Veto

Veto (pronounced vee-toh)

(1) In constitutional law, the power or right vested in one branch of a government to cancel or postpone the decisions, enactments etc of another branch, especially the right of a president, governor, or other chief executive to reject bills passed by a legislature.

(2) The exercise of this right.

(3) In the UN Security Council, a non-concurring vote by which one of the five permanent members (China, France, Russia, UK & US) can overrule the actions or decisions of the meeting on most substantive matters.  By practice and convention, in the context of geopolitics, this is "the veto power".

(4) Emphatically to prohibit something.

1620–1630: From the Latin vetō (I forbid), the first person singular present indicative of vetāre (forbid, prohibit, oppose, hinder (perfect active vetuī, supine vetitum)) from the earlier votō & votāre, from the Proto-Italic wetā(je)-, from the primitive Indo-European weth- (to say).  In ancient Rome, the vetō was the technical term for a protest interposed by a tribune of the people against any measure of the Senate or of the magistrates.  As a verb, use dates from 1706.  Veto is a noun, verb and adjective, vetoless is a (non-standard) adjective and vetoer is a noun; the noun plural is vetoes.  In the language of the diplomatic toolbox the related forms pre-veto, re-veto, un-veto & non-veto, used with and without the hyphen.

The best known power of veto is that exercised by the five permanent members (P5) of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).  The UNSC is an organ of the UN which uniquely possesses the authority to issue resolutions binding upon member states and its powers include creating peacekeeping missions, imposing international sanctions and authorizing military action.  The UNSC has a standing membership of fifteen, five of which (China, France, Russia, the UK and the USA) hold permanent seats, the remaining ten elected by the UNGA (UN General Assembly) on a regional basis for two year terms.  P5 representatives can veto any substantive resolution including the admission of new UN member states or nominations for UN Secretary-General (the UN’s CEO).  The term “united nations” was used as early as 1943, essentially as a synonym for the anti-Axis allies and was later adopted as the name for the international organization which replaced the League of Nations (LoN, 1920-1946) which had in the 1930s proved ineffectual in its attempts to maintain peace.  When the UN was created, its structural arrangements were designed to try to avoid the problems which beset the LoN which, under its covenant, could reach decisions only by unanimous vote and this rule applied both to the League's council (which the specific responsibility of maintaining peace) and the all-member assembly.  In effect, each member state of the League had the power of the veto, and, except for procedural matters and a few specified topics, a single "nay" killed any resolution.  Learning from this mistake, the founders of the UN decided all its organs and subsidiary bodies should make decisions by some type of majority vote (although when dealing with particularly contentious matters things have sometimes awaited a resolution until a consensus emerges).

The creators of the UN Charter always conceived the three victorious “great powers” of World War II (1939-1945), the UK, US & USSR, because of their roles in the establishment of the UN, would continue to play important roles in the maintenance of international peace and security and thus would have permanent seats on the UNSC with the power to veto resolutions.  To this arrangement was added (4) France (at the insistence of Winston Churchill (1875-1965; UK prime minister 1940-1945 & 1951-1955) who wished to re-build the power of France as a counterweight to Germany and (5) China, included because Franklin Roosevelt (1882-1940 US president 1933-1945) was perceptive in predicting the country’s importance in the years to come.  This veto is however a power only in the negative.  Not one of the permanent members nor even all five voting in (an admittedly improbable) block can impose their will in the absence of an overall majority vote of the Security Council.  Nor is an affirmative vote from one or all of the permanent five necessary: If a permanent member does not agree with a resolution but does not wish to cast a veto, it may choose to abstain, thus allowing the resolution to be adopted if it obtains the required majority among the fifteen.

Lindsay Lohan meeting Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (b 1954; prime-minister or president of the Republic of Türkiye since 2003), Ankara, January 2017.

As part of her efforts during 2017 drawing attention to the plight of Syrian refugees, Lindsay Lohan was received by the president of Türkiye.  As well as issuing a statement on the troubles of refugees and IDPs (internally displaced persons) in the region, Ms Lohan also commented on another matter raised by Mr Erdogan: the need to reform the structure of the UNSC which still exists in substantially the form created in 1945, despite the world’s economic and geopolitical realities having since much changed with only the compositional alteration being the PRC (People's Republic of China) in 1971 taking the place of the renegade province of Taiwan, pursuant to UNGA Resolution 2758, which recognized the PRC as “the only legitimate representative of China to the United Nations” and expelled “the representatives” of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek (1887-1975; leader of the Republic of China (mainland) 1928-1949 & the renegade province of Taiwan.  In an Instagram post, Ms Lohan used the phrase “the world is bigger than five.  Five big nations made promises but they did not keep them.”  Despite her efforts, reform of the UNSC has advanced little because although consensus might be reached on extending permanent membership to certain nations, it remains doubtful all of the P5 (the permanent five members) would achieve consensus for this including the veto.  That would have the effect of replacing the present two-tier structure with three layers and it seems also unlikely a state like India would accept the “second class status” inherent in a permanent seat with no veto.

The Vatican, the CCP and the bishops, real & fake

A well-known and economically significant niche in modern Chinese manufacturing is fakes.  Most obvious are fake Rolexes, fake Range Rovers etc but Peking for decades produced fake bishops.  After the Holy See and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) sundered diplomatic relations in 1951, papal appointments to Chinese bishoprics were not recognized by Peking which appointed their own.  In retaliation, popes refused to acknowledge the fakes who in turn ignored him, the amusing clerical stand-off lasting until January 2018 when negotiations appeared to produce a face-saving (sort-of) concordat.  As a prelude, Rome retired or re-deployed a number of their bishops in order to make way for new (once-fake) bishops, nominated by the CCP and, in a telling gesture, Pope Francis (b 1936; pope 2013-2025) re-admitted to "full ecclesial communion" seven living Chinese bishops who were ordained before the deal without Vatican approval, and had thus incurred a latae sententiae (literally "of a judgment having been brought") penalty.  Long a feature of the Catholic Church's canon law, a latae sententiae works as an administrative act, the liability for which is imposed ipsō factō (literally "by the same fact" and in law understood as "something inherently consequent upon the act").  What that means is the penalty is applied at the moment the unlawful act is done; no judicial or administrative actions needs be taken for this to happen.  Thus, at the point of non-Vatican approved ordination, all fake bishops were excommunicated.

On 22 September 2018, a provisional agreement was signed.  It (1) cleared the Chinese decks of any bishops (fake or real) not acceptable to either side, (2) granted the CCP the right to nominate bishops (the list created with the help of a CCP-run group called the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association (CCPA) and (3) granted the pope a right of veto.  Although not mentioned by either side, the most important understanding between the parties seemed to be the hints the CCP sent through diplomatic channels that the pope would find their lists of nominees “helpful”.  If so, such a document deserved to be thought "a secret protocol" to the "Holy See-CCP Pact but however the sausages were made, it was a diplomatic triumph for Beijing.  Although Rome at the time noted it was a “provisional agreement”, many observed that unless things proved most unsatisfactory, it was doubtful Rome would be anxious again to draw attention to the matter because, whatever the political or theological implications, to acquiesce to the pope as cipher would diminish the church’s mystique.

