Privilege

Privilege (pronounced priv-lij (U) or priv-uh-lij (non-U))

(1) A special right, immunity, or exemption granted to persons in authority or office to free them from certain obligations or liabilities; the principle or condition of enjoying special rights or immunities; to exempt from certain obligations; a right, immunity, or benefit enjoyed only by a person beyond the advantages of most.

(2) Any of the rights common to all citizens under a modern constitutional government.

(3) An expression of pleasure.

(4) In the equity markets, an option to buy or sell stock at a stipulated price for a limited period of time, including puts, calls, spreads, and straddles (a now rare nineteenth century innovation).

(5) In ecclesiastical law, an exemption, granted by popes, from certain laws; a use dating from the eighth century, now restricted mostly to historic references.

(6) In law, a common law doctrine that protects certain communications from being used as evidence in court, most familiar as attorney-client privilege (often misunderstood because the privilege is held by the client and not the lawyer) and executive privilege which can protect presidential and cabinet discussions and documents from scrutiny.

(7) In computing, access to or the ability to execute certain actions which may selectively be granted or denied to users.

(8) As “white privilege”, an expression which encapsulates the idea of the (institutional) advantage white people enjoy as cluster of preferential treatment and opportunities in society beyond (the structural) defined in law; one of the core components of critical race theory (CRT).

(9) To bring or put into a condition of privilege or exemption from evil or danger; to exempt; to deliver (archaic).

1125-1175: From the Middle English privilegen (and the earlier privilegie) from the Anglo-Norman privilege, from the Old French privilege, from the Latin prīvilēgium (ordinance or law against or in favor of an individual).  The Middle English privilegen was from the Middle French privilegier which, like the Medieval Latin prīvilēgiāre was from the Latin prīvilēgium, the construct in Latin being from prīvus (private) + lēx or lēg- (law).  Middle English also had the late fourteenth century pravilege (an evil law or privilege), from the Medieval Latin pravilegium, a play on privilegium by substitution of pravus (wrong, bad).  The alternative spellings priviledg & priviledge are long obsolete.  Synonyms include freelage, immunity, prerogative, right, advantage, foredeal & franchise, (a UK dialectal form); the plural is privileges.

The verb privilege was from the late fourteenth century privilegen (endow (someone) with a special right, grace, power, etc.; to invest with a privilege), from the noun and the thirteenth century Old French privilegier, from the Medieval Latin privilegare, from the Classical Latin privilegium.  The verb disprivilege (deprive (someone) of privilege) was a technical legal term first used in the 1610s; it’s rare but still exists.  The adjective privileged emerged in the late fourteenth century and applied to things; by the mid-1400s it described “persons enjoying certain privileges or immunities"; the past-participle adjective from verb privilege.  The mid-twelfth century meaning of "grant, commission" (which existed earlier in Old English but was referenced with a Latin word), came from the early twelfth century Old French privilege (right, priority, privilege) and directly from the Latin privilegium (law applying to one person, bill of law in favor of or against an individual) which in the post-Augustine era came to be restricted to mean "an ordinance in favor of an individual".  Typically this meant the exemption of one individual from the operation of a law.  In the eleventh century, although it had existed in ecclesiastical law since the eighth, this was a notable aspect of the way the Church exercised power, the privilege a "power or prerogative associated with a certain social or religious position".  The meaning "advantage granted, special right or favor granted to a person or group, a right, immunity, benefit, or advantage enjoyed by a person or body of persons beyond the common advantages of other individuals" is emerged in English during the mid-fourteenth century and had by the late 1300s begun to be used in the legal language of the courts as a general expression of "legal immunity or exemption".  Thus a concept which began in secular Roman civil law was refined in Church law to the point where it was formalized as an exemption or license granted by the Pope, or special immunity or advantage (as freedom of speech) granted to persons in authority or in office before being adopted in modern secular law as an expression of concepts as diverse as (1) general equality of all under the law, (2) basic rights common to all (habeas corpus, suffrage, protest, voting etc) & (3) defined exemptions for certain groups or individuals in certain circumstances from the otherwise prevailing rules.

Golf without clubs.  Donald Trump in discussion on the links, Virginia, September 2022.

On the internet (a most reliable source), it's being suggested Donald Trump (b 1946; US president 2017-2021 and since 2025) had taken to meeting his lawyers on the golf course because he thinks he's there less likely to be overheard or bugged.  He clearly doesn't frequent birdwatching circles or he'd know about the parabolic microphones which can capture birdsong from a distance of 50 m (165 feet) and beyond.  Sympathetic publications suggested the meetings on his Virginia course were either (1) to discuss the planning permission required for proposed upgrades or (2) in connection with arrangements being made to host an event for the Saudi Arabia-backed LIV tournament.

Lindsay Lohan and her lawyer in court, Los Angeles, December, 2011.

The common law doctrine of attorney-client privilege dates from medieval England and may at least in certain circumstances have been acknowledged as early as the fifteenth century but certainly between the sixteenth and eighteenth it became entrenched.  The way it operates is to prevent a court or other organ of the state from compelling the content or nature of communications between a lawyer and client to be disclosed.  Upon the lawyer this rule is almost absolute rule (except in cases such as (1) the fraud exception or (2) a lawyer being sued by their previous client and not suspending the privilege would adversely affect the defence) but, because the privilege is held by the client (not the lawyer), a client can waive the privilege.  This has the interesting consequence that a lawyer cannot unilaterally reveal privileged information, even if they believe it's in the client’s best interest or they are no longer representing the client, something by definition rare although there were instances at the first Nuremberg Trial (1945-1946).

