Dreadnought (pronounced dred-nawt)
(1) A
type of battleship armed with heavy-caliber guns in turrets: so called from the
British battleship HMS Dreadnought (1906);
A name used by the Royal Navy for many ships and submarines.
(2) A
garment made of thick woolen cloth that can defend against storm and cold.
(3) A
thick cloth with a long pile.
(4) Slang
a heavyweight boxer, sometime extended to the largest or heaviest in a given
field.
(5) A
person who fears nothing; something that assures against fear.
1800-1810:
The construct is dread + nought. Dread
is from the Middle English dreden,
from Old English drǣdan (to
fear, dread), aphetic form of ondrǣdan (to
fear, dread), from and- + rǣdan (from
which English picked up read); corresponding to an aphesis of the earlier adread.
The Old Saxon was antdrādan
& andrādan (to fear, dread), the Old
High German was intrātan (to fear)
and the Middle High German entrāten
(to fear, dread, frighten). Nought is
from the Middle English nought & noght, (noȝt),
from the Old English nōwiht & nāwiht (the construct being nay + a + wight),
which in turn came from ne-ā-wiht,
a phrase used as an emphatic "no", in the sense of "not
a thing". In the transition to
Modern English, the word reduced gradually to nought, nawt and finally not; a doublet
of naught. The alternative spelling
(though never used by the Admiralty) is Dreadnaught.
The dreadnoughts
HMS Dreadnought, 1906.
Launched in 1906, HMS
Dreadnought is often said to have revolutionized naval power, the design so
significant it proved the final evolution of what had, by the late nineteenth
century, evolved into the battleship.
Subsequent vessels would be larger, faster, increasingly electronic and
more heavily armed but the concept remained the same. HMS Dreadnought rendered instantly obsolete
every other battleship in the world (including the rest of the Royal Navy) and
all other battleships then afloat were immediately re-classified as pre-dreadnoughts.
HMS Dreadnought.
Her
main design features were speed, armor, steam turbine propulsion and, especially,
firepower almost exclusively of weapons of the largest caliber. In the decades after her launch, British,
German, American, Japanese and other navies would build larger and heavier
dreadnoughts until, during world war two, their utility was finally seen to been
eclipsed by both aircraft carriers and submarines. The last dreadnought, HMS Vanguard, launched
in 1946, was scrapped in 1958 but the US Navy maintained, on either the active
or reserve lists, at least one of the four battleships it retained from WW2
until 2004 when the last was decommissioned.
HMS Dreadnought, 1908.
That
it was the Royal Navy which first launched a dreadnought doesn’t mean the British
Admiralty was alone in pursuing the concept.
Naval strategists in several nations had noted the course of battle
between the Russian and Japanese fleets in 1905 and concluded the immediate
future of naval warfare lay in the maximum possible deployment of big guns,
able to launch attacks from the longest possible range, subsidiary smaller
caliber weapons seen even as a disadvantage in battle. That the Royal Navy was the first with such a
ship afloat was a testament to the efficiency of British designers and
shipbuilders, not the uniqueness of its plans.
The nineteenth century of Pax Britannica ("British Peace", echoing the Pax Romana of the Roman Empire), describes the century of relative great-power stability between the Congress of Vienna (1814-1815) and the outbreak of war in 1914 encompasses the idea of British Empire as the global hegemon, a role possible only because the Royal Navy enjoyed an unchallenged ability to patrol and protect the key maritime trade routes. The effective control of these transport corridors not only guaranteed the security of the British Empire but it meant also the British effectively controlled maritime access to much of Asia, the Americas, Oceania the south Pacific, although, one factor in the success was it was that London ran things essentially in accordance with US foreign policy, assisting Washington in enforcing the Monroe Doctrine which upheld the US preponderance of interest in the Americas. It can be argued the roots of the so-called "special relationship" took hold here.
By the
early twentieth century, economic and geopolitical forces combined to render
the policy impossible to maintain, Britain no longer able to operate in
“splendid isolation” (another somewhat misleading phrase of the era), needing
alliances to spread the load of imperial defense. It wasn’t just the rapid growth of the German
fleet which had changed the balance of power but that alone was enough for the
British and the French to reach an accommodation which is remembered as the Entente Cordiale (Cordial Agreement) of
1904 which may or may not have been an alliance but was enough of one for the admiralties
in Paris and London cooperatively to organize the allocations of their
fleets. It certainly illustrated Lord
Palmerston's (1784–1865) doctrine that the country had neither eternal allies
nor perpetual enemies but only permanent interests for despite the centuries of
enmity between Britain and France, the self-interest of both dictated the need
to align against the German threat.
Royal Navy battlecruiser HMS New Zealand, 1911.
