Prerogative

Prerogative (pronounced pri-rog-uh-tiv)

(1) An exclusive right, privilege, etc., exercised by virtue of rank, office, or the like; having a hereditary or official right or privilege.

(2) A right, privilege, etc., limited to a specific person or to persons of a particular category.

(3) A power, immunity, or the like restricted to a sovereign government or its representative.

(4) Characterized by lawless state actions (refers to the prerogative state)

(5) Precedence (obsolete).

(6) A property, attribute or ability which gives one a superiority or advantage over others; an inherent advantage or privilege; a talent.

(7) In constitutional law, a right or power exclusive to a head of state (often derived from the original powers of a monarch) or their nominee exercising delegated authority, especially the powers to appoint or dismiss executive governments.

1350-1400: From the Anglo-Norman noun prerogatif, from the Old French prerogative, from the Latin praerogātīva (previous verdict; claim, privilege), noun use of the feminine singular of praerogātīvus (having first vote; privileged), in Anglo-Latin as prerogativa from late thirteenth century.  The origin lay in a statute in the civil law of Ancient Roman which granted precedence to the tribus, centuria (an assembly of one-hundred voters who, by lot, voted first in the Roman comita).  The law guaranteed them a praerogātīvus (chosen to vote first) derived from praerogere (ask before others).  The construct of praerogere was prae (before) + rogare (to ask, ask a favor), apparently a figurative use of a primitive Indo-European verb meaning literally "to stretch out (the hand)" from the root reg- (move in a straight line).  In Middle English, the meaning "an innate faculty or property which especially distinguishes someone or something" was added.  The alternative spelling prærogative is long obsolete.

The royal prerogative and the reserve powers of the crown

The royal prerogative is the body of customary authority, privilege, and immunity and the means by which (some of) the executive powers of government are exercised in the governance of the state.  These powers are recognized in common law and in a few civil law jurisdictions are held to vest wholly in the sovereign alone, even if exercised through either appointees (of which governors, governors-general & viceroys are the most-known) constitutional government.  In the narrowest sense of technical theory, the recognition of the personal powers of a sovereign exists in most common law systems where the concept is relevant but has long since mostly been reduced to legal fiction and. in most constitutional monarchies, almost all individual prerogatives have been abolished by parliaments.  Some republican heads of state also possess similar powers but they tend to be constitutionally defined and subject to checks and balances.  A notable exception to this is a US president’s un-trammeled right to grant pardons to those convicted of offences under federal law and that’s interesting because it’s the only power in the US Constitution not subject to a check or balance.  A US president thus personally continues to exercise a prerogative in a way a British monarch (or their appointees as governors & governors-general), from whom the power is derived, no longer can.

In Britain, prerogative powers were originally exercised by the monarch (at least in theory and the role of the Church needs also to be noted) acting alone but from after the Magna Carta (1215), there had to be sought the consent of others and this ultimately became parliamentary consent granted to an executive (exercising powers derived from the absolute authority of the monarch) responsible to the parliament.  This took centuries to evolve and eventually meant, in practical terms, the king got the money he needed for his wars and other ventures in exchange for the parliament getting his signature to pass the laws they wanted. 

In Australia, the royal prerogative is limited (but not defined) by the constitution and those powers which vest a monarch’s authority in a governor-general don’t alter the nature of the prerogative, only its detail; the prerogative is exercised by the governor-general but only on the advice of “their” ministers.  The most obvious exception to this is the reserve power of the monarch (and there are those who doubt whether this still exists in the UK) to dismiss a government enjoying the confidence of the lower house of parliament.  In the UK, it’s not been done since William IV (1765–1837; King of the United Kingdom 1830-1837) dismissed Lord Melbourne (1779–1848; Prime Minister of Great Britain 1834 & 1835–1841) in 1834 (some dispute that, saying it was more of a gentleman’s agreement and the last termination was actually that of Lord North (1732–1792; Prime Minister of Great Britain 1770-1782) by George III (1738–1820) King of Great Britain 1760-1820) in 1782) but Australia has seen two twentieth-century sackings; that in 1932 of NSW premier Jack Lang (1876–1975; Premier of New South Wales 1925-1927 & 1930-1932) by Governor Sir Philip Game (1876–1961; Governor of NSW 1930-1935) and, in 1975, when governor-general Sir John Kerr (1914–1991; Governor-General of Australia 1974-1977) sundered Gough Whitlam’s (1916–2014; Prime Minister of Australia 1972-1975) commission.

The 1975 business provoked much academic discussion of the reserve powers but the most lucid read remains Dr HV Evatt’s (1894–1965; ALP leader 1951-1960) book from decades earlier: The King and His Dominion Governors.   Evatt’s (1936) volume was published a hundred odd-years after William IV sacked Melbourne and is useful because in that century there had been more than a few disputes about reserve powers.  Evatt’s central point was that the powers exist but proper rules by which they may be exercised are by no means clear.  The legal power is vested in the governor as the representative of the monarch and when it may properly be used depends on usage and convention.  It seems therefore scarcely possible to say confidently of any case when the Crown has intervened that its intervention was or was not correct for the only standard of correctness in each episode is its consistency with episodes of a similar character, none of which in themselves lay down any principle in law.  Further, Evatt notes, in looking to precedent, support for almost any view can be found in the authorities.  Lofty theoretical purity is also not helpful.  The view the sovereign automatically acts in all matters in accordance with the advice of his ministers rests entirely upon assertion and, Evatt observed, the reserve powers are still, on occasion, properly exercisable and that the Sovereign or his representative may have to exercise a real discretion.  Given that, it really might be impossible that the prerogative could be codified in a document which envisages all possible political or other circumstances.  Evatt nevertheless argued the principles which should guide a sovereign should be defined and made clear by statute.

Nor is practical political reality all that much help, however satisfactory an outcome may prove.  What the exercise of the reserve powers, both in 1932 and 1975, did was enable impasses described, however erroneously as constitutional crises to be resolved by an election, rather than other means.  The result of an election however does not conclude the matter for the correctness of the sovereign's action is not measured by his success as a prophet, any post-facto endorsement by the electorate having not even an indirect bearing on the abstract question of constitutionality.

Dr HV Evatt in his office at the UN.  Although variously a high court judge, attorney-general, foreign minister, opposition leader and Chief Justice of NSW, all he asked for on his gravestone was President of the United Nations, noting his service as president of the general assembly (1948-1949).

Evatt’s core argument therefore is that reserve powers should be subject to the normal and natural process of analysis, definition and reduction to the rules of positive law, which, by 1936, had in some places been done.  Evatt considered section 33(10) of the Western Nigerian constitution which codified things thus: The Governor shall not remove the Premier from office unless it appears to him that the Premier no longer commands the support or a majority of the members of the House of Assembly.  Other sections went on to detail the mechanisms of the exercise of the power, thereby attempting to do exactly what Evatt suggests.  However, the Nigerian example is discussed by Evatt not in the abstract but because the exercise of the power under the constitution became a matter of dispute and the case proceeded though the courts, finally ending up before the Privy Council as Adegbenro v. Akintola (1963 AC 614), an indication even the most explicit codification can remain an imperfect solution.