Things may be worse even than the cynics had predicted.  In late 2020 the two-year deal handling the appointment of Chinese bishops was extended after an exchange of notes verbales (in diplomatic language, something more formal than an aide-mémoire and less formal than a note, drafted in the third person and never signed), both sides apparently wishing to continue the pact, albeit still (technically) on a temporary basis.  The uneasy entente seems however not to have lasted, Beijing in 2021, through bureaucratic process, acting as if it had never existed by issuing Order No. 15 (new administrative rules for religious affairs) which included an article on establishing a process for the selection of Catholic bishops in China after 1 May 2021.  The new edict makes no mention of any papal role in the process and certainly not a right to approve or veto episcopal appointments in China, the very thing which was celebrated in Rome as the substantive concession gained from the CCP.

Still, Beijing’s new rules have the benefit of clarity and while it's doubtful Francis held many illusions about the nature of CCP rule, he certainly had certainty for the remainder of his pontificate.  Order No. 15 requires clergy of the Chinese Patriotic Catholic Church (CPCC) to “adhere to the principle of independent and self-administered religion in China” and actively support “the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party” and “the socialist system,” as well as to “practice the core values of socialism.”  They must also promote “social harmony” which is usually interpreted as conformity of thought with those of the CCP (although in recent years that has come increasingly to be identified with the thoughts of comrade Xi Jinping (b 1953; paramount leader of China since 2012) which, historically, is an interesting comparison with the times of comrade Chairman Mao Zedong (1893–1976; chairman of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 1949-1976).  Essentially, the CPCC is an arm of the CCP regime (something like "the PLA (People's Liberation Army" at prayer") and formalizing this is the requirement for bishops and priests to be licensed for ministry, much the same process as being allowed to practice as a driving instructor or electrician.

All this is presumably was a disappointment to the pope though it’s unlikely to have surprised to his critics, some of whom, when the agreement was announced in 2018 and upon renewal in 2020, predicted it would be honored by Beijing only while it proved useful for them to weaken the “underground” church and allow the CCP to assert institutional control over the CPCC.  At the time of the renewal, the Vatican issued a statement saying the agreement was “essential to guarantee the ordinary life of the Church in China.”  The CCP doubtlessly agreed with that which is why they have broken the agreement, and, if asked, presumably they would point out that, legally, it really didn’t exist, the text never having been published and only ever discussed by diplomats.  Although there are (by the Vatican's estimates) only some five million Chinese Catholics among a population of some 1.4 billion, that's still five-million potential malcontents and as the "Godless atheists" of the CCP know from their history books, that's enough to cause problems and if problems can be solved in the "preferred" CCP manner, they must be "managed".

Beware of imitations.  British Range Rover Evoque (left) and Chinese Landwind X7 (right).

Although not matching the original in specification or capabilities, the Landwind X7 sold in China for around a third what was charged for an Evoque and while it took a trained eye to tell the difference between the two, Chinese capitalism rose to the occasion and, within weeks, kits were on the market containing the badges and moldings needed to make the replication closer to exact.  Remarkably, eventually, Jaguar Land Rover (JLR) won a landmark legal case (in a Chinese court!), the judges holding the “…Evoque has five unique features that were copied directly” and that the X7’s similarity “…has led to widespread consumer confusion.”  In a decision which was the first by a Chinese court ruling favor of a foreign automaker in such a case, it was ordered Landwind immediately cease sales of the vehicle and pay compensation to JLR.  It was a bit hypocritical for the British to complain because for years shamelessly the British industry "borrowed" styling from Detroit and in the early, cash-strapped, post-war years, the Standard Motor Company (later Standard-Triumph) sent their chief stylist to sit with his sketch-pad outside the US embassy in London to "harvest" ideas from the new American cars being driven by diplomats and other staff.  That's why Standard's Phase I Vanguard (the so-called "humpback", 1947-1953) so resembles a 1946 Plymouth, somewhat unhappily shrunk in every dimension except height.  One can debate the ethics of what Landwind did but as an act of visual cloning, they did it well and as Chinese historians gleefully will attest, when it comes to cynicism and hypocrisy, the British have centuries of practice.    

Beware of imitations.  Joseph Guo Jincai (b 1968, left) was in 2010 ordained Bishop of Chengde (Hebei) today without the approval of the pope.  He is a member of the China Committee on Religion and Peace and was appointed a deputy to the thirteenth National People's Congress.  Because of the circumstances of his ordination as a bishop, he was excommunicated latae sententiae but later had the consolation of being elected vice-president of Chinese Patriotic Catholic Association.  In September 2018, Francis lifted the excommunication of Joseph Guo Jincai and other six bishops previously appointed by the Chinese government without pontifical mandate.  What Francis did was something like the "re-personing" granted in post-Soviet Russia to those "un-personed" under communist rule.

Politically, one has to admire the CCP’s tactics.  Beijing pursued the 2018 deal only to exterminate the underground Catholic Church which, although for decades doughty in their resistance to persecution by the CCP (including pogroms during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976)), were compelled to transfer their allegiance to the CPCC once it received the pope’s imprimatur.  After the agreement, Chinese authorities rounded up underground Catholic clergy, warning that they would defy the pope if they continued baptizing, ordaining new clergy and praying in unregistered churches; most of those persuaded became part of the CPCC and those unconvinced resigned their ministries and returned to private life.  According to insiders, a rump underground movement still exists but it seems the CCP now regard the remnant as a terrorist organization (a la the subversive Falun Gong) and are pursuing them accordingly.

The central committee of the CCP's politburo contains operators highly skilled in the art of political opportunism and in 2025 they demonstrated their prowess during the brief interregnum between the death of PFrancis and the election of Leo XIV (b 1955; pope since 2025) when unilaterally they “elected” two bishops, one of them to a diocese already led by a Vatican-appointed bishop.  The clever maneuver took advantage of the fact that during this sede vacante (the vacancy of an episcopal see), the Holy See had been unable to ratify episcopal nominations.  The CCP clearly regards its elections as a fait accompli and one technically within the terms of the 2018 provisional agreement (most recently renewed in October 2024), adopting the pragmatic position of “what’s done is done and can’t be undone”.  The Vatican lawyers might demur and even though the terms of the agreement have never been published, the convention had evolved that Beijing would present to the Vatican a single candidate chosen by assemblies of the clergy affiliated by the CCPA; this nominee the pope could the appoint or not.  In 2025, the argument is that no veto was exercised which, during a sede vacante, was of course impossible but it’s no secret that in recent years Beijing has on a number of occasions violated the agreement.  The CCP are of the “how many divisions has he got” school established by comrade Stalin (1878-1953; Soviet leader 1924-1953), practiced with the “take whatever you can grab” ethos of capitalism which modern China has embraced with muscular efficiency.

