Aggression

Aggression (pronounced uh-gresh-uhn)

(1) The action of a state in violating by force the rights of another state, particularly its territorial rights; an unprovoked offensive, attack, invasion, or the like.

(2) Any offensive action, attack, or procedure; an inroad or encroachment.

(3) The practice of making assaults or attacks; offensive action in general.

(4) In clinical psychiatry, overt or suppressed hostility, either innate or resulting from continued frustration and directed outward or against oneself.

(5) In the study of animal behavior and zoology, behavior intended to intimidate or injure an animal of the same species or of a competing species but is not predatory.  Aggression may be displayed during mating rituals or to defend territory, as by the erection of fins by fish and feathers by birds.

1605–1615: English borrowed the word directly from the French aggression, derived from the Latin aggressionem (nominative aggressio (a going to, an attack)), a noun of action from past participle stem of aggredi (to approach; attack) a construct of ad (to) + gradi (past participle gressus (to step)) from gradus (a step).  The Classical Latin aggressiōn (stem of aggressiō), was equivalent to aggress(us) + iōn derived from aggrēdi (to attack).  Psychological sense of "hostile or destructive behavior" had its origin in early psychiatry, first noted in English in 1912 in a translation of Freud.  Related forms are antiaggression (adjective), counteraggression and preaggression (nouns); most frequently used derived form is aggressor (noun).

Aggression and International Jurisprudence, Locarno, Kellogg–Briand and the Nuremberg Trial

For centuries, philosophers, moral theologians and other peripheral players had written of the ways and means of outlawing wars of aggression but in the twentieth century, in the aftermath of the carnage of World War I (1914-1918), serious attempts were made to achieve exactly that, the first of which was the Locarno Pact.

Gustav Stresemann, Austen Chamberlain & Aristide Briand, Locarno, 1926.

Although usually referred to as the Locarno Pact, technically the pact consisted of seven treaties, the name derived from the Swiss city of Locarno at which the agreements negotiated between 5-16 October, 1925 although the documents were formally signed in London on 1 December.  Cynically, it can be said the Locarno Pact was a device by the western European powers to ensure they’d not again be the victims of German aggression which, if and when if were to happen, would be directed against those countries on its eastern border.  Of the seven treaties, it was the first which mattered most, a guarantee of the existing frontiers of Belgium, France, and Germany, underwritten by the UK and Italy.  Of the other agreements, two were intended to reassure the recently created Czechoslovakia and the recreated Poland, both of which, presciently as it turned out, felt some threat from Germany.

Whatever the implications, the intent was clear and about as pure as anything in politics can be: an attempt to ensure European states would never again need to resort to war.  Although the structural imbalances appear, in retrospect, obvious, at the time there were expectations of continued peaceful settlements and there arose, for a while, what was called the "spirit of Locarno": Germany was admitted to the League of Nations in September 1926, with a permanent seat on its council and Nobel Peace Prizes were awarded to the lead negotiators of the treaty, Sir Austen Chamberlain (1863-1937; UK foreign secretary 1924-1929), Aristide Briand (1862-1932; French foreign minister 1926-1932) and Gustav Stresemann (1878-1929; German foreign minister 1923-1929).

Members of the Cabinet, Senate, and House are seen gathered in the East Room of the White House, after President Coolidge and Secretary of State Kellogg signed the Kellogg-Briand Pact.

The spirit of Locarno proved infectious and inspired the noble notion it might be possible for men to gather around tables and sign papers which for all time would outlaw war and the Kellogg–Briand Pact (known also as the Pact of Paris and technically the General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy) was a product of this optimism.  Signed in 1928 and named after the two main authors, Briand and Frank Kellogg (1856-1937; US Secretary of State 1925-1929), it was soon ratified by dozens of countries, all the signatory states promising not to use war to resolve "disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them".  It gained Kellogg his Nobel Peace Prize but peace proved elusive and in little more than a decade, the world was at war.  Another point cynics note is that the real consequence of the pact was not the prevention of war but the unfashionability of declaring war; wars continuing with a thin veneer of legal high-gloss.  Anthony Eden (1897-1977; UK prime-minister 1955-1957) during the Suez Crisis (1956), noting no declaration had been made, distinguished between being “at war” and being in “a state of armed conflict” although those on the battlefield doubtless noticed no difference.  Because the pact was concluded outside the League of Nations, it remains afoot and the influence lingers; although hardly militarily inactive since 1945, the last declaration of war by the United States was in 1942.

Defendants at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE), popularly known as the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal.

Kellogg–Briand thus failed but was a vitally important twentieth century instrument.  It was from Kellogg-Briand the prosecutors at the Nuremberg Trial in 1945-1946 were able to find the concept of a crime against peace as pre-existing law that was of such importance in establishing the legal validity of the incitements, both there and at the subsequent Tokyo Tribunal.  Without that legal framework from the 1920s, the construction of the legal basis for the concept of crimes against peace (the first two of the four articles of indictment at Nuremberg), may not have been possible.

At Nuremburg, the indictments served by the International Military Tribunals were:

(1) Conspiracy to plan the waging of wars of aggression.

(2) Planning, initiating and waging wars of aggression.

(3) War crimes.

(4) Crimes against humanity.

