Privy

Privy (pronounced priv-ee)

(1) Participating in the knowledge of something private or secret (usually as the phrase “privy to”).

(2) Private; assigned to private uses; exclusive; not public; one's own.

(3) Belonging or pertaining to some particular person (in or with reference to constitutional law, especially as applied to a sovereign).

(4) Secret, concealed, hidden, or secluded; acting or done in secret (archaic).

(5) In law (usually of contractual matters, a person participating directly in or having a derivative interest in a legal transaction.

(6) A toilet, lavatory, loo (mostly obsolete and tended to be applied to outside structures (also as outhouse)).

(7) Of or relating to one person only (archaic).

1175–1225: From the Middle English pryvy & prive (secret, concealed, not made known in public), from the Old French privé (close friend (adjective) & private place (noun), from the Latin prīvātus (private; deprived), the perfect passive participle of prīvō (I bereave, deprive; I free, release).  The adjectival form came first in the sense of something "secret, concealed, not made known in public", the noun forming later to describe places secluded or deliberately hidden" a direct use of the Old French privé (friendly, intimate; a private place) from the Latin prīvātus.  The now familiar phrase “privy to” (participating something a secret to most others) is from the late fourteenth century.  The phrase Privy member (organ of sex; the genitals) was from the late thirteenth century.

A privy.

The sense of the noun privy meaning "latrine, outdoor toilet in a small shed (outhouse) dates from circa 1200, from Old French privé & privee used in the same sense, the meaning in French literally "private place, the noun derived from the adjective.  Historically, the outdoor facilities for urination and defecation were differentiated by being either open (latrine) or enclosed (privy).  Privy (the spelling privie is obsolete) is a noun & adjective, privier & priviest are adjectives, privily (the spellings prively, priuely, pryvely & pryuely long obsolete) is an adverb and priviness is a verb; the noun plural is privies.  A privy chamber was the private apartment of a royal residence in England, analogous with places like the pope's apartment in the Vatican, the flat in 10 Downing Street or the residence in the White House.  In the English (and later the UK's) monarchy, the term privy chamber referred nominally to the place but more broadly to the sovereign’s private office and staff.  In an age when the authority of kings and queens was greater than now, the privy chamber was the most influential department in the royal household and thereby the system of government.  In the sixteenth century, as the role and extent of government expanded, the Privy Chamber came to be understood as a political institution, something distinct from the king's apartment (loosely referred to as the bedchamber).  In that way, the privy chamber became the outer chamber (often styled as the "presence chamber" or "chamber of the presence) although historians have noted that the key to influence lay in access to the bedchamber.  The privy purse was literally a ceremonial bag carried at ceremonies by the keeper of the privy purse (it’s not clear of ever it was used to carry cash or indeed anything) and the phrase is still use to refer to (1) the British monarch's private income from various sources, (2) the net total of the monies available to the monarch for private or personal expenses (as distinct from what's incurred in the discharge of official duty as head of state et al) and (3) the official and the office which acts as comptroller of the monarch's finances.

In England, the term Privy Council emerged circa 1300 in a general sense and the familiar use to describe the organ of government dates from the late fourteenth century although, reflecting the court practice of the age, it was originally styled (using the French word order) as consaile priue and existed as a group of advisors to the monarch who were summoned or not at his pleasure.  That evolved to a system in which those summoned were those supporting the government of the day and that is essentially the present form although those no longer in favor don’t cease to be privy councilors; they are just not summonsed.  In practice, the advisory body is now the cabinet (all of whom will be privy councilors) although larger assemblies of the Privy Council are sometimes convened for constitution or ceremonial occasions such as the recent proclamation of King Charles III as monarch.

The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC) in session.

The historic judicial functions of the King-in-Council are now performed by Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC). The JCPC consists of senior judges appointed as Privy Councillors: predominantly Justices of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom although senior judges from the Commonwealth can still be appointed. The Privy Council formerly acted as the High Court of Appeal for the entire British Empire (other than for the United Kingdom itself) and continues to hear judicial appeals from some other independent Commonwealth countries, as well as Crown Dependencies and British Overseas Territories.  Although the Privy Council’s decisions are mostly not binding on the UK’s domestic courts, the rulings are held to be extremely persuasive as other respected tribunals (US Supreme Court, Supreme Court of Canada et al) are regarded.  One quirk of the Australian Constitution is that, the 1986 Australia Acts notwithstanding, the High Court can issue a certificate referring certain cases to the council but none has been granted for a century and the court has long made clear there’ll be no more.  As a bit of a relic of English constitutional history and the established church, in the United Kingdom, the Privy Council retains appellant jurisdiction some domestic matters:

(1) Appeals from the Arches Court of Canterbury and the Chancery Court of York in non-doctrinal faculty causes

(2) Appeals from the High Court of Chivalry.

(3) Appeals from the Court of Admiralty of the Cinque Ports and Admiralty prize courts.

(4) Appeals from the Disciplinary Committee of the Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons.

(5) Disputes under the House of Commons Disqualification Act, essentially a role similar to that the High Court of Australia discharges as the Commonwealth’s Court of Disputed Returns.

The JCPC (always referred to as “the Board”) was long noted (and much admired) for handing down single judgments without dissenting opinions; a fine example of judicial clarity and efficiency that other courts showed no inclination to follow.  Unfortunately, in recent decades, multiple opinions have been allowed.

