Abrosexual

Abrosexual (pronounced ab-ruh-seks-uhl (U) or ab-roh-sek-shoo-uhl (non-U))

Describing, noting, acknowledging or relating to a person whose sexual orientation is fluid and may from time to time fluctuate.

2013: The construct was abro- + sexual.  Abro- was not a standard suffix but was an adaptation of the Ancient Greek ἁβρός (feminine ἁβρᾱ́, neuter ἁβρόν) (habrós) (graceful, delicate, pretty) which scholars of the Classics note appeared usually in verse (though never in epic poetry) and was rare in early texts written in prose.  In abrosexual it was used in the sense of “graceful, delicate, pretty” (presumably because in Antiquity it was used especially of the human body) but originally it could also describe something splendid in appearance, an elegance of style or (often in a derogatory manner), dainty, luxurious or effete, thus the transferred sense of “delicate”, applied often to those from the Orient.  The construct of abrosexual appears one of English’s linguistic novelties and is unrelated to abrogate (now best known from the use in administrative law) which, dating from 1526, was from the Middle English abrogat (abolished), from the Latin abrogātus, the perfect passive participle of abrogō (repeal), the construct being ab (away) + rogō (ask, inquire, propose).

The word –sexual was a noun or adjective describing a state or style of sexuality, the construct being sex + -ual.  Sex was from the Middle English sexe (gender), from the Old French sexe (genitals; gender), from the Latin sexus (gender; gender traits; males or females; genitals), from the Proto-Italic seksus, from the primitive Indo-European séksus, from sek- (to cut, cut off, sever), thus the meaning “section, division (into male and female)”.  The use as it applied to women was influenced by the Middle French le sexe (women), traces of this development noted in the late sixteenth century.  The usage for third and additional sexes was calqued from the French troisième sexe (third gender), which was applied first to “masculine women” in 1817 and male homosexuals in 1847 (the first such reference in English apparently to in reference to Catholic clergy, a theme which continues, one of the internal criticisms of the Roman Curia (the Holy See’s ecclesiastical cum bureaucratic apparatus, the establishment which runs the Vatican) that it is a “gay cabal”.  Perhaps surprisingly, the use of the word “sex” to describe “sexual intercourse” seems not to have appeared in print until 1899 when was used in that context in HG Wells’ (1866-1946 and a noted proponent of “free love”) novel Love and Mr Lewisham; obviously an abbreviation rather than a euphemism and etymologists presume the use would for some time have been “verbal shorthand” in oral use.  Modernity arrived in 1929 when DH Lawrence (1885–1930) introduced the phrase “have sex” to idiomatic English; it caught on.  The –ual suffix was a back-formation from Latin adjectives ending in –uālis (formed from fourth-declension nouns suffixed with –ālis) and an alternative form of –al.  Abrosexual is an adjective and a (non-standard) noun; the noun plural is abrosexuals.  The companion word is the (non-standard) abroromantic.

Abrosexual seems first to have appeared on-line in 2013 but interest has recently spiked for reasons not immediately clear, sexual fluidity hardly a new idea; the current feeling seems to be it has become increasingly popular as a form of self-identification, one which has the advantage of infinite variability (no consistency demanded).  One early criticism of the word was it was unnecessary because the “P” in the LGBTQQIAAOP glossary referred to “pansexual” (those attracted to a person because of their personality; sex and gender both irrelevant) which seemed to cover the behavior.  The difference however is that pansexuality is a permanent state whereas abrosexuality is an identity in which orientation may shift, the implication presumably that whatever might be the orientation to which one has shifted, as long as it lasts, it is exclusive although how that maps onto some states has never been explained.  For example, a bisexual may be attracted almost exclusively to one gender and may then shift to favor almost exclusively the other: is that an example of fluidity within the rubric of bisexuality, an instance of abrosexuality or both.  In other words, must the shift be only between the LGBTQQIAAOP categories or can it also refer to degrees of intensity, a definitional puzzle complicated further by the multisexual umbrella which covers those whose preference span a number of categories.

The Abrosexual Pride flag.