The files were among the many piled in Leo’s in-tray and keenly Vaticanologists awaited his response and the new pope didn’t long delay, in June 2025 appointing Bishop Joseph Lin Yuntuan (b 1952) as an assistant in Fuzhou, the capital of the south-eastern Fujian province.  Unlike bishoprics elsewhere, analysts made no mention of whether the appointee belong to the “liberal” or “conservative” factions but focused instead on both sides exhibiting a clear desire to “continue on the path of reconciliation”.  In a statement, the Holy See Press Office stressed “final decision-making power” remained with the pope while for Beijing the attraction was the (substantial) resolution of the decades-long split between the underground church loyal to Rome and the state-supervised CCPA although there are doubtless still renegades being pursued.  Lin had in 2017 been ordained a bishop in the underground church and had the CCP wished to maintain an antagonism it could of course declined to countenance the appointment of a character with such a dubious past but the installation’s rubber-stamping in both states seems a clear indication both wish to maintain the still uneasy accord.  During the ceremony, Bishop Lin swore to abide by Chinese laws and safeguard social harmony.

Interregnum

Interregnum (pronounced inn-ter-reg-numb)

(1) (a) An interval of time between the close of a sovereign's reign and the accession of his or her normal or legitimate successor.  (b) A period when normal government is suspended, especially between successive reigns or regimes.  (c)  Any period during which a state has no ruler or only a temporary executive

(2) The period in English history from the execution of Charles I in 1649 to the Restoration of Charles II in 1660.

(3) An interval in the Church of England dioceses between the periods of office of two bishops.

(4) In casual use, any pause or interruption in continuity.

1570-1580: From the Latin interregnum (an interval between two reigns (literally "between-reign), the construct being inter (between; amid) + rēgnum (kingship, dominion, reign, rule, realm (and related to regere (to rule, to direct, keep straight, guide), from the primitive Indo-European root reg- (move in a straight line), with derivatives meaning "to direct in a straight line", thus "to lead, rule"). To illustrate that linguistic pragmatism is nothing new, in the Roman republic, the word was preserved to refer to a vacancy in the consulate.  The word is now generally applied to just about any situation where an organization is between leaders and this seems an accepted modern use. The earlier English noun was interreign (1530s), from French interrègne (14c.).  Interregnum & interregent are nouns and interregnal is an adjective; the noun plural is interregnums or interregna.

The classic interregnum.  One existed between 1204 and 1261 in the Byzantine Empire.  Following the Sack of Constantinople during the Fourth Crusade, the Byzantine Empire was dissolved, to be replaced by several Crusader states and several Byzantine states.  It was re-established by Nicean general Alexios Strategopoulos who placed Michael VIII Palaiologos back on the throne of a united Byzantine Empire.

The retrospective interregnum.  The Interregnum of (1649–1660) was a republican period in the three kingdoms of England, Ireland and Scotland.  Government was carried out by the Commonwealth and the Protectorate of Oliver Cromwell after the execution of Charles I and before the restoration of Charles II; it became an interregnum only because of the restoration.  Were, for example, a Romanov again to be crowned as Tsar, the period between 1917 and the restoration would become the second Russian interregnum, the first being the brief but messy business of 1825, induced by a disputed succession following the death of the Emperor Alexander I on 1 December.  The squabble lasted less than a month but in those few weeks was conducted the bloody Decembrist revolt which ended when Grand Duke Konstantin Pavlovich renounced his claim to throne and Nicholas I declared himself Tsar.

The constitutional interregnum.  In the UK, under normal conditions, there is no interregnum; upon the death of one sovereign, the crown is automatically assumed by the next in the line of succession: the King is dead, long live the King.  The famous phrase signifies the continuity of sovereignty, attached to a personal form of power named auctoritas.  Auctoritas is from the Old French autorité & auctorité (authority, prestige, right, permission, dignity, gravity; the Scriptures) from the Latin auctoritatem (nominative auctoritas) (invention, advice, opinion, influence, command) from auctor (master, leader, author).  From the fourteenth century, it conveyed the sense of "legal validity" or “authoritative doctrine", as opposed to opposed to reason or experience and conferred a “right to rule or command, power to enforce obedience, power or right to command or act".  It’s a thing which underpins the legal theory of the mechanics of the seamless transition in the UK of one the sovereign to the next, coronations merely ceremonial and proclamations procedural.  Other countries are different.  When a King of Thailand dies, there isn’t a successor monarch until one is proclaimed, a regent being appointed to carry out the necessary constitutional (though not ceremonial) duties.  A number of monarchies adopt this approach including Belgium and the Holy See.  The papal interregnum is known technically as sede vacante (literally "when the seat is vacant") and ends upon the election of new pope by the College of Cardinals.

The interregnum by analogy.  The term has been applied to the period of time between the election of a new President of the United States and his (or her!) inauguration, during which the outgoing president remains in power, but as a lame duck in the sense that, except in extraordinary circumstances, there is attention only to procedural and ceremonial matters.  So, while the US can sometimes appear to be in a state with some similarities to an interregnum between the election in November and the inauguration in January, it’s  merely a casual term without a literal meaning.  The addition in 1967 of the twenty-fifth amendment (A25) to the US Constitution which dealt with the mechanics of the line of succession in the event of a presidential vacancy, disability or inability to fulfil the duties of the office, removed any doubt and established there is never a point at which the country is without someone functioning as head of state & commander-in-chief.

Many turned, probably for the first time, to A25 after watching 2024’s first presidential debate between sleazy old Donald and senile old Joe.  Among historians, comparisons were made between some revealing clips of Ronald Reagan (1911-2004; US president 1981-1989) late in his second term and reports of the appearance and evident mental state of Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR, 1882–1945, US president 1933-1945) during the Yalta conference (February 1945).  In 1994, Reagan’s diagnosis of Alzheimer's disease was revealed and within two months of Yalta, FDR would be dead.  Regarding the matter of presidential incapacity or inability, the relevant sections of A25 are:

Section 3: Presidential Declaration of Inability: If the President submits a written declaration to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President becomes Acting President until the President submits another declaration stating that he is able to resume his duties.

Section 4: Vice Presidential and Cabinet Declaration of Presidential Inability: If the Vice President and a majority of the principal officers of the executive departments (or another body as Congress may by law provide) submit a written declaration to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President immediately assumes the powers and duties of the office as Acting President.

If the President then submits a declaration that no inability exists, he resumes the powers and duties of his office unless the Vice President and a majority of the principal officers (or another body as Congress may by law provide) submit a second declaration within four days that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office. In this case, Congress must decide the issue, convening within 48 hours if not in session. If two-thirds of both Houses vote that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President continues as Acting President; otherwise, the President resumes his powers and duties.

