Prerogative

Prerogative (pronounced pri-rog-uh-tiv)

(1) An exclusive right, privilege, etc, exercised by virtue of rank, office, or the like; having a hereditary or official right or privilege.

(2) A right, privilege, etc, limited to a specific person or to persons of a particular category.

(3) A power, immunity, or the like restricted to a sovereign government or its representative.

(4) Characterized by lawless state actions (refers to the prerogative state)

(5) Precedence (obsolete except in the legal sense of the hierarchy of rights).

(6) A property, attribute or ability which gives one a superiority or advantage over others; an inherent (though not necessarily unique) advantage or privilege; a talent.

(7) In constitutional law, a right or power exclusive to a head of state (often derived from the original powers of a monarch) or their nominee exercising delegated authority, especially the powers to appoint or dismiss executive governments.

1350-1400: From the Anglo-Norman noun prerogatif, from the Old French prerogative, from the Latin praerogātīva (previous verdict; claim, privilege), noun use of the feminine singular of praerogātīvus (having first vote; privileged), in Anglo-Latin as prerogativa from late thirteenth century.  The origin lay in a statute in the civil law of Ancient Roman which granted precedence to the tribus, centuria (an assembly of one-hundred voters who, by lot, voted first in the Roman comita).  The law guaranteed them a praerogātīvus (chosen to vote first) derived from praerogere (ask before others).  The construct of praerogere was prae (before) + rogare (to ask, ask a favor), apparently a figurative use of a primitive Indo-European verb meaning literally "to stretch out (the hand)" from the root reg- (move in a straight line).  In Middle English, the meaning "an innate faculty or property which especially distinguishes someone or something" was added.  The alternative spelling prærogative is long obsolete.  Prerogative is a noun & adjective, prerogatived is an adjective and prerogatively is an adverb; the noun plural is prerogatives.

In English law, a court classified as “a prerogative court” was one through which the discretionary powers, privileges, and legal immunities reserved to the sovereign could be exercised.  The best known of these courts was the Court of Exchequer, the Court of Chancery and the Court of the Star Chamber (the latter one of those institutions formed to rectify injustice but which was later the source of much; the Court of the Star Chamber may be used as a case-study explaining the phrase: “the road to hell is paved with good intentions”).  In time, clashes between the prerogative courts and common law courts became something of a proxy-theatre in the contest between the king and parliament.  The way that worked out was that the ancient (essentially personal) prerogative rights of the monarch weren’t abolished but rather exercised by parliament or institutions (including courts) to which the powers were delegated.  Whether any prerogative power remains in the hands of the sovereign to be used in “extraordinary and reprehensible circumstances” remains a matter of debate.  There were also ecclesiastical prerogative courts under the authority of the archbishops of Canterbury and York but they existed only to handle probate matters in cases where estates beyond a certain defined value were spread between the two dioceses but they also handled many wills of those who died in colonial or other overseas service.  As part of the great reforms of the late nineteenth century undertaken in the Judicature Acts (1873-1899) the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical prerogative moved to the common law courts, being finally vested in the Family Division of the High Court of Justice.

In English law, the still sometimes invoked prerogative writ (the best known of which were habeas corpus (from the Latin habeas corpus ad subjiciendum (usually translated as “bring up the body (ie the prisoner))), a demand a prisoner being held by an organ of the state be brought before a court to determine whether there was lawful authority for the detention) and mandamus (from the Latin mandāmus (we command)), an order issued by a higher court to compel or to direct a lower court or a government officer correctly to perform mandatory duties) was a class of six orders available to the crown for the purpose of directing the action of an organ of government (including courts, officials or statutory bodies).  The name was derived from the authority these exercised being traceable ultimately to the discretionary prerogative & extraordinary power of the monarch and the principle remains in use in many common law jurisdictions which evolved from the old British Empire, notably those of the Raj of colonial India.

The woman's prerogative

For a man incautiously to use the phrase “a woman's prerogative”, the risk would be “cancellation” (or worse) although it’s probably still acceptable if there’s a layer of irony.  The phrase is a clipping of the full: “it’s a woman’s prerogative to change her mind”, the implication being women have the right to change their minds or make decisions based on their own preferences and need provide no explanation or justification.  Wise men (and the pussy-whipped) accept this without demur.  It is of course a reflection of a cultural stereotype and seems to have come into use in the mid-nineteenth century, an era in which gender roles were more rigidly defined and women were thought to be more capricious or whimsical in their actions.  However, in law, the “woman's prerogative” was once enforceable, granting them rights not available to men, a most unusual development in Western jurisprudence.

Well into the twentieth century, it was legal orthodoxy in common law jurisdictions for an offer of marriage to be enforceable under the rules of contract law.  While courts didn’t go as far as ordering “specific performance” of the contract (ie forcing an unwilling party to marry someone), they would award damages on the basis of a “breach of promise”, provided it could be adduced that three of the four essential elements of a contract existed: (1) offer, (2) certainty of terms and (3) acceptance.  The fourth component: (4) consideration (ie payment), wasn’t mentioned because it was assumed to be implicit in the nature of the exchange; a kind of “deferred payment” as it were.  It was one of those rarities in common law where things operated wholly in favor of women in that they could sue a man who changed his mind while they were free to break-off an engagement without fear of legal consequences though there could be social and familial disapprobation.  Throughout the English-speaking world, the breach of promise tort in marriage matters has almost wholly been abolished, remaining on the books in the a handful of US states (not all of which lie south of the Mason-Dixon Line) but even where it exists it’s now a rare action and one likely to succeed only in exceptional circumstances or where a particularly fragrant plaintiff manages to charm a particularly sympathetic judge.

The royal prerogative and the reserve powers of the crown

The royal prerogative is the body of customary authority, privilege, and immunity and the means by which (some of) the executive powers of government are exercised in the governance of the state.  These powers are recognized in common law (and in some civil law) jurisdictions are held to vest wholly in the sovereign alone, even if exercised through either appointees (of which governors, governors-general & viceroys are the best-known) constitutional government.  In the narrowest sense of technical theory, the recognition of the personal powers of a sovereign exists in most common law systems where the concept is relevant but has long since mostly been reduced to legal fiction and in most constitutional monarchies, almost all individual prerogatives have been abolished by parliaments.  Some republican heads of state also possess similar powers but they tend to be constitutionally defined and subject to checks and balances.  A notable exception to this is a US president’s un-trammeled right to grant pardons to those convicted of offences under federal law and that’s interesting because it’s the only power in the US Constitution not subject to a check or balance.  A US president thus personally continues to exercise a prerogative in a way a British monarch (or their appointees as governors & governors-general), from whom the power is derived, no longer can.