The annual Abrosexual Pride Day is 2 July and of course, by definition, abrosexuals are not restricted to than one celebration.  An asexual might mark International Asexuality Day on 6 April and then shift to become a lesbian, thus enjoying also Lesbian Visibility Day on 26 April, Lesbian Day on 8 October and Coming Out Day 72 hours later.  There is also an acknowledged abrosexual flag although the origin of the design is contested as is the meaning represented by the choice of colors; the most popular suggestion being green signaling queer attraction, the fade to and from white the effortless transition and the pink the actual shift.  The hues are those of a watermelon, the use of which is analogous with the contemporary use of the N-word which is permissible only by (certain) people of color (PoC) in that it should be spoken only by those who identify was abrosexual, use by others a slur or micro-aggression depending on context.  It's not the first time "watermelon" has been co-opted: in Thailand the word is used to describe soldiers who are "green on the outside, red on the inside", the reference being to (1) the green military fatigues they wear and (2) red being the color of the political opposition (the establishment using the yellow of the royal family).  So abrosexuality is a permanent state of orientational flux.  Even if one switches from one to another only once in one’s life, one remains at least a latent abrosexual, however much one may rationalize such things as “just a phase” because the modern politics of sexuality are predicated on the “born like this” paradigm; the shifts inherent in abrosexuality are an inherent part of one and not a lifestyle choice like becoming a vegan or joining the Freemasons.  Phases might exist but they’re part of the whole and all are equally authentic but abrosexual doesn't belong in the LGBTQQIAAOP glossary; it is a process, not a category.

Just a phase: Lindsay Lohan with former special friend Samantha Ronson.

There are however those who have suggested such things could be a purely situational occurrence; a thing of time and place.  Interviewed in January 2018, Lindsay Lohan was asked about if she considered herself “sexually fluid” to which she responded with an unambiguous “No, I definitely like men”.  Probed further about her sometimes tempestuous relationship with former special friend Samantha Ronson she seemed amused and replied “I was living in LA.  I'm not saying it's a bad thing…” and that expanded a little on her observation in 2013: “I know I’m straight. I have made out with girls before, and I had a relationship with a girl.  But I think I needed to experience that and I think I was looking for something different.”  She concluded her 2018 comments by noting she was “having a break from relationships at the moment… not forever, but just for now."  In Ms Lohan’s case the fondness for women may just have been an “LA induced” phase and (now a married mother) she’s permanently straight but “not forever, but just for now” is the essence of abrosexuality.

Coriaceous

Coriaceous (pronounced kawr-ee-ey-shuhs, kohr-ee-ey-shuhs or kor-ee-ey-shuhs)

(1) Of or resembling leather.

(2) In botany, a surface (usually a leaf) distinguished having the visual characteristics of leather.

1665-1675: from Late Latin coriāceus (resembling leather in texture, toughness etc), the construct being corium (skin, hide, leather (and also used casually to refer to belts, whips and other leather items, and upper layers (ie analogous with a skin or hide) in general such as crusts, coatings, peels or shells)), from the Proto-Italic korjom, from the primitive Indo-European sker & ker- + -aceous.  The suffix –aceous was from the New Latin, from the Classical Latin -aceus (of a certain kind) and related to the Latin adjectival suffixes –ac & -ax.  It was used (1) to create words meaning “of, relating to, resembling or containing the thing suffixed” and (2) in scientific classification, to indicate membership of a taxonomic family or other group.  The comparative is more coriaceous and the superlative most coriaceous.  Coriaceous & subcoriaceous are adjectives and coriaceousness is a noun.

Botanists classify coriaceous leaves by degree.  The common greenbrier (Smilax rotundifolia) (left) is listed as subcoriaceous (ie somewhat or almost coriaceous) while the Shining Fetterbush (Lyonia lucida) is distinguished by glossy coriaceous leaves with a prominent vein along margins (right).

In late 1967, as a prelude to the next year’s introduction of the XJ6, Jaguar rationalized its saloon car line-up, pruning the long-running Mark II range from three to two, dropping the 3.8 litre model and re-designating the smaller-engined pair (the 2.4 becoming the 240, the 3.4 the 340), thus bringing the nomenclature into line with the recently released 420.  The standardization exercise extended to the big Mark X which became the 420G but curiously the S-Type’s name wasn’t changed and it became the only Jaguar in which the 3.8 litre engine remained available as a regular production option, the E-Type (XKE) having earlier adopted the 4.2.  So the 240, 340, S-Type (3.4 & 3.8) and 420 (all based on the 1959 Mark 2 (itself a update of the 1955 2.4)) all remained in production, along with the Daimler 250 (the re-named 2.5 fitted with Daimler’s 2.5 litre V8) and to add a further quirk, a dozen 340s were built to special order with the 3.8 liter engine.  Production of all ceased in 1968 with the coming of the XJ6 except the big 420G (which lasted until 1970 although sales had for some time slowed to a trickle), the 240 (available until 1969 because Jaguar wasn’t until then able to offer the 2.8 liter option in the XJ6) and the Daimler 250 (which also ran until 1969 until the Daimler Sovereign (an XJ6 with a Daimler badge) entered the showrooms).