In the US, there are two types of legal professional privilege (1) the attorney-client privilege and (2) the work product doctrine.  The attorney-client privilege has ancient origins in English common law and in familiar throughout the English-speaking world.  Essentially, it exists to protect the right of an individual to communicate with their lawyer without concern the state (or others) might compel either to disclose the discussions.  The legal rationale for attorney-client privilege is that, as a matter of public policy, justice depends on a lawyer being fully informed by their client and the privilege is generally absolute, applying broadly in both litigation and non-litigation contexts; it may be asserted in all proceedings in which testimony may be compelled, including civil, criminal, administrative, regulatory and disciplinary proceeding.  The work product doctrine is another basis by which US courts may provide protection from disclosure for certain materials created in the context of attorney-client relations. The doctrine is relatively new, having originated in a Supreme Court ruling (Hickman v Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510–11 (1947)) which held an adverse party generally may not discover or compel disclosure of written or oral materials prepared by or for an attorney in anticipation of litigation or in preparation for trial; the presumption of non-disclosure is a rebuttable one.

Canon Law and the Pauline Privilege

Depiction of St Paul in stained glass window, St Edmund's Church, Bungay, Suffolk, England.

In Roman Catholic Canon Law, the Pauline Privilege constitutes an exception to the church's general rules governing marriage, rules grounded in sacramental theology.  It is one of the few examples in the legal code where a specific law is taken directly from sacred scripture, ie from the words of Saint Paul himself.  Canon Law starts with the general principle that a marriage, once ratum et consummatum (ratified and consummated), cannot be dissolved by any human power, or by any cause other than death.  The notion, impressive rates of divorce notwithstanding, survives to this day in the marriage rituals of many denominations in the words “…what God has joined together let no man tear asunder.”   

In other words, a marriage is truly indissoluble if (1) it has been celebrated with a valid marriage rite and (2) the spouses have subsequently engaged in a "conjugal act, apt for the generation of offspring".  If condition (1) is missing or defective in some substantive way, the marriage may be annulled, since it was never proper to begin with.  If condition (2) is missing the marriage is ratum sed non consummatum (ratified but not consummated) or ratum et non consummatum (ratified and not consummated) and the Pope has the power to dissolve it.  Otherwise, a marriage ends only with the death of one of the spouses.

This is an ancient position of the church, originally based on teachings in the Old Testament and was not revised by the Second Vatican Council (Vatican II; 1962-1965).  However, a loophole exists because of a couple of passages in the New Testament which conflict with canon law.  In Saint Paul's First Letter to the Corinthians, John mentions:

To the married I give charge, not I but the Lord that the wife should not separate from her husband (but if she does, let her remain single or else be reconciled to her husband), and that the husband should not divorce his wife.

To the rest I say, not the Lord, that if any brother has a wife who is an unbeliever, and she consents to live with him, he should not divorce her.  If any woman has a husband who is an unbeliever, and he consents to live with her, she should not divorce him.  For the unbelieving husband is consecrated through his wife, and the unbelieving wife is consecrated through her husband...

But if the unbelieving partner desires to separate, let it be so; in such a case the brother or sister is not bound. For God has called us to peace.   (1 Corinthians 7:12-15)

So, Saint Paul asserts, in a particular set of circumstances, a ratified but not consummated marriage can be dissolved and he acknowledges that this isn't coming from God but rather, from Paul himself.  According to Paul, the overall indissolubility of marriage has a loophole: if two unbaptized people are married, and one of them is subsequently baptized, the marriage can be ended  if the other spouse both (1) remains unbaptized and (2) "desires to separate" from his or her spouse.  As codified, the loophole found its way into Church law as canon 1143.  It states that a marriage of two unbaptized persons is dissolved when one of the spouses is baptized and enters a new marriage, if the unbaptized spouse departs. There are a number of criteria, all of which must be present, for this privilege to apply but its exercise hinges on the word departs.  Firstly, the Pauline Privilege is relevant only if one of the spouses becomes a Christian and the other does not.  In other words, if both spouses are baptized after their marriage, and they then want to separate and remarry, they cannot do so under canon 1143.

Secondly, the privilege can be applied if the unbaptized spouse is either unwilling to continue living with the newly baptized spouse, or if the unbaptized spouse is not willing to do so without "offense to the Creator." In other words, if the unbaptized spouse is so antagonistic toward the Christian faith of the newly baptized husband or wife that they cannot live together in peace, this constitutes "departing" for the purposes of canon 1143.  The canon lawyers therefore widened the loophole somewhat, deciding a departure need not be a physical decampment but remained otherwise rigid: the Pauline Privilege cannot be invoked if it’s the baptized spouse who "departs." So long as the unbaptized spouse is willing to remain in the marriage, and is not hostile to the Christian faith of the other spouse, the marriage cannot be dissolved other than by death.  Thirdly, the newly baptized spouse must want to enter into a new marriage. Unless and until this happens, he or she remains married to the unbaptized.

Canon Law §§ 1143-1147 codifies the process and instances can be handled on the diocesan level with the Holy See apparently now content to retain only a (seldom exercised) power of veto.  The Pauline Privilege does not apply when either of the partners was a Christian at the time of marriage and differs from annulment because it dissolves a valid natural (but not sacramental) marriage whereas an annulment declares that a marriage was invalid from the beginning.  Regarding the often desired annulments, on paper, little changed in the modern age until 2015 when Pope Francis issued two motu proprio (literally “on his own impulse”; essentially the law-making mechanism available to absolute monarchs as the royal decree): Mitis iudex dominus Iesus (Reform to the Canons of the Code of Canon that pertain to the marriage nullity cases) and Mitis et misericors Iesus (Reform of the canons of the Code of Canons of Eastern Churches pertaining to cases regarding the nullity of marriage) which changed canon law, simplifying the annulment process.  Those who thought this a harbinger of something radical were however disappointed; it appears the pope’s intervention did little more than reflect the position taken in recent decades by so many bishops more anxious to retain bums on pews and coins in the plate than preserve unhappy marriages.  Shortly after the decrees were issued, better to help sinners consider their position, Cardinal Francesco Coccopalmerio, president of the Pontifical Council for Legislative Texts, issued a clarification, noting the Church “…does not decree the annulment of a legally valid marriage, but rather declares the nullity of a legally invalid marriage”.