In Britain, prerogative powers were originally exercised by the monarch (at least in theory and the role of the Church needs also to be noted) acting alone but after the Magna Carta (1215, from the Medieval Latin Magna Carta Libertatum (Great Charter of Freedoms) which divided power among the ruling class, there had to be sought the consent of others and this ultimately became parliamentary consent granted to an executive (exercising powers derived from the absolute authority of the monarch) responsible to the parliament.  This took centuries to evolve and eventually meant, in practical terms, the king got the money he needed for his wars and other ventures in exchange for the parliament getting his signature to pass the laws they wanted.

Watched by the courtiers Lord Mulgrave & Lord Morpeth, Lord Melbourne serves King William IV a blackbird pie (1836), lithograph with watercolour by John Doyle (1797-1868), Welcome Collection, London.  The text is a re-arranged selection of lines from the eighteenth century English nursery rhyme “Sing a Song of Sixpence” and reads: “Sing a song of six pence a bag full of rye, four and twenty black birds baked in a pie, when the pie was opened, the birds began to sing, was not this a pretty dish to set before a king.”  The blackbirds sing “Justice for Scotland!” and “No tithes!”, controversial issues of the age.  Nineteenth century cartoonists were sometimes more harsh in their treatment of politicians and royalty. 

In Australia, the royal prerogative is limited (but not defined) by the constitution and those powers which vest a monarch’s authority in a governor-general don’t alter the nature of the prerogative, only its detail; the prerogative is exercised by the governor-general but only on the advice of “their” ministers.  The most obvious exception to this is the reserve power of the monarch (and there are those who doubt whether this still exists in the UK) to dismiss a government enjoying the confidence of the lower house of parliament.  In the UK, it’s not been done since William IV (1765–1837; King of the United Kingdom 1830-1837) dismissed Lord Melbourne (1779–1848; Prime Minister of Great Britain 1834 & 1835–1841) in 1834 (some dispute that, saying it was more of a gentleman’s agreement and the last termination was actually that of Lord North (1732–1792; Prime Minister of Great Britain 1770-1782) by George III (1738–1820) King of Great Britain 1760-1820) in 1782) but Australia has seen two twentieth-century sackings; that in 1932 of NSW premier Jack Lang (1876–1975; Premier of New South Wales 1925-1927 & 1930-1932) by Governor Sir Philip Game (1876–1961; Governor of NSW 1930-1935) and, in 1975, when governor-general Sir John Kerr (1914–1991; Governor-General of Australia 1974-1977) sundered Gough Whitlam’s (1916–2014; Prime Minister of Australia 1972-1975) commission.

Dr HV Evatt in his office at the United Nations, New York, 1949.

The 1975 business provoked much academic discussion of the reserve powers but the most lucid read remains Dr HV Evatt’s (1894–1965; ALP leader 1951-1960) book from decades earlier: The King and His Dominion Governors (1936).  Evatt’s volume was published a hundred odd-years after William IV sacked Melbourne and is useful because in that century there had been more than a few disputes about reserve powers.  Evatt’s central point was that the powers exist but proper rules by which they may be exercised are by no means clear.  The legal power is vested in the governor as the representative of the monarch and when it may properly be used depends on usage and convention.  It seems therefore scarcely possible to say confidently of any case when the Crown has intervened that its intervention was or was not correct for the only standard of correctness in each episode is its consistency with episodes of a similar character, none of which in themselves lay down any principle in law.  Further, Evatt notes, in looking to precedent, support for almost any view can be found in the authorities.  Lofty theoretical purity is also not helpful.  The view the sovereign automatically acts in all matters in accordance with the advice of his ministers rests entirely upon assertion and, Evatt observed, the reserve powers are still, on occasion, properly exercisable and that the Sovereign or his representative may have to exercise a real discretion.  Given that, it really might be impossible that the prerogative could be codified in a document which envisages all possible political or other circumstances.  Evatt nevertheless argued the principles which should guide a sovereign should be defined and made clear by statute.

Nor is practical political reality all that much help, however satisfactory an outcome may prove.  What the exercise of the reserve powers, both in 1932 and 1975, did was enable impasses described, however erroneously as constitutional crises to be resolved by an election, rather than other means.  The result of an election however does not conclude the matter for the correctness of the sovereign's action is not measured by his success as a prophet, any post-facto endorsement by the electorate having not even an indirect bearing on the abstract question of constitutionality.

Although variously a high court judge, attorney-general, foreign minister, opposition leader and Chief Justice of NSW, all Dr Evatt asked for on his gravestone was President of the United Nations, noting his service as president of the general assembly (1948-1949).

Evatt’s core argument therefore was reserve powers should be subject to the normal and natural process of analysis, definition and reduction to the rules of positive law, which, by 1936, had in some places been done.  Evatt considered section 33 (10) of the Western Nigerian constitution which codified things thus: The Governor shall not remove the Premier from office unless it appears to him that the Premier no longer commands the support or a majority of the members of the House of Assembly.  Other sections went on to detail the mechanisms of the exercise of the power, thereby attempting to do exactly what Evatt suggests.  However, the Nigerian example cited by Evatt did not prove a solution because the exercise of the power under the constitution became in 1962 a matter of dispute and the case proceeded though the courts, finally ending up before the Privy Council as Adegbenro v. Akintola (1963 AC 614), an indication even the most explicit codification can remain something imperfect.

Privilege

Privilege (pronounced priv-lij (U) or priv-uh-lij (non-U))

(1) A special right, immunity, or exemption granted to persons in authority or office to free them from certain obligations or liabilities; the principle or condition of enjoying special rights or immunities; to exempt from certain obligations; a right, immunity, or benefit enjoyed only by a person beyond the advantages of most.

(2) Any of the rights common to all citizens under a modern constitutional government.

(3) An expression of pleasure.

(4) In the equity markets, an option to buy or sell stock at a stipulated price for a limited period of time, including puts, calls, spreads, and straddles (a now rare nineteenth century innovation).

(5) In ecclesiastical law, an exemption, granted by popes, from certain laws; a use dating from the eighth century, now restricted mostly to historic references.

(6) In law, a common law doctrine that protects certain communications from being used as evidence in court, most familiar as attorney-client privilege (often misunderstood because the privilege is held by the client and not the lawyer) and executive privilege which can protect presidential and cabinet discussions and documents from scrutiny.

(7) In computing, access to or the ability to execute certain actions which may selectively be granted or denied to users.

(8) As “white privilege”, an expression which encapsulates the idea of the (institutional) advantage white people enjoy as cluster of preferential treatment and opportunities in society beyond (the structural) defined in law; one of the core components of critical race theory (CRT).

(9) To bring or put into a condition of privilege or exemption from evil or danger; to exempt; to deliver (archaic).

