Hegemony

Hegemony (pronounced hi-jem-uh-nee or hej-uh-moh-nee)

(1) Leadership or predominant influence exercised by one nation over others, as in a confederation.

(2) Aggression or expansionism by large nations in an effort to achieve world domination (especially among smaller nations).

(3) As cultural hegemony, ascendancy or domination of one (class, ethnic, linguistic etc) group over others.

1560–1570: From the Ancient Greek ἡγεμονία (hēgemonía) (leadership, authority, supremacy), the construct being ἡγεμών (hēgemon-) (stem of hēgemṓn) (leader) + -ia (the suffix forming abstract nouns of feminine gender, from the New Latin, from the Classical Latin -ia and the Ancient Greek -ία (-ía) & -εια (-eia)); the rarer form was ἡγέομαι (hēgeisthai) (to lead).  The root of hēgeisthai is unknown but a link has been suggested to "to track down," from the primitive Indo-European sag-eyo- from the root sag- (to seek out, track down, trace).  The forms antihegemonic & counterhegemonic were creations in political science to describe the tactics and strategies adopted to oppose a hegemon.  Hegemony, hegemon, hegemonization & hegemonist are nouns, hegemonized, hegemonizing & hegemonize are verbs, hegemonic is an adjective and hegemonically is an adverb; the noun plural is hegemonies.

The noun hegemonism dates from 1965 and refers to a policy of political domination, based to some extent on the model of imperialism.  The noun hegemonist was first used in 1898 in a discussion of the particular role of Prussia in the German (con)federation (the joke of the time being that while there were many states with an army, Prussia was an army with a state).  The noun hegemon had been used a year earlier, describing the unique position of Great Britain in the world as a maritime power with a far-flung world-wide empire, quite distinct historically from the models of the previous two millennia which had tended to be continental or at least contiguous.  The adjective hegemonic had emerged as early as the 1650s and was older still, noted in oral use in the 1610s.

Gramsci's legacy

Hegemons at lunch.

Mean Girls (2004) has been analysed as a series of case-studies deconstructing the ways an individual or group can asset a cultural hegemony but it's also been subject to the critique that as a piece of cinema, it's emblematic of the way the industry reinforces white supremacy and white privilege.  The original sense of hegemony, dating from the 1560s, was in reference to the predominance of one city state over another in Ancient Greece and was used also to mean the literal authority or sovereignty of one city-state over a number of others, as Athens in Attica or Thebes in Boeotia and generally to the Hellenic League (338 BC), a federation of Greek city–states created by Philip II of Macedon (382–336 BC; king (basileus) of Macedonia 359-336) to facilitate his access to and use of Greek armies against the Persian empire.  It was first used in a modern sense in geo-politics during the 1850s to describe the position of Prussia in relation to other German states and came to be applied, sometime misleadingly, to the European colonialism imposed upon the Americas, Africa, Asia, and Australasia.  In the twentieth century, political scientists (not only those from the left although the idea was most developed by neo-Marxists) extended the denotation of hegemony to include cultural imperialism, the domination, by a ruling class (or culture), in a socially stratified society.  The core of the theory was that by manipulating cultural values and mores, thereby constructing a dominant ideology, the ruling class intellectually can dominate the other classes by imposing a worldview (Weltanschauung) that, ideologically and structurally, justifies the social, political, and economic status quo to the point where it’s viewed as normal, inevitable and perpetual, with no possible alternative.

Antonio Gramsci

It was Italian politician and Marxist philosopher Antonio Gramsci’s (1891–1937) discussions in the 1920s of the nature of hegemony which provided the framework upon which others built their theories.  Gramsci was interested in the survival, indeed the flourishing of the capitalist state in the most advanced Western countries, despite the social and economic convulsions which earlier theorists had suggested should have threatened the system’s survival.  Gramsci understood the supremacy of a class and that the reproduction of its associated mode of production could be obtained by brute domination or coercion but his key observation was that in advanced capitalist societies, the perpetuation of class rule was achieved largely through consensual means.  A hegemonic class is thus one able to attain the consent of other social forces, and the retention of this consent is an ongoing project.  His work continues to underpin most critical analysis of apparently disparate systems such as The People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the US, systems in which tiny ruling classes (the Communist Party (CCP) in the former and the (somewhat misleadingly named) one percent in the latter), maintain and enhance a system entirely in their own interest with support from the masses ranging mostly from resigned acquiescence to actual enthusiasm.  In the CCP, this manifests as most of the population supporting the suppression of their political rights; in the US, they’re convinced to act against their own economic interests.  Under capitalism (ie the system used by both PRC and the US), Gramsci observed the relentless contribution of the institutions of civil society to the shaping of mass cognitions.

Gramsci wasn’t a theorist only of structures but was interested also in revolutionary strategy.  He noted the acquisition of consent prior to gaining power as an obvious implication but this he refined by offering a distinction a war of manoeuvre (the full frontal assault on the bourgeois state) and one of position (engagement with and subversion of the mechanisms of bourgeois ideological domination).  Others were taken with the concept, notably German-American political theorist Herbert Marcuse (1898–1979) of the Frankfurt School of critical theory and German Marxist sociologist Rudi Dutschke (1940–1979), best remembered for the idea, inspired by Gramsci, of a “long march through the institutions”.  The strategy was inspired, the tactics flawed.  The institutions through which the revolutionaries were allowed (some say encouraged) to march turned out to be art galleries, theatre trusts and other structures on the margins.  The institutions which controlled the economy and the security of the state remained under the control of the hegemon.

Occidental & Oriental

Occidental (pronounced ok-si-den-tl)

(1) Of, relating to, or characteristic of the Occident or its natives and inhabitants (usually initial capital letter).

(2) A literary or formal word for Western.