Prerogative

Prerogative (pronounced pri-rog-uh-tiv)

(1) An exclusive right, privilege, etc, exercised by virtue of rank, office, or the like; having a hereditary or official right or privilege.

(2) A right, privilege, etc, limited to a specific person or to persons of a particular category.

(3) A power, immunity, or the like restricted to a sovereign government or its representative.

(4) Characterized by lawless state actions (refers to the prerogative state)

(5) Precedence (obsolete except in the legal sense of the hierarchy of rights).

(6) A property, attribute or ability which gives one a superiority or advantage over others; an inherent (though not necessarily unique) advantage or privilege; a talent.

(7) In constitutional law, a right or power exclusive to a head of state (often derived from the original powers of a monarch) or their nominee exercising delegated authority, especially the powers to appoint or dismiss executive governments.

1350-1400: From the Anglo-Norman noun prerogatif, from the Old French prerogative, from the Latin praerogātīva (previous verdict; claim, privilege), noun use of the feminine singular of praerogātīvus (having first vote; privileged), in Anglo-Latin as prerogativa from late thirteenth century.  The origin lay in a statute in the civil law of Ancient Roman which granted precedence to the tribus, centuria (an assembly of one-hundred voters who, by lot, voted first in the Roman comita).  The law guaranteed them a praerogātīvus (chosen to vote first) derived from praerogere (ask before others).  The construct of praerogere was prae (before) + rogare (to ask, ask a favor), apparently a figurative use of a primitive Indo-European verb meaning literally "to stretch out (the hand)" from the root reg- (move in a straight line).  In Middle English, the meaning "an innate faculty or property which especially distinguishes someone or something" was added.  The alternative spelling prærogative is long obsolete.  Prerogative is a noun & adjective, prerogatived is an adjective and prerogatively is an adverb; the noun plural is prerogatives.

In English law, a court classified as “a prerogative court” was one through which the discretionary powers, privileges, and legal immunities reserved to the sovereign could be exercised.  The best known of these courts was the Court of Exchequer, the Court of Chancery and the Court of the Star Chamber (the latter one of those institutions formed to rectify injustice but which was later the source of much; the Court of the Star Chamber may be used as a case-study explaining the phrase: “the road to hell is paved with good intentions”).  In time, clashes between the prerogative courts and common law courts became something of a proxy-theatre in the contest between the king and parliament.  The way that worked out was that the ancient (essentially personal) prerogative rights of the monarch weren’t abolished but rather exercised by parliament or institutions (including courts) to which the powers were delegated.  Whether any prerogative power remains in the hands of the sovereign to be used in “extraordinary and reprehensible circumstances” remains a matter of debate.  There were also ecclesiastical prerogative courts under the authority of the archbishops of Canterbury and York but they existed only to handle probate matters in cases where estates beyond a certain defined value were spread between the two dioceses but they also handled many wills of those who died in colonial or other overseas service.  As part of the great reforms of the late nineteenth century undertaken in the Judicature Acts (1873-1899) the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical prerogative moved to the common law courts, being finally vested in the Family Division of the High Court of Justice.

In English law, the still sometimes invoked prerogative writ (the best known of which were habeas corpus (from the Latin habeas corpus ad subjiciendum (usually translated as “bring up the body (ie the prisoner))), a demand a prisoner being held by an organ of the state be brought before a court to determine whether there was lawful authority for the detention) and mandamus (from the Latin mandāmus (we command)), an order issued by a higher court to compel or to direct a lower court or a government officer correctly to perform mandatory duties) was a class of six orders available to the crown for the purpose of directing the action of an organ of government (including courts, officials or statutory bodies).  The name was derived from the authority these exercised being traceable ultimately to the discretionary prerogative & extraordinary power of the monarch and the principle remains in use in many common law jurisdictions which evolved from the old British Empire, notably those of the Raj of colonial India.

The woman's prerogative

For a man incautiously to use the phrase “a woman's prerogative”, the risk would be “cancellation” (or worse) although it’s probably still acceptable if there’s a layer of irony.  The phrase is a clipping of the full: “it’s a woman’s prerogative to change her mind”, the implication being women have the right to change their minds or make decisions based on their own preferences and need provide no explanation or justification.  Wise men (and the pussy-whipped) accept this without demur.  It is of course a reflection of a cultural stereotype and seems to have come into use in the mid-nineteenth century, an era in which gender roles were more rigidly defined and women were thought to be more capricious or whimsical in their actions.  However, in law, the “woman's prerogative” was once enforceable, granting them rights not available to men, a most unusual development in Western jurisprudence.

Well into the twentieth century, it was legal orthodoxy in common law jurisdictions for an offer of marriage to be enforceable under the rules of contract law.  While courts didn’t go as far as ordering “specific performance” of the contract (ie forcing an unwilling party to marry someone), they would award damages on the basis of a “breach of promise”, provided it could be adduced that three of the four essential elements of a contract existed: (1) offer, (2) certainty of terms and (3) acceptance.  The fourth component: (4) consideration (ie payment), wasn’t mentioned because it was assumed to be implicit in the nature of the exchange; a kind of “deferred payment” as it were.  It was one of those rarities in common law where things operated wholly in favor of women in that they could sue a man who changed his mind while they were free to break-off an engagement without fear of legal consequences though there could be social and familial disapprobation.  Throughout the English-speaking world, the breach of promise tort in marriage matters has almost wholly been abolished, remaining on the books in the a handful of US states (not all of which lie south of the Mason-Dixon Line) but even where it exists it’s now a rare action and one likely to succeed only in exceptional circumstances or where a particularly fragrant plaintiff manages to charm a particularly sympathetic judge.

