, the cohort  of potential husbands they found acceptable did not for what the distorted gender balance created by the one-child policy and the selective-sex abortion preferences had produced was an increasingly educated and middle-class female minority, not much impressed by the available pool of a less schooled and more rural male majority. 

Geographic distribution of leftover women, PRC, 2022.

“Leftover women” seemed the choice in print but on the internet, the punchier 3S or 3SW (Single, Seventies (referring to the then prominent 1970s birth cohort) and Stuck) was also used instead of sheng nu.  There is an equivalent term for men, guang gun (bare branches (ie men who do not marry and thus do not add branches to the family tree)); shengnan (leftover men) does exist but is rare.

As early as 1993, the CCP's demographers had expressed concerns about the social and economic implications of the one-child policy but "bureaucratic inertia" built into the institutions of the Chinese state is stubbornly resistant to change and it wasn't until the new century, the policy was first selectively relaxed, then revised to permit additional children for those selected by the CCP as desirable breeders before, on 31 May, 2021, at a meeting of the of the CCP's Politburo, the three-child policy (三孩政策) was announced.  The session, chaired by Xi Jinping (b 1953; CCP general secretary 2012- & PRC president 2013-), followed the release of the findings of the seventh national population census that had shown the number of births in mainland China in 2020 (some 12 million), would be the lowest since 1960, a marker of the demographic trend causing the ageing of the population.  The Xinhua state news agency then announced the three child policy would be accompanied by supportive measures to “maintain China's advantage in human resources” but surveys suggested the section of the population the CCP would like to see produce three children per household were generally unwilling to have even two, the reasons overwhelmingly the high cost of living in Chinese cities and the costs inherent in raising children.  The subsequent announcement on 26 July, 2021 permitting Chinese couples to have any number of children, was thus greeted by most with restrained enthusiasm.

Leftover no longer: Lindsay Lohan's engagement ring.  Ms Lohan announced her engagement in 2021, marring the following year.  In 2023, a post confirmed reports of her pregnancy. 

The problem of re-production is not restricted to the PRC, the birth rate in the RoK (Republic of Korea (South Korea)) now down to around .8 per woman (2.1 is necessary for a population to be sustained).  What exacerbates the problem in the PRC is the simple lack of women of child-bearing age, caused by the distorted male/female live-birth rates in the decades following the imposition of the one-child policy and any vague hope the long stretches of pandemic-era lock-downs may have encouraged procreation were not realized; like those in the West, Chinese couples preferred television and the internet.  Despite that disappointment, the CCP wasn't discouraged and embarked on a new propaganda campaign, making it clear to young women that having babies was part of their patriotic duty to the motherland: pregnancy was now compulsory.  That seems not to have had much effect and in the West, the decline in the birth rate has for some time been thought a problem, largely because of the impending acceleration in the distortion between those of working age (paying into the system) and those not generating income (extracting from the system).  Of late however, influenced by the un-anticipated rapidity in the advances in AI (artificial intelligence) and robotics, theorists are re-visiting the models and pondering the implications.  Given it's at least possible vast numbers of us will be able to be replaced by robots or AI agents, it may be the falling birth-rate will be, in a sense, demographically self-correcting because the only humans who may be "needed" will be a tiny elite and their servants (mechanics, technicians, bodyguards, prison wardens and "personal service workers", the latter category including sex workers but especially weighted towards nurses and specialist medical staff). 

The thoughts of Chairman Mao, 1973.