1125-1175: From the Middle English privilegen (and the earlier privilegie) from the Anglo-Norman privilege, from the Old French privilege, from the Latin prīvilēgium (ordinance or law against or in favor of an individual).  The Middle English privilegen was from the Middle French privilegier which, like the Medieval Latin prīvilēgiāre was from the Latin prīvilēgium, the construct in Latin being from prīvus (private) + lēx or lēg- (law).  Middle English also had the late fourteenth century pravilege (an evil law or privilege), from the Medieval Latin pravilegium, a play on privilegium by substitution of pravus (wrong, bad).  The alternative spellings priviledg & priviledge are long obsolete.  Synonyms include freelage, immunity, prerogative, right, advantage, foredeal & franchise, (a UK dialectal form); the plural is privileges.

The verb privilege was from the late fourteenth century privilegen (endow (someone) with a special right, grace, power, etc.; to invest with a privilege), from the noun and the thirteenth century Old French privilegier, from the Medieval Latin privilegare, from the Classical Latin privilegium.  The verb disprivilege (deprive (someone) of privilege) was a technical legal term first used in the 1610s; it’s rare but still exists.  The adjective privileged emerged in the late fourteenth century and applied to things; by the mid-1400s it described “persons enjoying certain privileges or immunities"; the past-participle adjective from verb privilege.  The mid-twelfth century meaning of "grant, commission" (which existed earlier in Old English but was referenced with a Latin word), came from the early twelfth century Old French privilege (right, priority, privilege) and directly from the Latin privilegium (law applying to one person, bill of law in favor of or against an individual) which in the post-Augustine era came to be restricted to mean "an ordinance in favor of an individual".  Typically this meant the exemption of one individual from the operation of a law.  In the eleventh century, although it had existed in ecclesiastical law since the eighth, this was a notable aspect of the way the Church exercised power, the privilege a "power or prerogative associated with a certain social or religious position".  The meaning "advantage granted, special right or favor granted to a person or group, a right, immunity, benefit, or advantage enjoyed by a person or body of persons beyond the common advantages of other individuals" is emerged in English during the mid-fourteenth century and had by the late 1300s begun to be used in the legal language of the courts as a general expression of "legal immunity or exemption".  Thus a concept which began in secular Roman civil law was refined in Church law to the point where it was formalized as an exemption or license granted by the Pope, or special immunity or advantage (as freedom of speech) granted to persons in authority or in office before being adopted in modern secular law as an expression of concepts as diverse as (1) general equality of all under the law, (2) basic rights common to all (habeas corpus, suffrage, protest, voting etc) & (3) defined exemptions for certain groups or individuals in certain circumstances from the otherwise prevailing rules.

Golf without clubs.  Donald Trump in discussion on the links, Virginia, September 2022.

On the internet (a most reliable source), it's being suggested Donald Trump (b 1946; US president 2017-2021 and since 2025) had taken to meeting his lawyers on the golf course because he thinks he's there less likely to be overheard or bugged.  He clearly doesn't frequent birdwatching circles or he'd know about the parabolic microphones which can capture birdsong from a distance of 50 m (165 feet) and beyond.  Sympathetic publications suggested the meetings on his Virginia course were either (1) to discuss the planning permission required for proposed upgrades or (2) in connection with arrangements being made to host an event for the Saudi Arabia-backed LIV tournament.

Lindsay Lohan and her lawyer in court, Los Angeles, December, 2011.

The common law doctrine of attorney-client privilege dates from medieval England and may at least in certain circumstances have been acknowledged as early as the fifteenth century but certainly between the sixteenth and eighteenth it became entrenched.  The way it operates is to prevent a court or other organ of the state from compelling the content or nature of communications between a lawyer and client to be disclosed.  Upon the lawyer this rule is almost absolute rule (except in cases such as (1) the fraud exception or (2) a lawyer being sued by their previous client and not suspending the privilege would adversely affect the defence) but, because the privilege is held by the client (not the lawyer), a client can waive the privilege.  This has the interesting consequence that a lawyer cannot unilaterally reveal privileged information, even if they believe it's in the client’s best interest or they are no longer representing the client, something by definition rare although there were instances at the first Nuremberg Trial (1945-1946).

In the US, there are two types of legal professional privilege (1) the attorney-client privilege and (2) the work product doctrine.  The attorney-client privilege has ancient origins in English common law and in familiar throughout the English-speaking world.  Essentially, it exists to protect the right of an individual to communicate with their lawyer without concern the state (or others) might compel either to disclose the discussions.  The legal rationale for attorney-client privilege is that, as a matter of public policy, justice depends on a lawyer being fully informed by their client and the privilege is generally absolute, applying broadly in both litigation and non-litigation contexts; it may be asserted in all proceedings in which testimony may be compelled, including civil, criminal, administrative, regulatory and disciplinary proceeding.  The work product doctrine is another basis by which US courts may provide protection from disclosure for certain materials created in the context of attorney-client relations. The doctrine is relatively new, having originated in a Supreme Court ruling (Hickman v Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510–11 (1947)) which held an adverse party generally may not discover or compel disclosure of written or oral materials prepared by or for an attorney in anticipation of litigation or in preparation for trial; the presumption of non-disclosure is a rebuttable one.

Canon Law and the Pauline Privilege

Depiction of St Paul in stained glass window, St Edmund's Church, Bungay, Suffolk, England.

In Roman Catholic Canon Law, the Pauline Privilege constitutes an exception to the church's general rules governing marriage, rules grounded in sacramental theology.  It is one of the few examples in the legal code where a specific law is taken directly from sacred scripture, ie from the words of Saint Paul himself.  Canon Law starts with the general principle that a marriage, once ratum et consummatum (ratified and consummated), cannot be dissolved by any human power, or by any cause other than death.  The notion, impressive rates of divorce notwithstanding, survives to this day in the marriage rituals of many denominations in the words “…what God has joined together let no man tear asunder.”   

In other words, a marriage is truly indissoluble if (1) it has been celebrated with a valid marriage rite and (2) the spouses have subsequently engaged in a "conjugal act, apt for the generation of offspring".  If condition (1) is missing or defective in some substantive way, the marriage may be annulled, since it was never proper to begin with.  If condition (2) is missing the marriage is ratum sed non consummatum (ratified but not consummated) or ratum et non consummatum (ratified and not consummated) and the Pope has the power to dissolve it.  Otherwise, a marriage ends only with the death of one of the spouses.

This is an ancient position of the church, originally based on teachings in the Old Testament and was not revised by the Second Vatican Council (Vatican II; 1962-1965).  However, a loophole exists because of a couple of passages in the New Testament which conflict with canon law.  In Saint Paul's First Letter to the Corinthians, John mentions:

To the married I give charge, not I but the Lord that the wife should not separate from her husband (but if she does, let her remain single or else be reconciled to her husband), and that the husband should not divorce his wife.