It’s always been the fourth which has attracted most attention because the crimes committed were of such enormity and on such as scale, the word genocide had to be invented.  However, the greater effect on international law was the creation of the notion that those who plan wars of aggression can be punished for that very act, punishments wholly unrelated to the mechanics or consequences of how the wars may be fought.  Form this point can be traced the end of the centuries-old legal doctrine of sovereign immunity for those waging wars of aggression.

So, after Nuremberg, the long tradition of the preemptive and preventative war as an instrument of political policy was no longer the convenient option it had for thousands of years been.  With section 4 of the United Nations (UN) Charter prohibiting all members from exercising "the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state", there was obvious interest in the charter's phrase phrase of exculpation: "armed attack" which effectively limited the parameters of the circumstances in which the use of military force might be legitimate under international law.  Stretching things as far as even the most accommodating of impartial lawyers were prepared to reach, if no armed attack has been suffered, for an act of preemptive self-defense to be lawful, (1) a threat must be demonstratively real and not merely a perception of the possible and (2), the force applied in self-defense must be proportional to the harm threatened.  All this is why General Colin Powell's (1937–2021; US Secretary of State 2001-2005) statement of justification to the Security Council seeking authority to invade Iraq in 2003 took the tortured form it did.

Mr Putin.

The state of international law is why President Vladimir Putin (b 1952; prime-minister or president of Russia since 1999) has resorted to some unusual terminology and some impressive, if not entirely convincing, intellectual gymnastics in his explanations of geography and history.  While hardly the direct and unambiguous speech used by some of his predecessors in the Kremlin, it's certainly kept the Kremlinologists and their readers interested.  As early as December 2020, Mr Putin was already using the phrase "military-technical measures" should NATO (again) approach Russia's borders and the charm of that presumably was that having no precise meaning, it could at any time mean what Mr Putin wanted it to mean at that moment.  Mr Putin also claimed the government in the Ukraine is committing genocide against ethnic Russians within the territory and, in an echo of similar claims from the troubled 1930s "seemed to believe his own atrocity stories", later doubling-down, calling the Ukranian government a "Nazi regime" and said he was seeking a process of "de-Nazification" (an actual structured and large-scale programme run in post-war Germany by the occupying forces aimed at removing the worst elements of the Third Reich from public life).  

Most interestingly, Mr Putin said Ukraine wasn’t a real country, a significant point if true because it's only foreign countries which can be invaded.  If a government moves troops into parts of their own territory, it's not an invasion; it might be a police action, a counter-insurgency or a military exercise or any number of things but it can't be an invasion.  Technically of course, that applies also to renegade provinces.  It seemed an adventurous argument to run given Ukraine has for decades been a member of the UN and recognized by just about every country (including Russia) as a sovereign state.  To clarify, Mr Putin added the odd nuance, claiming Ukraine was "...not a real country..." and had "...never had its own authentic statehood."  "There has never been a sustainable statehood in Ukraine.”  The basis of that was his assertion that Ukraine was created by the Soviet Union's first leader, Vladimir Lenin (1870–1924; Leader of Soviet Russia 1917-1924 & the USSR 1922-1924) as either a sort of administrative zone or just as a mistake depending on interpretation.  Ignoring the wealth of historical material documenting the pre-Soviet history of the Ukraine, Mr Putin insisted it was part of Russia, an "...integral part of our own history, culture, spiritual space.”

Having established his case the Ukraine was no foreign country but just another piece of Russia, Mr Putin turned his thoughts to the nature of the threat the obviously renegade province posed.  Although after the collapse of the USSR, the Ukraine voluntarily (and gratefully) gave up the nuclear weapons in its territory in exchange for a security guarantees issued by the US, UK, and Russia, Mr Putin expressed concern the neo-Nazi regime there had both the knowledge and the desire to obtain nuclear weapons and delivery systems, adding: “If Ukraine acquires weapons of mass destruction, the situation in the world and in Europe will drastically change, especially for us, for Russia... we cannot but react to this real danger, all the more so since, let me repeat, Ukraine’s Western patrons may help it acquire these weapons to create yet another threat to our country.”

The internal logic of this was perfect to satisfy international law: (1) The territory which on maps is called Ukraine is not a country and just a part of Russia and (2), the illegal administration running the renegade province of Ukraine is plotting to acquire weapons of mass-destruction.  Under those conditions, military action by Moscow would be valid under international law but just to make sure, Mr Putin recognized Donetsk and Luhansk (two separatist regions in the Donbas), and deployed Russian troops as "peacekeepers".  Around the world, just about everybody except the usual suspects called it an invasion.