The problem of China’s “leftover women” is not new, Dr Henry Kissinger (1923-2023; US national security advisor 1969-1975 & secretary of state 1973-1977) in The White House Years (1979) recalling one revealing conversation with comrade Chairman Mao (Mao Zedong 1893–1976; chairman of the CCP, 1949-1976) during a meeting in Beijing in 1973:

“And yet for all his preoccupation with foreign policy, the Chairman could not avoid the obsession of his last years with Peking’s internal problems, which as so often in China’s history seemed to follow their own momentum.  Repeatedly Mao warned me about the pressures on him from radicals, but he did it so allusively that my dense Occidental mind did not immediately follow his meaning. ‘You know China is a very poor country,’ said Mao.  ‘We don’t have much. What we have in excess is women.’  Thinking that Mao was joking, I replied in kind: ‘There are no quotas for those, or tariffs.’  ‘So if you want them we can give a few of those to you, some tens of thousands,’ shot back Mao.  ‘Of course, on a voluntary basis,’ interrupted Zhou [Zhou Enlai (1898–1976; premier of the People's Republic of China (PRC) 1949-1976)].  ‘Let them go to your place,’ Mao continued. ‘They will create disasters.  That way you can lessen our burdens.’  He laughed uproariously.  But Mao was not yet sure that I had got the point; he returned to the theme a few minutes later.  ‘Do you want our Chinese women? [W]e can let them flood your country with disaster and therefore impair your interests.’

Whether Dr Kissinger long considered the comrade Chairman’s offer is something he seems never to have discussed but he may have mused over the advantages of an increase in the US “woman supply”.  Although he’d probably prefer to be remembered for his profound observations on foreign policy or diplomacy, his best known quote probably remains “Power is the ultimate aphrodisiac” and upon becoming a “political celebrity”, he became a fixture on the international cocktail party circuit, seemingly never short of glamorous female companions; presumably there were also a few unlucky “leftovers”.  Within the White House he was dubbed the “playboy of the western wing” but the well-connected socialite Barbara Howar (1934-2024, who’d often been seen on his arm) complained he was a bad date, advising anyone going out with him to “…not start to get dressed until the third time he’s called to say he’s on his way.”  She also claimed their well-publicized relationship was “strictly platonic”, explaining: “The reason Henry goes out with me is that he knows I’m one woman who is not husband hunting” but also quipped “Henry’s idea of sex is to slow the car down to 30 mph when he drops you off at the door.”  Clearly, she was no leftover but their relationship must be thought a “strategic ambiguity”.

Lord Kitchener Wants You, the famous British Army recruitment poster (1914) created by graphic artist Alfred Leete (1882–1933).  Immensely influential, for many purposes, the technique has since widely been used, its effect achieved by Kitchener’s gaze and pointing finger appearing to be directed straight at a viewer, regardless of the angle at which they stood.

As Dr Kissinger noted, the comrade Chairman’s concerns were not motivated only by aggregate numbers, conditions in China by 1973 “…far from being as stable as they looked [with] women… stirring up China and challenging the prevailing policy.”  Central to this unrest was Mao’s (fourth) wife (Jiang Qing (1914–1991)) who would in the aftermath of the chairman’s death emerge as one of the “Gang of Four” who attempted to seize power.  After her arrest was ordered by the dominant CCP faction, she was in 1980 tried and sentenced to death but a two-year stay was issued and later this was commuted to life imprisonment.  She died in 1991, reputedly by suicide and it was an interesting example of the difference between the way things were once done in Beijing and Moscow.  Had comrade Stalin (1878-1953; Soviet leader 1924-1953) been having troubles with a bolshie wife, he’d have known what to do; wife would have understood his language.  It’s a shame comrade Chairman Mao never had a chance to meet the UK’s Lord Kitchener (Field Marshal Horatio Herbert Kitchener, 1850–1916; secretary of state for war, 1914-1916) because they’d have had much about which to chat.  When, after the battle of Omdurman (1898), Kitchener visited Balmoral to meet Queen Victoria (1819–1901; Queen of the UK 1837-1901), he explained that in the aftermath of the conflict he’d been “rather inconvenienced by having some 2,000 women on his hands”.  Intrigued by anything “exotic”, Princess Beatrice (1857-1944) asked: “What were the women like?” to which Kitchener replied: “Very like all women.  They talked a great deal.”  As the chairman and field marshal would have agreed, on a case-by-case basis, “women are always a problem, it’s just a matter of working out why”.

Kindleberger

Kindleberger (pronounced khin-dil-berg-ah)

A family name of Germanic origin.

