Backwoodsman

Backwoodsman (pronounced bak-woodz-muhn)

(1) A person living in or coming from the backwoods, or a remote or unsettled area (backwoodswoman a later back-formation).

(2) A person of uncouth manners, rustic behavior or speech etc.

(3) In historic UK use, a peer (member of the House of Lords) who rarely attends the chamber.

1700-1710: An Americanism, the construct being backwoods ((1) partly or wholly uncleared forest (especially in North America use) and (2) a remote or sparsely inhabited region (especially in North America use); away from large human settlements and the influence of modern life) + -man.  The related terms included “hinterlander”, “mountain man” & “woodsman” and while the history of use meant they evolved to be not wholly without implied meaning, in various places a number of “loaded” words and phrases came to be used as a way of disparaging rural dwellers including country bumpkin, boor, clodhopper, hick, rube, rustic, yokel, country boy (or country girl), hayseed, clod, hodge, swain, country cousin, son of the soil, lubber, lummox, galoot, mountainmen & lunk.  Backwoodsman is a noun; the noun plural is backwoodsmen.

Back was from the Middle English bak, from the Old English bæc (rear part of the body), from the Proto-West Germanic bak, from the Proto-Germanic baką & bakam, possibly from the primitive Indo-European bhago- (to bend; to curve) and may be compared with the Middle Low German bak (back), from the Old Saxon bak, the West Frisian bekling (chair back), the Old High German bah, and the Swedish and Norwegian bak.  It was cognate with the German Bache (sow (adult female hog)).  Wood was from the Middle English wode, from the Old English wudu & widu (wood, forest, grove; tree; timber), from the Proto-West Germanic widu, from the Proto-Germanic widuz (wood), from the primitive Indo-European hweydh- (to separate).  It was cognate with the Dutch wede (wood, twig), the Middle High German wite (wood), the Danish ved (wood), the Swedish ved (firewood), the Icelandic viður (wood) and additional cognates include the Irish fiodh (a wood; tree), the Irish fid (tree) and the Welsh gwŷdd (trees), all from the Proto-Celtic widus (wood).  The word was unrelated to the Dutch woud (forest), and the German Wald (forest).  Man was from the Middle English man, from the Old English mann (human being, person, man), from the Proto-West Germanic mann, from the Proto-Germanic mann (human being, man), probably from the primitive Indo-European mon- (man) (men having the meaning “mind”); a doublet of manu.  The specific sense of “adult male of the human race” (distinguished from a woman or boy) was known in the Old English by circa 1000.   Old English used wer and wif to distinguish the sexes, but wer began to disappear late in the thirteenth century, replaced by mann and increasingly man.  Man also was in Old English as an indefinite pronoun (one, people, they) and used generically for "the human race, mankind" by circa 1200.  It was cognate with the West Frisian man, the Dutch man, the German Mann (man), the Norwegian mann (man), the Old Swedish maþer (man), the Swedish man, the Russian муж (muž) (husband, male person), the Avestan manš, the Sanskrit मनु (manu) (human being), the Urdu مانس‎ and Hindi मानस (mānas).  Although often thought a modern adoption, use as a word of familiar address, originally often implying impatience is attested as early as circa 1400, hence probably its use as an interjection of surprise or emphasis since Middle English.  It became especially popular from the early twentieth century.

Types de pionniers, de bouviers et d indians de Benton (Montana) (pioneers, drovers and Indians from Benton, Montana).  A late nineteenth century engraving after the drawing by Émile-Antoine Bayard (1837–1891), depicting the voyage from Washington to San Francisco, in 1868, by French engineer & geologist Louis Laurent (1830-1886), published in Le tour du monde (Hachette edition, 1874), edited by Édouard Charton (1807–1890).  When reproduced for sale in the US (right), the title Backwoodsmen and Indians (in the sense of “Native Americans” was sometimes used.

In the US, “backwoodsman” was a term used to describe those living remotely and it could be used neutrally or, by city-dwellers, as a form of disparagement.  It spread to the UK but didn’t become widely used until the dispute between the Conservative & Unionist Party (the Tories) opposition and the new Liberal government over certain budget measures, the squabble culminating in the “constitutional crisis” of 1911 and the passage of the Parliament Act which removed from the non-elected House of Lords the power permanently to block legislation passed by the (then sort of) democratically elected House of Commons.  When the Lords, defying convention, voted to reject the government’s budget, the prime minister and chancellor of the exchequer (the finance minister or treasurer) decided what was needed was constitutional reform, ending or at least severely restricting the right of their lordships to frustrate a government with a majority in the Commons.

HH Asquith, London, 1911.

The significance of the “backwoodmen” in the constitutional crisis was that they were the peers (members of the House of Lords, almost all of who had inherited their title and the right to sit in the parliament’s upper house, some there thus because of some great service (or in some cases corrupt act) of a ancestor possibly centuries earlier) who rarely, if ever attended sessions.  They gained their name by virtue of being country gentlemen and by virtue of their inherent bias for the Tory cause, they provided a built-in majority for the party and should ever the need arise, they could be summoned to vote.  That need arose during the crisis because the prime-minister (HH Asquith (1852–1928; UK prime minister 1908-1916) had threatened to secure George V’s (1865–1936; King of the United Kingdom & Emperor of India 1910-1936) acquiescence to the creation of hundreds of Liberal Party aligned peers thereby overwhelming the Tory majority, a move which contained the implied threat of the new crop being used in an act of “political suicide”: voting to abolish the Lords.  That might have seemed scaremongery but in the decades ahead, elsewhere in the empire, upper houses would do exactly that.

Backwoodsperson Lindsay Lohan in the woods in Albus Lumen top & skirt from Matches Fashion with Missoni earrings & choker from Ounass, Emirates Woman magazine, May 2018.