Many also discussed the legal position, perhaps not a great consolation to the citizens of Ukraine and the limitations of international law had anyway long been understood by those who were most hopeful of their civilizing power.  In his report to President Truman (1884–1972; US president 1945-1953) at the conclusion of the Nuremberg trial (1945-1946), Justice Robert Jackson (1892–1954; sometime justice of the US Supreme Court, US solicitor general & attorney general and chief US prosecutor at the Nuremberg trials), noted the judgment had "...for the first time made explicit and unambiguous what was theretofore, as the Tribunal has declared, implicit in International Law, namely, that to prepare, incite, or wage a war of aggression, or to conspire with others to do so, is a crime against international society, and that to persecute, oppress, or do violence to individuals or minorities on political, racial, or religious grounds in connection with such a war, or to exterminate, enslave, or deport civilian populations, is an international crime, and that for the commission of such crimes individuals are responsible. This agreement also won the adherence of nineteen additional nations and represents the combined judgments of the overwhelming majority of civilized people. It is a basic charter in the International Law of the future."  However, his idealism tempered by what he knew to be the nature of men, he conceded it would be "... extravagant to claim that agreements or trials of this character can make aggressive war or persecution of minorities impossible." although he did add that there was no doubt "they strengthen the bulwarks of peace and tolerance."  One of the US judges at Nuremburg had, whatever the theoretical legal position, reached an even more gloomy conclusion, Francis Biddle (1886–1968; US solicitor general 1940-1941 & attorney general 1941-1945 and primary US judge at the Nuremberg Trials) writing to the president that the judgements he'd helped deliver couldn't prevent war but might help men to "... learn a little better to detest it."  "Aggressive war was once romantic, now it is criminal."

Biddle was a realist who understood the forces which operated within legal systems and nation states.  Even the long-serving liberal judge William O Douglas (1898–1980; associate justice of the US Supreme Court 1939-1975) couldn’t bring himself to accept that the aggression which led to World War II (1939-1945) in which as many a sixty millions died was not reason enough to overcome his aversion to ex post facto law (the construct being the Latin ex (from) + post (after) + facto, ablative of factum (deed), (that which retrospectively changes the legal consequences of actions from what would have applied prior to the application of the law).  Douglas deplored the way the IMT had not only convicted but imposed capital sentences of those indicted for conduct which has at time been legal under metropolitan and international law:

“No matter how many books are written or briefs filed, no matter how finely the lawyers analyzed it, the crime for which the Nazis were tried had never been formalized as a crime with the definiteness required by our legal standards, nor outlawed with a death penalty by the international community. By our standards that crime arose under ex post facto law. Goering et al. deserved severe punishment. But their guilt did not justify us in substituting power for principle.”

Developments since in international law have seen progress.  The United Nations Charter, adopted in 1945, prohibits the use of force by one state against another, except in cases of self-defense or when authorized by the UN Security Council for the purpose of maintaining or restoring international peace and security, Article 2(4) of the UN Charter stating “all Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state."  That works in conjunction with the Nuremberg Principles which declared the planning, preparation, initiation, or execution of a war of aggression is a crime against peace and a violation of international law, a more concrete underpinning of customary international law than the Kellogg-Briand Pact which was in the same vein but always was of limited practical application because there existed no mechanism of enforcement or codification of penalties.  Despite that, the core concept of just what does constitute the crime of “aggressive war” has never been generally agreed and although the UN’s 1974 statement: “Aggression is the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations.” seems compelling, the debate continues.

Quire

Quire (pronounced kwahyuhr)

(1) A set of twenty-four (24) uniform sheets of paper (in commerce, sometimes sold as twenty-five (25) sheets, analogous with baker’s dozen); a twentieth of a ream.

(2) In bookbinding, a section of printed leaves in proper sequence after folding; gathering; usually four sheets of paper folded once to form a section of 16 pages.

(3) An alternative spelling of choir (archaic except in church architecture).

(4) A book, poem, or pamphlet (archaic).

(5) In church architecture, one quarter of a cruciform church, the area of a church or cathedral that provides seating for the clergy and singer of the choir (choir & quire used interchangeably until the mid-nineteenth century when the former began to prevail, providing a useful distinction between the singers and the place they stood).

1175–1225: From the Middle English quayer, from the Anglo-Norman quaier (a short book) & quier, from the Old French quaier & caier (sheet of paper folded in four (which evolved into the Modern French cahier)) & quaer, from the Medieval Latin quaternum (set of four sheets of parchment or paper, from the Vulgar Latin quaternus, from the Classical Latin quarternī (four each)).  The root of the Latin quater (four times) was the primitive Indo-European kwetwer (four).  The meaning “a standard unit for selling paper" was first recorded in the late fourteenth century and the phrase “in quires” is attested from the late fifteenth, meaning "unbound."  The meaning "a standard unit for selling paper" (which became typically 24 (two dozen) or 25 (one twentieth of a ream)) sheets is recorded from the late fourteenth century and by the mid fifteenth-century, quires had come to mean also "unbound" in the sense of loose-leaf.  Quire was also an early form and later variant spelling of the Middle English choir from the Old French quer & queor, variants of cuer and the related word was the Medieval Latin quorus, a variant of chorus.  The word is a homophone of choir and doublet of cahier.  Quire is a noun and quired & quiring are verbs; the noun plural is quires.

The quire, Westminster Abbey, London.

Otiose

Otiose (pronounced oh-shee-ohs or oh-tee-ohs)

(1) Being at leisure; idle; indolent (rare).

(2) Ineffective or futile.

(3) Having no reason for being (raison d’être); having no point, superfluous or useless, having no reason or purpose.

(4) Done in a careless or perfunctory manner (rare).