Quite what the mechanism would be for a vice president and the requisite number of the cabinet to issue such a certificate is not codified.  Every president in the last century-odd has been attended by a doctor with the title “Physician to the President” (both John Kennedy (JFK, 1917–1963; US president 1961-1963) and Bill Clinton (b 1946; US president 1993-2001), uniquely, appointed women) and presumably they would be asked for an opinion although, even though FDR’s decline was apparent to all, nobody seems to have suggested Vice Admiral Ross McIntire (1889–1959) would have been likely to find the threshold incapacity in a president he’d known since 1917 as served as physician since 1933.  Vice presidents and troubled cabinet members may need to seek a second opinion.

Fashions change: The dour Charles I (left), the puritanical Oliver Cromwell (centre) and the merry Charles II (right).

The famous interregnum in England, Scotland, and Ireland began with the execution of Charles I (1600-1649) and ended with the restoration to the thrones of the three realms of his son Charles II (1630-1685) in 1660.  Immediately after the execution, a body known as the English Council of State (later re-named the Protector's Privy Council) was created by the Rump Parliament.  Because of the implication of auctoritas, the king's beheading was delayed half a day so the members of parliament could pass legislation declaring themselves the sole representatives of the people and the House of Commons the repository of all power.  Making it a capital offence to proclaim a new king, the laws abolished both the monarchy and the House of Lords.  For most of the interregnum, the British Isles were ruled by Oliver Cromwell (1599–1658) an English general and statesman who combined the roles of head of state and head of government of the republican commonwealth.

When Queen Elizabeth II (1926-2022; Queen of England and other places variously 1952-2022) took her last breath, Charles (b 1948) in that moment became King Charles III; the unbroken line summed up in the phrase "The King is dead.  Long Live the King".  In the British constitution there is no interregnum and a coronation (which may happen weeks, months or even years after the succession) is, in secular legal terms, purely ceremonial although there have been those who argued it remains substantive in relation to the monarch's role as supreme governor of the established Church of England, a view now regarded by most with some scepticism.  As a spectacle however it's of some interest (as the worldwide television ratings confirmed) and given the history, there was this time some interest in the wording used in reference to the queen consort.  However, constitutional confirmed that had any legal loose ends been detected or created at or after the moment of the succession they would have been "tidied up" at a meeting of the Accession Council, comprised of a number of worthies who assemble upon the death of a monarch and issue a formal proclamation of accession, usually in the presence of the successor who swears oaths relating to both church (England & Scotland) and state.  What receives the seal of the council is the ultimate repository of monarchical authority (on which the laws and mechanisms of the state ultimately depend) and dynastic legitimacy, rather than the coronation ceremony.

Some fashions did survive the interregnum: Charles II in his coronation regalia (left) and Lindsay Lohan (right) demonstrate why tights will never go out of style.

Sedevacantism

Sedevacantism (pronounced sed-ah- vey-kuhnt-niz-uhm)

In Christianity, the belief (maintained by a faction of conservative Roman Catholics) that the present occupant of the Holy See is not the true pope and the see has been vacant since the Second Vatican Council (Vatican II (1962-1965)).

Circa 1965: the construct was the Latin phrase sede vacante +‎ -ism.  The Latin phrase sede vacante (vacant chair) is from canon law term sedes vacans which describes the period during which there is no appointee to an episcopal see.  It thus applies to any vacant bishopric but is most associated with that of the Bishop of Rome (the Roman Catholic Pope) where it’s part of formal processes associated with any interregnum.  The construct of sedes (seat, chair (and used sometimes also to mean “place, residence, settlement, habitation, abode”)) was sedeō (I sit) +‎ -ēs (the suffix used to form a third-declension feminine abstract noun designating the result of an action from a verb root or conceived root form).  Etymologists note that like caedēs (slaughter) from caedō (I kill or cut), sedes is an outlier and like the proto-Italian, Latin tended not productively to form nouns from verbs by changing the vowel grade.  They consider the word's lengthened grade as similar to the Proto-Germanic sētiją (seat) and likely ultimately from a common source although the origin remains murky.  Vacante was the ablative (masculine, feminine & neuter) singular of vacāns (emptying, vacating; idling) (genitive vacantis), the present active participle of vacō.  The –ism suffix was from the Ancient Greek ισμός (ismós) & -isma noun suffixes, often directly, sometimes through the Latin –ismus & isma (from where English picked up ize) and sometimes through the French –isme or the German –ismus, all ultimately from the Ancient Greek (where it tended more specifically to express a finished act or thing done).  It appeared in loanwords from Greek, where it was used to form abstract nouns of action, state, condition or doctrine from verbs and on this model, was used as a productive suffix in the formation of nouns denoting action or practice, state or condition, principles, doctrines, a usage or characteristic, devotion or adherence (criticism; barbarism; Darwinism; despotism; plagiarism; realism; witticism etc).  Sedevacantism and sedevacantist are nouns; the common noun plural is Sedevacantists.

Pope Francis (b 1936; pope since 2013) is a very busy man and it not know if he has much time to open the Bible but it may be that recently he felt constrained to turn to Galatians 6:7 and ponder the passage in which Paul the Apostle in his Epistle to the Galatians wrote: “Be not deceived; God is not mocked: for whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also reap.”  King James Version (KJV, 1611).  Francis certainly has been sowing.  Recently, the Vatican’s Dicastery for the Doctrine of the Faith (the DDF, the latest name for the Inquisition) issued a statement confirming an adult who identifies as transgender can receive the sacrament of Baptism under the same conditions as any adult, as long as “there is no risk of causing scandal or confusion to other Catholics”.  To clarify the matter, the DDF added that children or adolescents experiencing transgender identity issues may also receive Baptism “if well prepared and willing”.  Within days of that announcement, Francis played host to a group of transgender women (many of them sex workers or migrants from Latin America) who were among the 1200 impoverished or homeless who attended a luncheon held in the papal audience hall (the Vatican Press Office noting the catering extended to “a full meal and dessert”) to mark the Church’s “World Day of the Poor”.  Apparently, the pontiff has been in contact with the transgender women since he organized assistance for the during the COVID-19 lockdowns when they were unable to practice their trade.  Meetings are said now to be monthly with His Holiness providing funds, medicine and shampoo.

A pope giving shampoo (and hopefully conditioner) to the needy need not be controversial but news of that largess came at a time when dissent was swirling about the DDF’s announcement (signed by Francis) which confirmed trans-men & women can also witness marriages and be named as godparents under certain circumstances.  In the tradition of the Inquisition, the DDF’s document was legalistic although many noticed a vague “clarification” which seemed rather to verge on the ambiguous: That for individuals with gender-identity afflictions to be baptized, it must not cause “scandal” or “disorientation”.  However, the very idea seemed to scandalize some bishops and theologians who noted there had apparently been no change to the Church’s traditional teaching that gender ideology and transgender lifestyles are a "grave disorder" in need of correction through spiritual and secular therapy.