To the rest I say, not the Lord, that if any brother has a wife who is an unbeliever, and she consents to live with him, he should not divorce her.  If any woman has a husband who is an unbeliever, and he consents to live with her, she should not divorce him.  For the unbelieving husband is consecrated through his wife, and the unbelieving wife is consecrated through her husband...

But if the unbelieving partner desires to separate, let it be so; in such a case the brother or sister is not bound. For God has called us to peace.   (1 Corinthians 7:12-15)

So, Saint Paul asserts, in a particular set of circumstances, a ratified but not consummated marriage can be dissolved and he acknowledges that this isn't coming from God but rather, from Paul himself.  According to Paul, the overall indissolubility of marriage has a loophole: if two unbaptized people are married, and one of them is subsequently baptized, the marriage can be ended  if the other spouse both (1) remains unbaptized and (2) "desires to separate" from his or her spouse.  As codified, the loophole found its way into Church law as canon 1143.  It states that a marriage of two unbaptized persons is dissolved when one of the spouses is baptized and enters a new marriage, if the unbaptized spouse departs. There are a number of criteria, all of which must be present, for this privilege to apply but its exercise hinges on the word departs.  Firstly, the Pauline Privilege is relevant only if one of the spouses becomes a Christian and the other does not.  In other words, if both spouses are baptized after their marriage, and they then want to separate and remarry, they cannot do so under canon 1143.

Secondly, the privilege can be applied if the unbaptized spouse is either unwilling to continue living with the newly baptized spouse, or if the unbaptized spouse is not willing to do so without "offense to the Creator." In other words, if the unbaptized spouse is so antagonistic toward the Christian faith of the newly baptized husband or wife that they cannot live together in peace, this constitutes "departing" for the purposes of canon 1143.  The canon lawyers therefore widened the loophole somewhat, deciding a departure need not be a physical decampment but remained otherwise rigid: the Pauline Privilege cannot be invoked if it’s the baptized spouse who "departs." So long as the unbaptized spouse is willing to remain in the marriage, and is not hostile to the Christian faith of the other spouse, the marriage cannot be dissolved other than by death.  Thirdly, the newly baptized spouse must want to enter into a new marriage. Unless and until this happens, he or she remains married to the unbaptized.

Canon Law §§ 1143-1147 codifies the process and instances can be handled on the diocesan level with the Holy See apparently now content to retain only a (seldom exercised) power of veto.  The Pauline Privilege does not apply when either of the partners was a Christian at the time of marriage and differs from annulment because it dissolves a valid natural (but not sacramental) marriage whereas an annulment declares that a marriage was invalid from the beginning.  Regarding the often desired annulments, on paper, little changed in the modern age until 2015 when Pope Francis issued two motu proprio (literally “on his own impulse”; essentially the law-making mechanism available to absolute monarchs as the royal decree): Mitis iudex dominus Iesus (Reform to the Canons of the Code of Canon that pertain to the marriage nullity cases) and Mitis et misericors Iesus (Reform of the canons of the Code of Canons of Eastern Churches pertaining to cases regarding the nullity of marriage) which changed canon law, simplifying the annulment process.  Those who thought this a harbinger of something radical were however disappointed; it appears the pope’s intervention did little more than reflect the position taken in recent decades by so many bishops more anxious to retain bums on pews and coins in the plate than preserve unhappy marriages.  Shortly after the decrees were issued, better to help sinners consider their position, Cardinal Francesco Coccopalmerio, president of the Pontifical Council for Legislative Texts, issued a clarification, noting the Church “…does not decree the annulment of a legally valid marriage, but rather declares the nullity of a legally invalid marriage”.

Patent

Patent (pronounced pat-nt or peyt-nt)

(1) The exclusive right, granted by a government to an inventor (or owner of the invention) to manufacture, use or sell an invention for a certain length of time.

(2) An invention or process protected by an exclusive right to manufacture, use, or sell it.

(3) An official document conferring on the inventor the exclusive right to manufacture, use, or sell an invention; letters patent.

(4) Protected by an exclusive right given to an inventor to manufacture, use, or sell an invention; patented; the holding of an exclusive right to manufacture, use, or sell an invention.

(5) Relating to, concerned with, or dealing with the granting of exclusive rights to sell or manufacture something, especially inventions (ie the matter of “patent law” dealt with by a “patent attorney”.

(6) Of or pertaining to a right, privilege etc conferred by a patent.

(7) To take out a patent on; obtain the exclusive rights to (an invention, process, etc) by securing a patent.

(8) In US law, the instrument with which by which the federal government conveys a legal title in fee-simple (freehold) to public land.

(9) An ellipsis of patent leather (a varnished, high-gloss leather used in fashion for shoes, handbags, coats and such).

(10) As patent leather, a hide treated in a way which results in a very shiny surface.

(11) Of plate glass, ground and polished on both sides,

(12) In pharmaceuticals, (of a medication) sold without a prescription and usually protected by an exclusive legal right to manufacture (described often as “patent remedies” or “patent drugs”).

(13) In medicine, (of a duct or passage in the body) open or unobstructed.

(14) In medicine (including veterinary medicine) of an infection, in the phase when the organism causing it can be detected by clinical tests.

(15) In phonetics, open, in various degrees, to the passage of the breath stream.

(16) In metallurgy to heat a metal above a transformation temperature and then quench (cool) it in preparation for cold-drawing, wire pulling etc.

(17) In gambling, the combination of seven bets on three selections, offering a return even if only one bet comes in.

(18) In baking (of flour), fine, and consisting mostly of the inner part of the endosperm of the grain from which it is milled.

(19) In botany (and sometimes in horticulture and agriculture generally), expanded or spreading.

(20) Lying open; not enclosed or shut in (often as “a patent field” and applied also to open doorways, passages and such.

(21) Readily open to notice or observation; evident unconcealed, conspicuous, palpable, clear (usually in the phrase “patently obvious”).

(22) To originate and establish as one's own.

(23) A characteristic or quality that one possesses; in particular (hyperbolic) as if exclusively; a monopoly (often in the form “got a patent on”).

(24) An official document granting a right (the significance of the "patent" element in "letters patent" being it indicated the document was openly published an accessible to all (ie in the sense of the Latin patēns).

(25) Any right granted by such a document.