1794: From the Latin ōtiōsus (having leisure or ease, unoccupied, idle, not busy, undisturbed), the construct being ōti(um) (leisure, spare time, freedom from business) + -ōsus (the adjectival suffix); source of the French oiseux, the Spanish ocioso and the Italian otioso, from ōtium (leisure, free time, freedom from business) of unknown origin.  The meaning "at leisure, idle" dates from 1850, often quoted in the literature of the time in the Latin phrase otium cum dignitate (leisure with dignity).  The earlier adjective in English was otious (at ease) from the 1610s and Middle English had the late fifteenth century noun otiosity.  The -ōsus suffix was from the Old Latin -ōsos, from -ōnt-to-s, from the Proto-Italic -owonssos, from -o-wont-to-s, the last being a combination of two primitive Indo-European suffixes: -went- (& -wont-) and –to.

Otium cum dignitate: Lindsay Lohan enjoying a dignified rest, Los Angeles, 2014.

Periscope

Periscope (pronounced per-uh-skohp)

(1) Any of a number of optical instruments used to view objects that are above the level of direct sight or in an otherwise obstructed field of vision, consisting essentially of a tube with an arrangement of prisms or mirrors and, usually, lenses; used especially in submarines and military reconnaissance.

(2) A periscopic lens.

(3) A now defunct live video streaming app for Android and iOS, acquired by Twitter (before launch) in 2015 and depreciated between 2016-2021.

(4) A general or comprehensive view (obsolete).

1815–1825: The construct was peri + scope, a back formation from periscopic from the Ancient Greek periskopein (to look around).  Peri- was from the Ancient Greek περί (perí) (about, around) and was cognate with the primitive Indo-European via.  Scope was from the From Italian scopo (purpose), from the Latin scopus (target), from the Ancient Greek σκοπέω (skopéō) & σκοπός (skopós) (examine, inspect, look to or into, consider), from σκέπτομαι (sképtomai), from the primitive Indo-European speḱ- and etymologically related to both skeptic and spectrum.  Periscope is a noun (and a largely archaic verb), periscopic is an adjective and periscopically an adverb.  The present participle is periscoping and the past participle periscoped); the noun plural is periscopes.

Periscope concepts using mirrors and lens.

Although variations of the device had existed for decades, the word periscope either wasn’t used or was at least not in general use before 1899 but as early as 1865 it attested as a technical term in photography.  The concept of the periscope (then called the polemoscope) and using two angled lens had been described as early a 1647 in a work discussing the geological nature of the moon although then it was envisaged as device suitable for military observation.  Undocumented and undated sketches thought to date from decades earlier have also been unearthed but, although conceptually accurate, their exact purpose is unclear and they may have been architectural drawings.

Kim Jong-un (b circa 1994, Supreme Leader or DPRK (North Korea) since 2011), looking through the periscope of DPRK submarine.

The first naval periscopes appeared in 1854, constructed by placing two mirrors in a vertical tube, fixed at each end at a 45° angle and were a noted feature of the early submarines used in the US Civil War (1861-1865); by the dawn of the twentieth century they’d begun regularly to be part of the design although the great innovation was the retractable periscope in 1902, then known as the skalomniscope or omniscope.  The retractable periscope quickly became a standard fitting to submarines and proved an important factor in the success they enjoyed during the First World War.

Kim Jong-un looking at South Korea through infantry observation periscopic binoculars.

Surprisingly, given how simple the adaptation would have been, periscopes were little-used by nineteenth century armies but proved to be an invaluable addition to the kit in the trench warfare of 1914-1918, providing a wide vista for observation without exposing the viewer to the risk of attracting sniper fire.  One invention which proved of less utility was the so-called periscope-rifle, a kind of remote-controlled infantry rifle mounted atop the trench parapet, aimed and fired by a soldier in a safe position below.  Success was limited.  More useful were devices called stereoscopic rangefinders, periscopic binoculars with grids which enabled trained observers to estimate the distance to a target.

The Lamborghini Countach "Periscopio"

1971 Lamborghini Countach LP500 concept (note periscopio bulge in the centre of roof).

When shown at the 1961 Geneva Motor Show, the Jaguar E-Type (XKE) created a sensation.  At the same event, ten years later, the Lamborghini Countach LP500 created almost as much excitement and its lines have been the template for most Lamborghinis since.  In a sense, progress in the design of such machines paused at that point, everything since (and not just by Lamborghini) a refinement of the yellow wedge.  Although it was a small and functionally unsatisfactory aspect of the dramatic LP500, it was the abortive periscopio (periscope) which would be used to characterize the first 157 (some sources insist 158) LP400 production cars, the periscopio rear view concept lending the roof its distinct shape.  The factory’s documents don’t reveal whether the idea of the periscope was the inspiration of an individual or emerged from a committee but the thought was that in such a low-slung vehicle, the driver would be afforded a better view from a lens mounted atop the roof than would be provided by a conventional rear-view mirror aligned with the rear-window.  Donnelly Corporation in the US delivered a working version of the periscope mirror system, a number of which had actually be built in the era for use in the ESV (Experimental Safety Vehicle) projects which a number of manufacturers had developed to test their implementation of the engineering which would be required to conform with the safety regulations soon to come into force.