As the parliamentary battle-lines were drawn, the Tories in the Lords coalesced into two factions: the “ditchers” and “hedgers”.  The ditchers were the “hardliners”, the absolutists prepared (metaphorically) to “die in the last ditch” rather than accede to any reform which constrained their power.  The ditchers had a world view which included the aristocracy being the natural and essential class to govern the nation.  The hedgers were the age’s version of the “power-realists”, pragmatists who may not have approved of reform but could sniff the winds of political change blowing through Westminster’s oak-panelled corridors, winds that were turning to gusts, blowing in moths already nibbling at the ermine.  Their view was the threatened reform was the lesser of two evils and it was better to concede a little now than later lose a lot more.

David Lloyd George, London, 1907.

Compromise was anathema to the ditchers who mobilized the network of backwoodsman peers, summoning them to London to vote which would have been a experience for some who had not for decades cat their eyes upon the the houses of parliament, let alone sat in the place.  The ditchers thought they had the numbers and at some points in the struggle they almost certainly did but when the news circulated the king had agreed to created hundreds of new barons, some of the ditchers, appalled at the thought their  exclusive circles would be diluted by an infusion of miners, manufacturers and motor car salesmen, left their ditch for the hedge.  When the moment arrived, the Parliament Act (1911) was passed by 131 votes to 114, the hundreds of abstentions an indication of how many had decided to “sit on the hedge”.  After the Parliament Act, the Lords could no longer veto all but the most fundamental constitutional acts and their power was restricted to delaying implementation for two years (in 1949 reduced to six months).  One Liberal actually pleased the need for the hundreds of new peers had never arisen was David Lloyd George (1863–1945; UK prime-minister 1916-1922), then chancellor of the exchequer.  Lloyd George was well acquainted with the character of men likely to be among the hundreds of new barons and viewed them with some distaste, admitting to the Tory leader of the opposition (Arthur Balfour (1848–1930; UK Prime Minister 1902-1905)) that like him he had no desire to see the creation happen: “…looking into the future, I know that our glorified grocers will be more hostile to social reform than your Backwoodsmen.”  Lloyd George appreciated the backwoodsmen might have some sense of noblesse oblige but he knew the way the “jumped up grocers” treated the working class in their mines, mills and factories.

Exchequer

Exchequer (pronounced eks-chek-er or iks-chek-er)

(1) A treasury, as of a state or nation.

(2) The governmental department in charge of the public revenues (often initial capital letter).

(3) A now disestablished English office administering the royal revenues and determining all cases affecting them.

(4) An ancient English common-law court of civil jurisdiction in which cases affecting the revenues of the crown were tried, now merged in the King's Bench Division of the High Court.  It was usually styled as the Court of Exchequer.

(5) Informal slang for one’s personal finances.

1250-1300: From Middle English escheker and eschequier, borrowed from the Anglo-French escheker and eschekier, derived from the Old French eschequier and escheccheck (chessboard, counting table).  Source was the Medieval Latin scaccarium (chess board).  The meaning with which it’s now most associated (government finances), emerged under the Norman kings of England, the basis the design of the cloth (divided in squares), covering the tables on which accounts of revenue were reckoned with counters; these reminded all who saw them of a chess board and the name was adopted.  The English respelling with an -x- was because of the erroneous medieval belief that it originally was a Latin ex- word (the old alternative spelling exchecker is long obsolete).  The most common modern use is the UK office of Chancellor of the Exchequer, equivalent variously to finance ministers or treasurers in other systems.  Confusingly for those not political junkies, the UK's prime-minister is formerly styled First Lord of the Treasury and the Chancellor, the Second Lord.  Exchequer is a noun & verb; the noun plural is exchequers.  When used to refer to an established institution (such as the UK's department of treasury), it's correct to use an initial capital.

Court of Exchequer Chamber

Although its origins date from the fourteenth century, it was the statute of 1585 which established the Court of Exchequer Chamber in essentially the form it would remain until its abolition by the Judicature Acts of 1873-1875 when it was absorbed into the Queen’s Bench Division of the High Court.  Always an appellate court for common law civil actions, the court heard references from the King's Bench, the Court of Exchequer and, from 1830, directly rather than indirectly from the Court of Common Pleas.  It was a classic English appeal court in that it was constituted by four judges belonging to the two courts that had been uninvolved at first instance although, in matters of especial importance, twelve common law judges, four from each division below, sitting in Exchequer Chamber, might be asked to determine a point of law, the matter being referred by the court hearing the case rather than the parties.  Appeals from its judgments were, by leave, to the House of Lords but, because the Exchequer Chamber was regarded as a specialist and authoritative body, this was rare before the nineteenth century and rules of judgment by the Chamber were considered definitive statements of the law.

Court of Exchequer (1808) by William Henry Pyne (1769-1843).

Most appeals to the chamber were from the Exchequer of Pleas or Court of Exchequer, a court which dealt with matters of equity and expanded in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries because the doing business in the Court of Chancery was a slow and expensive business.  In the manner of the evolution of the English courts, the Exchequer's jurisdiction, at various times, was common law, equity, or both, the prevailing trend being for discretionary areas of its jurisdiction to expand.  By the nineteenth century, Exchequer and Chancery enjoyed similar jurisdictions and with the Judicature Acts, the Exchequer was formally dissolved as a judicial body by an Order in Council of 16 December 1880.

The style of cloth spread across the tables of the courts of Exchequer has proved durable in fashion, the bold pattern working especially well with stark color contrasts, white with black, red, purple or navy blue the most popular combinations.  The gingham Macy midi dress (left) is a classic example but Lindsay Lohan (right) demonstrates how the look can be achieved using one’s own skin, using a Black Pash shirt & Alaia skirt combo (the t-strap sandals were by Miu Miu but an opportunity was missed by not adding a sympathetic clutch purse), The World's First Fabulous Fund Fair in aid of The Naked Heart Foundation, The Roundhouse, London, February 2015.

