Ambiguous

Ambiguous (pronounced am-big-yoo-uhs)

(1) Open to or having several possible meanings or interpretations; equivocal.

(2) In linguistics, of an expression exhibiting constructional homonymity; having two or more structural descriptions.

(3) Of doubtful or uncertain nature; difficult to comprehend, distinguish, or classify.

1528: From the late Middle English ambiguous (of doubtful or uncertain nature, open to various interpretations) Latin ambiguus (moving from side to side, of doubtful or uncertain nature, open to various interpretations), from ambigere (to dispute about (figuratively "to hesitate, waver; be in doubt" and literally “to wander; go about; go around”) the present active infinitive of ambigō from ambi (around) +‎ agō or agere (I drive, move).  The first known citation in English is in the writings of Sir Thomas More (1478-1535) in 1528 but most scholars maintain the noun ambiguity had been in use since circa 1400 in the sense of "uncertainty, doubt, indecision, hesitation", from the Old French ambiguite and directly from Latin ambiguitatem (nominative ambiguitas) (double meaning, equivocalness, double sense), the noun of state from ambiguus (having double meaning, doubtful),  The meaning "obscurity in description" emerged in the early fifteenth century.  The adjective unambiguous dated from the 1630s while the noun disambiguation (removal of ambiguity) is documented since 1827.  Ambiguous is an adjective, ambiguate is a verb and ambiguity, ambiguation & ambiguousness are nouns; the most common noun plural is ambiguities. 

Structural ambiguity, syntactic ambiguity & lexical ambiguity

One of the core concepts in structural linguistics is that the meaning of many combination or words (ie a compound, sentence or phrase) is derived not merely from the meanings of the individual words but also from the way in which they’re combined.  It’s a simple idea which academics have managed to make sound complex, calling the process “compositionality” (that meaning is a construct of word meanings plus morphosyntactic structures).  So, because a structure can contribute to meaning, it follows that changing the order of the words can lead to a different meaning even if the same words are used.  When a word, phrase, or sentence has more than one meaning, it is ambiguous and “ambiguous” has a specific meaning in structural linguistics because it doesn’t mean simply that a meaning is vague or unclear: It means two or more distinct meanings are available and this is called structural ambiguity or syntactic ambiguity (as distinct from when a word has more than one distinct meaning which is known as lexical ambiguity.  Sometimes, the intended meaning can be unclear but often context can be used to assist the deconstruction.  When in December 2017, several news outlets reported, “Lindsay Lohan bitten by snake on holiday in Thailand”, few actually believed serpents take holidays and assumed instead grammatical standards had fallen since sub-editors went extinct.

China, the renegade province of Taiwan and strategic ambiguity

Taiwan (aka Formosa) is an island off the coast of China which separated, politically, from the mainland in 1949.  The Chinese government regards Taiwan as “a renegade province”; the island’s administration maintains a position of structural autonomy without actually declaring independence.  Since 1950, the US has maintained a security guarantee for the de facto independence of Taiwan which has been sometimes explicit, sometimes vague, the latter paradigm known as a policy of strategic ambiguity.

The origins of the guarantee lie in the Korean War.  In 1950, Dean Acheson (1893–1971; US secretary of state 1949-1953) delineated the US security perimeter in Asia and included neither Taiwan nor South Korea.  Chinese leader Chairman Mao (Mao Zedong 1893–1976; chairman of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 1949-1976) and Kim Il-sung (Kim I, 1912–1994; Great Leader of DPRK (North Korea) 1948-1994), in an interpretation endorsed by their senior partner, Comrade Stalin (1878-1953; Soviet leader 1924-1953), concluded Washington would not defend either country.  The DPRK acted first, invading South Korea in June 1950 which shocked the US into assembling a military response under the flag of the UN and, fearing further Communist incursions in Asia, sent the Seventh Fleet to deter any attempt by Peking to invade Taiwan.

In 1954, China probed US policy by shelling some Taiwanese islands in what came to be known as the First Taiwan Strait Crisis; the US responded by entering into defense treaties with both Taiwan and South Korea.  The probing continued, notably with the second crisis in 1958 and in the 1960 presidential campaign, both candidates, Richard Nixon (1913-1994; US president 1969-1974) and John Kennedy (JFK, 1917–1963; US president 1961-1963), pledged to defend Taiwan against Chinese aggression.  During the 1960s, in a kind of military choreography, US-China standoffs continued.  By 1972, things had changed.  The US sought China’s assistance, both to extricate themselves from the quagmire of the Vietnam War and to become something of a strategic partner against the USSR, Peking having long split from Moscow.  In a communique issued from Shanghai, Washington affirmed Peking’s “one China” principle that Taiwan is part of China saying it was a matter for China and Taiwan to work out the relationship peacefully. 

The nine dash line.

Despite that, the US-Taiwan Treaty remained but it needed now to be viewed in the context of Richard Nixon's Guam Doctrine, issued in 1969, in which the president noted "…the US would assist in the defense… of allies and friends" but would not "undertake all the defense of the free nations of the world."  For Taiwan, and presumably everyone else, strategic ambiguity thus began.  Seven years after the Shanghai statement, later, the Carter administration recognized the People’s Republic of China (PRC, the old Red China), severed formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan and terminated the treaty.  Strategic ambiguity has shrouded Washington’s position on Taiwan ever since.  US presidents have on occasion suggested both something more robust and something less so it appears to remain the position that the US might defend Taiwan were China to invade but it might not.  It would depend on the circumstances.  For seventy-odd years, the US position has been enough to deter China from exercising the military option to restore the renegade province to the motherland but a multi-dimensional chess game will play-out over the next decade in the South China Sea.