1967 Jaguar Mark 2 3.8 with leather trim (left) and a "de-contented" 1968 Jaguar 240 with the "slimline" bumpers, Ambla trim and optional  rimbellishers (right).

Given the new revised naming convention wasn’t carried over the XJ6 (rendering the 420G an alpha-numeric orphan for the last year of its existence), there’s since been speculation about whether the Jaguar management had a change of mind about how the XJ6 was to be labeled or the changes were just an attempt to stimulate interest in the rather dated Mark 2 and its derivatives.  That certainly worked though perhaps not quite as Jaguar intended because Mark 2 sales spiked in 1968 and the oldest models (240 & 340) handsomely outsold both the newer 420 and the by then moribund S-Type.  Probably the change in name had little to do with this and more significant was the price cutting which made the 240 & 340 suddenly seem like bargains, the 240 especially.  Dated they might have looked in the year the NSU Ro80 debuted, but they still had their charm and the new price drew in buyers whereas the 420 suffered because it was known the XJ6 would soon be available and expectations were high.

The renewed interest in the 240 was at least partly because Jaguar had finally devoted some attention to the breathing of its smallest engine, straight-port heads and revised SU carburetors increasing the power to the point where a genuine 100 mph (160 km/h) could be attained, something not possible since the lighter 2.4 (retrospectively known as the Mark 1) ended production in 1959.  The 100 mph thing was something the factory was quite sensitive about because in the 1950s (when it was still quite an achievement) it had been a selling point and for most of the Mark 2’s life, Jaguar were reluctant to make 2.4s available for testing.  The 240’s new performance solved that problem and it was the biggest seller of the revised range (4446 240s vs 2800 340s) although those who read the small print might have been disappointed to note the fuel consumption; both models weighed about the same but the small engine had to work much harder, the 340 barely more thirsty.

1962 Jaguar Mark 2 3.8 with leather trim (left) and 1968 Jaguar 240 with Ambla trim.  It was only when the optional leather trim was specified that the fold-down "picnic tables" were fitted in the front seat-backs. 

The real thing: Lindsay Lohan in leather (albeit with faux fur sleeves).

Still, with the 240 selling in 1968 for only £20 more than the what a 2.4 had cost in 1955, it was soon tagged “the best Jaguar bargain of all time” but that had been achieved with some cost-cutting, some of the trademark interior wood trim deleted, the fog and spot lamps replaced by a pair of chromed grilles, the hubcap design simplified and “slimline” bumpers fitted in place of the substantial units in place since 1959, this not only saving weight but a remarkable amount of the cost of production.  The revised cars were not as generously equipped as before (although some of the “de-contenting” had been introduced late in Mark 2 production) but a long option list remained and on it were some items once fitted as standard, the list including a choice of five radio installations with or without rear parcel shelf-mounted speaker, a laminated windscreen, chromium-plated wheel rimbellishers for steel wheels, Ace Turbo wheel trims for steel wheels, a tow bar, a locking petrol filler cap, front seat belts, the choice of radial, town and country, or whitewall tyres, automatic transmission, overdrive (for the manual transmission), wire wheels, fast ratio steering box, a fire extinguisher, Powr-Lok differential, rear window demister, heavy-duty anti-roll bar, close-ratio gearbox, tinted glass, a driver’s wing mirror, childproof rear door locks, an integrated ignition & starter switch (steering column), reclining front seats, power-assisted steering & leather upholstery.

It was the moving of the leather trim to the option list which is said to have made the greatest contribution to the price cuts.  The replacement fabric was Ambla, one of a class of coriaceous materials which have come variously to be referred to as faux leather, pleather, vegan leather, Naugahyde, synthetic leather, artificial leather, fake leather & ersatz leather.  First manufactured in the US, most production now is done in China as well as upholstery, the fabric is use for just about anything which has ever been made in leather including clothing, footwear, gloves, hats, belts, watch bands, cases, handbags, sports items, firearm holsters, luggage and a myriad besides.  It does appear that as early as the fifteenth century, the Chinese were experimenting with ways synthetic leather could be manufactured but it doesn’t appear anything was ever produced at scale and it was only when petroleum-based plastics became available in the US in the late nineteenth century that it became viable to mass produce a viable alternative to leather.  Historically, most of the products were petroleum-based but vegetable-based alternatives are now attracting much interest as attention has focused on the environmental impact of the traditional petro-chemical based approach.