Prerogative

Prerogative (pronounced pri-rog-uh-tiv)

(1) An exclusive right, privilege, etc, exercised by virtue of rank, office, or the like; having a hereditary or official right or privilege.

(2) A right, privilege, etc, limited to a specific person or to persons of a particular category.

(3) A power, immunity, or the like restricted to a sovereign government or its representative.

(4) Characterized by lawless state actions (refers to the prerogative state)

(5) Precedence (obsolete except in the legal sense of the hierarchy of rights).

(6) A property, attribute or ability which gives one a superiority or advantage over others; an inherent (though not necessarily unique) advantage or privilege; a talent.

(7) In constitutional law, a right or power exclusive to a head of state (often derived from the original powers of a monarch) or their nominee exercising delegated authority, especially the powers to appoint or dismiss executive governments.

1350-1400: From the Anglo-Norman noun prerogatif, from the Old French prerogative, from the Latin praerogātīva (previous verdict; claim, privilege), noun use of the feminine singular of praerogātīvus (having first vote; privileged), in Anglo-Latin as prerogativa from late thirteenth century.  The origin lay in a statute in the civil law of Ancient Roman which granted precedence to the tribus, centuria (an assembly of one-hundred voters who, by lot, voted first in the Roman comita).  The law guaranteed them a praerogātīvus (chosen to vote first) derived from praerogere (ask before others).  The construct of praerogere was prae (before) + rogare (to ask, ask a favor), apparently a figurative use of a primitive Indo-European verb meaning literally "to stretch out (the hand)" from the root reg- (move in a straight line).  In Middle English, the meaning "an innate faculty or property which especially distinguishes someone or something" was added.  The alternative spelling prærogative is long obsolete.  Prerogative is a noun & adjective, prerogatived is an adjective and prerogatively is an adverb; the noun plural is prerogatives.

In English law, a court classified as “a prerogative court” was one through which the discretionary powers, privileges, and legal immunities reserved to the sovereign could be exercised.  The best known of these courts was the Court of Exchequer, the Court of Chancery and the Court of the Star Chamber (the latter one of those institutions formed to rectify injustice but which was later the source of much; the Court of the Star Chamber may be used as a case-study explaining the phrase: “the road to hell is paved with good intentions”).  In time, clashes between the prerogative courts and common law courts became something of a proxy-theatre in the contest between the king and parliament.  The way that worked out was that the ancient (essentially personal) prerogative rights of the monarch weren’t abolished but rather exercised by parliament or institutions (including courts) to which the powers were delegated.  Whether any prerogative power remains in the hands of the sovereign to be used in “extraordinary and reprehensible circumstances” remains a matter of debate.  There were also ecclesiastical prerogative courts under the authority of the archbishops of Canterbury and York but they existed only to handle probate matters in cases where estates beyond a certain defined value were spread between the two dioceses but they also handled many wills of those who died in colonial or other overseas service.  As part of the great reforms of the late nineteenth century undertaken in the Judicature Acts (1873-1899) the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical prerogative moved to the common law courts, being finally vested in the Family Division of the High Court of Justice.

In English law, the still sometimes invoked prerogative writ (the best known of which were habeas corpus (from the Latin habeas corpus ad subjiciendum (usually translated as “bring up the body (ie the prisoner))), a demand a prisoner being held by an organ of the state be brought before a court to determine whether there was lawful authority for the detention) and mandamus (from the Latin mandāmus (we command)), an order issued by a higher court to compel or to direct a lower court or a government officer correctly to perform mandatory duties) was a class of six orders available to the crown for the purpose of directing the action of an organ of government (including courts, officials or statutory bodies).  The name was derived from the authority these exercised being traceable ultimately to the discretionary prerogative & extraordinary power of the monarch and the principle remains in use in many common law jurisdictions which evolved from the old British Empire, notably those of the Raj of colonial India.

The woman's prerogative

For a man incautiously to use the phrase “a woman's prerogative”, the risk would be “cancellation” (or worse) although it’s probably still acceptable if there’s a layer of irony.  The phrase is a clipping of the full: “it’s a woman’s prerogative to change her mind”, the implication being women have the right to change their minds or make decisions based on their own preferences and need provide no explanation or justification.  Wise men (and the pussy-whipped) accept this without demur.  It is of course a reflection of a cultural stereotype and seems to have come into use in the mid-nineteenth century, an era in which gender roles were more rigidly defined and women were thought to be more capricious or whimsical in their actions.  However, in law, the “woman's prerogative” was once enforceable, granting them rights not available to men, a most unusual development in Western jurisprudence.

Well into the twentieth century, it was legal orthodoxy in common law jurisdictions for an offer of marriage to be enforceable under the rules of contract law.  While courts didn’t go as far as ordering “specific performance” of the contract (ie forcing an unwilling party to marry someone), they would award damages on the basis of a “breach of promise”, provided it could be adduced that three of the four essential elements of a contract existed: (1) offer, (2) certainty of terms and (3) acceptance.  The fourth component: (4) consideration (ie payment), wasn’t mentioned because it was assumed to be implicit in the nature of the exchange; a kind of “deferred payment” as it were.  It was one of those rarities in common law where things operated wholly in favor of women in that they could sue a man who changed his mind while they were free to break-off an engagement without fear of legal consequences though there could be social and familial disapprobation.  Throughout the English-speaking world, the breach of promise tort in marriage matters has almost wholly been abolished, remaining on the books in the a handful of US states (not all of which lie south of the Mason-Dixon Line) but even where it exists it’s now a rare action and one likely to succeed only in exceptional circumstances or where a particularly fragrant plaintiff manages to charm a particularly sympathetic judge.