As “Kindleberger Moment” & “Kindleberger Trap”, two related terms describing different aspects from an underlying problem in international political economy and named after economist Professor Charles P. Kindleberger (1910-2003) whose writings inspired their coining.  Professor Kindleberger’s middle name was “Poor” and while that may seem more appropriate for a monk than an economist, it didn’t appear to hamper his career.

The surname Kindleberger is of German origin, functioning as a habitational or topographic name, the construct being Kind(l)- + -berg + -er.  Kind (kid, child, young person) was from the Middle High German kint, from the Old High German kind, from the Proto-West Germanic kind, from Proto-Germanic kindą & kinþą, from the primitive Indo-European ǵenh- (to give birth); there were many local dialect variations.  Berg (mountain, hill) was from the Middle High German bërc, from the Old High German bërg, from the Proto-West Germanic berg, ultimately from the Proto-Germanic bergaz; it may be compared with the Dutch berg, the German Low German Barg, Berg & Biärg, the West Frisian berch, the English berry & barrow, the Danish bjerg and the Swedish berg.  The –er suffix (in this context) was appended to indicate inhabitant or person from a specific locality.  The “-berg” element thus in general was used in the names of those living near a specific hill or a place named with those combined linguistic roots and Kindleberger would likely have began with someone who was the (probably male) offspring of someone named “Berg”, “Berger” or such.  As a compound surname, it may in some instances have referred not to individuals living near mountainous regions but those (likely female) who were known for their roles as caretakers of children; the etymological structure can indicate a connection between familial roles and the natural landscape.  The name dates from at least the Late Medieval period (when surnames became hereditary) and records of use exist in several German-speaking regions, clusters found concentrated in areas like the Rheinland-Pfalz (Rhineland-Palatinate) region that, while not characterized by alpine peaks, does have a topography noted for rolling hills, low mountain ranges, and deeply carved river valleys.  As internal migration increased (notably within the Holy Roman Empire), like many European surnames, variations like Kindleberger and Kindelberger spread and this occurred internationally during the nineteenth & twentieth centuries; outside of Europe, the Kindleberger name is most likely to be found in the states of the north-eastern US (the largest concentrations historically in West Virginia, Ohio & Pennsylvania).  Kindleberger is a proper noun; the noun plural is Kindlebergers.

A red meteor observed by US-born astronomer Stephen James O'Meara (b 1956) in the skies above Maun, Botswana.

Asteroid 42354 Kindleberger was named after the professor.  Originally listed by the International Dark Sky Discovery Center in Fountain Hills, Arizona on 12 February, 2002 (and provisionally allocated ID 2002 CK43), it was discovered by Charles Juels (1944–2009) and Paulo Holvorcem (b 1967), both amateur astronomers.  Paulo Holvorcem (b 1967) is a mathematician based in Brasília (one of a handful of “created” capital cities), Brazil while Charles Juels (1944–2009) was a US psychiatrist practicing in Phoenix, Arizona; after retirement, he became one of the planet’s most prolific discoverers of asteroids, minor planets and such.  The naming conventions administered by the IAU (International Astronomical Union) permit those who discover minor planets to submit potential names, once the orbit officially is confirmed.  Professor Kindleberger was honoured in recognition both of his academic contributions to the discipline of economics and the role his books (especially Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises (1978) played in explaining such phenomena to a non-specialist audience.  The choice (within certain limitations) is in the hands of the discoverer(s) and other economists have had asteroids named after them.  Red-tailed asteroids are rare but do exist, 3200 Phaethon's (provisionally 1983 TB) vivid tail made of sodium vaporized from the rock by the heat of the Sun, inducing  fluoresce an orange glow.  Definitely the next red-tailed asteroid should be named after Lindsay Lohan.

The World in Depression, 1929-1939 (1973) by Charles P. Kindleberger.