The DDF issued its statement in response to a dubia (a respectful request for clarification regarding about certain established teachings), one of quite a few which have ended up in the Vatican’s post-box (dubias are always on paper) in this pontificate.  The most celebrated of these letters of dissent (the more searchingly serious of which are in exquisitely polite Latin) were signed by four cardinals and received in September 2016, asking (1) Whether those living in sin were now to be granted Holy Communion, (2) Whether the Church had overturned Saint John Paul II’s (1920–2005; pope 1978-2005) 1993 encyclical Veritatis splendor (The Splendor of the Truth) which laid down certain fundamentals of the Church's role in moral teaching, (3) Whether there were changes in what constituted certain sins, (4) Whether circumstances or intentions can now transform an act intrinsically evil by virtue of its object into an act subjectively good or defensible as a choice and (5), Whether the church no longer excludes any creative interpretation of the role of conscience and now accepts that conscience can be authorized to permit legitimate exceptions to absolute moral norms that prohibit intrinsically evil acts by virtue of their object?

Francis neither acknowledged nor replied to the cardinals' respectful dubia, perhaps wondering if the long tradition in the Church of England of hoping problems might go away if one pretends they don’t exist might be the best course to follow.  However, some months later a less deferential letter arrived in which several dozen Catholic theologians, priests and academics went further than the cardinals and formally accused Pope Francis of spreading heresy, a document the like of which hadn't been sent to a pope since the 1300s.  Stunningly, it was one step short of actually accusing the pontiff of being a heretic.

Apparently unfazed, His Holiness has continued along a path of greater inclusiveness of which “shampoo diplomacy” is a part, dealing with dissenters as he goes.  In In November 2023, it was announced he had sacked (“removed from the pastoral care of the diocese” as the Holy See puts such things) US Bishop Joseph Strickland (b 1958; Bishop of the Diocese of Tyler, Texas 2012-2023) and appointed an interim apostolic administrator.  Bishop Strickland (appointed to his position in 2012 by Benedict XVI (1927–2022; pope 2005-2013, pope emeritus 2013-2022)) is said to be one of the WWJD (what would Jesus do?) school and on 12 May 2023 had tweeted (ie to the whole world) “I believe Pope Francis is the pope, but it is time for me to say that I reject his program of undermining the Deposit of Faith.  Follow Jesus."  The tweet was enough for the Vatican to launch an investigation, in response to which on more than one occasion Bishop Strickland asserted he would not voluntarily resign.  The investigation was remarkably quick by the standards of the Holy See and early in November a spokesman for the Archdiocese of Galveston-Houston revealed the tribunal had advised His Holiness “the continuation in office of Bishop Strickland was not feasible.”  The pope requested the bishop resign but he declined, thus the rare sacking.  Strickland stating “I believe Pope Francis is the pope” was of some significance, a clear statement he was not a sedevacantist.  Sedevacantism is a belief maintained by a faction of conservative Roman Catholics that the present occupant of the Holy See is not the true pope and the see has been vacant since the Second Vatican Council (Vatican II (1962-1965)).  The sedevacantists disapprove of the changes in Church rituals, procedures brought about by Vatican II but the essence of their movement is that popes since the death of Pope Pius XII (1876-1958; pope 1939-1958) have espoused one or more heresies.

Pope Francis at the traditional Wednesday General Audience, St. Peter's Square, Vatican City, 8 March 2023.

Dissenters and sedevacantists are two problems facing the pope but he needs also to deal with rumblings from those who may well believe they are “working towards Francis” (or at least where they would like Francis to go).  What shampoo diplomacy seems to have done is unleash forces which would like to impose on the Church a “modernizing” beyond anything which would have been recognizable as an implication of Vatican II.  In late October 2023, the Vatican acted with rare decisiveness to block attempts by German prelates to change doctrine regarding homosexual relationships and female clergy.  Sedevacantism wasn’t mentioned by Rome by the other “S word” appeared, the German hierarchy warned they were “approaching schism” in their moves to diverge from the Catholic Church's teachings and that “radical propositions” such as the approval of homosexual relationships and the ordination of women priests must be abandoned.

What presumably also miffed Rome was that the objectionable German document was entitled “German Synodal Way”, something chosen deliberately as a reference to Pope Francis's global “Synod on Synodality”.  That was either cheeky or provocative but having sown the wind, Francis is reaping the whirlwind; having given the Germans ideas, he now has to draw the line and draw it he did, telling the bishops in Bonn that regarding the matters they are contesting: “there is no possibility of arriving at a different assessment”, adding it “…must be made clear from the outset that these issues are of varying relevance and cannot all be placed on the same level.”  Whether or not it much mollified the Germans, it was further noted that while some matters cannot even be discussed, other “…aspects can be subjected to joint in-depth discussion.”

Unconscionable

Unconscionable (pronounced un-kno-shon-ible)

(1) Not guided by conscience; unscrupulous.

(2) Not in accordance with what is just or reasonable:

(3) Excessive; extortionate, imprudent or unreasonable

1560s: The construct was un- + conscionable.  The un- prefix was from the Middle English un-, from the Old English un-, from the Proto-West Germanic un-, from the Proto-Germanic un-, from the primitive Indo-European n̥-.  It was cognate with the Scots un- & on-, the North Frisian ün-, the Saterland Frisian uun-, the West Frisian ûn- &  on-, the Dutch on-, the Low German un- & on-, the German un-, the Danish u-, the Swedish o-, the Norwegian u- and the Icelandic ó-.  It was (distantly) related to the Latin in- and the Ancient Greek ἀ- (a-), source of the English a-, the Modern Greek α- (a-) and the Sanskrit अ- (a-).  Conscionable was from the Middle English conscions (the third-person singular simple present indicative form of conscion), an obsolete variant of conscience, +‎ -able.  The suffix -able was from the Middle English -able, from the Old French -able, from the Latin -ābilis (capable or worthy of being acted upon), from the primitive Indo-European i-stem forms -dahli- or -dahlom (instrumental suffix); it was used to create adjectives.  Conscience was from the Middle English conscience, from the Old French conscience, from the Latin conscientia (knowledge within oneself), from consciens, present participle of conscire (to know, to be conscious (of wrong)), the construct being com- (together) + scire (to know).  The suffix -able was from the Middle English -able, from the Old French -able, from the Latin -ābilis (capable or worthy of being acted upon), from the primitive Indo-European i-stem forms -dahli- of -dahlom (instrumental suffix); it was used to create adjectives.  Unconscionable is an adjedtive, unconscionableness is a noun and unconscionably is an adverb; the noun plural is unconscionabilities.

Like disgruntled, unconscionable is one of those strange words in English where the derivation has flourished while the source word is effective extinct.  That said, English is defined and constructed by being used and the word conscionable (in accordance with conscience; defensible; proper) remains good English; it has merely faded from use and is described by some dictionaries as obsolete, archaic or at least, since the eighteenth century, a fossilized form of its surviving negative: unconscionable. Conscionable in the 1540s meant "having a conscience", the meaning expanding by the 1580s to refer to actions "consonant with right or duty" and by the 1640s to persons, "governed by conscience".  The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) notes both conscious & conscioned were probably popular formations from conscion, taken as a singular of conscien-ce by a misapprehension of the "s" sound as a plural inflection. The related form was (and is) conscionably.