Looking the other way while the Supreme Leader is engaged.

The Supreme Leader, mid-engagement.

The statesman who has done most to advance privy design is Kin Jong-un (Kim III, b 1983; Supreme Leader of the DPRK (North Korea) since 2011).  On the rare occasions the Supreme Leader leaves the DPRK (traveling usually by train), included in his inventory is a customized state limousine (either a Mercedes Maybach S62 or a Mercedes Maybach S600 Pullman) with a built-in toilet.  No photographic evidence of the convenient installation seems to have appeared but the "information" has appeared on the internet so users can vest it with whatever veracity they think appropriate.  Apparently, it's easy to tell when the Great Leader is relieving himself inside his mobile privy because the security detail always discreetly looks away from the car.  Other than the privy plumbing, the cars are distinguished from the standard models by a longer wheelbase, an armored floor and laminated windows, all features designed to withstand attacks by firearms or explosives and bullets.  Diplomatic sources confirm the Supreme Leader had the vehicles commissioned to prevent foreign spies from taking stool or urine samples which could be analyzed to allow his state of his health to be determined.  The Supreme Leader is probably right to take precautions because several sources have reported the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has made more than one attempt to collect his fecal samples.

Within the borders of the DPRK, the logistics are simpler, the Supreme Leader always provided with a portable privy for his exclusive use, at all times under military guard to ensure no others intrude.  It's believed that whenever he leaves the privy, recalling an old DPRK adversary, he utters the words "I shall return".

Concur

Concur (pronounced kuhn-kur)

(1) To accord in opinion; to agree.

(2) To cooperate; work together; combine; be associated.

(3) To coincide; occur at the same time.

(4) To run or come together; converge (obsolete).

1375–1425: From the late Middle English concur (collide, clash in hostility), from the Latin concurrere (to run together, assemble hurriedly; clash, fight), in transferred use “to happen at the same time", the construct being con (the Latin prefix variation of cum (with; together)) + currere (to run).  The early meaning in English was "collide, clash in hostility," the sense of "to happen at the same time" didn’t emerge until the 1590s; that of "to agree in opinion" a decade earlier.  Ultimate root was the Proto-Italic korzō, derived from the primitive Indo-European ḱers (to run).  Related forms are the adverb concurringly and the adjectives concurring and concurrent.  Despite the rarity, the verbs preconcur, preconcurred & preconcurring, and the adjectives unconcurred & unconcurring are said to exist, at least to the extent no dictionary appears yet to have declared them obsolete or archaic.  The adjective concurrent is noted from the late fourteenth century though concurring is said (surprisingly) not to have been in use until the 1630s.  The first concurring opinion was recorded in 1720.  The sense "to coincide, happen at the same time" is from 1590s; that of "to agree in opinion" dates in English from the 1580s

In praise of the Privy Council

Concurrent is probably the most common adjectival form in general use.  Noted since the late 1300s, in the sense of “acting in conjunction, contributing to the same effect or event", it was from the Old French concurrent or directly from Latin concurrentem (nominative concurrens), present participle of concurrere.  The meaning "combined, joint" is from 1530s and in law, concurrent jurisdiction (that possessed equally by two courts and if exercised by one not usually assumed by the other) is recorded from 1767.

Lindsay Lohan and her lawyer in court, Los Angeles, December 2011.

Concur is one of many synonyms for “agree” and the one most favoured by judges on appellant courts to indicate they agree with (or at least acquiesce to) a judgment written by another.  That’s good because it means there’s less to have to read.  However, some judges prefer to pen their own judgments, helpful perhaps if they wish to explore some aspect of the case not elsewhere mentioned but otherwise a duplication of effort unless their prose serves to render readable what can be turgid stuff.  Then there are the dissenting judgments, of interest to academic lawyers and historians and sometimes a source of hope to those entertaining thoughts of an appeal.  That notwithstanding, those wishing just to know the state of law with certainty might long for a system in which appellate courts of appeal issued only the majority judgment with the dissenters encouraged to submit essays or letters to the editors of legal journals.

Etching of a sitting of a Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (1846).

That only one judgment was issued was the most appealing procedural aspect of the Privy Council, until 1968 and 1986 respectively, the highest court of appeal for Australian state and Commonwealth jurisdictions.  Properly styled The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC), the Privy Council remains the ultimate court of appeal for some British Overseas Territories and Commonwealth countries.  Although the Privy Council’s decisions are mostly not binding on the UK’s domestic courts, the rulings are held to be extremely persuasive as other respected tribunals (US Supreme Court, Supreme Court of Canada et al) are regarded.  One quirk of the Australian Constitution is that, the 1986 Australia Acts notwithstanding, the High Court can issue a certificate referring certain cases to the council but none has been granted for a century and the court has long made clear there’ll be no more.  As a bit of a relic of English constitutional history and the established church, in the United Kingdom, the Privy Council retains appellant jurisdiction some domestic matters:

(1) Appeals from the Arches Court of Canterbury and the Chancery Court of York in non-doctrinal faculty causes.

(2) Appeals from the High Court of Chivalry.

(3) Appeals from the Court of Admiralty of the Cinque Ports and Admiralty prize courts.

(4) Appeals from the Disciplinary Committee of the Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons.