The royal prerogative and the reserve powers of the crown

The royal prerogative is the body of customary authority, privilege, and immunity and the means by which (some of) the executive powers of government are exercised in the governance of the state.  These powers are recognized in common law (and in some civil law) jurisdictions are held to vest wholly in the sovereign alone, even if exercised through either appointees (of which governors, governors-general & viceroys are the best-known) constitutional government.  In the narrowest sense of technical theory, the recognition of the personal powers of a sovereign exists in most common law systems where the concept is relevant but has long since mostly been reduced to legal fiction and in most constitutional monarchies, almost all individual prerogatives have been abolished by parliaments.  Some republican heads of state also possess similar powers but they tend to be constitutionally defined and subject to checks and balances.  A notable exception to this is a US president’s un-trammeled right to grant pardons to those convicted of offences under federal law and that’s interesting because it’s the only power in the US Constitution not subject to a check or balance.  A US president thus personally continues to exercise a prerogative in a way a British monarch (or their appointees as governors & governors-general), from whom the power is derived, no longer can.

In Britain, prerogative powers were originally exercised by the monarch (at least in theory and the role of the Church needs also to be noted) acting alone but after the Magna Carta (1215, from the Medieval Latin Magna Carta Libertatum (Great Charter of Freedoms) which divided power among the ruling class, there had to be sought the consent of others and this ultimately became parliamentary consent granted to an executive (exercising powers derived from the absolute authority of the monarch) responsible to the parliament.  This took centuries to evolve and eventually meant, in practical terms, the king got the money he needed for his wars and other ventures in exchange for the parliament getting his signature to pass the laws they wanted.

Watched by the courtiers Lord Mulgrave & Lord Morpeth, Lord Melbourne serves King William IV a blackbird pie (1836), lithograph with watercolour by John Doyle (1797-1868), Welcome Collection, London.  The text is a re-arranged selection of lines from the eighteenth century English nursery rhyme “Sing a Song of Sixpence” and reads: “Sing a song of six pence a bag full of rye, four and twenty black birds baked in a pie, when the pie was opened, the birds began to sing, was not this a pretty dish to set before a king.”  The blackbirds sing “Justice for Scotland!” and “No tithes!”, controversial issues of the age.  Nineteenth century cartoonists were sometimes more harsh in their treatment of politicians and royalty. 

In Australia, the royal prerogative is limited (but not defined) by the constitution and those powers which vest a monarch’s authority in a governor-general don’t alter the nature of the prerogative, only its detail; the prerogative is exercised by the governor-general but only on the advice of “their” ministers.  The most obvious exception to this is the reserve power of the monarch (and there are those who doubt whether this still exists in the UK) to dismiss a government enjoying the confidence of the lower house of parliament.  In the UK, it’s not been done since William IV (1765–1837; King of the United Kingdom 1830-1837) dismissed Lord Melbourne (1779–1848; Prime Minister of Great Britain 1834 & 1835–1841) in 1834 (some dispute that, saying it was more of a gentleman’s agreement and the last termination was actually that of Lord North (1732–1792; Prime Minister of Great Britain 1770-1782) by George III (1738–1820) King of Great Britain 1760-1820) in 1782) but Australia has seen two twentieth-century sackings; that in 1932 of NSW premier Jack Lang (1876–1975; Premier of New South Wales 1925-1927 & 1930-1932) by Governor Sir Philip Game (1876–1961; Governor of NSW 1930-1935) and, in 1975, when governor-general Sir John Kerr (1914–1991; Governor-General of Australia 1974-1977) sundered Gough Whitlam’s (1916–2014; Prime Minister of Australia 1972-1975) commission.

Dr HV Evatt in his office at the United Nations, New York, 1949.

The 1975 business provoked much academic discussion of the reserve powers but the most lucid read remains Dr HV Evatt’s (1894–1965; ALP leader 1951-1960) book from decades earlier: The King and His Dominion Governors (1936).  Evatt’s volume was published a hundred odd-years after William IV sacked Melbourne and is useful because in that century there had been more than a few disputes about reserve powers.  Evatt’s central point was that the powers exist but proper rules by which they may be exercised are by no means clear.  The legal power is vested in the governor as the representative of the monarch and when it may properly be used depends on usage and convention.  It seems therefore scarcely possible to say confidently of any case when the Crown has intervened that its intervention was or was not correct for the only standard of correctness in each episode is its consistency with episodes of a similar character, none of which in themselves lay down any principle in law.  Further, Evatt notes, in looking to precedent, support for almost any view can be found in the authorities.  Lofty theoretical purity is also not helpful.  The view the sovereign automatically acts in all matters in accordance with the advice of his ministers rests entirely upon assertion and, Evatt observed, the reserve powers are still, on occasion, properly exercisable and that the Sovereign or his representative may have to exercise a real discretion.  Given that, it really might be impossible that the prerogative could be codified in a document which envisages all possible political or other circumstances.  Evatt nevertheless argued the principles which should guide a sovereign should be defined and made clear by statute.

Nor is practical political reality all that much help, however satisfactory an outcome may prove.  What the exercise of the reserve powers, both in 1932 and 1975, did was enable impasses described, however erroneously as constitutional crises to be resolved by an election, rather than other means.  The result of an election however does not conclude the matter for the correctness of the sovereign's action is not measured by his success as a prophet, any post-facto endorsement by the electorate having not even an indirect bearing on the abstract question of constitutionality.