The royal prerogative and the reserve powers of the crown

The royal prerogative is the body of customary authority, privilege, and immunity and the means by which (some of) the executive powers of government are exercised in the governance of the state.  These powers are recognized in common law (and in some civil law) jurisdictions are held to vest wholly in the sovereign alone, even if exercised through either appointees (of which governors, governors-general & viceroys are the best-known) constitutional government.  In the narrowest sense of technical theory, the recognition of the personal powers of a sovereign exists in most common law systems where the concept is relevant but has long since mostly been reduced to legal fiction and in most constitutional monarchies, almost all individual prerogatives have been abolished by parliaments.  Some republican heads of state also possess similar powers but they tend to be constitutionally defined and subject to checks and balances.  A notable exception to this is a US president’s un-trammeled right to grant pardons to those convicted of offences under federal law and that’s interesting because it’s the only power in the US Constitution not subject to a check or balance.  A US president thus personally continues to exercise a prerogative in a way a British monarch (or their appointees as governors & governors-general), from whom the power is derived, no longer can.

In Britain, prerogative powers were originally exercised by the monarch (at least in theory and the role of the Church needs also to be noted) acting alone but after the Magna Carta (1215, from the Medieval Latin Magna Carta Libertatum (Great Charter of Freedoms) which divided power among the ruling class, there had to be sought the consent of others and this ultimately became parliamentary consent granted to an executive (exercising powers derived from the absolute authority of the monarch) responsible to the parliament.  This took centuries to evolve and eventually meant, in practical terms, the king got the money he needed for his wars and other ventures in exchange for the parliament getting his signature to pass the laws they wanted.

Watched by the courtiers Lord Mulgrave & Lord Morpeth, Lord Melbourne serves King William IV a blackbird pie (1836), lithograph with watercolour by John Doyle (1797-1868), Welcome Collection, London.  The text is a re-arranged selection of lines from the eighteenth century English nursery rhyme “Sing a Song of Sixpence” and reads: “Sing a song of six pence a bag full of rye, four and twenty black birds baked in a pie, when the pie was opened, the birds began to sing, was not this a pretty dish to set before a king.”  The blackbirds sing “Justice for Scotland!” and “No tithes!”, controversial issues of the age.  Nineteenth century cartoonists were sometimes more harsh in their treatment of politicians and royalty. 

In Australia, the royal prerogative is limited (but not defined) by the constitution and those powers which vest a monarch’s authority in a governor-general don’t alter the nature of the prerogative, only its detail; the prerogative is exercised by the governor-general but only on the advice of “their” ministers.  The most obvious exception to this is the reserve power of the monarch (and there are those who doubt whether this still exists in the UK) to dismiss a government enjoying the confidence of the lower house of parliament.  In the UK, it’s not been done since William IV (1765–1837; King of the United Kingdom 1830-1837) dismissed Lord Melbourne (1779–1848; Prime Minister of Great Britain 1834 & 1835–1841) in 1834 (some dispute that, saying it was more of a gentleman’s agreement and the last termination was actually that of Lord North (1732–1792; Prime Minister of Great Britain 1770-1782) by George III (1738–1820) King of Great Britain 1760-1820) in 1782) but Australia has seen two twentieth-century sackings; that in 1932 of NSW premier Jack Lang (1876–1975; Premier of New South Wales 1925-1927 & 1930-1932) by Governor Sir Philip Game (1876–1961; Governor of NSW 1930-1935) and, in 1975, when governor-general Sir John Kerr (1914–1991; Governor-General of Australia 1974-1977) sundered Gough Whitlam’s (1916–2014; Prime Minister of Australia 1972-1975) commission.

Dr HV Evatt in his office at the United Nations, New York, 1949.

The 1975 business provoked much academic discussion of the reserve powers but the most lucid read remains Dr HV Evatt’s (1894–1965; ALP leader 1951-1960) book from decades earlier: The King and His Dominion Governors (1936).  Evatt’s volume was published a hundred odd-years after William IV sacked Melbourne and is useful because in that century there had been more than a few disputes about reserve powers.  Evatt’s central point was that the powers exist but proper rules by which they may be exercised are by no means clear.  The legal power is vested in the governor as the representative of the monarch and when it may properly be used depends on usage and convention.  It seems therefore scarcely possible to say confidently of any case when the Crown has intervened that its intervention was or was not correct for the only standard of correctness in each episode is its consistency with episodes of a similar character, none of which in themselves lay down any principle in law.  Further, Evatt notes, in looking to precedent, support for almost any view can be found in the authorities.  Lofty theoretical purity is also not helpful.  The view the sovereign automatically acts in all matters in accordance with the advice of his ministers rests entirely upon assertion and, Evatt observed, the reserve powers are still, on occasion, properly exercisable and that the Sovereign or his representative may have to exercise a real discretion.  Given that, it really might be impossible that the prerogative could be codified in a document which envisages all possible political or other circumstances.  Evatt nevertheless argued the principles which should guide a sovereign should be defined and made clear by statute.

Nor is practical political reality all that much help, however satisfactory an outcome may prove.  What the exercise of the reserve powers, both in 1932 and 1975, did was enable impasses described, however erroneously as constitutional crises to be resolved by an election, rather than other means.  The result of an election however does not conclude the matter for the correctness of the sovereign's action is not measured by his success as a prophet, any post-facto endorsement by the electorate having not even an indirect bearing on the abstract question of constitutionality.

Although variously a high court judge, attorney-general, foreign minister, opposition leader and Chief Justice of NSW, all Dr Evatt asked for on his gravestone was President of the United Nations, noting his service as president of the general assembly (1948-1949).

Evatt’s core argument therefore was reserve powers should be subject to the normal and natural process of analysis, definition and reduction to the rules of positive law, which, by 1936, had in some places been done.  Evatt considered section 33 (10) of the Western Nigerian constitution which codified things thus: The Governor shall not remove the Premier from office unless it appears to him that the Premier no longer commands the support or a majority of the members of the House of Assembly.  Other sections went on to detail the mechanisms of the exercise of the power, thereby attempting to do exactly what Evatt suggests.  However, the Nigerian example cited by Evatt did not prove a solution because the exercise of the power under the constitution became in 1962 a matter of dispute and the case proceeded though the courts, finally ending up before the Privy Council as Adegbenro v. Akintola (1963 AC 614), an indication even the most explicit codification can remain something imperfect.