(3) A native or inhabitant of the Occident (usually initial capital letter).

(4) An artificial language, created by Baltic German mathematician Edgar de Wahl (1867-1948), later renamed Interlingue shortly before the publication of Interlingua (1949) (always initial capital).

1350–1400: A Middle English borrowing from the Old French occidental from the Latin occidentālis (western), the construct being occident- + -ālis.  The Latin occidentalis was from occidēns (west), the present active participle of occidō (I fall down; pass away).  Occidental is a noun & adjective, occidentalism, occident & occidentalist are nouns and occidentally is an adverb; the noun plural is occidentals.

Oriental (pronounced awr-ee-en-tl or ohr‐ee-en-tl)

(1) Of, relating to, or characteristic of the Orient, or East; Eastern (usually initial capital letter).

(2) Of the orient, or the eastern region of the world.

(3) In geography, belonging to a geographical division comprising southern Asia and the Malay Archipelago as far as and including the Philippines, Borneo, and Java (initial capital letter).  (In pre-modern geography, pertaining to the regions east of the Mediterranean, beyond the Roman Empire or the early Christian world).  Oriental is a noun & adjective, orientalism, orient & orientalist are nouns and orientally is an adverb; the noun plural is orientals (often correctly used with initial capital).

(4) In jewelry, designating various gems that are varieties of corundum: Oriental aquamarine; Oriental ruby (usually initial capital letter).

(5) Designating certain natural saltwater pearls found especially in Asia.

(6) Of a pearl or other precious stone: having a superior lustre.

(7) A breed of slender muscular cat with large ears, long legs, and a long tail.

(8) A native or inhabitant of the Orient (usually initial capital letter).

(9) In astronomy and astrology), pertaining to the eastern part of the sky; happening before sunrise.

(10) Designating various types of aromatic tobacco grown in Turkey and the Balkans (post-nineteenth century use).

(11) A lily cultivar of a widely varied group, with strong scent.

(12) In any context, eastern or of the eastern part (obsolete except as a literary or poetic device).

1350–1400: Middle English from the Middle French $ Anglo-Latin oriental from the Latin orientālis (eastern), from oriēns (rising (of the sun)), present active participle of orior (I rise), the construct being orient- (east, the east) –ālis.  The suffix –ālis was added to a noun or numeral to form an adjective of relationship; it was from the primitive Indo-European -li-, which later dissimilated into an early version of –aris, perhaps connected to hzel- (to grow).  The neuter form was –āle.

Edward Said

Controversial even in the post-colonial milieu of the time, Edward Said’s (1935-2003) Orientalism (1979) was a critique of a particular construct of the historic Western treatment of things eastern.  It dealt with not only academic orientalists but also seminal figures of western social science such as Karl Marx (1818-1883) and Max Weber (1864-1920) whose writings emphasized fundamental differences between East and West.  It’s regarded still, by some, as a dangerous book, blamed for the schism in the field of modern Middle Eastern studies which coalesced into the polarized factions of the Middle East Studies Association (MESA) and its newer rival, the Association for the Study of the Middle East and Africa (ASMEA).  The stylistic patchwork Said adopted perhaps made criticism inevitable.  Within a scholarly framework, the author laid bare his outage at the reductionist objectification of the Western tradition in its treatment of the other, his words construed as political and polemic.

Even the book's covers attracted comment and varied according to the market in which it was sold although, unlike some controversial titles, it was apparently never necessary anywhere to offer it in a plain, brown wrapper. 

Detractors and admirers alike all were aware of the significance of Orientalism and it’s regarded still as “one of the most influential scholarly books published in English in the last half-century”, even by some who documented its flaws.  The book was one of those rare texts in historiography which stirred up a stormy debate in and beyond academia, the idea of authors in the West having a skewed and condescending view towards the East finding a sympathetic audience.  So incendiary was the reaction that not only was the book controversial but so was the nature of the reaction although, despite the claims of some, the pattern of the responses appeared not to align with the ethnicity or religious orientation of the scholars and intellectuals but with their attitude to history and the modern and post-modern philosophical ideas (deconstruction, truth as illusion, intellectual hegemony etc).

In a sense, it was Said himself who created the structure for the criticism which would follow because he defined Orientalism in three ways: (1) the academic profession, (2) the world view and (3) a mode of hegemony.  The first was the most readily understood, an academic Orientalist was anyone who teaches, writes about, or researches the Orient, whether they be an anthropologist, sociologist, historian, philologist or literary critic.  That did not imply the world view of Orientalists was monolithic but Said did contend that their views were almost invariably dictated by a style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made between the “the Orient” and “the Occident” (ie between Eastern & Western culture) and this applied also to poets, novelists, philosophers, political theorists and economists, their position a direct inheritance from the ideas spread by European imperial administrators, travellers and explorers; whether in simple or elaborate form, the theorists, novelists and poets all worked within the same framework of “difference”.  Finally, Said defined Orientalism by the actual political and colonial relations constructed in “the West” epistemologically, based on the earlier definitions; it was this construct with which the West conducted itself with the Orient.  Perhaps predictably, the academics appeared more upset at what they perceived as Said’s attack on the accuracy of their research and their intellectual impartiality than what was done with what he claim they created, even if unknowingly. 

One concept he introduced was the notion of “the distinction between the latent and manifest orientalism”, the latent being a general unconscious certainty the Orient was the way it has been described by the practitioners while the manifest was the supremacy of American imperialism as practiced since in the post-war years they assumed the hegemony in things east of Suez from the British and French: “The distinction I am making is really between an almost unconscious (and certainly an untouchable) positivity, which I shall call latent Orientalism, and the various stated views about Oriental society, languages, literatures, history, sociology, and so forth, which I shall call manifest Orientalism”.  The idea of the latent and manifest wasn’t wholly new but was one which later would be picked up and developed in critical race theory (CRT).

