Literal
(pronounced lit-er-uhl)
(1) In accordance with, involving, or being
the primary or strict meaning of the word or words; not figurative or
metaphorical.
(2) Following the words of the original exactly.
(3) True to fact; not exaggerated; actual
or factual; being actually such, without
exaggeration or inaccuracy.
(4) Of, persons, tending to construe words
in the strict sense or in an unimaginative way; matter-of-fact; prosaic.
(5) Of or relating to the letters of the
alphabet (obsolete except for historic, technical or academic use); of or pertaining to the nature of
letters.
(6) In language translation, as "literal translation", the precise meaning of a word or phrase as opposed to the actual meaning conveyed when used in another language.
(7) A typographical error, especially
involving a single letter (in technical use only).
(8) In English (and other common law
jurisdictions) law, one of the rules of statutory construction and
interpretation (also called the plain meaning rule).
(9) In computer science, a notation for
representing a fixed value in source code.
(10) In mathematics, containing or using
coefficients and constants represented by letters.
1350-1400: From the Middle English from the
Late Latin literalis & litteralis (of or belonging to letters
or writing) from the Classical Latin litera
& littera (letter, alphabetic
sign; literature, books). The meaning
"taking words in their natural meaning" (originally in reference to
Scripture and opposed to mystical or allegorical), is from the Old French
literal (again borrowed from the Latin literalis
& litteralis). In English, the original late fourteenth
meaning was "taking words in their natural meaning" and was used in
reference to the understanding of text in Scripture, distinguishing certain
passages from those held to be mystical or allegorical. The meaning "of or pertaining to the
letters of the alphabet " emerged in English only in the late fifteenth
century although that was the meaning of the root from antiquity, a fork of
that sense being " verbally exact, according to the letter of verbal
expression, attested from the 1590s and it evolved in conjunction with “the
primary sense of a word or passage”. The
phrase “literal-minded” which can be loaded with negative, neutral or positive
connotations, is noted from 1791. Literal is a noun & adjective, literalize is a verb, literalistic is an adjective, literalist, literalization & literalism are nouns and literally is an adverb; the noun plural is literals.
The meaning "concerned with letters
and learning, learned, scholarly" was known since the mid-fifteenth
century but survives now only literary criticism and the small number of
universities still using “letters” in the description of degree
programmes. The Bachelor of Letters
(BLitt or LittB) was derived from the Latin Baccalaureus
Litterarum or Litterarum Baccalaureus
and historically was a second undergraduate degree (as opposed to a Masters or
other post-graduate course) which students pursued to study a specialized field
or some aspect of something of particular interest. Once common, these degrees are now rare in
the English-speaking world. It was between 1895-1977 offered by the University of Oxford and was undertaken by many Rhodes Scholars,
sometimes as an adjunct course, but has now been replaced by the MLitt (Master of
Letters) which has a minimal coursework component. When the BLitt was still on the books, Oxford
would sometimes confer it as a sort of consolation prize, offering DPhil candidates whose
submission had proved inadequate the option of taking a BLitt if the prospect
of re-writing their thesis held no appeal.
Among the dons supervising the candidates, the verb "to BLitt"
emerged, the classic form being: “he was
BLitt-ed you know".
Oxford's
colorful academic gowns are a footnote in the history of fashion although
influences either way are difficult to detect.
The regulations of 1895 required the new BLitt and the BSc (Bachelor of
Science) were to wear the same dress as the existing B.C.L (Bachelor of Civil
Law) and the BM (Bachelor of Medicine) and if there was a difference between
the blues used for the BCL and the BM in 1895, the implicit
"respectively" (actually then its Latin equivalent) would seem to
suggest the BLitt was to use the same color hood as the BCL and the BSc to use
the shade of the BM and that's certainly how it appears on many contemporary
depictions. Although in the surviving
record the hues of blue would in the following decades vary somewhat (and the colors
were formerly re-allocated during the 1920s, the BLitt moving to a more vivid
rendition of light-blue), the BLitt, BSc and BCL hoods tended always to be
brighter and the BM darker. Whether it
was artistic license or an aesthetic nudge, one painter in 1927 mixed something
much lighter for the BLitt, a shade more neutral and hinting at a French grey
but no other artist seems to have followed.
By 1957, the BLitt and BSc gowns had returned to the colors of the 1895
decree while the BCL and BM were now in mid-blue and that remained unchanged
until 1977 when the BLitt and BSc were superseded by masters’ degrees, the new
MSc and MLitt given a blue hood lined with the grey of the DLitt & DSc.
Quite
how much the work of the artist can be regarding as an accurate record of a
color as it appeared is of course dubious, influenced as it is the painter’s
eye, ambient light and the angle at which it was observed. Even the descriptions used by the artists in
their notes suggest there was either some variation over the years (and that
would not be unexpected given the differences in the dying processes between
manufacturers) or the terms for colors meant different things to different painters:
The Oxford BMus hood was noted as blue (1882 & 1934), mauve (1920), lilac
(1923, 1924, 1927, 1935 & 1957), dark lilac (1948) and dark purple (1926). With improvements in photographic reproduction
and the greater standardization in the industrial processes used in dying, the
post-war photographic record is more reliable and lilac seems a good description for the BM
and “light blue” for the BLitt.