(5) Disputes under the House of Commons Disqualification Act, a role essentially similar to that the High Court of Australia (HCA) discharges as the Commonwealth’s Court of Disputed Returns.

Historically, the Privy Council dealt with cases thus referred without any known demand for multiple judgments or dissenting opinions; a fine example of judicial clarity and efficiency and one which judges in other courts never to admire, much less emulate.  Despite its exalted place in the legal hierarchy, the council has been a surprisingly flexible and informal court.  In 1949, it found, on technical grounds, the Commonwealth of Australia’s appeal in the bank nationalization case (Commonwealth of Australia v Bank of NSW [1949] UKPC 37, [1950] AC 235; [1949] UKPCHCA 1, (1949) 79 CLR 497 (26 October 1949)) couldn’t proceed but, because so many people had travelled over ten-thousand miles (17,000 km) to London (no small thing in 1949), it anyway heard the case and issued what would have been the substantive judgment.  If ever it’d been prepared to set the example of providing advisory opinions, the Privy Council would have been the best appellant court ever.  Unfortunately, In recent years, dissenting opinions have started to be issued.

Sitting of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, 18 June 1946.

M.R Jayaker, Lord Du Parcq, Lord Goddard (Lord Chief Justice), Lord Simonds, Lord Macmillan, Lord Simon, The Lord Chancellor (Lord Jowitt), Lord Thankerton, Lord Porter, Lord Uthwatt, Sir Madhavan Nair, and Sir John Beaumont.

Appellate

Appellate (pronounced uh-pel-it)

(1) Of or pertaining to that which can be reviewed by a power or authority vested with the necessary jurisdiction.

(2) A court, tribunal or other body having the power or authority to review and decide appeals made against decisions issued by subordinate individuals or institutions; that which legally can be appealed to.

1726: From the Classical Latin appellātus (called upon, summoned), past participle of appellāre (to appeal) and perfect passive participle of appellō (address as, call by name), the construct being ad (to, towards) +‎ pellō (push; impress).  The noun appellant (one who appeals from a lower to a higher court) dates from the 1610s, from the Anglo-French & French appellant, noun use of present participle of the French appeller (make an appeal), from the Old French apeler, from the Latin appellare (appeal to).  Appellate is an adjective and appellant is a noun; the noun plural is appellants.

Unrelated to the hierarchy of courts, there are words used formal grammar and linguistics including the noun appellative (a common noun; an epithet), the adjective appellative (of or pertaining to an appellative noun or common noun; of or pertaining to ascribing names), the noun appellativeness (the state or quality of being appellative), the adverb appellatively (after the manner of appellative nouns; so as to express whole classes or species and the noun appellativization (the process of a proper name becoming a common noun (such as hoover; kleenex; google et al)).  The antonym is proprialization (White House, Grand Canyon et al).  The noun appellation (designation, name given to a person, thing, or class) entered English in the mid-fifteenth century, from the twelfth century Old French apelacion (name, denomination), from the Latin appellationem (nominative appellatio) (an addressing, accosting; an appeal; a name, title), the noun of action from the past-participle stem of appellare (address, appeal to, name).  An appellation is a descriptive and specific term (Joan of Arc’s appellation was Arc; John the Baptist's was Baptist while those who were most associated with the political discussions which culminated in the formation of the United States of America (USA) are given the appellation “Founding Fathers”.  An appellation differs thus from an official or honorary title such as earl, bishop, general, professor et al but technically, these too are appellations.  The adjective appellative dates from the early fifteenth century (of a noun, serving to name or mark out, common (as opposed to proper))," from the Latin appellativus, from appellat-, past-participle stem of appellare (address, name, appeal to).  As a noun, it was in use by at least the 1590s in the sense of “a common” and by the 1630s as a “title or descriptive name”.

Courts of appeal

Appellate courts, usually styled as courts of appeal, are those vested with the jurisdiction to an appeal from a subordinate court within the same hierarchy.  In Australia, as a general principle, the court system exists in three layers (1) a trial court, (2) an intermediate appellate court and (3) a final court of appeal although variations exist and appeals from lower courts are not always of right; in many cases an application for leave to appeal can be declined.  Details of appellate jurisdiction in English courts appear in Sir William Blackstone's (1723–1780) Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765–1769), a matrix which has since been a thing of repeated change.  The hierarchical nature of the appellate food-chain is of significance because ultimately it's the final stage which is decisive: A case might for example be heard by eleven eminent judges, one in the supreme court at first instance, three on a court of appeal and seven at a high court so if the first appeal is decided 3-0 and the final 4-3 then one party can have enjoyed the concurrence of 7 of the 11 yet still lose.  That's how the appellate system works.

The Australian court systems are now unitary which means that, depending on the law(s) involved, the avenue of appeal lies to a state, territory or Commonwealth court, appeals to the Privy Council (actually the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC)) in London sundered for Commonwealth matters in 1968 and for those involving the states in 1986 by the Australia Acts although there is one historic relic.  Section 74 of the constitution provides for an appeal from the High Court of Australia (HCA) to the the Privy Council if the court issues a certificate that it is appropriate for the Privy Council to determine an inter se (a case concerning constitutional relations between the Commonwealth and one or more states or between states) matter.  The only such certificate was issued in 1912 and in 1985, the High Court judges (unanimously) observed that the power to grant such a certificate “…has long since been spent… and is obsolete".  However, it’s there with full legal force so, in the strict constitutional sense, an appeal from the HCA to the JCPC, however unlikely, remains possible.