An occidental in the orient: Long-time resident Lindsay Lohan creating a photo opportunity with the Dubai Police, thanking them and the government of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) for their ongoing support during the Covid-19 pandemic, Dubai, April 2020.

That the critics found faults in both Said’s historiography and theoretical inconsistencies in his framework clearly pleased them but appeared to do little to affect the impact of Orientalism, something probably at least partly attributable to his deconstruction of the Western filter through which things eastern were viewed being built with the tools provided by some of the cult favourites in late twentieth century Western philosophy: Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900) (representation and the thing-in-itself), Michel Foucault (1926–1984) (discourse, power, knowledge, episteme and truth regimes), Antonio Gramsci (1891–1937) (cultural hegemony) and Jacques Derrida (1930-2004) (deconstruction).  Said was a subtle thinker but to try to synthesize something from applying the thoughts of that lot would of necessity need some intellectual brutishness just to make it fit and it’s not surprising there were those who faulted him for occupying “…theoretical positions which are mutually contradictory”.  Still, if anything the effect of that was stimulative and Orientalism was one of those books which people read and found it confirmed their own views about the West or the West’s critics.  It’s doubtful Orientalism changed many minds and there were flaws which the critics were right to identify but regardless of how ultimately it will be remembered as an academic text, it remains a literary classic.

Surplus

Surplus (pronounced sur-pluhs)

(1) Something that remains above what is used or needed.

(2) In agricultural economics, produce or a quantity of food grown by a nation or area in excess of its needs, especially such a quantity of food purchased and stored by a governmental program of guaranteeing farmers a specific price for certain crops.

(3) In accounting, the excess of assets over liabilities accumulated throughout the existence of a business, excepting assets against which stock certificates have been issued; excess of net worth over capital-stock value.

(4) In public finance, an excess of government revenues over expenditures during a certain financial year.

(5) In international trade, an excess of receipts over payments on the balance of payments.

(6) In economic theory, an unsold quantity of a good resulting from a lack of equilibrium in a market.  For example, if a price is artificially high, sellers will bring more goods to the market than buyers will be willing to buy.  In classical economics, the opposite of shortage.

(7) In Chancery law (and its successor courts), the remainder of a fund appropriated for a particular purpose.

1325–1375: From the Middle English surplus, from the Old French sorplus (remainder, extra), from the Medieval Latin superplūs (excess, surplus), the construct being super (over) + plūs (more).  The Italian surplus was a borrowing from modern French where surplus had existed since the twelfth century while in English, surplus has been used as an adjective since the fourteenth century.  Enjoying the same pronunciation, surplice and surplus are often confused.  A surplice is a liturgical vestment of the Christian Church, usually styled as a tunic of white linen or cotton material, with wide sleeves and often some lace embellishment or embroidered edges.  Lengths vary; in medieval times it reached almost to the ground but tends now to be shorter; some still retain the longer garments for the ceremonial.  As surplis, it was a thirteenth century Middle-English borrowing from the Anglo-French surpliz, a syncopated variant of Old French surpeliz, derived from the Medieval Latin superpellīcium (vestīmentum) over-pelt (garment), neuter of superpellīcius, the construct being super (over) + pellīt(us) (clothed with skins or fur) + -ius (the adjectival suffix).  A clerical surplice is thus a kind of frock; a clerical surplus means "too many priests".  Surplus is a noun, adjective & verb, surplusage is a noun and surplused & surplussing are verbs; the noun plural is surpluses or surplusses.

Surplus Repression

German-American Herbert Marcuse (1898–1979), a sociologist and philosopher, highly influential in the mid-late twentieth century.  Even today, Marcuse enjoys a cult following and remains a hate-figure for those on the right who trace the ills of Western civilization to the corrosive influence Marxist & neo-Marxists exerted on youth in the newly expanded universities in the 1960s & 1970s.

A critique of capitalism’s culture and economic arrangements, Marcuse's book Eros and Civilization (1955) drew, inter alia, from Karl Marx (1818-1883) and Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) and described an alternative structure for society.  He didn’t reject Freud’s idea that repression of man's instinctive desires was necessary for civilization to endure but Marcuse distinguished between basic (or necessary) repression and surplus repression, detailing the differences between the biological vicissitudes of the instincts and the socially imposed.  His construct was that basic repression was that which man suppresses to permit peaceful societies to form; repression or modification of the instincts being necessary “…for the perpetuation of the human race in civilization.”  Surplus repression meant those “…restrictions necessitated by [the] social domination” of the particular ruling-class or hegemony.  The purpose of surplus repression was to shape the instincts of individuals to conform to the requirements of modern capitalism, a surrender to what Marcuse called the “performance principle”, a construct building on Marx’s theories of alienation and surplus value.

Lindsay Lohan and her lawyer in court, Los Angeles, 2011.

Marcuse's writing did have the attraction of being more accessible than that of Marx or Freud (and certainly that of many neo-Marxists or Freudians) but that also meant it was easier for critics to cherry pick the points they found most objectionable.  For an explanation of why society need to be organized the way it was, conservatives seemed to prefer the rationalization of the "harsh but deliciously clever" English philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) best known for his book Leviathan (1651) in which appeared the memorable passage describing the life of man in a world where there existed no restraining authorities forcing people to repress their worst instincts:

In such condition, there is no place for industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious building; no instruments of moving, and removing, such things as require much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; no arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.

Such a culture Hobbes called the "state of nature" by which he meant not an environmentally sustainable hippie commune but a place in which there was "bellum omnium contra omnes" (war of all against all) and murder went unpunished except by another murder.  Although the distinction is now an unfashionable one to draw, conservatives liked the way Hobbes seemed to know not all cultures were civilizations and that a little surplus repression was a small price to pay for for its benefits.  Hobbes lived through troubled times and his views on the importance of stable, strong governance should be understood as the writings of one who had seen what the alternative looks like but as a list of exculpatory bullet-points, his world view was one which could be ticked off by by the ayatollahs in Tehran or the CCP (Chinese Communist Party).  Marcuse is not so transportable.