1250–1300: As an adjective, patent was from the Middle English patent, from the Latin patent-, stem of patēns (open, standing open), present participle of patēre (to stand open, lie open).  The Middle English noun patent (document granting an office, property, right, title, etc.; document granting permission, licence; papal indulgence, pardon) was either a clipping of “letters patent”, a translation of the Medieval Latin littera patēns or litterae patentēs (open letters) or was directly from the Anglo-Norman and Middle French patente (which endures in modern French as patent) or a clipping of the Anglo-Norman lettres patentes, Middle French lettres patentes, lettre patente and Old French patentes lettres (document granting an office, privilege, right, etc or making a decree).  The adjective patent (granting a right, privilege, or power) emerged late in the fourteenth century while the sense of “open to view, plain, clear” was in use by at least 1505 and use as an adverb dates from the mid fifteenth century.

The verb dates from the 1670s and was derived from the Middle English nouns patent & patente (wide open; clear, unobstructed; unlimited; of a document: available for public inspection), from the Anglo-Norman & Middle French patent and directly from their etymon the Latin patēns (open; accessible, passable; evident, manifest; exposed, vulnerable), the present active participle of pateō (to be open; to be accessible, attainable; to be exposed, vulnerable; of frontiers or land: to extent, increase), from the primitive Indo-European pete or peth- (to spread out; to fly).  The verb originally was used in the sense of “to obtain right to land" by securing letters patent” while the meaning “obtain a copyright to an invention” was in use by at least 1822, building on the earlier meaning (recorded in 1789) “obtain an exclusive right or monopoly” a privilege granted by the Crown by the issue of letters patent.  Patents issued thus (for a licence granted by a government covering a new and useful invention, conferring exclusive right to exploit the invention for a specified term of years) came into use in the 1580s.  Patent is a noun, verb & adjective, patenter, patentor, patentee, patentholder, patency, patentability, impatency, patency & prepatent are nouns, patented is a verb & adjective, patenting is a verb, patentable, antipatent, patentlike, patentfree, patentless & impatent are adjectives and patentably & patently are adverbs; the noun plural is patents.  The derived forms (nonpatentable, unpatentability, repatent etc) are used as required.

Alice Geek Teck^TM strapless bra.  The product was released with Geek Teck^TM still in its "Pat. pend" phase.

The Alice Geek Teck^TM strapless bra was released in 2015, its novelty being the use of “Patent-Pending Geek Teck^TM” panels which exploited the Van Der Waals forces (intermolecular electrostatic attractive forces) created by their silicone construction with microscopic hair-like structures known as setae (analogous to those found on the feet of geckos, famous for their ability to attach themselves (upside-down) to ceilings, using, if need be, only one foot.  The theory was the Geek Teck^TM panels would “stick to” the wearer’s skin thereby enhancing the most important design imperative of the strapless bra: staying up.  US patent 9,402,424 was assigned to Kellie K apparel LLC but it seems not to have succeeded which is unfortunate because there’s a gap in the market for a genuinely gravity-defying strapless bra.

The familiar term “patent pending” (often seen stamped on products in the abbreviated form “Pat. pend.”) is used to indicate a patent application has been filed but has not yet been granted.  The significance of the use is: (1) it can act to deters competitors, signalling to potential “copycats” that patent protection is expected to be granted, thus discouraging attempts at imitation, (2) it’s thought to lend credibility to a product, thus conferring a marketing advantage, (3) it can make a product more attractive to potential investors because a patent grants years of protection from competition and (4) the existence of the label can in subsequent infringement proceedings lead to a higher award of damages because it can be used as evidence the other party did not act “in good faith”.  However, the mere existence of a “Pat. Pend.” label does not provide legal protection and others may still (at their own risk) copy and sell the product, something of significance because patent applications can take months (or even years in complex or contested matters) to process and there have been cases where a company violating a subsequently granted patent has “come and gone” (taking with them their profits) by the time a patent is granted.  Importantly, a manufacturer cannot mark something as “Pat. Pend.” just to try to ward of potential competition and in most jurisdictions it’s unlawful to use the term if no application has been filed.  In legal slang, “patentees” and “patentspeak” are terms referring to the legal and technical jargon used in the handling of patents while “patentometrics” is the statistical analysis of patents.

In law, “patent troll” is an informal term used (usually disparagingly) to describe an individual or company which acquires and enforces patents in an aggressive and opportunistic manner, often with no intention of producing, marketing, or promoting the subjects of the patents.  The term is based on the similar concepts “trademark troll” and “copyright troll” and in more formal use a “patent troll” is usually styled a “patent assertion entity” or a “non-practicing entity”.  The seemingly curious business model (making money by neither producing or selling stuff to which one holds the exclusive patent) works usually through litigation or (more typically) the threat of litigation, exploiting the cost–benefit imbalance between contesting versus settling a lawsuit.  Sometimes speculatively but usually because potential targets have been identified, patent trolls will (1) buy older or unused patents from bankrupt companies, small inventors or concerns which have no further use for them or (2) file new patents that are broad or vague, something especially prevalent in highly technical fields where change is rapid (anything IT related the classic example) and specialists can amass hundreds or even thousands of patents, some unambiguously enforceable, some with enough of a hint of validity to be a creditable threat.  Thus equipped, patent trolls search for possible targets for litigation, the ideal victims being (1) companies so big they might settle a claim for what is (for them) a small sum (though most lucrative for the trolls who may have done little more than send a C&D (cease & desist letter)) or (2) smaller companies which cannot afford the cost of litigation (they might settle for less but it’s still a profit to the troll) because even if a case successfully is defended, the cost of doing so can, in the US, run to millions.

What that means is the troll’s business model has three potential revenue streams: (1) licensing fees, (2) one-off settlements and (3) court-awarded damages (in the rare instances in which a case goes to trial).  With no costs associated with R&D (research & development), product testing, production or marketing, a troll’s overheads are comparatively minimal and limited usually to legal and administrative fees.  Highly developed practitioners of trolling also use elaborate company structures made up of trusts, shelf companies and such, often in trans-national form, the jurisdictions chosen on the basis of which is most advantageous for a certain purpose (secrecy, taxation arrangements, limitations of liability etc); all these layers can protect a troll’s assets from counter-claims.  Patents are also “just another asset” and once assembled become a portfolio which can be leveraged as investment vehicles, something done often by the device of bundling them in securitized form, sometimes S&Ded (sliced & diced) for sale to investors, not as individual patents but as a percentage of the whole.

Some products become known as “patent something” because they gained their original uniqueness by virtue of patent protection.  In nautical use, a “patent log” is a mechanical device dragged from the stern of the vessel and used to indicate the craft’s speed through the water; most consist of a rotator (ie on the principle of a propeller) and reading unit, connected by a stiff line (usually covered with a flexible, protective skin).  Even in the age of electronic sensors, patent logs remain in use because they are simple, reliable, low maintenance units which require no external power source, the rotator spinning as it proceeds astern, the rotations of the connecting line registered by a wheel works and dial mounted to the vessel's rail.  The earliest versions of mechanical logs had the counting attached directly to the rotator, meaning the apparatus had to be hauled aboard to “take a reading” so the US innovation in the 1860s of a connecting line (spinning a la the mechanical speedometers which later would appear in automobiles) was an advance which made the thing a “real time” device.