In the matter of Grand Theft Auto (GTA5): Lindsay Lohan v Take-Two Interactive Software Inc et al, New York Court of Appeals (No 24, pp1-11, 29 March 2018)

Truly a martyr, Lindsay Lohan hasn't had much luck in appellate courts.  In a case which took an unremarkable four years from filing to reach New York’s highest appellate court, Lindsay Lohan’s suit against the makers of video game Grand Theft Auto V was dismissed.  In a unanimous ruling in March 2018, six judges of the New York Court of Appeals rejected her invasion of privacy claim which alleged one of the game’s characters was based on her.  The judges found the "actress/singer" in the game merely resembled a “generic young woman” rather than anyone specific.  Unfortunately the judges seemed unacquainted with the concept of the “basic white girl” which might have made the judgment more of a fun read.

Beware of imitations: The real Lindsay Lohan and the GTA 5 ersatz, a mere "generic young woman".

Concurring with the 2016 ruling of the New York County Supreme Court which, on appeal, also found for the game’s makers, the judges, as a point of law, accepted the claim a computer game’s character "could be construed a portrait", which "could constitute an invasion of an individual’s privacy" but, on the facts of the case, the likeness was "not sufficiently strong".  The “… artistic renderings are an indistinct, satirical representation of the style, look and persona of a modern, beach-going young woman... that is not recognizable as the plaintiff" Judge Eugene Fahey (b 1951; associate judge of New York Court of Appeals from 2015-2021) wrote in his ruling.  Ms Lohan’s lawyers did not seek leave to appeal.

In happier times: Gladys Berejiklian (b 1970; Premier (Liberal) of New South Wales 2017-2021) & Daryl Maguire (b 1959, MLA (Liberal) for Wagga Wagga 1999-2018).

Also not having much luck with a matter taken on appeal is former New South Wales (NSW, Australia) Premier Gladys Berejiklian, compelled in 2021 to resign after being found to have committed an act of Billigung, her crucial phrase in a secretly recorded conversation being "I don't need to know about that bit" when her then (secret) lover began to tell her some details of his dubious deals.  To that pertinent observation, Mr Maguire replied "No, you don't".  The suggestion is the premier failed to declare a conflict of interest when dealing with the allocation of taxpayer funds which would be to the benefit of Mr Maguire.

The German Billigung is not so much hard to translate as able to be translated in a number of senses; context is everything.  The way it is used to mean “looking away; avoiding specific knowledge of something which one knows or suspects is happening” was clarified in 1977.  Albert Speer (1905-1981, Nazi Minister for Armaments 1942-1945), the convicted war criminal, had always denied any knowledge of the holocaust and was displeased when sent the English translation of a profile to be published in Die Zeit magazine in which Billigung had been rendered as his “...tacit consent...” of the final solution.  This he corrected, explaining Billigung in this context meant “looking away”.  This meant he averted his gaze from the worst crime of the criminal régime he served in order to be able to deny he knew of it.  Speer, predictably, was able to summon a word to explain this too: Ahnumg (the sensing of something without quite knowing exactly what).  He did at least concede the implication of his translation “...is as grave…” as the original, one biographer noting that had Speer said as much at his trial “…he would have been hanged.”  Other historians and some lawyers disagreed with that but it was an assertion the author was unable to pursue.  When she tried to nudge Speer a little further, pointing out that for one to look away from something, one must first know it's there, he didn’t deny what he’d earlier said but added they “…must never speak of it again".  The moment passed and within weeks he would be dead, dying "on the job" in police slang.  Some have noted the feeling Speer conveyed of always somehow longing to confess his knowledge of the holocaust.  He so often came so close to admitting he knew what he'd always denied, as if the last great act of his life would have been to admit worst of the the guilt he convinced himself (and some others) he'd evaded when the International Military Tribunal (IMT) at the first Nuremberg  Trial (1945-1946) convicted him of war crimes & crimes against humanity (counts 3 & 4) and sentenced him to twenty years imprisonment.  Had he then told the truth, he'd have been hanged.

The words used by Ms Berejiklian: "I don't need to know about that bit" are best understood in modern use as an attempt to manufacture "plausible deniability" and may be compared with how Herr Speer described his response in mid-1944 to being warned by a friend "never, under any circumstances" "to accept an invitation to inspect a concentration camp in Upper Silesia".  Speer's friend explained that at that place he'd "...seen something there which he was not permitted to describe and moreover could not describe".  Having received what he claimed was his first knowledge of Auschwitz, Speer asked no questions of anyone, later admitting: "I did not want to know what was happening there".  That was what he later called Billigung.  There's obviously quite some difference between knowledge of the Holocaust and the dodgy dealings of a politician but the Billigung principle is the same. However, the former premier may have been comforted that unlike the IMT at Nuremberg, the ICAC wasn't vested with capital jurisdiction so there was that.

Enjoying their pipes: Albert Speer in conversation with his lawyer Dr Hans Flächsner (1896-dod unrecorded) and a legal associate, Nuremburg, 1945.     