Peace man: PotM (Playmate of the Month) Debbie Ellison (b 1949) on the cover of Playboy magazine, September 1970.  That year's PotY (Playmate of the Year) was Sharon Clark (b 1943).  With due respect to Ms Ellison, sometimes, it really may have been bought for the articles: Michael G Horowitz's profile of Marcuse was published in this edition.  The old curmudgeon of the left wouldn’t have had much sympathy for hippies and their piece sign because neither appeared to be doing much to bring on the revolution and was anyway once heard to remark: “Ach, women!  Useless in a revolutionary situation!”

Playboy titled the profile Portrait of the Marxist as an Old Trooper although the author (one of the philosopher's old students) preferred to call the piece a "personality snapshot" and it certainly had a different flavor than what would have been found in the activist press or journals of political science.  Years later, the author would concede some of his critique of Marcuse's work was misplaced and many of the old pessimist's predictions had (unfortunately) transpired.  That said, Marcuse seems never to have complained about the piece, unlike Albert Speer (1905–1981; Nazi court architect 1934-1942; Nazi minister of armaments and war production 1942-1945) whose interview by Eric Norden, conducted over an apparently convivial ten days in the “richly furnished living room of his spacious home” in Heidelberg, was published in Playboy’s June 1971 edition.  Speer would later complain the piece had been “…restructured, with words and formulations entirely foreign to me.”  He did however conclude “…on the whole the interview as printed corresponds with my opinions…” by which he meant Nordon was yet another to accept an recycle his core position: “If I didn't see it [the Holocaust], then it was because I didn't want to see it.”  That was the so-called “Billigung defense” which Speer since 1945 had, in a masterful manner, used simultaneously to accept a collective guilt yet absolve himself of individuality responsibility.  Others no more guilty but less cunning had been hanged at Nuremberg and the Playboy interview was printed years before material was discovered in the German federal archives documenting his part in the persecution of Jews and the unearthing of private correspondence in which he admitted knowledge of the holocaust and its awful, chilling rationale.  As one of his biographers, Gitta Sereny (1921–2012), rightly pointed out in Albert Speer: His Battle with Truth (1995): “If Speer had said as much in Nuremberg, he would have been hanged.”

Marcuse’s work was acknowledged as a landmark in the synthetization of Marxist and psychoanalytic theories but was criticized for being just another of the "pointless utopian myths" written of since antiquity, work cut adrift from the moorings of the political reality which seemed in the 1960s more urgently to demand attention.  Marcuse acknowledged the distance of his work from reality and conceded his theories could reach actualization only by revolution or gradual infiltration of the structures of the power-elite and, after the disappointments of the moments in 1968 when revolution fleetingly was in the air, he preferred the latter.  German student activist Rudi Dutschke (1940–1979) had advocated a "…march through the institutions of power", radically to change society from within government and cultural institutions by becoming part of the machinery and structures under which capitalism operated.  This too owed a debt to the theories of hegemony and Marcuse wrote to Dutschke in 1971 saying he “regarded your notion of the "march through the institutions" as the only effective way.”  It all failed.  It was the highly unusual coincidence of political, economic & demographic circumstances in the post war (1948-1973) Western world which briefly in 1968 made the system seem internally vulnerable and the hegemony learned the lesson: they would control who manned the institutions that matter and the trouble-makers could march through things like theatre trusts, literary festivals and art gallery committees.

Inculcate

Inculcate (pronounced in-kuhl-keyt)

(1) To implant ideas, opinions or concepts in others, usually by forceful or insistent repetition or admonition; persistently to teach.

(2) To cause or influence others to accept an idea or feeling; to induce understanding or a particular sentiment in a person or persons.

1540s: From the Latin inculcātus past participle of inculcāre (to trample, impress, stuff in, force upon) and perfect passive participle of inculcō (impress upon, force upon).  The construct of inculcāre was in- + calcāre (to trample), from calcō (to tread upon), from calx (heel).  The Latin prefix in- was from the Proto-Italic en-, from the primitive Indo-European n̥- (not), the zero-grade form of the negative particle ne (not) and was akin to ne-, nē & nī.  In Modern English it is from the Middle English in-, from Old English in- (in, into), from the Proto-Germanic in, from the primitive Indo-European en.  The meanings in English upon adoption in the mid-sixteenth century (act of impressing upon the mind by repeated admonitions; forcible or persistent teaching) are agreed but some etymologists note the source of the noun inculcation might have been different, coming directly from the Late Latin inculcationem (nominative inculcatio), the noun of action from past-participle stem of inculcāre.  Inculcate is a verb, inculcation & inculcator are nouns, inculcates, inculcating, & inculcated are verbs and inculcative & inculcatory are adjectives; the most common noun plural is inculcations.

Inculcation and inculcators

The word inculcate sits on the spectrum of descriptors of the process by which an individual or institution can attempt impose a doctrine, belief or construct of reality on others, the range extending from suggestion & persuasion to instill, ingrain, propaganda, inculcation & brainwashing.  It thus belongs in the class called loaded words (those which, usually for historic or associative reasons, have come to possess implications “loading” the meaning beyond the technical definition.  For most purposes, those who wish to apply the process of inculcation for some purpose usually cloak their intent with other words; "inspire" often appears in vapid corporate mission-statements but is tainted by its association with advertising and a better choice is the less obviously manipulative "instil".

Professor Noam Chomsky.

