Privilege

Privilege (pronounced priv-lij (U) or priv-uh-lij (non-U))

(1) A special right, immunity, or exemption granted to persons in authority or office to free them from certain obligations or liabilities; the principle or condition of enjoying special rights or immunities; to exempt from certain obligations; a right, immunity, or benefit enjoyed only by a person beyond the advantages of most.

(2) Any of the rights common to all citizens under a modern constitutional government.

(3) An expression of pleasure.

(4) In the equity markets, an option to buy or sell stock at a stipulated price for a limited period of time, including puts, calls, spreads, and straddles (a now rare nineteenth century innovation).

(5) In ecclesiastical law, an exemption, granted by popes, from certain laws; a use dating from the eighth century, now restricted mostly to historic references.

(6) In law, a common law doctrine that protects certain communications from being used as evidence in court, most familiar as attorney-client privilege (often misunderstood because the privilege is held by the client) and executive privilege which can protect presidential and cabinet discussions and documents from scrutiny.

(7) In computing, access to or the ability to execute certain actions which may selectively be granted or denied to users.

(8) As “white privilege”, an expression which encapsulates the idea of the (institutional) advantage white people enjoy as cluster of preferential treatment and opportunities in society beyond (the structural) defined in law; one of the core components of critical race theory (CRT).

(9) To bring or put into a condition of privilege or exemption from evil or danger; to exempt; to deliver (archaic).

1125-1175: From the Middle English privilegen (and the earlier privilegie) from the Anglo-Norman privilege, from the Old French privilege, from the Latin prīvilēgium (ordinance or law against or in favor of an individual).  The Middle English privilegen was from the Middle French privilegier which, like the Medieval Latin prīvilēgiāre was from the Latin prīvilēgium, the construct in Latin being from prīvus (private) + lēx or lēg- (law).  Middle English also had the late fourteenth century pravilege (an evil law or privilege), from the Medieval Latin pravilegium, a play on privilegium by substitution of pravus (wrong, bad).  The alternative spellings priviledg & priviledge are long obsolete.  Synonyms include freelage, immunity, prerogative, right, advantage, foredeal & franchise, (a UK dialectal form); the plural is privileges.

The verb privilege is from the late fourteenth century privilegen (endow (someone) with a special right, grace, power, etc.; to invest with a privilege), from the noun and the thirteenth century Old French privilegier, from the Medieval Latin privilegare, from the Classical Latin privilegium.  The verb disprivilege (deprive (someone) of privilege) was a technical legal term first used in the 1610s; it’s rare but still exists.  The adjective privileged emerged in the late fourteenth century and applied to things; by the mid-1400s it described “persons enjoying certain privileges or immunities"; the past-participle adjective from verb privilege.

The mid-twelfth century meaning of "grant, commission" (which existed earlier in Old English but was referenced with a Latin word), came from the early twelfth century Old French privilege (right, priority, privilege) and directly from the Latin privilegium (law applying to one person, bill of law in favor of or against an individual) which in the post-Augustine era came to be restricted to mean "an ordinance in favor of an individual".  Typically this meant the exemption of one individual from the operation of a law.  In the eleventh century, although it had existed in ecclesiastical law since the eighth, this was a notable aspect of the way the Church exercised power, the privilege a "power or prerogative associated with a certain social or religious position".  The meaning "advantage granted, special right or favor granted to a person or group, a right, immunity, benefit, or advantage enjoyed by a person or body of persons beyond the common advantages of other individuals" is emerged in English during the mid-fourteenth century and had by the late 1300s begun to be used in the legal language of the courts as a general expression of "legal immunity or exemption".

Thus a concept which began in secular Roman civil law was refined in Church law to the point where it was formalized as an exemption or license granted by the Pope, or special immunity or advantage (as freedom of speech) granted to persons in authority or in office before being adopted in modern secular law as an expression of concepts as diverse as (1) general equality of all under the law, (2) basic rights common to all (habeas corpus, suffrage, protest, voting etc) & (3) defined exemptions for certain groups or individuals in certain circumstances from the otherwise prevailing rules.

Golf without clubs.  Donald Trump in discussion on the links, Virginia, September 2022.

On the internet (a most reliable source), it's being suggested Donald Trump (b 1946; US president 2017-2021) had taken to meeting his lawyers on the golf course because he thinks he's there less likely to be overheard or bugged.  He clearly doesn't frequent birdwatching circles or he'd know about the parabolic microphones which can capture birdsong from a distance of 50 m (165 feet) and beyond.  Sympathetic publications suggested the meetings on his Virginia course were either (1) to discuss the planning permission required for proposed upgrades or (2) in connection with arrangements being made to host an event for the Saudi Arabia-backed LIV tournament.

In the US, there are two types of legal professional privilege (1) the attorney-client privilege and (2) the work product doctrine.  The attorney-client privilege has ancient origins in English common law and in familiar throughout the English-speaking world.  Essentially, it exists to protect the right of an individual to communicate with their lawyer without concern the state (or others) might compel either to disclose the discussions.  The legal rationale for attorney-client privilege is that, as a matter of public policy, justice depends on a lawyer being fully informed by their client and the privilege is generally absolute, applying broadly in both litigation and non-litigation contexts; it may be asserted in all proceedings in which testimony may be compelled, including civil, criminal, administrative, regulatory and disciplinary proceeding.  The work product doctrine is another basis by which US courts may provide protection from disclosure for certain materials created in the context of attorney-client relations. The doctrine is relatively new, having originated in a Supreme Court ruling (Hickman v Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510–11 (1947)) which held an adverse party generally may not discover or compel disclosure of written or oral materials prepared by or for an attorney in anticipation of litigation or in preparation for trial; the presumption of non-disclosure is a rebuttable one.