Unconscionability in the law

Unconscionability is a legal doctrine (most often applied in contact law) which permits courts to strike-out or write-down clauses or agreements which are unduly harsh or so grossly unfair that that it would offend legal principles for them to be enforced.  When a court uses the word "unconscionable" to describe conduct, it means the conduct does not conform to the dictates of conscience as defined in law; it makes no judgment about whether they are at variance with other ethical constructs (although there will often be overlap).  In addition, when something is judged unconscionable, a court will refuse to allow the perpetrator of the conduct to benefit.  If need be, entire contracts can be set-aside or declared void, even if they are otherwise constructed wholly in conformity with the rules of contract.  A contract therefore can be found to be "legal" yet still be voided because it's held to be unconscionable in the same way a contract (for example an agreement between two parties in which one is paid to murder a third part can be held to be a "legal contract" yet be declared  "void for illegality".

Lindsay Lohan and her lawyer in court, Los Angeles, December 2011.  

Unconscionability is determined by examining the circumstances of the parties when the contract was made; these circumstances may include the bargaining power, age, and mental capacity of the parties and the doctrine is applied only where it would be an affront to the integrity of the judicial system to enforce a contracts.  At law, as in moral theology, the concept of unconscionability is probably absolute; something is either unconscionable or not.  However, cases are considered on their merits and the circumstances in which the unconscionable arose might color the detail of a judge’s verdict.

Portrait of King Charles II in his Garter robes (circa 1667), oil on canvas by Sir Peter Lely (1618-80).

The Most Noble Order of the Garter, an order of chivalry and the senior order of knighthood in the UK’s honors system, was founded by Edward III (1312–1377; King of England 1327-1377).  Appointments are exclusively in the gift of the sovereign and limited to two dozen living members (apart from royal appointees).  The Garter was of great significance to Charles II (1630–1685; King of Scotland 1649-1651, King of Scotland, England and Ireland 1660-1685) as it had been his father, Charles I (1600–1649; King of England, Scotland & Ireland 1625-1649) who awarded it as something symbolic of the binding tie with his favored aristocrats.  For Charles II, as the only dignity he was able to confer upon his adherents while in exile during the interregnum (1649-1660), it was a potent symbol, proof the King still retained the mystique and the power of monarchy.  Charles II suffered a sudden apoplectic fit on the morning of 2 February 1685 and his doctors expected him to have the decency to die within the hour.  Instead he lingered another four days before expiring and just before, he apologised to those around him, his last words being: “You must pardon me, gentlemen, for being a most unconscionable time a-dying.”  In this, as in many other things, he was unlike his father Charles I, who died suddenly, executed by having his head cut off.

Dynasty

Dynasty (pronounced dahy-nuh-stee (US English); din-uh-stee (UK English)

(1) A sequence of rulers from the same family, stock, or group.

(2) The rule of such a sequence.

(3) A series of members of a family who are distinguished for their success in business, wealth creation etc.

(4) In sport, a team or organization which has an extended period of success or dominant performance (technically unrelated to family links or even and great continuity in personnel).

(5) As used specifically in East Asian history, the polity or historical era under the rule of a certain dynasty.

1425-1475: From the Middle English dynastia, from the Middle French dynastie, from the Late Latin dynastia, from the Ancient Greek δυναστεία (dunasteía) (power, dominion, lordship, sovereignty) from dynasthai (have power), of unknown origin.  The adjective dynastic (from 1800) is used when speaking or, relating to or pertaining to a dynasty; dynastical attested since 1730.  A dynast (hereditary ruler) is from the 1630s, from the Late Latin dynastes, from the Greek dynastes (ruler, chief, lord, master).  Synonyms include house & lineage.  Dynasty & dynast are nouns, dynastic & dynastical are adjectives and dynastically is an adverb; the noun plural is dynasties.

The word is widely used of the ruling families of nations associated with royalty (Hapsburg dynasty, Romanov dynasty, Hohenzollern dynasty) and remains the standard term in the historiography of Imperial China (Ming dynasty, Qing dynasty, Song dynasty, Tang dynasty, Yuan dynasty).  In political science it’s a popular use (verging on a slur) to describe the political arrangements concocted when a ruler attempts (sometimes with success) to pass the office (and thus their country) to a descendent (usually the eldest or most demonstrably ruthless son), examples including the Congo, Syria and Cambodia.  Sometimes, polities organized in this manner can give rise to what is known as a subdynasty (which seems never to hyphenated), an idea borrowed from European history when royal families routinely would provide offspring to serve as kings of other states, thereby creating a new dynasty; sometimes this worked well, sometimes not.

In politics, families which some characterize as appearing dynastic can be very sensitive to anything which seems even to hint at the suggestion and the Lee family in Singapore is the standard case study.  Between the rule of Lee Kuan Yew (1923–2015; prime minister of Singapore 1959-1990) and that of his son Lee Hsien Loong (b 1952; Prime Minister of Singapore since 2004) there was gap of over a dozen years (which must not be called an interregnum) and of some interest is whether a similar mechanism will be engineered to enable a third generation to assume office, the previous successor designate having been removed from the plan because of “some unsuitability”.  According to commentators, this means Mr Lee has decided to delay his retirement so a “long runway” is provided on which the next prime minister can emerge (Mr Lee presumably thinking of “runway” in the modern sense of the “catwalk” on which models strut their stuff rather than anything to do with aviation).

While Li Hongyi (b 1987; first-born child of Lee Hsien Loong), has disavowed any interest in a political career, there’s still plenty of time and if, in the fullness of time, “drafted” by the ruling PAP (the People’s Action Party which has been in power since independence in 1959), he may feel it his duty to be “be persuaded”.  Li Hongyi however may simply believe his lineage is too great a disadvantage to overcome.  Earlier, Lee Hsien Loong dismissed suggestions his stellar career (becoming at becoming at 32 the youngest brigadier-general in the history of the Singapore military and prime minister at 53) owed anything to family connections, claiming being the prime minister’s son actually hindered him because people were so anxious to avoid accusations of favoritism.  Interestingly, entertainment personality Kylie Jenner (b 1997) made much the point, claiming it was belonging to a famous family which saw her denied some modelling work.  The Lee family though do seem unusually sensitive to suggestions the scions might unduly benefit from the connection, the Financial Times in 2007 even having to apologize for having published not anything libellous (actually easily done in Singapore) but simply a list of Lee family members in high positions in the island nation.  The current derogatory slang is “nepo baby”, a clipping of nepotism baby, a term one is unlikely to read in the Singaporean press.