The classic examples of inculcation are the totalitarian regimes of the twentieth century which existed as political entities during the brief few decades when states could (1) control the mass distribution of ideas and information while (2) simultaneously restricting and dissemination of alternatives.  Such states still exist but technological changes have rendered their attempts less effective.  Political and linguistic theorists have developed constructs describing the way by which, even in nominally non-totalitarian states, corporate and political interests can inculcate collective values and opinions.  One celebrated discussion of the process is in Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media (1988) by Noam Chomsky (b 1928; Laureate Professor of Linguistics at the University of Arizona & Institute Professor Emeritus at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)) and US economist Edward S Herman (1925-2017).

The phrase "the manufacture of consent" had appeared in the book Public Opinion, published in 1922 by US journalist Walter Lippmann (1889–1974), a work which explored the interaction between the mass of the public and the techniques of inculcation used by government (and others) to shape collective opinion and expectation.  Public Opinion remains text useful for its analysis and the structural models presented although now few would (at least publicly) agree with his elitist solutions to the problems identified.  Like Chomsky & Herman’s Manufacturing Consent, it is a helpful reminder that inculcation is a set of techniques not restricted to the totalitarian regimes with which it tends most to be associated.  The message may differ but a hegemony will always attempt to ensure the world view essential to their survival is the one which prevails, the notion of “consent” so important because as British colonial official Thomas Pownall (1722-1805; Governor of the Province of Massachusetts Bay 1757-1760) repeatedly warned his uncomprehending government during the rumblings which would lead to the American Declaration of Independence: “You may exert power over, but you can never govern an unwilling people.”.  That is something understood, whether by a president in the Oval Office, an ayatollah in his chamber or the führer in his bunker although some accept that if they can’t be governed, they can be suppressed and, as long as the resource allocation remains possible, that can for decades work.

Inculcation begins at school.

The best documented case study in inculcation on a population-wide scale remains that undertaken by the Nazi State (1933-1945) in Germany and many memoirs of era record the way Adolf Hitler (1889-1945; Führer (leader) and German head of government 1933-1945 & head of state 1934-1945) would acknowledge what he’d learned of this from the Roman Catholic Church, even at times admitting it was inevitable the two-thousand year old institution (and their many schools) would still be flourishing in Germany long after he had departed the Earth.  He also understood how critical it was the process began young because it was in school he had been inculcated with the framework on which later he would build his awful intellectual structures.  Social Historian Richard Grunberger (1924-2005) in A Social History of the Third Reich (1971) reported that although Hitler had scant regard for most of his school teachers, he had high regard for his history master, Leopold Pötsch (or Poetsch) (1853–1942), a rabid German Nationalist (like many who lived in Upper Austria).  From Dr Poetsch the future Führer imbibed the heady cocktail of a romanticized tale of Germany from Charlemagne (748–814; (retrospectively) the first Holy Roman Emperor 800-814) to Otto von Bismarck (1815-1989; Chancellor of the German Empire 1871-1890).

In Mein Kampf (My Struggle, 1925), Hitler would write that his favorite teacher: “...used our budding nationalistic fanaticism as a means of educating us, frequently appealing to our sense of national honor. By this alone he was able to discipline us little ruffians more easily than would have been possible by any other means. This teacher made history my favorite subject. And indeed, though he had no such intention, it was then that I became a little revolutionary. For who could have studied German history under such a teacher without becoming an enemy of the state which, through its ruling house, exerted so disastrous an influence on the destinies of the nation? And who could retain his loyalty to a dynasty which in past and present betrayed the needs of the German people again and again for shameless private advantage?”  Upon assuming power in 1933, Hitler almost immediately deployed the education system for the purpose of inculcating the youth with Nazi ideology, the institution ideal for the purpose because it was hierarchical and didactic.  Education in “racial awareness” (the core Nazi tenant) was based on the notion of “racial duty to the national community”, that there were “worthy & unworthy" races” and while it’s misleading to suggest there’s a lineal (and certainly not a planned) path to the Holocaust, the connection must be noted.  If the entire Nazi project of inculcation can be reduced to just two themes, it’s (1) the sense of race struggle and (2) the readiness for the coming war.

Void

Void (pronounced void)

(1) In law, having no legal force or effect; not legally binding or enforceable.

(2) Useless; ineffectual; vain; devoid; destitute (usually followed by of).

(3) Without contents; empty.

(4) Without an incumbent, as an office.

(5) In mathematics, of a set: empty.

(6) In card games, having no cards in a suit.

(7) An empty space or one with a sense of emptiness.

(8) Something experienced as a loss or privation:

(9) A gap or opening, as in a wall.

(10) A vacancy; vacuum.

(11) In typography, inside area of a character of type, such as the inside of an O.

(12) To make ineffectual; invalidate; nullify.

(13) To empty; discharge; evacuate.

(14) To depart from; to vacate (archaic).

(15) In computer programming, a function or method that does not return a value.

(16) In architecture, a differentiated treatment of space.

1250–1300: The adjectival form was from the Middle English voide & voyde, from the Anglo-French & Old French voide, voit, vuide, & vuit (source also of the Modern French vide), from the unattested Vulgar Latin vocīta & vocita, feminine of vocītus & vocitus, an unattested and dissimilated variant of the Latin vacīvus, vacuus & vocīvus, (empty) from vacāre (to be empty).  The verb was from the Middle English voiden, from the Anglo-French voider, from the Old French, from the unattested Vulgar Latin vocitāre, derivative of the unattested vocītus & vocitus, noun derivative of the adjective.  Root was the primitive Indo-European wak-, an extended form of the root eue- (to leave, abandon, give out).