Bench

Bench (pronounced bench)

(1) A long seat (without arm or back-rest) for two or more people:

(2) A seat occupied by an official, especially a judge in a courtroom.

(3) Such a seat as a symbol of the office of an individual judge or the judiciary.

(4) The office or dignity of various other officials, or the officials themselves.

(5) In certain team sports, the seat (literally or figuratively) on which the reserve (substitute) players sit during a game while not playing and on which “starting side” players sit while substituted.

(6) The quality and number of the players named as substitutes.

(7) By extension, the quality and number of professionals or experts in reserve, to be called upon as needed:

(8) As a clipping of workbench, the worktable of those engaged in trades.

(9) In interior design, certain fixed flat surfaces (kitchen bench, bathroom bench etc).

(10) A platform on which animals or objects are placed for exhibition.

(11) In farming, a hollow on a hillside formed by sheep.

(12) In surveying, a bracket used to mount land surveying equipment onto a stone or a wall.

(13) In certain legislatures, as “front bench” (the office-holding members of a government or opposition who sit on the bench at the front of their side of the assembly), “back bench” (those elected members not appointed to an office who sit on benches behind) and “cross-bench” (those not members of the party in government or formal opposition who sit on other benches).  The terms are sometimes literal but depending on an assembly’s architecture or the size of a government’s majority, others can sometimes “overflow” to the physical “cross benches”.  Thus there are “front benchers”, “back benchers” & “cross benchers” (sometimes hyphenated).

(14) In geography, a shelf-like area of rock with steep slopes above and below, especially one marking a former shoreline.

(15) In extractive mining, a step or working elevation in a mine.

(16) In science (usually as “at the bench”), to distinguish between being engaged actively in research and concurrent or subsequent administrative functions.

(17) To furnish with benches (now rare).

(18) To seat on a bench or on the bench (now rare).

(19) In extractive mining, to cut away the working faces of benches.

(20) In certain team sports, to substitute or remove a player from a game or relegate them to the reserve squad.

Pre 1000: From the Middle English bench, benk & bynk, from the Old English benc (bench; long seat (especially if backless)), from then Proto-West Germanic banki, from the Proto-Germanic bankon & bankiz (bench), from the primitive Indo-European bheg.  It was cognate with the Scots benk & bink, the West Frisian bank, the Dutch bank, the Old High German Bank, the Old Norse bekkr, the Old Frisian benk, the Danish bænk, the Swedish bänk and the Icelandic bekkur, all from a Germanic source and all of which meant “bench”.  In the Old English there were the verbs bencian (to make benches) and bencsittend (one who sits on a bench).  The dialectal spellings benk & bink are both long obsolete.  Bench & benching are nouns & verbs, bencher is a noun, benched is a verb & adjective and benchy & benchlike are adjectives; the noun plural is benches.

The source of the idea of the “bench as a type of long seat” is thought to come from a riparian imagery (natural earthen incline beside a body of water) and etymologists speculate the original notion was of a “man-made earthwork used as a seat”.  Bench was from the late fourteenth century used of the tables on which merchants displayed their wares and that may have been a borrowing from the reference to the seat the judge would occupy in a court of law, that use emerging early in the 1300s and coming soon to mean “judges collectively, office of a judge, the judiciary”.  Whether it was actually an allusion to customers “judging the goods displayed” is speculative.  The use in team sports of “the bench” being the “reserve or substitute team members” was drawn from the actual physical bench on the sideline on which those players would sit while not on the field.  The earliest known reference to the existence of furniture used for this purpose is from the US in 1899 but extending this generally to the “reserve of players” in baseball, football etc seems not to have begun until 1909.  In sport, the idiomatic forms include “bench player” (one habitually selected only in the reserves and not the “starting side”), “benched” (a player substituted during play and “sent to the bench”, either because of poor performance or as part of a planned rotation, “injury bench” (players substituted due to injury), “bench warmer (or “bench sitter”, or “bench jockey”) (one whose career has plateaued as a “bench player”, “warming the bench”) 

Bench has attracted many modifiers describing use including “bench grinder”, “bench saw”, “bench drill”, “sawbench”, “kitchen bench”, “deacon's bench”, “friendship bench”, “bench easel”, “mourners' bench”, “piano bench” (a “piano stool” for two), “preacher’s bench” et al.  The noun & verb “benchmark” refers to the optimal results obtained when testing something or someone on a “test bench” although the use is often conceptual, a physical “test bench” not necessarily part of the processes and even some structures in engineering referred to as a “test bench” may bear no relationship to any actual “bench” however described.

Bench seats ranged from the austerely functional to the luxurious: 1971 Holden HQ Belmont Station Sedan (station wagon or estate-car) in vinyl (turquoise) (left) and 1974 Imperial LeBaron four-door hardtop (left) in chestnut tufted leather though not actually “fine Corinthian leather” which was (mostly) exclusive to the Cordoba (1975-1983) until late 1975 when not only did the Imperial's brochures mention "genuine Corinthian leather (available at extra cost)" but for the first time since 1954 the range was referred to as the "Chrysler Imperial", a harbinger the brand was about to be retired.  Imperial's advertising copy noted of the brochure photograph above: “...while the passenger restraint system with starter interlock is not shown, it is standard on all Imperials.”; the marketing types didn't like seat-belts messing up their photos.  While all of the big three (GM, Ford & Chrysler) had tufted interiors in some lines, it was Chrysler which displayed the most commitment to the motif.