An 1881 Patent Log by Thomas Walker, on display at the Smithsonian Natural History Museum.

For many reasons, to know a vessel’s true speed was an important part of seamanship and “log” element in the name came from the old way sailors determined speed.  Since the sixteenth century, the technique had been to attach knotted rope to a wooden log which was heaved overboard and, the knots being tied at regular intervals, the number of knots counted off over a short period indicating the speed.  From this came the standard unit of speed at sea being the “knot” (one knot being equal to one nautical mile per hour and few things annoy old salts more than the expression “knots per hour”).  The log method obviously was inexact because of the variables to which it was subject so the mechanical device was a great advance.  A company founded by Thomas Walker (1805-1873) as a nautical instrument maker based in Birmingham (in England about as far as one can get from the sea) received a patent for a mechanical log in 1878, sometime before one was granted by the US patent office although that application was submitted in 1877.

Lindsay Lohan during blonde phase in Lanvin patent leather coat, New York City, May 2007.

“Patent leather” describes a hide which has been coated with a process using a substance which produces a high-gloss finish, so shiny as to be described as “like a polished, glazed ceramic”.  In fashion, the attraction of patent leather is that despite the brittle appearance, it retains all the flexible qualities and durability of leather while being almost waterproof (although intrusion can of course be possible at the seams).  Most associated with shoes, boots, handbags and coats, the original patent leather seems exclusively to have been produced in black but a wide range of colors have long been available so the material quickly became a favourite of designers.  In the late 1700s when patent leather first became commercially available in England, the lacquer coating was linseed oil-based but what revolutionized things and made mass-production more viable was the invention by metallurgist Alexander Parkes (1813–1890) of Parkesine, the first man-made “plastic”; it was one of his dozens of patented inventions, thus the name “patent leather”.  It was Parkesine which enabled the development of multi-colored patent leathers and because the product literally is “leather with a synthetic coating”, it’s one of the natural products most easily emulated (in appearance) by a plastic alternative although the imitations never possessed the same qualities.  Interestingly, many of the various processes used early in the nineteenth century to patent leather were never patented.

The former Court of Star Chamber (1836), drawing by unknown artist.

There were also “patent theatres”.  In England letters patent were for years a standard device in the administration of censorship, something that attracted increased interest from governments as soon as the printing presses began to operate at scale.  The printing press was one of the great creations of civilization but their availability appalled priest and politician alike because the last thing they wanted was “the common people” being given ideas (which they knew quickly would become heresy and sedition).  Under Henry VIII (1491–1547; King of England (and Ireland after 1541) 1509-1547) proclamations against heretical and seditious publications soon appeared and in 1538 a statute was added declaring books must be licensed for printing by the Privy Council or other royal nominees.  What this did was create a flourishing black market for works produced by illegal presses and this battle between censorship and “underground” publications would for some 450 years characterize the way things were done in England.  One critical development came in 1557 when the Stationers' Company was granted a “charter of incorporation” which provided that only members of the company (or others holding a special patent) were allowed to print any work for sale in the kingdom.  In 1586, the ever imaginative Court of Star Chamber devised an ordinance which directed that no printing press might be set up in any place other than London (with the exception of one each for the university towns Oxford and Cambridge) and rigorously, the Star Chamber enforced this law with their usual zeal and although the court was in 1641 abolished by the Long Parliament, governments didn’t lose their fondness for censorship; under the Commonwealth restrictions were tightened with all “unofficial periodicals” (a move aimed at troublesome “newsletters, precursors to modern magazines and newspapers) banned and while the Rump Parliament of 1659 permitted “licensed newsbooks”, severely their issue was restricted.

During the Restoration period neither the government’s strategy or tactics much changed and material deemed libellous or offensive (values which cast a wide net) to the state or Church could see offenders fined, imprisoned pilloried or hanged (the last invoked if the offence was judged “high treason”).  By the eighteenth century things had somewhat been relaxed but Thomas Paine (1737-1809) was nevertheless compelled to flee to France when his book Rights of Man (1791) was declared “subversive” and a warrant issued for his arrest; even an article condemning the use of disciplinary flogging by the military could attract a fine of Stg£1,000 (then a small fortune) and two years in prison.  Being popular entertainment and accessible to even the illiterate, censorship of the theatre was important and the licensing of individual plays seems to have begun as early as the 1640s with an inspired piece of legislation in 1572 deeming all players (actors) “rogues and vagabonds” unless they belonged to (1) a baron of the realm, (2) somebody of higher rank or (3) were licensed by two justices.

Theatre Royal, Drury Lane, London, one of the original two "patent theatres".

Later, London’s theatrical companies worked under royal patents created by issue of the appropriate letters patent.  Curiously, governments, while much concerned with the preservation of political & ecclesiastical power, had rather neglected public morality but the Puritans were appalled by even the idea of the theatre.  Oliver Cromwell (1599–1658; Lord Protector of the Commonwealth 1653-1658) and his ilk thought the stage a place of immorality and in 1542 the Long Parliament prohibited all dramatic performances.  Inevitably, with theatres closed, an underground movement arose, the best documented of which were the Droll-Humours.  At or after the Restoration, letters patent were issued so companies could be formed and in 1662 these conferred on the recipients the exclusive right to present, in public, plays in public within the City of Westminster.  It proved a lucrative business and after the deaths of the original holders of the rights, lawyers began their squabble over to whom or what entity the letters patent should be conveyed; the disputes dragged on for some time before ultimately they were settled on the Covent Garden and Drury Lane theatres.  These enduring institutions thus came to be called the “patent theatres” and what the letters called “drama” was confined to the patent theatres.  However, nobody had bothered to define exactly what constituted “legitimate drama” and that remained a source of dispute among critics and lawyers, resolved only when the Theatres Act (1843) rendered the original letters patent inoperative.

Drawing of patent hammer, attached to Mr Richard’s application to the US Patent Office. the image is from the Trowel and Masonry Tool Collector Resource.