1974 Lamborghini Countach LP400 roof detail.

However, during testing, it became obvious it was not a desirable solution, the positioning dictated by the then unique profile requiring the driver too often to avert their eyes from what was ahead adequately to focus on what lay behind.  Nor did the designers warm to the small bulge which would have to be added to the roofline to accommodate the hardware; aesthetics meant little to those who penned ESVs but they were prized by Italian stylists and consequently the periscope was abandoned.  However, whether for reasons of economy or constraints of time, although the bulge was deleted, the remaining periscopio roof shape was retained and in 1974 entered production as part of the LP400 although it now provided no obvious functional advantage except making the cabin a little brighter and perhaps adding some rigidity to the structure although there may have been some aerodynamic cost, the interruption to what would otherwise be a smooth surface presumably generating additional drag.  Whatever the drawbacks however, stylistically, it’s always been admired.

1977 Lamborghini Countach LP400.

Those first 157 LP400s were also the closest the production cars would be to the original, unadorned wedge which had made such an impact when displayed at the 1971 Geneva Motor Show as the Lamborghini LP500 concept.  That it was described as a concept was important because the LP500, although fully-functional, was no prototipo (prototype), and the uncompromising original could not without modification be transformed into a practical production car, hence the many scoops to ensure adequate cooling as well as the deletion of the periscope, changes to the construction method used for the frame, a reduced-capacity engine, the substitution of analogue instruments for the space-age electronica and some enlargement of the platform to make the thing more habitable.  Still, the LP400 was remarkably close to the startling original and tellingly, of all two-thousand odd which would in five generations be produced between 1974-1990, it would be the one with the best aerodynamics, the wings, flares and fat tyres added over the years all adding to drag.  If the smooth roof, introduced on the LP400 S in 1978, improved aerodynamics, it wasn’t enough to compensate.

The influential but short-lived service

The evolution of the internet since it began to assume its modern form (after the world wide web was “bolted on” in 1991, gaining something like critical mass around 1993) is characterized by a number of separate, parallel and sometimes intersecting threads and probably no application (although technically it was a service) was so emblematic of the trends than Periscope.  Periscope was created because someone found the then text-only Twitter (now X) compelling but was annoyed at having to go elsewhere look for video feeds relating to what was being tweeted.  The Periscope model was to take advantage of the ubiquity of (1) smartphones meaning high-definition video could, worldwide, be created by billions of users at a moment’s notice and (2) the increasing availability of bandwidth which made real-time streaming practical and what emerged was a system noted for its simplicity; a few taps and whatever one was filming was being streamed.

Send (left) & receive (right): Periscope's simple streaming model.    

In the way corporations sometimes do things, Twitter bought Periscope even before the product’s official release and success was immediate, the service quickly among the most popular with support notably coming from legacy broadcasters including the BBC which used the system as a low-cost form of content dissemination; in effect what used to be an “outside broadcast van” (literally a truck packed with cameras and transmission equipment which, with staff and other overheads cost sometimes millions a year to run and could be in one place at a time) was suddenly in the pockets of every staff member.  It was also in the pockets of everyone else, some of who were entrepreneurial and before long, Periscope streams of live events (for which broadcasters and others had paid sometimes millions for exclusive rights) and content on screens (cinemas, televisions etc) were being packaged for profit, cannibalizing many pay-per-view (PPV) business models.  A flurry of takedown notices (a specialized form of a C&D (cease & desist letter) ensued.  Periscope however became a victim of its own success, its model quickly available in many other ways and its functionality was “folded into” Twitter, the service discontinued in March 2021, much of the (not legally challenged) legacy content remaining available on X to this day.

Blackball

Blackball (pronounced blak-bawl)

(1) To reject (blackball) a candidate for membership of something, secretly by placing a black ball in a ballot box.

(2) In casual use, socially to exclude; ostracize.

(3) Openly to vote against a candidate or applicant for membership of something (non-traditional use).

(4) A hard-boiled sweet with black & white stripes (NZ).

(5) In billiards and related games, the black ball.

(6) In professional surfing, a flag to tell surfers they must clear the water.

(7) A slang term for the US baseball leagues (1920-1958) comprising teams made up predominantly of African-Americans and Hispanic-Americans.  

1760–1770: The construct was black + ball; sometimes written as black-ball.  Black is from the Middle English blak, black & blake, from the Old English blæc (black, dark (also "ink”), from the Proto-West Germanic blak, from the Proto-Germanic blakaz (burnt) and related to the Dutch blaken (to burn), the Low German blak & black (blackness, black paint, (black) ink), the Old High German blah (black), which may be from the primitive Indo-European bhleg- (to burn, shine).  The forms may be compared with the Latin flagrāre (to burn), the Ancient Greek φλόξ (phlóx) (flame) and Sanskrit भर्ग (bharga) (radiance).  Ball was from the Middle English bal, ball & balle, from the Old English beall & bealla (round object, ball) or the Old Norse bǫllr (a ball), both from the Proto-Germanic balluz & ballô (ball), from the primitive Indo-European bholn- (bubble), from the primitive Indo-European bhel- (to blow, inflate, swell).  It was cognate with the Old Saxon ball, the Dutch bal, the Old High German bal & ballo, and the German Ball (ball) & Ballen (bale).  It’s thought all related forms in the Romance languages are borrowings from the Germanic.  In general use, meaning is now often extended to describing any veto, not just the secret form of the original blackballing and thus it's long been common for "blackballed", "blackballing" etc to be used to describe a pubic vetoing. 