Although variously a high court judge, attorney-general, foreign minister, opposition leader and Chief Justice of NSW, all Dr Evatt asked for on his gravestone was President of the United Nations, noting his service as president of the general assembly (1948-1949).

Evatt’s core argument therefore was reserve powers should be subject to the normal and natural process of analysis, definition and reduction to the rules of positive law, which, by 1936, had in some places been done.  Evatt considered section 33 (10) of the Western Nigerian constitution which codified things thus: The Governor shall not remove the Premier from office unless it appears to him that the Premier no longer commands the support or a majority of the members of the House of Assembly.  Other sections went on to detail the mechanisms of the exercise of the power, thereby attempting to do exactly what Evatt suggests.  However, the Nigerian example cited by Evatt did not prove a solution because the exercise of the power under the constitution became in 1962 a matter of dispute and the case proceeded though the courts, finally ending up before the Privy Council as Adegbenro v. Akintola (1963 AC 614), an indication even the most explicit codification can remain something imperfect.

Franchise

Franchise (pronounced fran-chahyz)

(1) A privilege of a public nature conferred on an individual, group, or company by a government.

(2) In commerce, the right or license granted by a company to an individual or group to market its products or services in a specific territory.

(3) A store, restaurant, or other business operating under such a license.

(4) The territory over which such a license extends.

(5) The right to vote (usually regarded as concurrent with the full rights of citizenship.

(6) A privilege arising from the grant of a sovereign or government, or from prescription, which presupposes a grant.

(7) In professional sport, the right to own or operate a team as a member of a league.

(8) In modern commercial cinema, a film that is or has the potential to be part of a series and lends itself to merchandising.

(9) In the marine insurance division of Admiralty law, a sum or percentage stated in a policy, below which the insurer disclaims all liability.

(10) An obsolete word for enfranchise.

1250-1300: From the Middle English, from Old French, derivative of franc (free) and franchir & franchiss (to set free).  In Old French, the twelfth century word franchise meant “freedom, exemption; right, privilege” but by early eighteenth century meaning had narrowed to "particular legal privilege," then, the post-revolutionary "right to vote" by 1790.  The meaning in the sense of commercial licencing is cited variously between 1959-1966, though actual word franchising was first noted in the 1570s.  Use in the film industry is most modern, emerging in the late twentieth century (although the concept pre-dated the use of the descriptor) and in law and commerce, forms have been coined as required including: overfranchised, disfranchisement, subfranchise, subfranchised & subfranchising.  Franchise & franchising are nouns & verbs, franchiser, franchisor, franchisement, franchisability & franchisee are nouns and franchised is a verb; the most common noun plurals are franchises and franchisers.

Jim's Mowing began in Australia literally as a one-man, part-time lawn-mowing created by a student to generate income while pursuing a history Ph.D.  It has since expanded into a franchise business which has been adapted to over 50 service industries in four countries (Australia, Canada, the UK & US) with some 4,000 franchises.

In popular culture, the most common use of franchise is in film and television where it's used to describe productions of media content that in some way share a common fictional universe (the characters or the theme).  The typical franchise is two or more films or television shows connected by shared elements, such as recurring characters, settings, storylines, or themes.  Although some are now planned according to a well-understood formula, historically franchises emerged from a films or TV show which generated a sufficient level of fan interest and revenue and the revenue generation streams extend beyond the original format(s) to include merchandizing opportunities as video games, books, comics and clothing.  Dating from 2006, The Real Housewives is an US "reality television" franchise which has thus far yielded 11 geographically different series (The Real Housewives of Dubai including the novelty of being set overseas), more than 20 international adaptations and some two-dozen "spin-offs", some successful, some not.  The Real Housewives of Dubai (RHODubai to the cognoscenti) debuted in mid-2022 but, unfortunately, does not feature noted Dubai resident Lindsay Lohan.  Perhaps it's only a matter of time.

Appurtenance

Appurtenance (pronounced uh-pur-tn-uhns)

(1) Something subordinate to another, more important thing; adjunct; accessory.

(2) In property law, a minor right, interest or privilege, or improvement belonging to and passing with a principal property upon transfer of title.

(3) The apparatus or instruments of a trade, art or profession.

(4) In classical grammar, a modifier that is appended or prepended to another word to coin a new word that expresses belonging (obscure to the point it's used in this context only between consenting grammar Nazis).

1350-1400: From the Middle English appurtenance, from the Anglo-Norman appurtenance (right, privilege or possession subsidiary to a principal one (especially in law); a right, privilege, or "an improvement belonging to a property), from the twelfth century Old French apartenance & apertenance; present participle of apartenir (be related to), from the Late Latin appertinere (to pertain to, belong to), the construct being ad (to) + pertinere (belong; be the right of (and related to the Modern English pertain)), the ultimate root the Latin appertineō (I belong, I appertain).  In the late fourteenth century (in the plural appurtenances) it acquired the meaning "apparatus, gear; tools of the trade", used in the sense now "kit" is often applied.  The adjective appurtenant emerged also in the late fourteenth century in the sense of "belonging, incident, or pertaining to", from the Anglo-French apurtenant, from the Old French apartenant & apertenant, present participle of apartenir (be related to).  Appurtenance is a noun and appurtenant is a noun & adjective; the noun plural is appurtenances.

Even in the twenty-first century, the matter of what is or is not appurtenant to a property can end up in court.  Typically the cases involve certain things being removed from the property after the agreement to purchase was executed.  The case law on these matters document where sellers have removed things like rose bushes, curtains, a decorative letter-box, garden gnomes and wall-hung ceramic ducks.