On 1 October 2021, the NSW ICAC (Independent Commission against Corruption) announced an investigation into the former premier's conduct in office, later handing down a finding she had committed “serious corrupt conduct”.  Interestingly,  despite that, the ICAC made no recommendation criminal charges be pursued because the evidence Ms Berejiklian was required to provide to the ICAC wouldn’t be admissible in a court because there, the rules of evidence are different and a defendant can’t be compelled to provide an answer which might be self-incriminating.  In other words a politician can be forced to tell the truth when before the ICAC but not before a court when charged.  That’s an aspect of the common law’s adversarial system which has been much criticized but it’s one of the doctrines which underpins Western law where there is a presumption of innocence and the onus of proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt lies with the prosecution.

Ms Berejiklian challenged the findings and validity of the ICAC’s findings, her appeal heard by the NSW Court of Appeal, the state’s highest appellate court.  Her grounds for the appeal were claims (1) the ICAC made errors of law and (2) their report may have been delivered outside its legal authority due the expiration of the term of one of the ICAC’s assistant commissioners prior to the report being delivered.  In a split (2-1) decision handed down in July 2024, the court dismissed the appeal (with costs), the dissenting judge finding that because one assistant commissioner was engaged as a consultant after her term had expired (a role which included assisting in drafting the final report and writing assessments of the credibility of witnesses including Ms Berejiklian) what they did was act outside the limits of the authority conferred on a consultant.  The majority disagreed, finding the appointment as a consultant was in all ways “valid and effective” and also rejected the other grounds cited in the appeal.

So the ICAC’s finding of “serious corrupt conduct” stands.  Responding to the court’s decision, Ms Berejiklian didn’t mention that “c-word”) but thanked the court for its consideration given “...the limited nature of a challenge that can be made to ICAC findings by any citizen.  As the court noted, the ICAC Act does not permit a ‘merits’ review of the findings of ICAC.”  She also noted the split decision and concluded “Serving the people of NSW was an honour and privilege which I never took for granted. I always worked my hardest to look after the welfare and interests of the people of NSW.” 

Appellate courts, the hair police and black letter law

Appellate courts are best known for their rulings in cases of great public interest or legal significance; in the former category these typically are those involving celebrities, sex or anything especially gruesome and in the latter, constitutional matters.  There are exceptions (and some appellate courts do also function in certain specialized matters as courts of first instance) and the US Supreme Court (USSC) has agreed to hear parking-ticket and other minor matters if the law under which a conviction was obtained happened in a jurisdiction where the offence was deemed one of absolute liability and an appeal not permitted.  In those matters, the court held that in the US, a legal principle existed that the state could not convict a citizen of something without granting a means of appealing the decision.  Courts of appeal also hear the quirky and bizarre and in 2022 an appeal was lodged in the Supreme Court of Japan, a young woman in Osaka Prefecture seeking to overturn a ruling from the Osaka High Court that her former high school’s rules and guidance forcing her to dye her brown hair black were lawful.

The young lady had in 2015 enrolled in a high school (operated by the prefectural government) and in the original case (decided by the Osaka District Court) she alleged teachers had at least weekly told her to dye her hair black, instructions which continued despite her explanation she was born with brown hair and it was her natural color.  In September 2016, she began refusing to go to school, her suit against the prefectural government alleging she had suffered mental stress.  In 2021, the district court ordered the prefectural government to pay ¥330,000 (US$3,100) to the former student for certain actions (such as such as removing her name from school rosters after she stopped attending) but ruled also the school’s enforcement of the hair-related regulation exceed the discretionary authority it had been granted.  The plaintiff took the case to Osaka High Court (the first appellate layer) which held that, on the basis: “a wide range of discretion must be permitted for school education in order to allow diversified educational guidance in line with individual and collective conditions”, the ruling of the district court was upheld.  The case was well publicized and attracted much public interest (and comment) and, presumably nudged, the Osaka’s Prefectural Board of Education undertook a survey of rules at high schools under their control but concluded the “compulsory black hair” rule was “necessary”, issuing a statement saying “We will meticulously explain the necessity in order to gain understanding from students’ parents”.  That didn’t please the by now bolshie (former) schoolgirl and in her appeal to the Supreme Court (the next appellate layer) claimed banning brown hair was “unconstitutional”, citing Article 13 of Japan’s Constitution, which stipulates people’s right to pursue happiness.

The case attracted the interest of Doshisha University’s Professor Kayoko Oshima (b 1959) who explained the substantive matter was more the repeated demands the girl “dye her hair black rather than the rule itself”, his point being that the purpose of the rule was to prevent the dying of hair to ensure lurid greens or blues (or, God forbid, blondes) weren’t seen and in the case of someone with natural brown hair, the ruling shouldn’t be enforced.  In other words, for these purposes there should be the legal fiction that “brown is black”, something like the “honorary white” status the Apartheid-era South African government would sometimes grant to visiting PoCs (persons of color; typically athletes or politicians).  The rule, according to the professor, was thus rational but, in certain circumstances, its enforcement was not; an example of the “unintended consequences” which sometimes occur in the application of “black letter law”.