The Secret Veto

A Masonic ballot-box.

Blackballing is a traditional form of secret ballot, used when the constitution of an organization permits applicants for membership to be vetoed by one or more existing members.  Typically members will convene and when asked to vote on the candidate for membership, each places one ball in the ballot box, a white ball signifying a vote in support, a black ball a veto.  The ballot-box is designed in such a way that while it can be seen who has voted, there’s no way to tell which ball they dropped.  Historically, acceptance often demanded unanimity so a single black ball was enough to exercise a veto but some organizations specify two blacks and there are always collateral rules about the process of notification of an applicant’s name and the number of existing members who need to be present to constitute the quorum required to render the vote legitimate.  Originally, the balls were made of ivory, hardwood or marble but composites became popular and in some some Masonic lodges, a black cube was used instead of a black ball so it could more easily be differentiated from a discolored white ball, the lighting in the halls often kept dim further to maintain the secrecy of the process although it's said the Freemasons often conduct their rituals and practices in at least semi-darkness.  Since the seventeenth century, these rules have applied to elections to membership of the Freemasons and many gentlemen's clubs, the practice adopted also by academia in the Soviet Union when members of dissertation panels cast their votes on a thesis defense.  It’s not known if the Secret Society of the Les Clefs d’Or uses the process.

Get Well Soon (Lindsay Lohan) (2007), silkscreen on canvas, by ©Scott Hug on Blackball Projects.

Black Ball Projects is a US-based, non-profit arts collective, founded in 2015 with the mission of providing gallery space for contemporary artists unable to secure exposure through mainstream channels.  Created by and for those described as “working diligently on the periphery of the greater art world”, Black Ball Projects’ charter is to support DEI (diversity, equity and inclusion) in the production and display of art, noting the present inequalities in representation on the basis of gender, race and economic opportunity.  Black Ball Projects has thus far curated some 30 physical exhibitions and three online viewing rooms, the scope of which was expanded during the COVID-19 pandemic.  Black Ball Projects is funded by donations and sales of donated works from participating artists.  In 2019 it was officially declared a Non-Profit Arts Organization (501(c)(3)) and thus granted federal tax-exemption status.

Squinch

Squinch (pronounced skwinch)

(1) In architecture, a small arch, corbeling, or the like, built across the interior angle between two walls, as in a square tower for supporting the side of a superimposed octagonal spire or generally to support any superstructure such as a spire or dome.  Also called a squinch arch.

(2) To contort (the features) or squint (now rare).

(3) To squeeze together or crouch down, as to fit into a smaller space (now rare).

1490–1500: A variant of the obsolete scunch, short for scuncheon, from the Middle English sconch(e)on from the middle Middle French escoinson (The reveal of an aperture (such as a door or window) from the frame to the inner face of the wall) & esconchon.  Escoinson is drawn from its original formation es- & ex- (both from the Latin ex (out of, from)) + coin (corner).  The meaning in the sense of a squinting of the eyes emerged during the 1830s, the origin uncertain but likely an imperfect echoic.

The Hagia Sofia

Built by Byzantine Emperor Justinian I between 532 and 537 AD, the Hagia Sophia ((from the Greek `Αγία Σοφία (Holy Wisdom), Sancta Sophia or Sancta Sapientia in Latin)) sits at what has often been the strategically important point on the Bosporus between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, long thought the boundary between Europe and Asia.

The four minarets were added at different times after 1453.  Thought aesthetically successful, they add also to structural integrity.

The Hagia Sophia was originally a Greek Orthodox Christian patriarchal cathedral in Constantinople (modern day Istanbul, Turkey), consecrated briefly as a Catholic church in the thirteenth century.  Noted for its vast dome, it was an extraordinary achievement of engineering, architecture and mathematics, for centuries the biggest building on Earth, remaining the largest cathedral for nearly a thousand years until the dedication in 1520 of the basilica in Seville.  In 1453, when Constantinople fell to the Ottomans, it became a mosque, remaining one until 1935, when, as part of the modernity project that was the Turkish Republic created by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881–1938; (President of the Republic of Turkey 1923-1938)), it was made a museum, later becoming one of the country’s most popular tourist attractions.

Hagia Sofia dome with four (corner) squinch arches with supporting pendentives.

The pendentive is the construction element which permits a dome to be placed over a square or rectangular space.  Pendentives are triangular segments of a sphere that spread at the top, tapering to points at the bottom, thereby enabling the continuous circular or elliptical base needed to support the dome.  The horizontal curve of the dome’s base is connected directly to the vertical curves of the four supporting arches on each corner. Where the curve of the pendentive and dome is continuous, the vaulting form is known as a pendentive dome. 

Pendentives receive the outward force from the dome’s weight, concentrating it at the four corners from where it's transferred down the columns to the foundations below.  Before there were, pendentives, domes needed either the supporting structure to be round (The Pantheon) or were supported by corbelling or the use of squinches allowing the dome to sit on top of four arches.  Both methods imposed limitations of width and height whereas pendatives, which directed forces away from the walls, made possible bigger structures.  Invented in Ancient Rome, Byzantine architects perfected the technique and they came to be seen too in Islamic, Renaissance and Baroque architecture.