Canon Law and the Pauline Privilege

Depiction of St Paul in stained glass window, St Edmund's Church, Bungay, Suffolk, England.

In Roman Catholic Canon Law, the Pauline Privilege constitutes an exception to the church's general rules governing marriage, rules grounded in sacramental theology.  It is one of the few examples in the legal code where a specific law is taken directly from sacred scripture, ie from the words of Saint Paul himself.  Canon Law starts with the general principle that a marriage, once ratum et consummatum (ratified and consummated), cannot be dissolved by any human power, or by any cause other than death.  The notion, impressive rates of divorce notwithstanding, survives to this day in the marriage rituals of many denominations in the words “…what God has joined together let no man tear asunder.”   

In other words, a marriage is truly indissoluble if (1) it has been celebrated with a valid marriage rite and (2) the spouses have subsequently engaged in a "conjugal act, apt for the generation of offspring".  If condition (1) is missing or defective in some substantive way, the marriage may be annulled, since it was never proper to begin with.  If condition (2) is missing the marriage is ratum sed non consummatum (ratified but not consummated) or ratum et non consummatum (ratified and not consummated) and the Pope has the power to dissolve it.  Otherwise, a marriage ends only with the death of one of the spouses.

This is an ancient position of the church, originally based on teachings in the Old Testament and was not revised by the Second Vatican Council (Vatican II; 1962-1965).  However, a loophole exists because of a couple of passages in the New Testament which conflict with canon law.  In Saint Paul's First Letter to the Corinthians, John mentions:

To the married I give charge, not I but the Lord that the wife should not separate from her husband (but if she does, let her remain single or else be reconciled to her husband), and that the husband should not divorce his wife.

To the rest I say, not the Lord, that if any brother has a wife who is an unbeliever, and she consents to live with him, he should not divorce her.  If any woman has a husband who is an unbeliever, and he consents to live with her, she should not divorce him.  For the unbelieving husband is consecrated through his wife, and the unbelieving wife is consecrated through her husband...

But if the unbelieving partner desires to separate, let it be so; in such a case the brother or sister is not bound. For God has called us to peace.   (1 Corinthians 7:12-15)

So, Saint Paul asserts, in a particular set of circumstances, a ratified but not consummated marriage can be dissolved and he acknowledges that this isn't coming from God but rather, from Paul himself.  According to Paul, the overall indissolubility of marriage has a loophole: if two unbaptized people are married, and one of them is subsequently baptized, the marriage can be ended  if the other spouse both (1) remains unbaptized and (2) "desires to separate" from his or her spouse.  As codified, the loophole found its way into Church law as canon 1143.  It states that a marriage of two unbaptized persons is dissolved when one of the spouses is baptized and enters a new marriage, if the unbaptized spouse departs. There are a number of criteria, all of which must be present, for this privilege to apply but its exercise hinges on the word departs.  Firstly, the Pauline Privilege is relevant only if one of the spouses becomes a Christian and the other does not.  In other words, if both spouses are baptized after their marriage, and they then want to separate and remarry, they cannot do so under canon 1143.

Secondly, the privilege can be applied if the unbaptized spouse is either unwilling to continue living with the newly baptized spouse, or if the unbaptized spouse is not willing to do so without "offense to the Creator." In other words, if the unbaptized spouse is so antagonistic toward the Christian faith of the newly baptized husband or wife that they cannot live together in peace, this constitutes "departing" for the purposes of canon 1143.  The canon lawyers therefore widened the loophole somewhat, deciding a departure need not be a physical decampment but remained otherwise rigid: the Pauline Privilege cannot be invoked if it’s the baptized spouse who "departs." So long as the unbaptized spouse is willing to remain in the marriage, and is not hostile to the Christian faith of the other spouse, the marriage cannot be dissolved other than by death.  Thirdly, the newly baptized spouse must want to enter into a new marriage. Unless and until this happens, he or she remains married to the unbaptized.

Canon Law §§ 1143-1147 codifies the process and instances can be handled on the diocesan level with the Holy See apparently now content to retain only a (seldom exercised) power of veto.  The Pauline Privilege does not apply when either of the partners was a Christian at the time of marriage and differs from annulment because it dissolves a valid natural (but not sacramental) marriage whereas an annulment declares that a marriage was invalid from the beginning.  Regarding the often desired annulments, on paper, little changed in the modern age until 2015 when Pope Francis issued two motu proprio (literally “on his own impulse”; essentially the law-making mechanism available to absolute monarchs as the royal decree): Mitis iudex dominus Iesus (Reform to the Canons of the Code of Canon that pertain to the marriage nullity cases) and Mitis et misericors Iesus (Reform of the canons of the Code of Canons of Eastern Churches pertaining to cases regarding the nullity of marriage) which changed canon law, simplifying the annulment process.  Those who thought this a harbinger of something radical were however disappointed; it appears the pope’s intervention did little more than reflect the position taken in recent decades by so many bishops more anxious to retain bums on pews and coins in the plate than preserve unhappy marriages.  Shortly after the decrees were issued, better to help sinners consider their position, Cardinal Francesco Coccopalmerio, president of the Pontifical Council for Legislative Texts, issued a clarification, noting the Church “…does not decree the annulment of a legally valid marriage, but rather declares the nullity of a legally invalid marriage”.