Bench seat for four: the improbable 1948 Davis Divan.  The blue car (one of a dozen survivors of the 17 built) was restored by the Petersen Automotive Museum in Los Angeles where it is on display.

In cars and such, a “bench seat” differs from a “bucket” or “individual” seat in that comfortably it can accommodate two or more occupants, the comparison with furniture being the difference between a “chair” and a “sofa”.  In commercial vehicles, bench seats commonly can seat four but in cars the recommended (and eventually legal) limit was typically three although the truly bizarre Davis Divan (1948) featured a bench allowing four abreast seating for four adults, something which would have been an interesting experience for the quartet because a quirk of the suspension system was the long, pointed nose of the thing actually rose under braking.  The three-wheeled Divan was the brainchild of “automotive entrepreneur” (some historians are less kind) Glen Gordon “Gary” Davis (1904-1973) who put some effort into building the prototypes, not enough into preparation for actual production but much into raising funds from “investors”, a goodly chunk of which apparently was spent on real estate, entertaining and mink coats for “friends” (with all that implies).  He had a flair for slogans so many investors were attracted but the project proved chimeric, Davis tried and convicted of fraud & grand theft, spending two years in prison.  The name Divan was used as an allusion to the car's wide bench seat.  It was from the French divan, from the Ottoman Turkish دیوان (divan), from the Iranian Persian دیوان (divân), from the Classical Persian دیوان (dēwān), from Middle Persian dpywʾn' or dywʾn' (dēwān) (archive, collected writings, compilation of works”), from the Sumerian dub.  The sense was of a sofa-like piece of furniture comprising a mattress lying against the wall and on either the floor or an elevated structure.  Part of the tradition of interior decorating in the Middle East, in the West divans are sometimes called “ottomans”; those with an internal storage compartment: “box ottomans”.

In courts of the common law traditions the terms “bench” & “bar” date from the medieval age and remain part of courtroom terminology.  “The bench” was originally the seat on which judges at while presiding, the early furniture apparently a simple wooden bench as one would find at many long dining tables and in the manner typical of the way English evolves, “bench” came to be used of judges collectively and of the institution of the judiciary itself.  The “bar” was the physical barrier separating the spectators and participants of a trial from the area where the lawyers and judges conducted the proceedings, thus the “bar table” being that at which the advocates sat and the right to practice law before the bench being “passing the bar”, familiar in the modern US phrase “passing the bar exam” or the English form “called to the bar”.  As “bench” became a synecdoche for the judiciary, “bar” came to be used of the lawyers although in jurisdictions where there is a separation between those who appear in court (barristers) and those who do not (solicitors) “bar” was applied only to the former and even after reforms in some abolished the distinctions between certain branches of the law, specialist practitioners continue often to be referred to as the “equity bar” & “common law bar”.  There’s thus the apparent anomaly of the use of “bencher” (recorded in the 1580s) being used to mean “senior member of an inn of court”, all of whom would have been members of “the bar”.  Presumably the idea was one of “approaching the bench” or (more mischievously) “aspiring to the bench”.  The bench-warrant (one issued by a judge, as opposed to one issued by a magistrate or justice of the peace (JP) dates from the 1690s. 

An illuminated manuscript (circa 1460) which is the earliest known depiction of the Court of King's Bench in session.

In England, the Court of King’s Bench (KB) (or Queen’s Bench (QB) depending on who was on the throne) began in the twelfth century as a court at which the monarch literally presided; it was a circuit court which would, from time-to-time, travel around the counties hearing cases.  The Court of KB was thus in some sense “virtual”, whatever wooden bench upon which he sat becoming the KB for the duration of the trial.  Kings would cease to sit as judges and the KB later was interpolated into the system of courts (there would be many internecine squabbles over the years) until (as the Court of Queen’s Bench), under the Supreme Court of Judicature Act (1873), it, along with the Court of Common Pleas, the Court of Exchequer and Court of Chancery were merged to become the High Court of Justice, each of the absorbed institutions becoming a division.  The Common Pleas and Exchequer Division were abolished in 1880 when the High Court was re-organized into the Chancery Division, Queen's Bench Division and the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division (the latter memorably known as “wills, wives & wrecks” in legal slang).  The origin of the KB is a hint of why a king or queen can’t appear before a court in the UK or other places in which they remain head of state: Although it is in a practical sense now a legal fiction, all courts of law are “their courts” of which they remain the highest judge.

Benches afforced with foreign judges, the Chinese Communist Party and Hong Kong’s national security law

Multi-national benches are not uncommon.  There have been courts operating under the auspices of the League of Nations (LoN; 1920-1946) & United Nations (UN; since 1945) such as the International Criminal Court (ICC), the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the various ad-hoc bodies set up to handle prosecutions related to crimes in specific locations (Rwandan, the former Yugoslavia et al) and the UK had the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC) which included senior judges from the Commonwealth.  The JCPC functioned not only as a final court of appeal for Commonwealth nations (a role for a handful it still fulfils) but also as the appellate tribunal for a number of domestic bodies including some ecclesiastical bodies, admiralty matters and even matters from the usually obscure Disciplinary Committee of the Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons.  There were also the International Military Tribunals (IMT) which tried matters arising from the conduct of German & Japanese defendants from World War II (1939-1945), the bench of the latter Tokyo Tribunal notably diverse although those of the subsequent dozen trials in Nuremberg were staffed exclusively by US judges.  A number of former colonies also use foreign judges (and not always from the former colonial power).

However, what remains unusual is the matter of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) deciding to have foreign judges serve on Hong Kong’s Court of Final Appeal (HKCFA), established in 1997 when the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) was created upon Beijing regaining sovereignty (under the “one country, two systems” (1C2S)) principle, with the end of British colonial rule.  At that point, the HKCFA became the territory’s highest judicial institution, replacing the JCPC in London.  On the HKCFA’s bench sits the Chief Justice (a Hong Kong national), several “Permanent Judges” and some two-dozen odd “Non-permanent Judges” who may be recruited from Hong Kong or from among lawyers of the requisite background from any overseas common law jurisdiction.  As non-permanent judges, appointments have been drawn (from bar & bench) from Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the UK.