Over the moon: Lindsay Lohan (right) with mother Dina (left) and sister Aliana (centre) at a lunch to celebrate he pregnancy, New York, April 2023.
In March, her mother had been quoted as saying: “I’m literally over the moon. I’m so happy, I can’t stop smiling”. The now seemingly endemic misuse of literal
is not new, Henry Watson Fowler (1858–1933) in his A Dictionary of Modern English Usage (1926) noting errors in general use from as early as the 1820s and the Oxford
English Dictionary (OED) has cited literary examples from the seventeenth
century. Interestingly, it appears
objections emerged only in the early twentieth century which does suggest an
additional meaning may have existed or at least been evolving before the
grammar Nazis imposed their censorious ways. The use is now so endemic in English and rarely causes confusion so the pedants really should give up their carping and some illustrious names have sinned:
“The
land literally flowed with milk and honey.” (Louisa May Alcott (1832–1888), Little Women (1868-1869)).
“…literally
rolling in wealth…” (Mark Twain (1835-1910), The
Adventures of Tom Sawyer (1876)). In fairness this can be done because Disney had Scrooge McDuck (created 1947) do just that in his "money bin" but that wouldn't have been what Twain had in mind).
“…Gatsby literally glowed.” (F Scott Fitzgerald (1896–1940), The Great Gatsby (1925)). Women (often when pregnant) actually are said "to glow" in the sense of their happiness being such that it seems "to radiate" from them and this may be what he wanted to convey but it's most unusual to use it of men. It's anyway usually held to be a figurative radiation, not something literal.
The literal rule in statutory
interpretation in the UK & Commonwealth
Statute law is that set in place by a body
vested with appropriate authority (typically a legislature) and maintained in
written form. In providing rulings
involving these laws, courts in the common-law world (although in the US the
evolution has been a little different) have developed a number of principles of
statutory interpretation, the most fundamental of which is “the literal rule”
(sometimes called the “plain meaning rule”).
It’s the basis of all court decisions involving statues, the judge looking
just to the words written down, relying on their literal meaning without any
attempt to impute or interpret meaning. The
process should ensure laws are made exclusively by legislators alone; those
elected for the purpose, the basis of the constitutional theory being that it’s
this which grants laws their legitimacy and thus the consent of those upon
they’re imposed. However, an application
of the literal rule can result in consequences which are nonsensical, immoral
or unjust but the theory is that will induce the legislature to correct
whatever error in drafting was the cause; it not being the task of the court to
alter a duly passed law; the judiciary must interpret and not attempt to remedy
the law.
A judge in 1980 observed the British
constitution “…is firmly based upon the
separation of powers; parliament makes the laws, the judiciary interpret them. When Parliament legislates to remedy what the
majority of its members at the time perceive to be a defect… the role of the
judiciary is confined to ascertaining from the words that parliament has
approved as expressing its intention what that intention was, and to giving
effect to it. Where the meaning of the statutory words is plain and unambiguous
it is not for the judges to invent fancied ambiguities as an excuse for failing
to give effect to its plain meaning because they themselves consider that the
consequences of doing so would be inexpedient, or even unjust or immoral.” So a judge should not depart from the literal
meaning of words even if the outcome is unjust. If they do, the will of parliament is
contradicted.
However, some things were so absurd even
the most black-letter-law judges (of which there were not a few) could see the
problem. What emerged was “the golden
rule”, the operation of which a judge in 1857 explained by saying the “…grammatical and ordinary sense of the words
is to be adhered to unless that would lead to some absurdity or some repugnance
or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument in which case the grammatical
and ordinary sense of the words may be modified so as to avoid the absurdity
and inconsistency, but no farther.”
The golden rule thus operates to avoid an absurdity which an application
of the literal rule might produce.
The golden rule was though deliberately
limited in scope, able to be used only in examples of absurdity so extreme it
would be a greater absurdity not to rectify.
Thus “the mischief rule” which with judges exercised rather more
discretion within four principles, first mentioned in 1584 at a time when much
new legislation was beginning to emerge to supersede the old common law which had
evolved over centuries of customary practice.
Given the novelty of codified national law replacing what previously
been administered with differences between regions, the need for some debugging
was not unexpected, hence the four principles of the mischief rule: (1) What
was the common law before this law?, (2) What was the mischief and defect for
which the common law did not provide and thus necessitate this law?, (3) What
remedy for the mischief and defect is in this law”, & (4) The role of the judge is to make such construction as
shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy. The rule was intended to determine what mischief
a statute was intended to correct and interpret the statute justly to avoid any
mischief.
The mischief rule closes loopholes in the
law while allowing them to evolve in what may be a changing environment but
does permit an element of the retrospective and depends on the opinion and
prejudices of the judge: an obvious infringement on the separation of powers
protected by the strict application of literal rule. So it is a trade-off, the literal rule the
basic tool of statutory interpretation which should be deviated from only in
those exceptional cases where its application would create an absurdity or
something manifestly unjust. This the
golden rule allows while the mischief rule extends judicial discretion,
dangerously some have said, permitting the refinement of law at the cost of
increasing the role of the judges, a group where views and prejudices do vary. From all this has evolved the debate about
judicial activism.