Kim I, II & III: The Kim Dynasty, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, aka North Korea)

Kim I: Kim Il-sung (1912-1994; The Great Leader of DPRK (North Korea) 1948-1994 (left).  Like his descendants, The Dear Leader and The Supreme Leader, The Great Leader enjoyed food.  He’s pictured here at lunch with another foodie, comrade Stalin (1878-1953; Soviet leader 1924-1953) (right).

Kim Il-sung held an array of titles during his decades as the DPRK’s dictator, the proliferation not unusual in communist nations where the ruling party’s structures are maintained alongside the formal titles of state with which a nation maintains relations with the rest of the world.  In office for a notable forty five years he was designated premier (head of government) between 1948-1972 and president 1972-1994.  He was head of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) between 1949- 1994, and in that role was styled as chairman 1949-1966 and general secretary after 1966.  During his forty-five year rule, there were ten US presidents, six South Korean presidents, nine British prime ministers and ten Australian prime ministers.  He tenure in office also spanned the time of the USSR from its apotheosis under Comrade Stalin to its collapse in 1991. 

Being dead however proved no obstacle to The Great Leader extending his presidency, the collective office “Eternal leaders of Juche Korea” (Chuch'ejosŏnŭi yŏngwŏnhan suryŏng) created in 2016 by the insertion of an enabling line in the preamble to the constitution.  What this amendment did was formalise the position of The Great Leader and his late son Comrade Kim Jong Il (The Dear Leader) as the “eternal leaders” of the DPRK.  Juche is the term used to describe the DPRK’s national philosophy, a synthesis of The Great Leader’s interpretation of (1) Korean tradition and (2) Marxist-Leninist theory.

Funeral of The Great Leader, 1994.

It was an interesting move.  Technically, the office of president was constitutionally established only in 1972.  Prior to that, the role of head of state had been purely ceremonial and held by respected party functionaries, all power exercised by The Great Leader in his capacity as premier and general secretary of the WPK.  So tied to the legend of The Great Leader was the office of president that upon his death in 1994, the position was left vacant, The Dear Leader not granted the title.  That nuance of succession for a while absorbed the interest of the DPRK watchers but attempts to invest the move with any significance abated as DPRK business, though in the more straitened circumstances of the post Soviet world, continued as usual.

The constitution was again revised in 1998.  Being a godless communist state, no fine theological points stood in the way of declaring The Great Leader the DPRK’s "Eternal President", the latest addition to the preamble declaring:

Under the leadership of the Workers' Party of Korea, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Korean people will hold the great leader Comrade Kim Il-sung in high esteem as the eternal President of the Republic.

The constitution in its 2012, promulgated after the death of The Dear Leader, again referred to The Great Leader as "eternal President of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea" but, in 2016, The Dear Leader, having apparently been dead for a decent duration, another amendment to the preamble changed the administrative nomenclature of executive eternity to "eternal leaders of Juche Korea", the honor now jointly held by the leaders great & dear.  It was another first for the Kims.

Kim II: Kim Jong-il (1941–2011; The Dear Leader of DPRK (North Korea), 1994-2011).  Pictured here admiring a vegetable, The Dear Leader is accompanied by a general.  DPRK generals wear big hats and always carry a notebook in case the closest Kim says something.  They write it down.

As a construct, the DPRK is best thought of a hereditary theocracy.  Although opaque, its dynamics are now better understood but when The Great Leader died in 1994, neither within the country nor beyond was it widely understood how much of the power structure he controlled had passed to The Dear Leader.  Although the economic circumstances of 1994 were hardly propitious, there seems to have been little doubt about the formal succession, The Dear Leader having been anointed for more than a decade.  The DPRK’s media operation, while not in the conventional sense having a middle class to be made “quite prepared”, had the rest of the country to work on and The Dear Leader was gradually eased into photo opportunities with The Great Leader, eventually making even solo appearances, sometimes in the role of Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army to which he’s been appointed in 1991, despite having no military experience, although, given the minimal battlefield exposure of most of the generals, this might have been less of a problem than it appears.

Perhaps now aware of his own mortality, The Great Leader spent some of the time in the years before his death clearing the decks for the succession, purging the military and civilian ranks of any difficult types who might prove obstacles to The Dear Leader’s ascent.  Some apparently died but it may have been a coincidence; constitutionally the DPRK may be a theocracy but its military and political elite are gerontocracies.  The path was smoothed and, the military command settled, in 1992, The Great Leader announced The Dear Leader was in charge of all the DPRK’s internal affairs.  Curiously, shortly after that, the media began using the honorific “Dear Father” instead of “Dear Leader” but for whatever reason, all official communications soon reverted to the original title and there’s never been any explanation.

Despite all the dynastic help, the indications are it took The Dear Leader sometime fully to assert his authority.  Seriously weird it may appear but, the WPK is just another political party and they all have factions and, in the difficult post-Soviet environment of the 1994 succession, it seems there were genuine discussions within the party about how to deal with the economic problems the DPRK faced.  It frankly didn’t go well but while The Dear Leader may not have learned much economic theory, he proved adept at consolidating his power, adopting the Songun (military first) policy of North Korea, granting the military priority in resource allocation and political influence, not out of any concern about foreign invasion but to ensure the loyalty of what was, in effect, a giant police force to protect the Kim dynasty from a revolt of the people.  Secure in office, The Dear Leader did spasmodically attempt economic reforms but the results were not impressive.

Planning the dynasty: The Dear Leader shaking hands with Japanese-born singer Ko Yong-hui (1952-2004; aka Takada Hime) circa 1972.  She became his consort and would later give birth to Kim III (later The Supreme Leader).  Within the DPRK, her name must never be spoken and she's referred to only by honorific forms, the most commonly use of which is: “The Respected Mother who is the Most Faithful and Loyal 'Subject' to the Dear Leader Comrade Supreme Commander”.

By 1997, he was sufficiently entrenched to engineer his appointment to The Great Leader’s old post as General Secretary of the WPK and a year later, a constitutional amendment declared his role as chairman of the National Defence Commission was "the highest post of the state", presumably among those still alive because the same constitutional reform abolished the office of president and proclaimed The Great Leader to be the DPRK’s "Eternal President".  The year after The Dear Leader’s death in 2011, the constitution was amended to declare him Eternal General Secretary of the WPK and Eternal Chairman of the National Defence Commission.  In 2016, after a decent period of mourning, the new title "Eternal Leaders of Juche Korea" was created and granted to both the Great Leader & Dear Leader.

US actor Elizabeth Gillies (b 1993) appeared as Fallon Carrington on in the television drama Dynasty (2017–2022), a revival of the 1980s soap opera; it was shown in the US on the CW Television Network (episodes streamed internationally on Netflix the next day).  She appeared (far left) in Ariana Grande's (b 1993) music video Thank U, Next (2019), taking the part of Lindsay Lohan in the segment which was a homage to Mean Girls (2004).  While not technically a doppelganger, the degree of resemblance was sufficient for the concept to work.