A “Kindleberger Moment” is a critical point in global history when the world’s dominant power (of late typically a hegemon) ceases providing economic leadership and no other country is able or willing to assume the role.  MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) Professor of Economics Charles P. Kindleberger illustrated the concept during his study of the Great Depression of the 1930s, arguing the global economy “crashed” (ie suffered a significant decline in economic activity, employment, trade etc) because (1) the economy of the previously dominant power (the UK) had been too weakened by the First World War (1914-1918) to be able to provide the necessary leadership and corrective mechanisms and (2) the rising power (the US) was both also greatly affected by the downturn and anyway uninterested in becoming entangled in international affairs.  A Kindleberger moment can be considered a “global power vacuum”, the previous leader withdrawing from maintaining and contributing to global rules, trade agreements, and international organizations with no successor available.  At such moments, competing rising new powers tend to focus only on their own interests instead of supporting global stability, meaning the international system faces heightened risks of financial collapse, trade wars, political instability and related chaos (mass irregular migration, border conflicts etc).  Of late, there has been renewed interest in the Kindleberger moment as doubts have been raised about the ability of the US to continue in the rule it has fulfilled since 1945 at a time when the PRC (People’s Republic of China, 1949-) is becoming increasing powerful and assertive but has neither the capacity nor (apparently) the inclination to be the world’s “indispensable nation” (ie “global policeman and banker”).

Professor Kindleberger in his office at MIT, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

As an economist discussing the smooth operation of the international economy, Kindleberger didn’t attach to the concept of “hegemon” the negative connotations vested famously by the Italian Marxist theorist Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937) who had used to idea in a predictably Marxist way (of a “ruling class & ruling culture” able within a society to exert control and maintain power for its own economic benefit).  For Kindleberger, a hegemonic power was a highly desirable element in an inter-connected world economy that in the absence of such an authority would inevitably descent into conflicts that likely would spread.  A Kindleberger moment occurs when there’s hegemonic absence (or even significant deficit) in which the international system lacks a power willing and able to supply essential stabilising functions including:

(1) Maintaining an international trading system in which markets were free, open and transparent.

(2) Providing a system in which international capital flows were regulated to the extent of ensuring stability.

(3) Maintaining a stable monetary system by providing a stable, convertible reserve currency, able to be used by trading nations.

(4) Acting as a lender of last resort.

(5) Coordinating international responses to economic and other crises.

The related “Kindleberger Trap” (a term dating only from 2017) describes the structural dilemma that can arise from the world entering a “Kindleberger Moment”.  Were there always a nice symmetry in that as one power withdrew from the role, another took over on a “business as usual” basis, it would be a smoothly run world but in international relations things tend to be more messy and depending on the dynamics, things can take decades or even centuries to be resolved (for better or worse).  As a rising power acquires sufficient economic, military and geopolitical weight, it might be expected to contribute to maintaining the international order (from which, by definition, it has gained that strength) at a time when the established hegemon simultaneously is reducing its capacity or willingness to carry the burden but history suggests conflict is more likely than cooperation.  The twist in the “Kindleberger Moment” theory is that in a situation where the existing hegemon is in decline but the rising power is unwilling or unable to assume the role, a “trap” begins to open.  That trap is created by the rising power “probing” often regional weaknesses in the hegemon’s strategic architecture and the response to that often is localized tactical violence (often called “containment”), something that can exacerbate the decline of the authority of the established power while doing little to curb (and likely even encourage) the assertiveness of the rival.  Once the hegemon is so engaged, the trap has closed and the point is the “trap” is likely a process rather than a singer decisive event.  Deliberately the phrase echoed the better-known “Thucydides Trap” (the name from the Ancient Greek general & historian Thucydides (circa 460-circa 400 BC)). Describing the idea that when a rising power threatens to supplant the established one, the result is often war (pre-emptive or preventive depending on the spin chosen), either through a fear of being attacked or in an attempt to “contain the upstart”.  So, conceptually, a Kindleberger moment is the situation; the Kindleberger Trap is the recurring structural predicament that can lead to it.

Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises (1978) by Charles P. Kindleberger, fifty years on, still the standard work and now in its eighth edition (2023) and, there being no indication there'll not be more manias, panics, and crashes, a ninth edition can be expected, updated to document the latest crises.

The consensus among specialists seems to be the world is not at this point in a Kindleberger Moment because structurally the PRC is not yet able to assume the global role the US has evolved to fulfil since 1945.  These was nothing unique about the shift in 1945, just as the US replaced the UK, the UK had replaced the Netherlands, the Netherlands had replaced Spain and Spain had replaced various Italian city-states.  What however now makes the situation potentially unstable is that the PRC does not accept the existing US-led order, but is not only unable to replicate the global role but uninterested in doing so.  The PRC’s preferred model is “spheres of influence” on a grand scale administered on a “Westphalian basis” (ie non-interference in each other’s spheres).  In that, Beijing’s vision differs from spheres of influence approach during the Cold War in that the earlier model was one of conflict disguised as peaceful co-existence; the PRC’s regarding their mode; as beneficial for all.  Unlike those running the early Soviet Union (1922-1991), the CCP (Chinese Communist Party) has no interest in exporting its system of governance to other states; the lessons have been well-learned from the US attempting to “impose democracy” in places where historically it has never taken root.  The modern CCP does not wish to attempt to transform other places to clones of the PRC; what is wants is for them become good, reliable suppliers and consumers and whether they are run as democracies, theocracies or dictatorships is an “internal affair”.  What matters is peace, good order and a common system of “non-interference”.  The CCP’s collective view is not unknown in the annals of the US State Department, the diplomat and historian George Kennan (1904-2005) in one of his long (and mostly ignored) reports from Moscow in 1945 noting the US should “…remain true to its ideals but should not try to foist them on peoples with entirely different national traditions.”

Leviathan (1651) by Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679).  The etching used for the frontipiece of the original edition was by the French printmaker Abraham Bosse (circa 1604–1676) “with input from the author”.

The One comparison that can be made is between the notion a world hegemon is necessary for a generally stable world economy and the idea the very clever and deliciously wicked English philosopher Thomas Hobbes explored in Leviathan (1651): A strong sovereign (to whom individuals must cede certain “natural rights”) is essential for a peaceful, stable society.  Although striking, there are limitations to the extent the hegemon in Professor Kindleberger's model can be thought an international analogue of the grim vision in Leviathan; it is not a direct application of Hobbesian political theory.  Hobbes argued the fundamental problem in the “state of nature” (ie in which the earliest “societies” came to be formed) was the lack of a sufficiently powerful common authority to prevent individuals from pursuing their interests against one another.  In that model, because each person (at least theoretically) possesses roughly equal capacity to threaten others, rational individuals have an incentive to seek security by establishing a sovereign and one not there merely to coordinate but also with coercive power.  What the existence of a powerful sovereign offered was that in exchange for restrictions on individual freedom (at the most basic, not killing one’s opponents), collective security would be guaranteed.  Because all in the society would be subject to the same authority (and thus the same loss of certain freedoms) the arrangement would come to be accepted, if for no other reason than the alternative(s) being worse: “nasty, solitary, brutish and short” Hobbes’ memorable phrase.

Kindleberger's argument was developed in his book The World in Depression, 1929–1939 (1973) and concerned something analogous to what Hobbes described but at the international economic level.  His thesis was that (1) with an economy damaged by involvement in World War I and the consequent “difficulties” of the following decade, the UK was no longer able to provided the international economic leadership it had delivered before the war while (2) the US was unable or unwilling to assume the role.  With no stabilising hegemon, nations resorted to acting in short-term self interest, leading to reductions in trade, wealth and employment; Professor Kindleberger's key insight was that whatever their granular nature, in international economics these things must be thought public goods but, of course, individual countries each had incentives to have others bear the cost of maintaining them, thus the famous “Kindleberger Problem”: Who pays for the system?  That the UK was not prepared to go deeper into debt and the US preferred to focus on its own problems he held to be the major factors that made what might have been a sharp but relatively short recession into the Great Depression of the 1930s.  It was the leadership vacuum that created the conditions leading to the collapse of the international economic order.