There’s long been general understanding about the general meaning of appurtenance but, at the margins, there are always lawyers prepared to test the waters.  In Attorney General of Canada v Western Higbie ([1945] Supreme Court of Canada 385), Thibaudeau Rinfret (1879–1962; Chief Justice of Canada 1944-1954) proposed as a definition: “Things belonging to another thing as principal, and which pass as incident to the principal thing.”  The effect he suggested, world be “In general everything which is appendant or appurtenant to land will pass by any conveyance of the land itself, without being specified, and even without the use of the ordinary form with the appurtenances at the end of the description."  Rinfert CJ appeared to suggest the appendix of appurtenances appended usually to the form of transfer either need not exist or need not be wholly inclusive, the implication being it could be used as a place to list those items not thought appurtenances, although, given even his helpful definition didn’t descend to specifics, lengthy appendices might still be expected.

Lindsay Lohan photographed by Life & Style magazine "at home" during one of her court-ordered stays "at home", June 2011.

In this photograph, of that which is "easily" removable, probably only the downlight, stair-rail and electrical switches would be thought appurtenant to the property whereas the the painting, furniture & items on the shelves (as "mere chattels") would not.  Light-fittings are a good example of how the distinction is drawn.  As a general principle, a light fitting is appurtenant if permanently installed and "wired into" the property's wiring system while a free-standing lamp which plugs into a wall-socket is not.  However, disputes can arrive and courts have had to decide, on the facts of each case, if a chandelier is appurtenant.  They've had to adjudicate too in instances where a property is sold "fully furnished" and might thus be called upon to rule on something like the fruit bowl.  Few would doubt the fruit would not be covered by the doctrine but, depending on the circumstances, the fruit bowl might be found so; it would depend on the facts of the case (representations made; photographs or videos in which "fully-furnished" was mentioned etc).  However, the doctrine of appurtenance need not be absolute and is subject at contract to agreement between the parties.  Provided the usual rules of contract are followed, (certainty of terms, lack of coercion etc) either within the documents of sale or as a collateral contract, buyer & seller can agree to exclude items which would usually be held appurtenant or explicitly include "mere chattels" on that basis.  Properly constructed, courts will enforce such contracts.

Defame

Defame (pronounced dih-feym)

(1) To attack the good name or reputation of, as by uttering or publishing maliciously or falsely anything injurious; still in some jurisdictions classified as slander (in speech or by gesture) or libel (something permanent in some sense including writing, images & broadcasting); calumniate.

(2) To disgrace; to bring dishonor upon (dating from the fifteenth century and now archaic).

(3) To indict or accuse (dating from the fourteenth century and long obsolete).

1275–1325: From the Middle English defamen, from the Old French & Anglo-French defamer (verb) & defame (noun) or directly from the Medieval Latin dēfāmāre, a variant of the Medieval & Classical Latin diffāmāre (related to the Classical Latin dēfāmātus (infamous)) (to spread the news of; to spread by unfavorable report; to slander), the construct being dif- (an alternative form of dis- (the prefix form dif- appearing only when the prefix dis- was added to a word beginning with f, as in difficilis (difficult) from facilis (easy), or diffiteor (deny) from fateor (acknowledge)) + -fāmāre (verbal derivative of fāma (news, rumor, slander)),  It replaced the Middle English diffamen, from the Anglo-French & Old French diffamer or directly from Medieval Latin, source the Latin diffāmō, from fāma (fame; rumor; reputation).  The verb defame (speak evil of, maliciously speak or write what injures the reputation of) dates from circa 1300, from the Old French defamer (which in the thirteenth century became the Modern French diffamer).

The construct in English is de- + fame.  The de- prefix was from the Latin dē-, from the preposition dē (of, from (the Old English æf- was a similar prefix).  It imparted the sense of (1) reversal, undoing, removing, (2) intensification and (3) from, off.  Fame was from the Middle English fame, from the Old French fame (celebrity, renown), from the Latin fāma (talk, rumor, report, reputation), from the primitive Indo-European beh-meh from beh (to speak, say, tell).  It was cognate with the Ancient Greek φήμη (phḗmē) (talk) and related to the Old English bōian (to boast), bēn (prayer, request) & bannan (to summon, command, proclaim).  It displaced the Old English hlīsa.  Defame and its derivatives are defined in law but in general use the vaguely synonymous terms include backbite, besmirch, denigrate, derogate, discredit, disgrace, disparage, malign, revile, scandalize, smear, vilify, asperse, belie, blacken, blister, calumniate, detract, dishonor, knock, pan, roast & scorch.  Defame is a noun and verb, defaming is a verbs, defamer & defamation are nouns, defamingly is an adverb, defamed is a verb & adjective and defamatory is an adjective.

Google LLC v Defteros, Case # M86/2021 on appeal from Supreme Court of Victoria (Court of Appeal) (17 June 2021, VSCA 167).

The High Court of Australia (HCA) recently ruled that in certain circumstances, Google (and presumably every other search engine) is not a publisher, the critical point in this case being that a hyperlink generated in an organic search is “merely a tool which enables a person to navigate to another webpage”.  The case before the country’s highest court was an appeal from Victoria’s court of appeal which in 2021 declined to overturn a defamation finding in favor of a lawyer known for representing underworld figures and others associated with organized crime.  The state courts had found Google was the publisher of a defamatory 2004 newspaper article on the basis its search results were instrumental in communicating the content to readers.  Google had argued providing a hyperlink to content did not constitute publication and therefore it could not be liable for any defamatory material in the piece.  Apart from a discussion of the legal principles, counsel for Google also informed the HCA that were the decision of the lower court to be confirmed, it would have a “devastating” impact on the way the internet operates because it would compel search engines individually to see legal opinion on the billions of results to which hyperlinks are daily generated.  Google maintained it acted on the internet only as a navigator responding to users’ requests for directions and it was (and given the volumes had to be) wholly disinterested in the content of that to which its hyperlinks referenced, the operator of the hyperlinked link being the one which communicates (and thus publishes) the content to the user.