While the matter proceed through Japan's not especially rapid civil system, news organizations began reporting other interesting rules school impose on their female students including mandating white underwear and banning pony-tails on the basis that were the nape of the neck so scandalously to be exposed, it would risk “sexually exciting” male students.  Hair color, length and pony-tails are subject obviously to visual inspection but it's not clear if the underwear dictates are enforced by the same method.  The wide publication of these rules drew much derision and in response, early in 2022, the Tokyo prefecture announced those with natural hair other than black would no longer be required to dye to conform and that underwear need no longer exclusively be white.  The Tokyo authorities took an omnibus approach to reform, announcing also that a wider range of hairstyles would be permitted including the “two-block” (short on the sides and back while long on top) which was interesting because like the also permitted bob, the risk of napes being flaunted was obviously there.  Legal observers commented it was an example of a typically Japanese attempt to be flexible yet not be seen over-turning long defended-rules.  Thus the pony-tail proscription stands even though its rationale was undermined by the new permissiveness extending to the bob; again, black letter law.  Collectively, the “draconian rules” are known in Japan asブラック校則 (buraku kosoku) (black rules) and they have existed since the 1970s when it was noted “foreign influences” were beginning to intrude, resulting in previously unknown "behavioral issues".  As well as hair color and seductive pony tails, the most rigorously policed seems to have been skirt length, particular attention devoted to detecting the devious trick of “skirt-folding”, the standard workaround for those seeking the “above-knee look”.  Knees, it would seem, are thought as potentially provocative as the naked nape of the neck.

Ai Nishida San (b 1992) as she is (left) and as her school decided history would remember her (left).

Interestingly, high-tech Japanese school administrators have proved that even if the day comes when they can no longer make black hair compulsorily, with a little judicious digital editing, retrospectively they can make it seem as if uniformity is maintained.  In 2021, one student circulated a “before & after” pair of images, one her school photograph in untouched form (left), the other as it appeared in her school’s yearbook (right), the latter with hair in an acceptably shiny black.  Commenting on the editing, the former student said the message conveyed by the practice was it “…enforces the idea that black straight hair, a stereotypically Japanese look, is right”, the obvious implication being anything else is wrong and thus un-Japanese.  Her school had actually been accommodating, telling her that because it was her natural color, she was exempt the attention of the hair police and she thought little more about it until she received her 2007 yearbook when she realized she had been rendered “more Japanese”.  Ai Nishida San called the school’s actions “racist” and while, in the narrow technical sense, it might be more correct to suggest the motives were “racialist”, it’s certainly either and hardly in the spirit of the submission Japan’s delegation to the Paris Peace Conference (1919-1920) made, arguing for racial equality to be recognized as one of the core concepts underpinning international relations in the post-war (which turned out to be the inter-war) era.

Privity

Privity (pronounced priv-i-tee)

(1) Private or secret knowledge.

(2) Participation in the knowledge of something private or secret, especially as implying concurrence or consent.

(3) Privacy or secrecy (obsolete).

(4) In medieval theology, a divine mystery; something known only to God, or revealed only in the Holy Scriptures (obsolete).

(5) The genitals (archaic, and only in the plural).

(6) In law, a relationship between parties seen as being a result of their mutual interest or participation in a given transaction, usually in contract.

(7) The fact of being privy to something; knowledge, compliance (now rare).

1175–1225: From the Anglo-Norman priveté & privitee and the Middle English privete & private, from the Old French priveté, privité & priveté (privacy; a secret, private matter), the construct being privé (from the Late Latin privus (set apart, belonging to oneself)) + -té (from the Middle French -té, from the Old French -té, from the Latin -itātem or -tātem, accusative singular of -tās, ultimately from the primitive Indo-European -tehts; the suffix was used to form nouns, often denoting a quality or a property).  The ultimate source was the Classical Latin privātus (perfect passive participle of prīvō (I bereave, deprive; I free, release).  Privity is a noun; the noun plural is privities.

Between the twelfth & sixteenth centuries a privity was “a divine mystery; something known only to God, or revealed only in the Holy Scriptures and by the late 1200s this meaning had leaked into a general sense of “privacy; secrecy”, used between the fourteenth & seventeenth centuries to refer to “a private matter, a secret”.  The use to describe the genitals (presumably influenced in some way by “private parts” or “the private”) as “the privities” is attested from the late fourteen century and didn’t wholly fade from use until the early nineteenth although use had by then long declined to a northern English, Irish & Scottish regionalism.  The word was used from the 1520s as a technical term in the laws regulating feudal land tenure and other fields of law picked it up in the general sense of “a relationship between parties seen as being a result of their mutual interest or participation in a given transaction”; it was in contract law this would assume it’s important meaning as “privity of contract” (describing the special status of the parties to a contract (as legally defined), something which would for centuries be of critical importance and still in use today.  Less precise was the sixteenth century sense of “the fact of being privy to something; knowledge, compliance” and while there are better ways of saying it, such use is not yet extinct.

Privity of contract, Donoghue v Stevenson and the snail.

The classic case (drummed for almost a century into law students) in the demolition of the sense of the absolute in privity of contract was Donoghue v Stevenson ([1932] A.C. 562, [1932] UKHL 100, 1932 S.C. (H.L.) 31, 1932 S.L.T. 317, [1932] W.N. 139), finally decided before the House of Lords.  It was the case which more than any other established the foundation of the doctrine of product liability, refined the concept of negligence (transforming tort law) and remains a core part of the framework for the principles of “duty of care” which substantially it expanded.