The limitation in pursuing the analogy is of course that neither the UK in the nineteenth century nor the US since 1945 were the sovereign of the international system in the Hobbesian sense; Hobbes’ sovereign had juridical and coercive supremacy over subjects while the international hegemon does not because, although in the modern age state sovereignty is no longer the fabulous beast it was once claimed to be, individual nations remain still independent with some (though much varied) capacity to resist a hegemon.  In other words, Kindleberger's hegemon can help to provide order through preponderance in economic, political and political capabilities whereas the Hobbesian sovereign, within their territory, enjoyed absolute authority.  So the problems can be seen as similar but the solutions differ, Hobbes describing a rigid hierarchy and Kindleberger a leadership that administers anarchy by making it “managed chaos”.

US National Debt: US$40 trillion by August 2026.

All the history and economic theory is of course of interest but of immediate concern is (1) whether a Kindleberger moment is to hand (protagonist and antagonist being the US and PRC) and (2) whether the consequences of soch a moment will be economic disruption (of unknown extent or duration) or armed conflict (of unknown extent or duration).  The world is in a most unusual situation in that although the US continues of operate as hegemon, debatably it shouldn’t be able to because of its US$40 trillion debt (about 123% of GDP (gross domestic product)) and other problems.  While it’s true US debt was nudging 120% immediately after World War II (1939-1945), the US position at that time (vis-à-vis the rest of the planet) was unique and the debt trend was downwards whereas now it’s upwards.  There are those who argue things have changed and the US$40 trillion number is no longer an expression of “debt” in the conventional sense of the word but merely a way of describing the “new” mechanism of managing the US money supply.  The notion the US Treasury could at any time mint a single US$40 trillion coin, add it to the balance sheet and declare a net-debt free status has been offered as one example of why “deficits don’t matter” and while not all accept that, just about the whole world is now dependent on the US sustaining the existing system with this ever-growing debt so, in the absence of another country (or “demi-country” such as the EU (European Union (1993)), the multi-national aggregation which evolved from the EEC (European Economic Community), the Zollverein formed in 1957)) able and willing to fulfil the role of hegemon, the world economy and the US remain engaged in what some fear is a kind of economic danse macabre and there seems no way to use the numbers to predict if it's a debt level of US$50, 75, or 100 trillion that risks triggering a crisis.

Presidents Xi (left) and Trump (right).  With sufficient (1) goodwill or (2) amorality, the art of the deal can be done.  With enough of the latter, the former may one day emerge.

Of course the ultimate wild card (others might prefer “joker”) is that Donald Trump (b 1946; POTUS 2017-2021 and since 2025) is in the White House and while his idiosyncratic methods of governance intrigue political junkies, so marvellously unpredictable are his actions that it’s hard to map onto the dynamics a well understood concept like the Kindleberger Moment.  At heart a CEO (chief executive officer) rather than a democrat operating within constitutional norms, it’s suspected that left to his own devices, Mr Trump would sit down at the map table with comrade Xi Jinping (b 1953; General Secretary of the CCP and paramount leader of the PRC (People's Republic of China) since 2012) and divide up their respective spheres of influence.  Like Mr Trump who wants as little as possible to do with the internal affairs of America’s suppliers and customers (ie other countries), Mr Xi has no wish to waste effort or resources on “pointless squabbles” and not since a couple of horse-traders like Winston Churchill (1875-1965; UK prime-minister 1940-1945 & 1951-1955) & comrade Stalin (1878-1953; Soviet leader 1924-1953), needing nothing more, than pencil, paper and limitless cynicism divided up the Balkans into bite-sized spheres have two great powers been headed by a pair as suited to “doing the art of the deal”.  Of course, for those in places like the “renegade province of Taiwan”, there would be a cost but as at was demonstrated at the Yalta Conference (February 1945), somebody “always has to pay the price” and that may be a better trap to spring than risking the jaws of a Kindleberger Trap.