The facts of the case were also interesting in that they played out on a time-scale very different to that of most defamation matters.  Google was notified of the article in February 2016, some eleven years after it was published in the newspaper but it was not until December that year that the link was removed from search.  Interestingly, the “removal request form” submitted in 2016 had alleged the original article was defamatory and that proceedings brought against the newspaper in 2007 had resulted in a settlement at mediation which included the deletion of the article.  There was however no such settlement and proceedings against the newspaper had never commenced.  In 2020, the Supreme Count on Victoria (VSC) ruled the article implied the lawyer’s relationship with certain figures in organized crime had gone beyond a professional relationship to the point of being a confidant and friend and he had thus been defamed.  He was awarded damages of Aus$40,000.

In a 5-2 judgment, the HCA ruled in Google’s favor, finding that search engine’s results “merely facilitated access” to the material and that did not reach the threshold required to amount to publication in a legal sense, the point being that Google “…had not participated in the writing or disseminating of the defamatory matter”.  The other side of the HCA’s judgment was that it rejected the claim that search results “enticed” the person searching to open the provided hyperlink and thus proceed to the material on the basis that the person would already be looking for particular information before the result was received.  That was interesting but a wrinkle was added by one judge who differentiated between an organic hyperlink and a sponsored link in which each click generated advertising revenue which accrued to Google.  That matter however did not come before the lower courts and is thus not considered part of the substantive judgment (the ratio decidendi (reason (or rationale) for the decision) but is a piece of obiter dictum (by the way) which, left hanging in the legal air, might in the future be re-visited and, because it involves the core component of the search engines’ business model, interest will be greater still.  There certainly may be more to explore because the court, having found there was no basis for finding publication because Google had not participated in the writing or disseminating of the defamatory matter, noted that "…there being no publication”, the majority found it unnecessary to consider the defenses raised by the appellant.  That was a shame because it might have been an interesting discussion given Google filed, inter alia, defenses of innocent dissemination and qualified privilege.

There were however dissenting opinions, the most interesting of which at length discussed the actual mechanics of Google’s search engine, the succession of algorithms which interact with its indexes to generate the results seen by users.  In the view of one judge, what these components did constituted an “active and voluntary participation in the process that is in fact directed to making matter available for comprehension by a third party” and was thus an act of publication and that moreover neither the defense of innocent dissemination and qualified privilege, nor the defense of statutory qualified privilege available under Victoria’s Defamation Act 2005 were sustained.  The judge also hinted that a distinction between the results generated by organic search and those of sponsored content was not of necessity clear because of the commercial benefits which Google anyway gained through the operation of the search engine.  The other dissenting judge substantially agreed, adding that the matter of publication before the court would have been impossible without the operation of Google’s algorithms which “intentionally assisted in the process of conveying the words bearing defamatory meaning to a third party” and that publication would not have occurred but for Google’s facilitation.

So, the HCA has issued what is (for now) a definitive ruling on a search engine’s liability for third-party publications to which it has directed users, finding there is none, rejecting even the analogy cited by the lower court of a librarian handing someone a book with a certain page marked, preferring the example of someone in the street being asked for direction to a bookshop which turned out to have on its shelves a book containing a defamatory passage.  It seems inevitable that at least some of the matters raised in Google LLC v Defteros will again be litigated and analogies similes and metaphors will return to the battle.  Whether long-established legal principles can be reconciled with a public policy which would seem to suggest the algorithms of the search engines are acknowledged now to be an essential part of modern life, remains to be seen.

Meet our spokesperson.  With experience in civil litigation and other legal matters, Lindsay Lohan was a good choice to be lawyer.com's spokesperson.

Noted litigant Lindsay Lohan hasn’t enjoyed great success in her defamation suits, even when pursued on the basis of commercial rights.  In 2015, a defamation case against Fox News was dismissed, the judge ruling (perhaps unfairly given the nature of the evidence), "truth is a defense" (and in the US it is an absolute defense).  The case concerned Ms Lohan and her mother and according to their filing, Fox News “falsely, inappropriately, and shockingly” stated, unequivocally and as a “matter of fact” stated “Lindsay Lohan’s mother is doing cocaine with her”.  The judge noted Ms Lohan’s mother is a public figure and that the statements made on Fox News were not made maliciously (in US law two vital points used to determine whether or not something is at law, considered defamatory).  Interestingly Fox News had formally apologized for what they called an “oversight” in airing the piece, noting the evidence later introduced couldn’t verify the claim and that the material had been removed from their archives.

Just a little removed from defamation law was a writ she filed in 2010 against E-Trade in 2010 for using her name in one of their television advertisements without her permission. The commercial, which was played during the Super Bowl, featured a "milkaholic" baby named Lindsay and the basis for the suit was the claim E-Trade as mocking her drug and alcohol-related problems.  In response to the US$100 million claim, E-Trade responded with little more than an explanation that there are in the world, many Lindsays.  After some six months, the lawsuit was withdrawn, the terms of the settlement subject to a non-disclosure agreement (NDA).