Void circa 1300 was first a verb (to clear some place of something) with the meaning "to deprive (something) of legal validity" attested from the early fourteenth century.  The adjectival sense evolved in parallel with the verb, again circa 1300, the meaning "unoccupied, vacant" soon extending to "empty, vast, wide, hollow, waste, uncultivated, fallow" and as a noun, "opening, hole; loss".  The meaning "lacking or wanting (something)” is recorded from the early 1400s while "legally invalid, without legal efficacy" is attested from the mid fifteenth century.  The adjective voidable is from the late fifteenth century 15c; the sense of an "unfilled space, gap" dates from the 1610s and the meaning "absolute empty space, vacuum" is from 1727.  Voider and voidness are both derived nouns.

In diplomacy

In fourteenth century Europe, French was the most widely-spoken language and in 1539, the court of Francis I (1494–1547; King of France 1515-1547) declared French to be the official language of government.  It was in this era that diplomacy began to assume a recognizably modern form with an increasingly consistent use of titles, conventions and institutions.  From this position of cultural hegemony, French emerged as the language of diplomacy, a position enhanced as the European colonial empires expanded.  It wouldn’t be until well into the twentieth century, under mostly US influence, that English began first to run in parallel as a language of diplomacy and later to assume primacy, English and French being the first two official languages of the United Nations (UN).  However, the linguistic legacy endures in the handbooks of diplomacy which include the standardized titles and phrases of the profession.  One phrase still used is that when one diplomat refuses to accept a message from another, returning the envelope to the sender marked nul et non avenue (literally “null and void”), creating the diplomatic fiction the envelope was unopened and the message thus unread, thereby relieving both parties of the need to pursue the unpleasantness.

In architecture

Once reduced, in architecture there’s only form and space but it’s helpful to imagine some space as part of the form so there’s thus form, space and void, void being a space defined by the form and theorists layer this further by distinguishing between voids cognitive and functional.  Cognitive voids are those created for emotional and perceptional impact, a kind of (usually static) visual effect whereas functional voids fulfil a technical requirement, typically ventilation or the movement of people.  Theorists tend to classify cognitive voids in the language of art: conceptual, perceptual, or sculptural while the functional are grouped by traditional terms from architecture: as entrance, courtyard, circulation etc.  In the analysis of the theorists, cognitive voids exist either as transparent or permeable spaces, the former most used to create perceptual effects, the latter for the visual.

Functional void: Grand Central Terminal (the official abbreviation is GCT although the popular form is "Grand Central Station" (often clipped to "Grand Central")), Midtown Manhattan, New York City, 1929.

Unfortunately, the clerestories which once shone no longer shine.  Because of more recent development in the surrounding space, the sunlight no longer enters the CCT's void through the clerestoried windows is such an eye-catching way (left).  In modern skyscrapers, light-shafts or atriums can extend hundreds of feet to ensure what sunlight is available can be captured; there's now often little at ground level.  When the a scene from the Lindsay Lohan film Just my Luck (2006) (right) was shot in the GCT, it was in a dimmer ambiance.  

Dixiecrat

Dixiecrat (pronounced dik-see-krat)

(1) In US political history, a member of a faction of southern Democrats stressing states' rights and opposed to the civil rights programs of the Democratic Party, especially a southern Democrat who left the party in 1948 to support candidates of the States' Rights Democratic Party.

(2) In historic US use, a member of the US Democratic Party from the southern states (especially one of the former territories of the Confederacy), holding socially conservative views, supporting racial segregation and the continued entrenchment of a white hegemony.

1948: A portmanteau word of US origin, the construct being Dixie + (Demo)crat.  Wholly unrelated to other meanings, Dixie (also as Dixieland) in this context is a reference to the southern states of the United States, especially those formerly part of the Confederacy.  The origin is contested, the most supported theory being it’s derived from the Mason-Dixon Line, a historic (if not entirely accurate) delineation between the "free" North and "slave-owning" South.  Another idea is it was picked up from any of several songs with this name, especially the minstrel song Dixie (1859) by (northerner) Daniel Decatur Emmett (1815-1904), popular as a Confederate war song although most etymologists hold this confuses cause and effect, the word long pre-dating any of the known compositions.  There’s also a suggested link to the nineteenth-century nickname of New Orleans, from the dixie, a Confederate-era ten-dollar bill on which was printed the French dix (ten) but again, it came later.  The –crat suffix was from the Ancient Greek κράτος (krátos) (power, might), as used in words of Ancient Greek origin such as democrat and aristocrat; the ultimate root was the primitive Indo-European kret (hard).  Dixiecrat is a noun and Dixiecratic is an adjective; the noun plural is Dixiecrats.  The noun Dixiecratocracy (also as dixieocracy) was a humorous coining speculating about the nature of a Dixiecrat-run government; it was built on the model of kleptocracy, plutocracy, meritocracy, gerontocracy etc.

The night old Dixie died.

Former Dixiecrat, Senator Strom Thurmond (1902-2003; senator (Republican) for South Carolina 1954-2003) lies in state, Columbia, South Carolina, June 2003.

Universally called Dixiecrats, the States' Rights Democratic Party was formed in 1948 as a dissident breakaway from the Democratic Party.  Its core platform was permanently to secure the rights of states to legislate and enforce racial segregation and exclude the federal government from intervening in these matters.  Politically and culturally, it was a continuation of the disputes and compromises which emerged in the aftermath of the US Civil War almost a century earlier.  The Dixiecrats took control of the party machine in several southern states and contested the elections of 1948 with South Carolina governor Strom Thurmond as their presidential nominee but enjoyed little support outside the deep South and by 1952 most had returned to the Democratic Party.  However, in the following decades, they achieved a much greater influence as a southern faction than ever was achieved as a separatist party.  The shift in the south towards support for the Republican Party dates from this time and by the 1980s, the Democratic Party's control of presidential elections in the South had faded and many of the Dixiecrats had joined the Republicans.

US Electoral College map, 1948.