It was
in this atmosphere the great naval arms race took place, plans for which were laid
before the Wright brothers had flown a hundred–odd feet, barely off the ground,
torpedoes were in their infancy and submarines were little threat more than a
few miles from the coast. The measure of
a fleet was its battleships and their big guns and whichever side could put to
sea the most firepower was winning the race.
It intrigued the navalists, strategists and theorists who knew from
history that such a race, if left to run, could end only in war, the great,
decisive set-piece battle of which would be the clash of massed fleets of
battleships on the high seas, trading shell-fire at a range of twenty miles (32
km), before closing for the kill as the battle climaxed. Dreadnought was one strand of the theorists’
imagination but there were others. There
was a school of thought which favored an emphasis on
radio communications and a greater attention to the possibilities offered by
the torpedo and, most influentially, what seems now the curious notion of a
complimentary range of faster capital ships, essentially battleships with the
big guns but little armor, the loss of protection off-set by the few knots in
speed gained; these ships were called battlecruisers. The argument was they could fight at such
range nothing but a battleship would be a threat and those the battlecruiser
could outrun because of their greater speed.
It seemed, to many, a good idea at the time.
Super Dreadnought: HMS Iron_Duke, Port Said, 1921.
But it was the Dreadnoughts which
captured the imagination and defined the era.
Impressive though she was, HMS Dreadnought was not long unique as navies
around the world launched the own and, as happens in arms races, the original
was quickly out-classed and the next generation of ships, bigger and more
heavily gunned still, came to be known as super dreadnoughts. War did come but the grand battle on the high
seas which the navalists had, for a quarter century been planning, never
happened. There were smaller clashes of
squadrons but the imperative of the Royal Navy was more practical and
traditionally British: avoid defeat. As
Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty (minister for the navy), emphasized
to the First Sea Lord (the navy’s senior admiral), against a continental empire
like Germany, while the Royal Navy couldn’t in a year win the war, because
Britain’s empire was maritime, they could lose it in one afternoon. Accordingly, the Royal Navy made no sustained attempts to induce a massed battle, focusing instead on a blockade, keeping the German fleet confined
to its ports. It was the German admirals
who attempted to force the British to a set-piece battle, venturing into the North Sea in
May 1916 with a fleet of nearly a hundred, including sixteen dreadnoughts and
five battlecruisers. Against this, the
British assembled a hundred and fifty odd with twenty-eight dreadnoughts and
nine battlecruisers. The action came to be known as the Battle of Jutland.
German battlecruiser SMS Goeben, 1914.
On
paper, although the result described as inconclusive, it was a tactical success for the Germans but strategically, the British achieved their goal. The dreadnoughts barely engaged,
most of the action confined to the battlecruisers and, unlike the smaller Battle
of Tsushima (May 1905) in the Far East, fought by pre-dreadnoughts a decade
earlier between the Japanese and Russian fleets, there was no winner in the traditional sense of naval warfare. The German's tactical success in retrospect was something of a Dunkirk moment but the strategic implications were
profound. British losses were heavier but
their numeric advantage was such they could absorb the loss and had the
financial and industrial capacity to restore the fleet’s strength. Damage to the German fleet was less but they
lacked the time or capacity to build their navy to the point it could be used
as a strategic weapon and it remained confined to its ports. Both sides learned well the inherent limitations of
the battlecruiser.
WWI era German U-Boot (Unterseeboot (under-sea-boat)), anglicized as U-Boat.
After
Jutland, the German admirals concluded that to venture again against the
British Home Fleet would either be an inconclusive waste or lead to the inevitable,
decisive defeat. They accordingly
prevailed on the politicians and eventually gained approval to use the only
genuinely effective weapon in their hands, the submarine. It was the consequences of unrestricted
submarine warfare which would bring the United States into the war in 1917 as a
belligerent and without that intervention, the war would certainly have
followed a different course and reached perhaps a different conclusion.
Although HMS Dreadnought lent her name to an era and remains one of the most significant warships built, she's remembered for the geopolitical reverberations around her launching rather than any achievement at sea, missing even the anti-climatic Battle of Jutland because of a scheduled re-fit. Indeed, her only achievement of note in combat was the ramming and sinking of German U-Boat SM U-29 on 18 March 1915 although that remains a unique footnote in naval history, being the only time a battleship deliberately sank an enemy submarine. Dreadnought was decommissioned in 1920 and scrapped the next year. Later, under the terms of the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty which sought to prevent another naval arms race, most of the surviving dreadnoughts were scrapped or scuttled but many of the super-dreadnoughts remained in the fleets, some not scrapped until after World War II. The name has a strong resonance in the halls of the Admiralty (now the Navy Command in the Ministry of Defense) and has been chosen for the class of vessels to replace the existing Vanguard class ballistic missile submarines. Now under construction, the first of the Dreadnought class boats is expected to enter service early in the 2030s.