Lindsay Lohan returned to court in 2011, suing hip hop artist Pitbull over the lyrics in his song Give Me Everything, which included the line: So, I’m toptoein’, to keep flowin’, I got it locked up, like Lindsay Lohan.  Ms Lohan cited the lyric as a violation of her publicity and publicity rights which caused her emotional distress, claiming the lyrics “includes an unwarranted, unauthorized, and unfavorable mention of [her] name and personality, and allusions to her physical and mental character.”  The judge dismissed on technical grounds the claim made under New York Civil Rights law, adding that the First Amendment anyway affords full protection.  What was more interesting was the discussion of the argument the song was commercial rather than expressive in nature, the judge ruling that even if the work was created for the purpose of “making a profit”, that does not mean her name was “used for advertising or purposes of trade within the meaning of the New York law“ and that, on the facts of this case, even if that were proved, the “isolated nature of the use of her name” (just one line in the song) would “prove fatal” to the claims.  Putbull’s counsel indicated they wished to have the court sanction Ms Lohan for filing a frivolous lawsuit (an abuse of process) but the judge, noting the paucity of case law in this field, said the lack of precedent meant there was no clear indication the case would be doomed and the claim was therefore not so frivolous as to warrant the imposition of a sanction.  Lindsay Lohan thus remained free to litigate, which she did.

Basic

Basic (pronounced bey-sik)

(1) Of, relating to, or forming a base; fundamental.

(2) In chemistry, pertaining to, of the nature of, or containing a base; alkaline.

(3) In metallurgy, noting, pertaining to, or made by a steelmaking process (basic process) in which the furnace or converter is lined with a basic or non-siliceous material, mainly burned magnesite and a small amount of ground basic slag, to remove impurities from the steel.

(4) In geology, descriptor of a rock having relatively little silica.

(5) In military use, the lowest or initial form of anything (chiefly US).

(6) In popular culture, the adjectival part of a slang term for a sub-set of females characterized by predictable or unoriginal style, interests, or behavior.

(7) Of things elementary in character, essential, key, primary, basal, underlying.

(8) As a computer industry acronym, (BASIC and its forks, QBASIC, BASICA etc), a long-lived programming language: B(eginner's) A(ll-purpose) S(ymbolic) I(nstruction) C(ode).

1832:  Originally from chemistry (base + ic) and adopted by about every other field.  The programming language was created in 1964 by Hungarian-born US-based computer scientist John Kemeny (1926-1992) and US computer scientist Thomas Kurtz (b 1928).  Use to describe a female sub-set dates from 2005.

The Basic Bitch

Basic bitch, often truncated to the (sometimes affectionate) "basic", is a US pop-culture term.  Although use outgrew its origins, it was intended as a pejorative descriptor of white, middle class females with boringly predictable, mainstream tastes in consumer goods and culture.  Variously interpreted as a variation on the earlier airhead, a general expression of misogyny and another unsuccessful attempt to invent a term white people would find offensive, basic bitch briefly generated a sizable critique.  Although expressions of disapproval of hollow consumer culture had became common even before publication of JK Galbraith's (1908–2006) The Affluent Society (1958) made it a bit of a thing, basic bitch seemingly offended just about all the usual suspects in the grievance industry.

Feminists found it misogynistic and weren’t at mollified by the emergence of a term of male equivalence, their general position probably demanding the dismissal of all cultural feminine signifiers.  To them, the specifics were tiresomely irrelevant; basic bitch was just another way to demean women.  The left generally agreed, arguing it was unhelpful to target a stereotype of late capitalist femininity rather than adhere to their critique of consumer culture.  Western capitalism, neutral on the squabble, soon commodified:

Less predictable was the race-based criticism.  Basic bitch was considered yet another attempt to create a term of disparagement to describe the white folk which they would find actually offensive and in that, like all previous attempts, it didn’t work.  However, it clearly made sense only if applied to white, middle-class females so had the effect of creating yet another exclusive enclave of white privilege and one which, by definition, excluded other ethnicities, even if becoming a basic bitch was their aspiration.  First noted in 2005 in a sub-set of popular music, "basic bitch" entered mainstream use circa 2009 and use appears to have peaked in 2014 although term may persist because it references a mode of behavior rather than anything specific to a time or place; it’s thus adaptable and generationally transferrable.  It’s also an amusing example of one aspect of how Sisyphean battles in the pop-culture wars are waged.  All those who coined the alliterative basic bitch were saying was “our taste in pop music is better than their taste in pop music”.

In the matter of Judge Eugene Fahey

Lindsay Lohan v Take-Two Interactive Software Inc et al, New York Court of Appeals (No 24, pp1-11, 29 March 2018) was a case which took an unremarkable four years from filing to reach New York’s highest appellate court; Lindsay Lohan’s suit against the makers of video game Grand Theft Auto V was dismissed.  In a unanimous ruling in March 2018, six judges of the New York Court of Appeals rejected her invasion of privacy claim which alleged one of the game’s characters was based on her.  The judges found the "actress/singer" in the game merely resembled a “generic young woman” rather than anyone specific.  Unfortunately the judges seemed unacquainted with the concept of the “basic white girl” which might have made the judgment more of a fun read.

Beware of imitations: The real Lindsay Lohan and the GTA 5 ersatz, a mere "generic young woman".

Concurring with the 2016 ruling of the New York County Supreme Court which, on appeal, also found for the game’s makers, the judges, as a point of law, accepted the claim a computer game’s character "could be construed a portrait", which "could constitute an invasion of an individual’s privacy" but, on the facts of the case, the likeness was "not sufficiently strong".  The “… artistic renderings are an indistinct, satirical representation of the style, look and persona of a modern, beach-going young woman... that is not recognizable as the plaintiff" Judge Eugene Fahey (b 1951) wrote in his ruling.  Judge Fahey's words recalled those of Potter Stewart (1915–1985; associate justice of the US Supreme Court 1958-1981) when in Jacobellis v Ohio (378 U.S. 184 (1964) he wrote: “I shall not today attempt further to define… and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so.  But I know it when I see it…”  Judge Fahey knew a basic white girl when he saw one; he just couldn't name her.  Lindsay Lohan's lawyers did not seek leave to appeal.