The extraordinary case began with events which transpired in the modest settings of the Wellmeadow Café in Paisle, Scotland, Mrs Donoghue’s friend on 26 August 1928 buying her a ginger-beer, served in a bottle made from a dark, opaque glass.  After she’d consumed about half, the remainder was poured into a tumbler at which point the partially decomposed remains of a snail floated out, inducing an alleged shock and severe gastro-enteritis.  Because Mrs Stevenson was not a party to the contractual purchase of the ginger beer, she was unable to claim through breach of warranty of a contract: she was not party to any contract because, at law, she received the drink as a gift.  Accordingly, she issued proceedings against Stevenson (the manufacturer) and, after some four years in the lower courts, the matter ended up before the House of Lords, then the UK’s highest appellate court.

All were aware it was an important case.  The lower courts, bound by precedent, had been compelled to find the absence of privity of contract doomed the suit but the issue of product liability in the modern era of consumers interacting usually not directly with the producer of goods but their agents or retailers had for some time been discussed as an area of law in which reform was required.  What the Law Lords had to decide was whether the manufacturer owed Mrs Donoghue a duty of care in the absence of contractual relations contrary to established case law.  The important point was not if she was owed compensation for damages suffered but if a cause of action existed.

Previously, as a general principle, manufacturers owed no duty of care to consumers except if (1) the product was inherently dangerous and no warning of this sate was provided and (2) the manufacturer was aware that the product was dangerous because of a defect and this had been concealed from the consumer.  The Lords found for Mrs Donoghue although in a cautious judgement which could be read as offering little scope for others except the specific matter of ginger beer in opaque bottles containing the decomposed remains of a dead snail when sold to a Scottish widow.  However, the mood for reform was in the legal air and the judgment established (1) negligence is distinct and separate in tort, (2) there need not be privity of contract for a duty of care to be established and (3) manufacturers owe a duty to the consumers who they intend to use their products.

In the leading judgment, Lord Atkin (James Richard Atkin, 1867–1944; lord of appeal in ordinary 1928-1944) wrote, inter alia, what was at that time the widest definition of the “neighbour principle”: “The rule that you are to love your neighbour becomes in law, you must not injure your neighbour; and the lawyer’s question, Who is my neighbour? receives a restricted reply.  You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour.  Who, then, in law is my neighbour? The answer seems to be – persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are called in question.”  On this basis, if no other, the Lords held Mrs Donoghue’s action had succeeded and she had a cause of action in law, the culmination of a growing appreciation by the courts that the law needed to evolve to reflect the patterns of modern commerce.  Some years before Donoghue v Stevenson had been decided, another judge had observed “…it would appear to be reasonable and equitable to hold that, in the circumstances and apart altogether from contract, there exists a relationship of duty as between the maker and the consumer…”

Once, if someone bought two bottles of ginger beer and gave one to a friend, were both to be injured by decomposing snails within, only the consumer who handed over the cash could have recovered damages because they alone enjoyed a privity of contract.  Since Donoghue v Stevenson, both can in court seek remedy in tort on the basis of “product liability”, a manufacturer’s duty of care held to extend to all consumers of their products.

Being the common law, what was effectively a new doctrine (and one, as the term “neighbour principle” suggests, rooted in Christian morality) it was also a general principle and thus a foundation on which the building blocks of subsequent judgments would sit; it could not be treated, in the words of Lord Reid (James Scott Cumberland Reid, 1890–1975, lord of appeal in ordinary 1948-1975): “…as if it were a statutory definition. It will require qualification in new circumstances.”  The courts in the years after 1932 had ample opportunity to refine things and this included the development of the modern tests in tort for the “foreseeability of damage” and “proximity” to which was later appended the surprisingly recent “fairness”, something which came to be regarded as within the rubric of public policy, all able to work in conjunction and as one judge noted, the distinctions between them were “…somewhat porous but they are probably none the worse for that.”  From Donoghue v Stevenson has evolved the modern notion of product liability and it would now to many seem strange there was in living memory a time when a manufacturer could escape liability for selling defective goods simply on the basis the injured party wasn’t the purchaser.  One curious quirk of Donoghue v Stevenson remains that the facts were not tested so it will never be known if the most important character in the case (the decomposing snail) ever existed.

Chamber

Chamber (pronounced cheym-ber)

(1) A room, usually private, in a house or apartment, especially a bedroom (now archaic or poetic).

(2) A reception room or audience room in an official residence, palace, etc.

(3) The meeting hall of a legislative or other assembly.

(4) In law, a place where a judge hears matters not requiring action in open court.

(5) In England, the quarters or rooms that lawyers use to consult with their clients, especially in the Inns of Court.

(6) A legislative, judicial, or other like body.

(7) An organization of individuals or companies for a specified purpose.

(8) The place where the moneys due a government are received and kept; a treasury or chamberlain's office (obsolete).

(9) Of or relating to, or performing chamber music.

(10) To put or enclose in, or as in, a chamber.

(11) To provide with a chamber.

(12) The space between two gates of the locks of a canal, dry dock, etc

(13) An enclosure for a cartridge in the cylinder of a revolver or for a shell in the breech of a cannon

(14) An enclosed space, compartment or cavity; the smallest chamber in a cave.