From the late twentieth century, religious sentiment in the secular state became more combative and by the early 2000s, demands were being heard from both the Christian Orthodox and Sunni Islam for the Hagia Sofia to again be a place of worship.  Political sentiments hardened and, in July 2020, on the very same day a court annulled the 1934 law which enabled the site to become a museum, Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (b 1954; prime minister of Turkey 2003-2014 & president since 2014) signed a presidential decree under which the museum reverted to being the Great Mosque of Ayasofya.  Mr Erdoğan had flagged his intentions and the move was no surprise, this the fourth Byzantine church converted from museum to mosque during his time in office.  Architectural repurposing is hardly unknown west of the Bosporus either, thousands of mosques in Spain and Greece having over the centuries been converted to Christian churches.

The court’s rationale for annulling the 1934 decree was interesting, the judges finding it unconstitutional, under not only the contemporary Turkish constitution but also Ottoman law.  The court held that Mehmed II (1432-1481, محمد ثانى‎ in Ottoman Turkish, romanized as Meḥmed-i sānī), who conquered Constantinople in 1453, gained the Hagia Sofia as his personal property and, by the creation of a waqf (In the Arabic وَقْف‎ (ˈwɑqf), also known as a hubous (حُبوس); an inalienable charitable endowment of property under the Hanafi (Sunni law)), had lawfully made the structure permanently a mosque and thus unable to be used for any other purpose.  Under the Hanafi, Mehmed’s waqf was held to be valid, as was his gaining personal ownership in 1453 by virtue of the war code of the time.

Fatwa

Fatwa (pronounced faht-wah)

(1) In Islam, a religious decree issued by a high authority (such as a mufti) or the ʿulama (a body of Muslim scholars who are recognized as having specialist knowledge of Islamic sacred law and theology).

(2) In Islam, a non-binding judgment on a point of Islamic law given by a recognized religious authority.

1620s: From the Arabic fatwā or fetwā (a legal ruling given by a mufti) and related to fata (to instruct by a legal decision).  The Arabic فَتْوَى‎ (fatwā) was the verbal noun of أَفْتَى‎ (ʾaftā) (to deliver a formal opinion; he gave a legal decision), مُفْتٍ‎ (muftin) (mufti) the active participle of the same verb.  The noun mufti, one of a number of titles in the Islamic legal and institutional structures, dates from the 1580s muphtie (official head of the state religion in Turkey), from the Arabic mufti (judge), the active participle (with formative prefix mu-) of afta (to give) a conjugated form of fata.  The alternative forms are fatwah, fetwa, fetwah, futwa & (the archaic medieval) futwah although in some early sources it appeared as fotyā (plural fatāwā) & fatāwī; in English use, it’s written usually as fatwa.  Fatwa is a noun & verb and fatwaing & fatwaed are verbs; the noun plural is fatwas or fatawa.  The occasionally used adjectives fatwaesque & fatwaish are non-standard.

Portrait of the Imam as a young man: Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (1900–1989; Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1979-1989).

Apart from the work of historians and other scholars, the word was rare in English, popularized in the West only when, on Valentine’s day 1989, Ayatollah Khomeini issued a fatwā sentencing to death the author Salman Rushdie (b 1947) and others associated with publishing The Satanic Verses (1988), the charge being blasphemy.  The fatwā was revoked in 1998.  Interestingly, in purely juristic terms, The Satanic Verses fatwā is thought neither remarkable nor innovative, the call for extra-judicial killings, the summary execution of those condemned without judicial process, was well grounded in the historic provisions of Shiʿite (and Sunni) jurisprudence.  What lent this fatwā its impact was it had been issued by a head of state against the citizen of another country and seemed thus archaic in late twentieth century international relations.

A fatwā is the authoritative ruling of a religious scholar on questions (masāʾel) of Islamic jurisprudence either (1) dubious or obscure in nature (shobohāt) or (2) which are newly arisen and for which there is no known precedent (mostaḥdaṯāt) and it’s in connection with the latter category that the word fatwā has long been regarded as cognate with fatā (young man); the sense of something new.  However, the enquiry eliciting a fatwā may relate to an existing ordinance (ḥokm) of Islamic law (particularly one unknown to the questioner) or to its application to a specific case or occurrence which is sufficiently different to the way something has historically been applied.  In this case, the fatwā functions as an act to clarify the relevant ordinance (tabyīn-e ḥokm).  This can apply to something novel like new technology.  The International Space Station (ISS) operates at an altitude of 250 miles (400 km) and travels at 17,500 mph (28,000 km/h), thus orbiting Earth every ninety minutes so when a Muslim astronaut requested guidance about the correct protocols to ensure he was facing towards Mecca when in prayer, a Malaysian scholar issued a fatwā.

The process of requesting a fatwā is termed esteftāʾ; the one who requests it is the mostaftī; its delivery is the eftāʾ; and the one who delivers it is the moftī.  There is nothing in Islamic law which dictates a fatwā must be either requested or provided in writing although this has always been the common practice and certainly followed in matters of importance.  However, request and fatwā may be delivered orally and the practice is doubtlessly widespread, especially when merely confirming things generally known. The technical process of the fatwā wasn’t an invention of Islam.  In Roman civil law, the principle of jus respondendi (the right of responding) was an authority conferred on senior jurists when delivering legal opinions; thought essentially the right to embellish a ruling with an opinion, some historians maintain it was even a right to issue a dissent although there’s no agreement on this.  Perhaps even closer was the Jewish practice of Responsa (in Latin the plural of responsum (answer)) which in practice translated as “ask the Rabbi”.