The reputation of the DPRK as a hermit state cloaked in secrecy is undeserved because there is an official biography of The Dear Leader and from his birth, he was amazing.  He was born inside a log cabin beneath Korea’s most sacred mountain and in the moment of delivery, a shooting star brought forth a spontaneous change from winter to summer and there appeared in the sky, a double rainbow.  The Dear Leader was not subject to bowel movements, never needing to defecate or urinate although it’s not known if this is a genetic characteristic of the dynasty and therefore enjoyed also by The Supreme Leader.  He had a most discriminating palette so The Dear Leader employed staff to inspect every grain of rice by hand to ensure each piece was of uniform length, plumpness, and color, The Dear Leader eating only perfectly-sized rice.  Although he only ever played one round of golf and that on the country’s notoriously difficult 7,700 yard (7040 m) course at Pyongyang, he took only 34 strokes to complete the 18 holes, a round which included five holes-in-ones.  Experienced golfers have cast doubt on the round of 34 (not commenting on the holes-in-one) but the diet of individually inspected & polished grains of rice was thought "at least plausible".  

Funeral of The Dear Leader, 2011.

The car is a 1975 or 1976 Lincoln Continental, built by Moloney Standard Coach Builders on an extended wheelbase.  Lincoln experts say it's a different car to the similar model used in The Great Leader's funeral, the dynasty said to own several and it's believed they were obtained "through sources in Japan".  Uniquely, the Kin dynasty is the only only family said also to own a brace of Mercedes-Benz 600s (M100; 1963-1981) long-roof Landaulets, only twelve of which were built.  Fittingly, the long-roof variants are known casually as the "presidentials" but the factory never officially used the designation.  

The Kims certainly build personality cults but it’s not only the North Koreans who create retrospective honours to acknowledge the uniqueness of a special individual.  George Washington (1732-1799) will forever be the first President of the United States (POTUS) so that’s fine but he retired from the army as a lieutenant general and later appointments of some to more senior ranks bothered some in the military, concerned his primacy in the hierarchy wasn’t adequately honoured.  The later appointments had been (1) Ulysses S Grant (1822–1885) created General of the Army in 1866, (2) John Pershing (1860–1948) appointed General of the Armies in 1919 and (3) nine of the World War II (1939-1945) generals and admirals who were appointed to the newly formalised five star rank as Generals of the Army and Fleet Admirals respectively.  Where Washington stood in this potpourri of stars and titles wasn’t clear until 1978 when, after years of discussions of the difficulties inherent in solving the problem, in a surprisingly simple act of internal Army administration, Washington posthumously was promoted to General of the Armies of the United States, making him eternally the US military’s most senior officer.

Kim III: Kim Jong-un (b circa 1982; The Supreme Leader (originally The Great Successor) of DPRK (North Korea) since 2011).  The Supreme Leader is pictured here with South Korean foreign minister, Chung Eui-yong (b 1946).

Inheriting the family business at a much younger age than The Dear Leader, The Supreme Leader, didn’t benefit (or suffer) from the long public gestation period his father was provided by The Great Leader.  It was in 2009, about two years before The Dear Leader’s death that the media began reporting the youngest son, was to be the DPRK’s next leader although at that stage, he was referred to as The Brilliant Comrade, the honorific The Great Successor not adopted until after The Dear Leader’s death and it was soon replaced by The Supreme Leader.  For whatever reason, and the speculation and conspiracy theories are many, Kim III more quickly assumed his panoply of offices and titles than his immediate ancestor.  

Announced on state television as The Great Successor, The Supreme Leader was appointed General Secretary of the WPK, Chairman of the Central Military Commission, and President of the State Affairs Commission, followed soon afterwards by a promotion to the army’s highest military rank, Marshal of the Korean People's Army, adding to his position as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (exactly the same constitutional arrangement adopted by Hitler as commander-in-chief of both OKH (Oberkommando des Heeres (High Command of the Army)) and OKW (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (High Command of the Armed Forces)).  Great minds do think alike.  Confusingly, having already morphed from The Brilliant Comrade to The Great Successor to The Supreme Leader, references also appeared calling him The Dear Respected Leader but thankfully the proliferation seems now to have stopped.  In office, he has pursued 병진 (byungjin (literally "parallel development")), a refinement of The Great Leader’s policy simultaneously to develop both the economy and the military, his particular emphasis in the latter a focus on nuclear weapons and inter-continental delivery systems.  It may be an attempt to avoid the problems inherent in the “Waffen und Butter” (guns and butter) programme pursued by the Nazi regime (despite the international perception) as late as the first three years of World War II (1939-1945).

Although Kim III is no longer referred to as The Great Successor, there have been great successes.  Despite Western propaganda, there are elections in the DPRK and when The Supreme Leader sought a seat in the Supreme People's Assembly, there was a record turnout of voters and he received 100% of the votes cast.  Although it’s hard to determine the veracity of many of the reports, it’s suggested he’s an innovator in matters of military discipline, new methods used by firing squads said to include flame throwers, and anti-aircraft cannons, both said to make quite a mess although it's difficult to know how high is the body count, some reported executed later turning up alive and well.  Worth a mention though is the assassination in 2017 of his exiled half-brother Kim Jong-nam (1971-2017), killed with the nerve agent VX while walking through Kuala Lumpur International Airport, a novel twist on the extra-judicial execution being the use of two aspiring starlets to deliver the VX; they believed they were being filmed as part of a reality TV show. Most celebrated has been the nuclear programme and the increasingly bigger and longer-range missiles paraded from time to time.  Underground nuclear tests being hard to monitor, it remains unclear whether the devices tested are the long de rigueur plutonium weapons or, for the first time since the one-off A-Bomb used in Hiroshima in 1945, made using uranium.  Most recently, state media has announced the complete success in avoiding COVID-19 with no cases reported in the republic so, on any basis of calculation, The Supreme Leader has supervised the most successful COVID-19 strategy on Earth.

The Supreme Leader has also drawn the interest of the pro ana community because of his remarkable weight loss.  Whether his motivation was (1) concerns about his health, being a bit chubby, (2) a wish to look more sexy and attractive to younger women or (3) display some solidarity with his subjects, many of whom were suffering food shortages, his weight-loss regime has been a success, experts estimating, on the basis of photographic evidence, that he has probably shed up to 25-30 kg (65-80 lb).  This is good but has created a problem for the small number of people in the entertainment business who work as as Kim Jong-il impersonators, some of who have sought guidance from the pro ana community.  For security reasons, The Supreme Leader is known also to employ body doubles and it's not known if they're currently being starved or have already been shot and replaced with thinner models.  

After the weight loss he seems in such rude good health that, still not forty, there’s no reason he may not rule perhaps even longer than his grandfather’s forty-five years.  Ever since the demise of the USSR in 1991, analysts have been predicting the imminent demise of the communist regimes in both Pyongyang and Havana but they seem to muddle through, the DPRK of late enjoying new sources of foreign exchange, branching out from industrial-scale drug production and the smuggling of oil and minerals to the new field of cybercrime; even in the niche market of fake news they're said to run a small operation.