In stone-masonry, a “patent hammer” is a specialized hammer used by stonemasons for dressing stone, the head having two faces formed by a number (at least 2 but usually with 4, 6, 8, 10 or 12 “cuts” (blades) broad, thin chisels bolted side by side); the bolts could be loosened, allowing the blades to be removed to be re-sharpening or replaced.  The head of a patent hammer was heavy and the tool was used for finishing granite or the harder grades of sandstone and the choice of which to use was dictated by nature of the stone and the finish desired.  Historically, the most commonly used jaw opening was ⅞ inch but other graduations between ½ and one inch were widely produced and in the jargon of the trade, the number of cuts per nominal inch became the nominal description (eg an “8-cut finish”).  Essentially a time-saving device, use of a patent hammer allowed a stonemason to render a grooved surface more quickly and with more consistency than when using a single hand chisel.  The tools were in various places known also as the “patent bush hammer” “Scotia hammer” and “patent Scotia hammer” although, as a general principle, the Scotias usually were lighter and featured smaller jaw openings.  The tool gained its name from the patent granted in 1828 to Joseph Richards (1784-1848) of Braintree, Massachusetts and although the evidence suggests similar devices had for centuries been in use (presumably crated ad-hoc by stonemasons or tool-makers), this issue of the 1828 patent triggered an onrush of patent applications for stonemasonry tools and the US Patent Office (which classed them as “bush hammers” or “mill picks” to distinguish them from other hammers) soon had literally dozens of variants on the books.

In English law, letters patent and royal decrees (now more commonly styled as royal proclamations) are instruments with which the Crown exercises its prerogative powers, but they differ in form, purpose, and legal effect.  Letters patent are formal, written documents issued under the Great Seal, open for public inspection, declaring the monarch’s will in a matter of public record; they are addressed to all subjects, not to an individual or private recipient.  As an administrative device, letters patent are used to confirm rights, titles, offices, or privileges (including creating or conferring peerages or knighthoods) granting corporate charters (universities or city incorporations etc), issuing patents of invention or land grants and appointing public offices of state (governors, judges etc).  As legal devices, they operate as instruments of grant rather than command and unusually, take effect by virtue of being published, not by their delivery, registration or some form of gazetting.  Importantly, they can be subject to judicial challenge and voided if found to have been issued ultra vires (a legal maxim from the from Latin ultra vires (beyond the power) meaning (in this case) held to be beyond the monarch’s lawful prerogative) so although sounding something of an echo of the days of absolute power being exercised from the throne, they do operate within modern constitutional limits.

A royal proclamation is a command or declaration made by the monarch and issued over their signature but almost always drafted by the responsible ministers in government and published in the Gazette.  While a term like “royal proclamation” sounds like it might be used for commands like “off with their heads”, in modern use, typically, they’re invoked to announce or enforce policies, order, or regulations and that this is done under the royal prerogative is merely procedural.  So, while most are prosaic, (the regulation of this and that; announcing public holidays or public ceremonies etc), historically, royal proclamations have declared war and routinely still are the instrument summoning or dissolving parliament.  In the narrow technical sense the royal proclamation operates as an executive command rather than a grant but has a valid force of law only when issued under a lawful prerogative or statutory authority (since the Bill of Rights (1689), proclamations cannot create new offences or change existing law without the consent of both houses of parliament (as modified by the Parliament Acts (1911 & 1949)).

Mr Andrew Mountbatten Windsor (the former Prince Andrew, Duke of York) in the Garter robe he no longer dons (at least not when in public view).  Mr Mountbatten Windsor is the great grandson of King George V.

Because most are procedural, letters patent usually barely register in the public consciousness but, around the world, their use in late 2025 in the matter of Andrew Albert Christian Edward Mountbatten Windsor (b 1960) certainly made headlines.  Mr Mountbatten Windsor once was styled HRH (His Royal Highness) Prince Andrew, Duke of York, KG (Knight Companion of the Most Noble Order of the Garter), GCVO (Knight Grand Cross of the Royal Victorian Order) but the controversy about his alleged conduct with certain young women associated with the convicted child sex offender Jeffrey Epstein (1953–2019) meant that between 2022 and 2025, almost all his many titles gradually were (in one way or another) put into abeyance before his brother Charles III (b 1948; King of the United Kingdom since 2022) issued the letters patent effectively removing all.

Until that point, the gradual nibbling away of Mr Mountbatten Windsor’s array of titles had been an example of inept crisis management with him in 2022 ceasing to be a “HRH” in a “public capacity” but remaining one in his “private capacity”.  That didn’t mean he could use it only in his bedroom but meant it couldn’t be used were he to appear at any “official public event”.  While one being able to call oneself “HRH” only in private (presumably among consenting adults) might sound a bit of a slap on the royal wrist, it is possession of styles and titles which determine one’s place in the “order of precedence”, something of great significance to those who move in certain circles because where one sits on the pecking order determines things like who has to bow or curtsy to whom and whether at events one gets to sit somewhere nice with the dukes & earls or is shunted off into a corner with the provincial mayors and eldest sons of knights.  As a weapon, the removal of the “HRH” has been used against the Duchess of Windsor (Wallis Simpson; 1896–1986), Diana, Princess of Wales (1961-1997) and the Duchess of Sussex (Meghan Markle; b 1981).  Although Mr Mountbatten Windsor’s notorious television interview (approved by the palace courtiers against the advice of the media pros) seemed at the time the nadir of the crisis management of the “Andrew problem” (ranking with Boeing’s handing of the 737 Max’s “issues” and Intel’s attempt to “non-handle” the flaws in the original Pentium’s inbuilt math co-processor), the “drip feed” of the way his styles and titles gradually were eroded made things worse still.  As a footnote, the former Prince Andrew is now known as “Andrew Mountbatten Windsor” rather than “Andrew Windsor” because his father (Prince Philip, Duke of Edinburgh (1921–2021)) was upset his sons wouldn’t bear his name so the “Mountbatten” was added.

Revelations about his alleged conduct continued to emerge and in mid October, 2025, it was announced that following discussions with the king, he would cease to make use of the styles of address to which he was entitled as a duke and twice a knight of the realm (both knighthoods being in orders of chivalry in the personal gift of the sovereign (his mother) with no involvement by government).  That didn’t mean he ceased to be a duke (with subsidiary peerages) or the possessor of two knighthoods in orders of chivalry, just that he would no longer “use them”.  That meant for all public purposes he would revert to what he was by virtue of his birth: plain old “Prince Andrew”.  Had the revelations stopped there, the “fix” might have worked but as fresh accusations continued to appear, not only was the press making trouble but there were suggestions “the Andrew problem” might be discussed on the floor of the House of Commons where members enjoy what’s called “parliamentary privilege” (the right to make even defamatory statements without risk of legal action).  What appeared to be of particular interest to some politicians was Mr Mountbatten Windsor remaining eighth in the line of succession to the British throne (and thus the monarchies of Australia, the Bahamas, Belize, Canada and such).