1175-1225: From the Middle English chamber (a room in a (usually private) house) from the eleventh century Old French chambre (room, chamber, apartment), derived from the Late Latin camera (a chamber, room), variant of camara (vaulted room) from the Ancient Greek kamára.  In an interesting linguistic twist, the Old French and Middle English words were also used alone and in combinations to form words for "latrine, privy" from the idea of the "bedroom utensil for containing urine".  The word in the fourteenth century was adopted for use in to anatomy in the sense of "an enclosed space in a body" and this was extended to machinery after 1769, the use in gunnery or ballistics meaning  "part of the bore in which the charge is placed" dating from the 1620s.  The familiar use to refer to the rooms where legislative bodies assemble (ie upper & lower chambers) has been in use since circa 1400.  Chamber music dates from 1789; the distinction being it described a type of music meant to be performed in private rooms instead of public halls.  Chamber-lye, disturbingly to modern ears, meant "urine used as a detergent" and dates from the 1570s and the obviously related chamber-pot (also chamberpot) (vessel for urine used in bedrooms) came into use a decade earlier.  A chambermaid was (1) a female servant who dresses a lady and waits on her in her bedchamber and (2) a woman who makes beds and cleans rooms in a private house, palace or inn, a form which emerged in the 1580s and obviously derived from bedchamber (also bed-chamber) (a room for sleep or repose) which had been in use since the mid-fourteenth century.  Bedchamber is now archaic and used only in relation to royalty (an then mostly in historic reference), expensive hotels and hopeful real-estate salespeople.  The verb chamber was in the late fourteenth century derived from the noun and was used in the sense of (1) to restrain, shut up as in a chamber and (2) to furnish with a chamber" (implied in chambered); the related form was chambering.  The adjective chambered (divided into chambers) was from the same era and was the past-participle adjective the verb.  The famous reference to nautilus shells dates from 1819.

The Court of Star Chamber

Named for the star pattern on the ceiling of the room in Westminster Palace where sittings were convened, the Court of Star Chamber (known almost always as the Star Chamber), was an English law court which operated in parallel with the common-law courts.  The Star Chamber drew its authority from the king's sovereign power and privileges and was not bound by the common law.

The former Court of Star Chamber (1836), drawing by unknown artist.

The Court of Star Chamber was created originally to ensure the enforcement of laws against the socially and politically well-connected, those whom ordinary courts may hesitate to convict and technically, it evolved from the medieval King's Council.  There had been a tradition of the king presiding over a court composed of his Privy Counsellors and in 1487, under the supervision of Henry VII (1457–1509; King of England 1485-1509 and the first Tudor king), the Court of Star Chamber was established as a judicial body separate from the King's Council.  The original rationale was for the Star Chamber to (1) oversee the lower courts, (2) to act as a court of appeal and (3) to hear petitions addressed to the king seeking redress.  Initially the court heard cases only on appeal, but Henry VIII's (1491–1547; King of England 1509-1547) chancellor, Cardinal Thomas Wolsey (1473–1530; Lord High Chancellor of England 1515-1529) encouraged suitors directly to lodge writs of appeal and not await verdicts from the common-law courts.  Although most of the cases heard involved property rights, trade, government administration and public corruption, the Tudors especially were concerned with public disorder and Cardinal Wolsey referred matters involving forgery, fraud, perjury, riot, slander, and anything else he considered a breach of the peace. Following the Reformation, the Star Chamber was used (and much misused) to punish religious dissenters.

Procedurally the Star Chamber would begin a case with a petition or with information brought to the attention of the judges and depositions would be taken to discover the facts.  Accused parties could be put on oath to respond to the charges and answer detailed questions. No juries were used; members of the court decided whether to hear cases, passed verdicts and assigned punishments.  Structurally, court was thus a hybrid with influences from the common law, Roman civil law, developments in Chancery (equity) law and even the later Court of Exchequer.  Interestingly, the court did not have capital jurisdiction so instead declared its choice of punishment was wholly arbitrary and not at all governed by precedent, guidelines or laws. Judges could choose (indeed even invent) the punishment they felt was most appropriate to the crime or criminal. The punishments included fines, time in the pillory (or stocks), whipping, branding, mutilation or imprisonment for any length of time.  There are critics of the NSW ICAC who compare its operations with the Star Chamber; in this they’re only partially correct and certainly not in relation to punishments. 

Tucked up: Lindsay Lohan in her bedchamber.

The Star Chamber offered an expeditious resolution to legal conflicts. It was popular with the Tudors because it could quickly enforce the law when other courts were slow or tainted by corruption and because it could offer satisfactory remedies when the common law restricted punishment or failed to address specific infractions. Under the Tudors, Star Chamber hearings were held in public, so proceedings and verdicts were subject to inspection which led most judges to act with reason and try to deliver fair justice.  In the seventeenth century, the court evolved into something secretive and corrupt. The Stuarts used the court to enforce their royal proclamations, holding sessions in secret and allowing no appeal.  Charles I (1600–1649; King of England, Scotland, and Ireland 1625-1649) saw the court as a substitute for Parliament when he tried to govern without calling the legislature into session and resentment grew as the Stuarts used the court to prosecute members of the nobility who would otherwise not be subject to prosecution in common-law courts.  The Long Parliament abolished the Star Chamber in 1641.   

Except for historic reference, the term "star chamber" is now almost always pejorative and used to describe social and political oppression through the arbitrary use and abuse of the powers wielded.  In political science, the doctrine of separation of powers is held to be the most effective means to prevent abuse of power by the state.  At its most simple, it means politicians can no longer in individual cases impose the sanctions of criminal law, a function which belongs exclusively to the courts.