As a general principle, fatwās exist to address specific and actual problems or uncertainties, although rulings are not infrequently sought on a set of interrelated questions or on hypothetical problems the occurrence of which is anticipated.  A legal scholar can thus provide what is, in effect, an advisory opinion; something generally unknown in the Western legal tradition.  Nor are fatwās of necessity concerned purely with legal matters, doctrinal considerations necessarily involved whenever a fatwā results in takfīr (the condemnation of individuals or groups as unbelievers).  This is a feature especially in Shiʿite collections of fatwās which are sometimes prefaced with a summary of essential doctrines, intended to create concise handbooks for the common believer of both theology and law.

A misunderstood aspect of the fatwā is the extent to which it can be held to be mandatory.  Because of the structures of Islam, a fatwā is not comparable to a papal bull which is an absolute ruling from the Holy See; a fatwā is intrinsically obligatory simply because there is in Islam not the one lineal hierarchy, it is an expression of learned opinion which relies for its authority upon the respect afforded to the author and the willingness of followers to comply.  That’s not to say that some strains of Islam don’t attempt to formalise a structure which would impose that obligation.  In Shiʿism, the authority to deliver a fatwā is generally restricted to the mojtahed (the jurist qualified to deduce the specific ordinances of the law (forūʿ) from its sources (oṣūl), and obedience to the mojtahed of their choice (the marjaʿ-e taqlīd) is incumbent on all who lack learned qualifications.  As a specific point of law, the ruling given in the fatwā of a mojtahed is obligatory for those who sought.

Holy Quran commissioned by the last Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi (1919-1980).

One curious aspect of the fatwās is that while the process is only partially based on anything from the Holy Quran, by definition the content of a  fatwā can be based on nothing else.  The theological point is that while there are Quranic verses in which the Prophet was asked for rulings (yasʾalūnaka (they ask you) & yastaftūnaka (they ask you for a ruling)), the Prophet himself is not the source of the rulings for in these versus he is instructed to say, “God provides you with a ruling” (Allāho yoftīkom); a fatwā, ultimately relying for its authority not on the scholarship of the writer but upon it being Quranic: the word of God.  This relationship is made explicit in the injunction in 16:43 (“Ask the People of Remembrance (ie those learned in the Holy Quran) if you do not know”).  This accounts also for the brevity of most fatwās compared with Western traditions, it being superfluous for the moftī to cite textual or other evidence simply because all that can be issued is what can easily be referenced in the in Holy Quran.  It can be no other way because, under Islamic doctrine, Muhammad was the last prophet and thus, after his death in 632, God ceased to communicate with mankind through revelation and prophets; from that point onward, for all time, there are only the words of the Holy Quran.

Lindsay Lohan in hijab.

The vexed matter of the wearing of the hijab (or any of the other variations in Women’s “modest” clothing associated with Islam (as it is with some other faiths)) is an example of the fatwa in operation.  The Holy Quran contains passages discussing the concept of modesty in attire (for both men and women) but the interpretation and application of these has varied greatly within Islam’s many strands.  The Quranic verse most commonly cited is in Surah An-Nur (24:31) where it instructs believing women to “draw their veils over their bosoms and not display their beauty except to their husbands, their fathers, their husbands' fathers, their sons, their husbands' sons, their brothers, or their brothers' sons or their sisters' sons, or their women, or their slaves whom their right hands possess, or male attendants who lack vigor, or children who are not yet aware of the nakedness of women.”  So there’s no explicit mention of “heads or hair” but many Islamic scholars have constructed this as a directive for women to cover their hair when in the presence of those not immediate family members or close relatives.

Lindsay Lohan in hijab.

It’s not only in Islam that interpretations of religious texts can vary widely but in the early twenty-first century (and the trend has been accelerating since the triumpt of the 1979 revolution in Iran) it’s upon Islam where much of the liberal West’s attention has been focused, this interest not the garments but the allegations of coercion imposed on women.  Some in the West have even gone as far as to deny Islamic women the possibility that in choosing to hijab they are exercising free will, suggesting they are victims of what the Marxists call “false consciousness”.  In Islamic communities, cultural, regional and historic customs also play a significant role in how hijab is understood and practiced which is why there have been fatwas which interpret the Quranic verses as severely as dictating a burqa, as a head-scarf or merely a mode of dress and conduct which could be described as “modest” or “non-provocative”.

Lindsay Lohan in hijab.

So when there are competing fatwas, a choice must be made.   Were one to take a purely theoretical position, one might hold that choice would be made on the basis of an individual's personal beliefs, level of religious observance and understanding of Islamic teachings and, because within Islam there is such a diversity of opinion, a follower might be encouraged to consult with knowledgeable scholars and from that make an informed decision.  However, it’s absurd to suggest that process might be followed in a state like Afghanistan which maintains a “hijab police” and enforces a dress code as specific as a military parade ground.  A fatwa thus exists in its cultural, social and legal context and even in for those living in the liberal West, forces may within families or communities operate to mean the matter of choice is a rare luxury.