Accordingly, on 30 October 2025, the palace announced the king would be removing all his brother's styles, titles, and honours.  While technically this does not revoke the peerages, it does mean they are no longer “effective” and thus not affecting the vital order of precedence.  On 3 November, the king issued letters patent stripping Andrew of both the style “HRH” and title “prince”.  That the king can do this by the mere inking of a sheet of vellum is because (1) letters patent are a powerful tool and (2) in 1917 George V (1865–1936; King of the United Kingdom & Emperor of India 1910-1936) effectively codified the monarch’s authority in such matters; no involvement by parliament being required.  In 1917 the UK was at war with the German Empire so anti-German sentiment was about and as well as changing the royal family’s name from the obviously Teutonic Saxe-Coburg-Gotha to Windsor, the opportunity was taken for an “agonizing reappraisal” of the domestic structure.

Letters Patent issued by George V, 30 November 1917.  When mention was made to the "Great Seal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland", the reference was literally to a big wax seal.

Thus, King George V issued letters patent restricting use of the titles “Prince” & “Princess” and the style “HRH” to certain close relatives of the monarch: (1) the children of the sovereign, (2) the male-line grandchildren of the sovereign (3) and the eldest living son of the eldest son of the Prince of Wales (ie the heir apparent’s eldest son).  Other descendants of the monarch would be styled as children of dukes (Lord or Lady).  In doing this George V wasn’t claiming or asserting a new royal prerogative (it had long been acknowledged) but his issue of the 1917 Letters Patent was the moment it was codified and assumed the force of a formal decree.  That’s why it’s misleading to say the UK doesn’t have a written constitution; it’s just all the bits and pieces don’t appear in one consolidated document al la the US, Australia or the old Soviet Union.  The words of the 1917 Letters Patent were:

“Whitehall, 30^th November, 1917.  The KING has been pleased by Letters Patent under the Great Seal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, bearing date the 30th day of November, 1917, to declare that the children of any Sovereign of these Realms and the children of the sons of any such Sovereign and the eldest living son of the eldest son of the Prince of Wales shall have and at all times hold and enjoy the style, title or attribute of Royal Highness with their titular dignity of Prince or Princess prefixed to their respective Christian names or with their other titles of honour; and that the grandchildren of the sons of any such Sovereign in the direct male line (save only the eldest living son of the eldest son of the Prince of Wales) shall have and enjoy in all occasions the style and title enjoyed by the children of Dukes of these Our Realms.

And forasmuch as it has become expedient that the usage whereby the style, title or attribute of Royal Highness and of Prince or Princess shall be borne by other descendants of Our said Grandfather of blessed memory shall cease, We do hereby further declare that the said styles, titles or attributes shall not henceforth be borne by such descendants of Our said Grandfather save those above mentioned.”

Legally, “Our said Grandfather” actually referred to Victoria (1819–1901; Queen of the UK 1837-1901) and what the proclamation did was revoke the practice from Victoria’s time where almost all male-line descendants of the monarch were styled as princes or princesses.  Some countries still operate on the Victorian basis and a particular example is Saudi Arabia, a nation where, under their interpretation of the Sharia, kings and princes may enjoy more than the four wives which is the accepted limit in most Islamic nations which permit polygyny.  The royal scions have thus proliferated and if one moves in certain exulted circles, apart from the odd waiter or hairdresser, it can be possible to go through life and never meet a Saudi who is not a prince or princess.  In Saudi, for many reasons, it would be difficult to change the system but in Demark there recently was a cull of princes and princesses (the titles that is) with those who didn’t make the cut reverting to being count and countess of this and that.  For almost a century the 1917 Letters Patent remained the convention followed but  on 31 December 2012, Elizabeth II (1926-2022; Queen of the UK and other places, 1952-2022) issued letters patent extending both HRH and Prince or Princess status to all the children of the eldest son of the Prince of Wales:

“Whitehall, 31^st December, 2012.  The QUEEN has been pleased by Letters Patent under the Great Seal of the Realm dated the 31st day of December 2012 to declare that all the children of the eldest son of The Prince of Wales should have and enjoy the style, title and attribute of Royal Highness with the titular dignity of Prince or Princess prefixed to their Christian names or with such other titles of honour.”

What that achieved was a bit of “title creep”.  Under the George V rule, only the eldest living son of the eldest son of the Prince of Wales would have been styled a prince; younger siblings would not have been princes or princesses but rather Lord or Lady Mountbatten-Windsor.  What Elizabeth II’s 2012 Letters Patent did was equalize things so all the children of the eldest son of the Prince of Wales would be both HRH and princes or princesses; it’s a thoughtful great-grandmother who thinks of a way to avoid sibling rivalry.  There have since been no further general amendments to the 1917 convention although the royal prerogative has been used to grant or remove titles individually, such the letters patent issued granting the titles prince & princess to the Duke of Sussex’s children.

Windsor Castle, September, 2025.

The UK government's state banquet in honor of the visiting Donald Trump (b 1946; US president 2017-2021 and since 2025), hosted in Windsor Castle in September 2025.  Where one sits on the UK's order of precedence will influence (1) whether one is invited and (2) whether one gets a "good" seat.  Among US presidents, Mr Trump's second state visit was unprecedented.

So, titles and styles are quite a thing in royal families because they operate as a pecking order atop a pecking order.  Despite the frequency with which the claim is made, the British royal family is not wholly averse to change and one change they would be welcome would be things going back to how they were done decades or centuries ago: In 1938, George VI (1895–1952; King of the United Kingdom 1936-1952), being driven through Surry in the company of a US journalist, gestured through the window towards Runnymede, telling his companion: “That’s where the troubles started”.  For the institution of the monarchy, there have since 1215 been many troubles, some quite serious but apart for a brief, aberrant, republican interlude, one royal household or another has remained in place, challenges dealt with as they’ve arisen.  For the royal family, the matter of “the Andrew problem” is not so much what he’s alleged to have done (which could have been handled with the odd wry smile and otherwise never spoken of) but the ghastliness of it becoming public knowledge among “the common people”.  The attraction of “fixing things” by the use of letters patent is it’s quick and (it’s hoped) will mean “the Andrew problem” doesn’t end up being discussed in the House of Commons.  That would be bad enough but once such things start they can get out of hand and if one matter about the royal family is being discussed in parliament, there’s no guarantee it wouldn’t lead to other aspects being questioned.  There are many things about the royal family and their place in the UK’s constitutional apparatus which they’d prefer not be discussed and certainly not in the House of Commons.  As a tactic, the letters patent may well keep the commoners in the Commons at bay but Mr Mountbatten Windsor’s life may yet get worse because various institutions in the US are interested in questioning him in relation to alleged offences committed on US soil and an extradition request is not impossible.