In the 1948 presidential election, the Dixiecrats didn’t enjoy the success polls had predicted (although that was the year of the infamous “Dewey Defeats Truman” headline and the polls got much wrong), carrying only four states, all south of the Mason-Dixon line and not even the antics of one “faithless elector” (one selected as an elector for the Democratic ticket who instead cast his vote for Dixiecrats) was sufficient to add Tennessee to the four (South Carolina, Mississippi, Alabama, and Louisiana) won.  Nor did they in other states gain sufficient support to act as “spoilers” as Ross Perot (1930–2019) in 1992 & 1996 and Ralph Nader (b 1934) in 2000 achieved, the “narrowing of margins” in specific instances being of no immediate electoral consequence in the US system.  With that, the Dixiecrats (in the sense of the structure of the States' Rights Democratic Party) in a sense vanished but as an idea they remained for decades a potent force within the Democratic Party and their history is an illustration of why the often-quoted dictum by historian Professor Richard Hofstadter (1916–1970): “The role of third parties is to sting like a bee, then die” needs a little nuance.  What the Dixiecrats did after 1948 was not die but instead undergo a kind of “resurrection without crucifixion”, emerging to “march through the institutions” of the Democratic Party, existing as its southern faction.

That role was for generations politically significant and example of why the “third party” experience in the US historically wasn’t directly comparable with political behaviour elsewhere in the English-speaking world where “party discipline” tended to be “tight” with votes on the floors of parliaments almost always following party lines.  Until recent years (and this is something the “Trump phenomenon” radically has at least temporarily almost institutionalized), there was often only loose party discipline applied within the duopoly, Democrats and Republicans sometimes voting together on certain issues because the politicians were practical people who wished to be re-elected and understood what Tip O'Neill (1912–1994; (Democrat) speaker of the US Representatives 1977-1987) meant when he said “All politics is local”.  Structurally, that meant “third parties” can operate in the US and achieve stuff (for good or evil) as the Dixiecrats and later the Republican’s Tea Party Movement proved; it just that they do it as factions within the duopoly and that’s not unique, the Australian National Party (a re-branding of the old Country Party) really a regional pressure group of political horse traders disguised as a political party.

US Electoral College map, 1924.

The 1924 Electoral College results were a harbinger of the later Dixiecrat movement and a graphical representation of terms such as "solid South" or "south of the Mason-Dixon Line".  At the time of the 1924 election, slavery in the South was still in living memory.  Although there was fracturing at the edges, the "solid south" did remain a Democratic Party stronghold until the civil rights legislation of the 1960s and it was was the well-tuned political antennae of Texan Lyndon Johnson (LBJ, 1908–1973; US president 1963-1969) which picked up the implications and consequences of the reforms his skills had ushered through the Congress:  "I think I've just lost us the South" he was heard to remark when the Senate passed a landmark voting rights bill into law.

In recent years, what has changed in the US is the Republicans and Democrats have become the captive organizations of a tiny number of dedicated political operatives pursuing either their own ideological agendas or (more typically), those providing the funding.  The practical implication of that is the elections which now most matter are the primaries (where candidates for the election proper are selected) and because primary contests are voted on by a relative handful, outcomes are easier to influence and control that in general elections where there are millions to nudge.  Party discipline has thus become tighter than can often be seen on the floor of the House of Commons in the UK, not because the ideological commitments of politicians within parties have coalesced but because they’re now terrified of being “primaried” if they vote against the party line.  Re-election is a powerful inducement because the money politicians make during their careers is many, many times what might be expected given their notional earnings from their salary and entitlements.  There are few easier ways to get rich, thus the incentive to “toe the party line”.  This behavioural change, mapped onto something which structurally remains unchanged, is one of the many factors which have produced a country now apparently as polarized as ever it has been.  The nature of that polarization is sometimes misunderstood because of the proliferation of “red state, blue state” maps of the US which make the contrast between the “corrupting coastlines” and “flyover states” seem so stark but each state is of course a shade of purple (some darker, some lighter) but because of the way the two parties now operate, politics as it is practiced tends to represent the extreme, radical elements which now control the machines.  So while in the last twenty-odd years there’s been much spoken about “the 1%” in the sense of the tiny number of people who own or control so much, it’s political scientists and historians who much fret over the less conspicuous “1%” able to maintain effective control of the two parties, something of even greater significance because the state has put in place some structural impediments to challenging the two-party political duopoly.

In the US, the state does not (in a strict legal or constitutional sense of the word) “own” the Republican or Democratic Parties because they are “private” organizations protected by the constitution’s First Amendment (freedom of association).  However, over the years, something biologists would recognize as “symbiosis” has evolved as the state and the parties (willingly and sometimes enthusiastically) have become entangled to the extent a structural analysis would recognize the parties as quasi-public although not quite at the status familiar elsewhere as quangos (quasi autonomous non-government organizations).  Despite being “private concerns”, the parties routinely conduct state-regulated primaries to select candidates and in many cases these are funded by tax revenue and administered by state electoral instrumentalities.  Beyond that, it needs to be remembered that to speak of a “US national election” (as one might of a “UK general election”) is misleading because as a legal construct such events are really 50 elections run by each state with electoral laws not wholly aligned (thus the famous (or dreaded, depending on one’s position) Iowa caucuses) and in many states, it’s state law which regulates who can voted in party primaries, some permitting “open” primaries in which any lawfully enrolled voter is allowed to cast a ballot while others run “closed” events, restricting participation to registered members of the relevant party.  What that means is in some places a citizen can vote in each party’s primary.  That done, those who prevail in a primary further are advantaged because many states have laws setting parameters governing who may appear on a ballot paper and most of them provide an easier path for the Republican and Democratic Party candidates by virtue of having granted both “major party” status.  As objects, the two parties, uniquely, are embedded in the electoral apparatus and the interaction of ballot access laws, debate rules and campaign finance rules mean the two function as state-sponsored actors; while not quite structurally duopolistic, they operate in a protected environment with the electoral equivalent of “high tariff barriers”.