Lindsay Lohan, foreign judge on the bench of The Masked Singer (2019), a singing competition, the Australian franchise of a format which began in the ROK (Republic of Korea (South Korea)) as King of Mask Singer.

While it may seem strange a developed country like the People’s Republic of China (The PRC, the world’s second largest economy, a permanent member of the UN Security Council and since 1965 the final member of the original “Club of Five” declared nuclear powers) would have foreign judges sitting in one of its superior courts, on the mainland the PRC operates under a civil law system which, like the tradition in continental European, is based primarily on written statutes and codes, unlike common law systems, which rely heavily on case law and judicial precedent.  As a British colony, Hong Kong had used common law and under that system had become a major regional and international presence, something in part due to its judicial system being perceived as fair an uncorrupted; it was a “rule of law” state.  In the PRC there simply wasn’t a body of judges or lawyers with the necessary background in common law to staff the territory’s highest appellate court and significantly, at the time of the handover from the Raj, Hong Kong was of great importance to the PRC’s economy and the CCP understood it would be critical to maintain confidence in the rule of law, investors and overseas corporations with Hong Kong resident interests needing to be assured matters such as contracts would continue as before to be enforceable.

So it was, literally, “business as usual”, whatever may have been the fears about the political undercurrent.  The growth of the mainland economy since 1997 has been such that the HKSAR now constitutes only a small fraction of the national economy but analysts (some of whom provide advice to the CCP) understand the linkages running through the territory remain highly useful for Beijing and some long-standing conduits are still used for back-channel communications about this and that.  As far as business is concerned, the operation of the legal system has remained satisfactory, even though the CCP ensured that Beijing retained a reserved power to overturn the HKCFA’s decisions.

The colonial era building where now sits the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal.  Formally opened in 1912, it was built with granite in the neo-classical style and between 1985-2011 was the seat of the Legislative Council (LegCo).

However, in 2020, a “National Security Law” (technically the Law of the People's Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and thus usually written in English as the “NSL”) was imposed.  While not aimed at the regulation of business or economic matters, it was wide in its scope and claims of application (the extraterritoriality extending worldwide), essentially extending to the territory many of the laws of the mainland regarding “political activities” and matters of “free speech”, the latter widely interpreted by the CCP.  Citing the “political situation”, two British judges in June 2024 resigned from the HKCFA, prompted by Beijing’s recent crackdown on dissent in the city, something made possible by the NSL.  In his published letter, one judge, his rationale for departure notwithstanding, did say he continued “…to have full confidence in the court and the total independence of its members.”  As early as 2020, one Australian judge had already resigned, followed by two others from the UK, both saying the Hong Kong government had “…departed from values of political freedom and freedom of expression.”  The CCP may have anticipated some objection from the overseas judges because, since the passage of the NSL, no overseas judge has been allocated to hear the “security-related” cases.  The judicial disquiet seemed not to trouble the territory’s chief executive, former police officer John Lee (Ka-chiu) (b 1957) who said the overseas appointments would continue to help “…maintain confidence in the judicial system and… strong ties with other common law jurisdictions.”  In response to the departing judge’s comment, he claimed the NSL had “no effect” on judicial independence and the only difference was that “…national security is now better safeguarded.”

Early in June, the Hong Kong authorities arrested two men and one woman attending a FIFA World Cup qualification match against Iran, their offence being “turning their backs to the pitch and not standing during the performance of the national anthem”, a police spokesman adding that anybody “…who publicly and intentionally insults the national anthem in any way in committing a crime.”  Before the NSL was imposed, bolshie Hongkongers were known to boo the anthem to express discontent with their rulers; that definitely will no longer be tolerated.  The match ended Iran 4: Hong Kong 2 but despite that, more than ever the HKSAR and the Islamic Republic have much in common.

Compunction

Compunction (pronounced kuhm-puhngk-shuhn)

(1) A feeling of uneasiness or anxiety of the conscience caused by regret for doing wrong or causing pain; contrition; remorse; sorrow.

(2) Any uneasiness or hesitation about the rightness of an action.

1350–1400: From the Middle English compunccion, from the Old French compunction (from which in the twelfth century Modern French gained compunction), from the Late Latin compunctionem (a pricking) & compūnctiōn- (stem of the Ecclesiastical Latin compunctiō) (remorse; a stinging or pricking (of one’s guilty conscience)), the construct being the Classical Latin compūnct(us) (past participle of compungere (to sting; severely to prick), the construct of which was (com- (used as an intensive prefix) + pungere (to prick; to puncture) (from a suffixed form of the primitive Indo-European root peuk- (to prick)) + -iōn- (stem of –iō and a suffix forming nouns, used especially on past participle stems).  The origin of the meaning in Latin (transferred from the element pungere (to prick; to puncture)) was the idea of “a pricking of one’s guilty conscience” which could induce some feeling of regret although, like many injuries cause by pin-pricks, recovery was often rapid.  The adjective compunctious (causing compunction, pricking the conscience) dates from the late sixteenth century.  Compunction & compunctiousness are nouns, compunctious & compunctionless are adjectives and compunctiously is an adverb; the noun plural is compunctions.

The Ecclesiastical Latin compunctiō (and compunction in other forms) appears frequently in the texts of the early Church, used in a figurative sense originally to convey a more intense sense of “contrition” or “remorse” than that familiar in modern use.  Contrition and remorse were of course a thing vital for the Church to foster, indeed to demand of the congregation.  The very structure of Christianity was built upon the idea that all were born in a state of guilt because the very act of conception depending upon an original sin and this was what made Jesus unique: the virgin birth meant Christ was born without sin although centuries of theological squabbles would ensue as the debate swirled about his nature as (1) man, (2) the son of God and (3) God.  That was too abstract for most which was fine with the priests who preferred to focus on the guilt of their flock and their own importance as the intermediaries between God and sinner, there to arrange forgiveness, something which turned out to be a commodity and commodities are there to be sold.  Forgiveness was really the first futures market and compunction was one of the currencies although gold and other mediums of exchange would also figure.