Elon Musk (left) and Donald Trump (right), with Tesla Cybertruck (AWD Foundation Series), the White House, March, 2025.  It seemed like a good idea at the time.

Given all that, Elon Musk’s (b 1971) recent announcement he was planning to launch a “third party” (actually the US has many political parties, the “third party” tag used as a synecdoche for “not one of the majors”) might seem “courageous” and surprised many who thought the experience of his recent foray into political life might have persuaded him pursuits like EVs (electric vehicles), digging tunnels (he deserves praise for naming that SpaceX spin-off: “The Boring Company”) and travelling to Mars were more fulfilling.  However, Mr Musk believes the core of the country’s problems lie in the way its public finances are now run on the basis of the “Dick Cheney (born 1941; US vice president 2001-2009) doctrine: “Deficits don’t matter” and having concluded neither of the major parties are prepared to change the paradigm which he believes is leading the US to a fiscal implosion, a third party is the only obvious vehicle.  In Western politics, ever since shades of “socialism” and “capitalism” defined the democratic narrative, the idea of a “third way” has been a lure for theorists and practitioners with many interpretations of what is meant but all have in common what Mr Musk seems to be suggesting: finding the middle ground and offering it to those currently voting for one or other of the majors only because “your extremists are worse than our extremists”.  Between extremes there’s much scope for positioning (which will be variable between “social” & “economic” issues) and, given his libertarian instincts, it seems predicable Mr Musk’s economic vision will be “centre-right” rather than “centre-left” but presumably he’ll flesh out the details as his venture evolves.

Mr Musk can’t be accused of creating a “third party” because he wants to become POTUS (president of the US).  As a naturalized US citizen, Mr Musk is ineligible because Article II, Section 1, Clause 5 of the constitution restricts the office to those who are a “natural born Citizen” (Article II, Section 1, Clause 5).  Because the US Supreme Court (USSC) has never handed down a definitive ruling on the matter it’s not absolutely certain what that phrase means but the consensus among legal scholars is it refers to someone who was at birth a US citizen.  That need not necessitate being born on the soil of the US or its territories because US citizens often are born in other countries (especially to those on military or diplomatic duty) and even in international waters; indeed, there would appear no constitutional impediment to someone born in outer space (or, under current constitutional interpretation, on Mars) becoming POTUS provided they were at the time of birth a US citizen.  Nor does it seem an interpretation of the word “natural” could be used to exclude a US citizen conceived through the use of some sort of “technology” such as IVF (In Vitro Fertilization).

Lindsay Lohan, potential third party POTUS.

As a naturalized US citizen, Elon Musk can’t become POTUS so his new party (tentatively called the “America” Party) will have to nominate someone else and the constitution stipulates (Article II, Section 1, Clause 5): “No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President; neither shall any Person be eligible to that Office who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the United States”.  The age requirement is unambiguous and in his Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (1833), Justice Joseph Story (1779–1845; associate justice of the Supreme Court of the USSC 1812-1845) explained the residence requirement was “…not an absolute inhabitancy within the United States during the whole period; but such an inhabitancy as includes a permanent domicil in the United States.”  That means Mr Musk can consider nominating Lindsay Lohan for president.  She’d apparently flirted with the idea of running in 2020 but at that point would have been a few months too young; on all grounds she’ll be eligible for selection in 2028 and many would be attracted to the idea of Lindsay Lohan having her own nuclear weapons.

Whether or not it’s “courageous” (or even “heroic”), to build a new third party in the US time will tell but certainly it’s ambitious but Mr Musk is also a realist and may not be planning to have a presidential candidate on the ballot in all 50 states or even contest every seat both houses of Congress.  As he’ll have observed in a number of countries, “third parties” need neither parliamentary majorities nor executive office to achieve decisive influence over policy, some with comparatively little electoral support able to achieve “balance of power” status in legislatures provided those votes are clustered in the right places.  Additionally, because the polarized electorate has delivered such close results in the House & Senate, the math suggests a balance of power may be attainable with fewer seats than historically would have been demanded and under the US system of fixed terms, an administration cannot simply declare such a congress “unworkable” and all another election (a common tactic in the Westminster system); it must, for at least two years, work with what the people have elected, even if that includes an obstreperous third party. Still, the challenges will be onerous, even before the “dirty tricks” departments of the major parties start searching for skeletons in the closets of third party candidates (in a rare example of bipartisanship the Republicans and Democrats will probably do a bit of intelligence-sharing on that project) and the history is not encouraging.

It was the Republican party which in the 1850s was the last “third party” to make the transition to become a “major” and not since 1996 has such a candidate in a presidential contest secured more than 5% of the national vote.  In the Electoral College, not since 1968 has a third-party candidate carried any states and 1912 was the last time a third-party nominee finished second (and 1912 was a bit of a “special case” in which the circumstances were unusually propitious for challenges to the majors).  Still, with (1) the polls recording a general disillusionment with the major parties and institutions of state and (2) Mr Musk’s wealth able to buy much advertising and “other forms” of influence, prospects for a third party may be untypically bright in 2028 elections and 2030 mid-terms.  There are no more elections for Donald Trump (b 1946; US president 2017-2021 and since 2025) and it seems underestimated even now just what an aberration he is in the political cycle.  While his use of techniques and tactics from other fields truly has since 2016 been disruptive, what he has done is unlikely to be revolutionary because it is all so dependent on his presence and hands on the levers of power.  When he leaves office, without the “dread and awe” the implied threat of his displeasure evokes, business may return to something closer what we still imagine “normal” to be.