Sorry (Regretful or apologetic for one's actions) was from the From Middle English sory, from the Old English sāriġ (feeling or expressing grief, sorry, grieved, sorrowful, sad, mournful, bitter), from the Proto-West Germanic sairag, from the Proto-Germanic sairagaz (sad), from the primitive Indo-European seh₂yro (hard, rough, painful).  It was cognate with the Scots sairie (sad, grieved), the Saterland Frisian seerich (sore, inflamed), the West Frisian searich (sad, sorry), the Low German serig (sick, scabby), the German dialectal sehrig (sore, sad, painful) and the Swedish sårig.  Remarkably, despite the similarities in spelling and meaning, “sorry” is etymologically unrelated to “sorrow”.  Sorrow (a state of woe; unhappiness) was from the Middle English sorow, sorwe, sorghe & sorȝe, from the Old English sorg & sorh (care, anxiety, sorrow, grief), from the Proto-West Germanic sorgu, from the Proto-Germanic surgō (which may be compared with the West Frisian soarch, the Dutch zorg, the German Sorge, and the Danish, Swedish and Norwegian sorg), from the primitive Indo-European swergh (watch over, worry; be ill, suffer) (which may be compared with the Old Irish serg (sickness), the Tocharian B sark (sickness), the Lithuanian sirgti (be sick) and the Sanskrit सूर्क्षति (sū́rkṣati) (worry).

Johnny Depp & Amber Heard saying sorry in Australia and Johnny Depp deconstructing sorry in London.

Sorry indicates (1) one is regretful or apologetic for one’s thoughts or actions but it can also mean (2) one is grieved or saddened (especially by the loss of something or someone), (3) someone or something is in a sad or regrettable state or (4) someone or something is hopelessly inadequate for their intended role or purpose.  Such is human nature that expressions of sorry in the sense of an apology are among the more common exchanges and one suspects something like the 80/20 rule applies: 80% of apologies are offered by (or extracted from) 20% of the population.  So frequent are they that an art has evolved to produce phrases by which an apology can be delivered in which sorry is somehow said without actually saying sorry.  This is the compunction one fells when one is not feeling compunctious and a classic example was provided when the once (perhaps then happily) married actors Johnny Depp (b 1963) & Amber Heard (b 1986) were in 2015 caught bringing two pet dogs into Australia in violation of the country’s strict biosecurity laws.  Ms Heard pleaded guilty to falsifying quarantine documents, stating in mitigation her mistake was induced by “sleep deprivation”.  No conviction was recorded (the maximum sentence available being ten years in jail) and she was placed on a Aus$1,000 one-month good behavior bond, the couple ordered to make a “public apology” and that they did, a short video provided, the script unexceptional but the performances something like a Monty Python sketch.  However, whatever the brief performance lacked in sincerity, as free advertising for the biosecurity regime, it was invaluable.  Mr Depp later returned to the subject when promoting a film in London.

The synonyms for “sorry” (as in an apology) include regret, apologize, compunctious, contrite, penitent, regretful, remorseful & repentant (which is more a subsequent act).  Practiced in the art of the “non-apologetic” apology are politicians (some of whom have honed it to the point where it’s more a science) who have a number of ways of nuancing things.  Sometimes the excuse is that simply to say “sorry” might subsequent legal proceedings be construed as an admission of liability, thus exposing the exchequer and there was some basis for that concept which has prompted some jurisdictions explicitly to write into legislation that in traffic accidents and such, simply to say “sorry” cannot be construed as such an admission.  That of course has had no apparent effect on the behaviour of politicians.  Even when there is no possibly of exposing the state to some sort of claim, politicians are still averse to anything like the word “sorry” because it’s seen as a “loss of face” and a victory for one’s opponents.

There are exceptions.  Some politicians, especially during periods of high popularity, worked out that such was the novelty, saying sorry could work quite well, especially if delivered in a manner which seemed sincere (and the right subject, in the right hands, can learn such tricks) although some who found it worked did overdo it, the repetition making it clear it was just another cynical tactic.  An example was Peter Beattie (b 1952; Premier of Queensland 1998-2007) who found the electorate responded well to a leader saying sorry but such was the low quality of the government he headed that there was often something for which to apologize and having set the precedent, he felt compelled to carry on until the sheer repetitive volume of the compunctiousness began merely to draw attention to all the incompetence.

Lindsay Lohan and her lawyer in court, Los Angeles, December 2011.

The other exception is the set-piece event.  This is where a politician apologizes on behalf of someone else (a previous government, hopefully the opposition or something a vague as the nation in some dim, distant past) while making it clear that personally it’s nothing to do with them personally.  There has been a spate of these in recent decades, many apologizing for egregiously appalling acts by white men against ethnic minorities, indigenous populations, the disabled or other powerless groups.  Again, some of the apologies have been in the form of “personally sorry it happened”, thereby ticking the box without costing anything; people like and indigenous population apparently deserving words but not compensation.  For the rest of us, ranging from the genuinely sincere to the cynically opportunistic nihilistic psychopaths, the most obvious tool is the adverb: to say “I am so sorry” can be more effective than “I’m sorry” provided the tone of voice, inflections and the non-verbal clues are all in accord.  Sorry is recommend by many because it so easily can be made to sound sincere with a ease that’s challenging with compunctious, contrite, penitent, regretful, and remorseful, the longer words ideal for one politician “apologizing” to another in a form which is linguistically correct while being quite contemptuous.