1967 Mercedes-Benz 250 SE with MB-Tex trim (left) and 1971 Mercedes-Benz 300 SEL 6.3 with leather trim.

One of the best known coriaceous materials in the 1960s and 1970s was MB-Tex, a vinyl used by Mercedes-Benz which by far was the synthetic which most closely resembled genuine leather.  That was something made easier by the Germans using a process which resulted in slightly thicker tanned hide than those from Italy, Spain or England and this meant that replicating the appearance was more easily attained.  What most distinguished MB-Tex however was the durability and longevity.  Unlike leather which demanded some care and attention to avoid wear and cracking, it wasn’t uncommon for 20 or 30 year old MB-Tex to look essentially as it did when new and many who sat in them for years may have assumed it really was leather.  It certainly took an expert eye to tell the difference although in a showroom, moving from one to another, although the visual perception might be much the same, the olfactory senses would quickly know which was which because nothing compares with the fragrance of a leather-trimmed interior.  For some, that seduction was enough to persuade although those who understood the attraction of the close to indestructible MB-Tex, there were aerosol cans of “leather smell”, each application said to last several weeks.

For the incomparable aroma of leather.

The factory continued to develop MB-Tex, another of its attractions being that unlike leather, it could be produced in just about any color although, now colors (except black, white and shades of grey) have more or less disappeared from interior schemes, that functionality is not the advantage it once was.  As a fabric though, it reached the point where Mercedes-Benz dropped the other choices and eventually offered only leather or a variety of flavors of MB-Tex.  That disappointed some who remembered the velour and corduroy fittings especially popular in the colder parts of Europe but the factory insisted MB-Tex was superior in every way.  Also lamented were the exquisite (though rarely ordered) mohair interiors available for the 600 Grosser (W100, 1963-1981).  Apparently, the factory would trim a 600 in MB-Tex upon request but nobody ever was that post modern and most buyers preferred the leather, however coriaceous might have been the alternative.

Puffery

Puffery (pronounced puhf-uh-ree)

(1) Undue or exaggerated praise; inflated laudation; publicity, claims in advertising, acclaim etc, that are exaggerated (also known as the “puff piece”).

(2) In common law jurisdictions (often as “mere puffery), certain claims or assertions made which, even if literally untrue or misleading, are not actionable.

(3) An act of puffing (rare except in humor).

1730–1735: The construct was puff (in the sense of “to praise with exaggeration”) + -ery.  The noun puff was from the early thirteenth century Middle English puf, puffe, puff & puf, from the Old English pyf (a short, quick blast of wind, act of puffing) which was imitative and cognate with the Middle Low German puf & pof.  It was derived from the verb which was from the Middle English puffen, from the Old English pyffan & puffian (to breathe out, blow with the mouth) and similar forms in other European languages included the Dutch puffen, the German Low German puffen, the German puffen, the Danish puffe and the Swedish puffa.  The sense of “to blow with quick, intermittent blasts” was common by the mid-fourteenth century while the meaning “pant, breathe hard and fast” emerged some decades later.  It was used of the “fluffy light pastry" from the late fourteenth century while the “small pad of a downy or flossy texture for applying powder to skin or hair” was first so described in the 1650s.

The meaning “to fill, inflate, or expand with breath or air” dates from the 1530s while the intransitive sense (in reference to small swellings & round protuberances) was noted by 1725.  The transitive figurative sense of “exalt” was known by the 1530s which shifted somewhat by the early eighteenth century into the meaning “praise with self-interest, give undue or servile praise to”, the idea by mid century focused on the figurative sense of “empty or vain boast”, this sense soon extended to mean “flattery & inflated praise”.  The derogatory use of poof for “an effeminate man; a male homosexual” was noted from the 1850s and is presumably from puff (possibly in the sense of “powder puff”, an allusion to the stereotype of their “excessive concern with maintaining a delicate appearance”)) and the extended form “poofter” was early twentieth century Australian slang, an unusual linguistic departure for a dialect which tended either to clip or add a trailing “e”, “y” or “o” sound to words.  The correct spelling for the furniture piece (A low cushioned seat with no back; a padded foot-stool) was pouf, from the French pouf & pouff (again of imitative origin) but, presumably because of confusion caused by the pronunciation, the spellings puff & poof sometimes are used.  The suffix -ery was from the Middle English -erie, from the Anglo-Norman and Old French -erie, a suffix forming abstract nouns.  The suffix first occurs in loan words from the Old French into the Middle English, but became productive in English by the sixteenth century, sometimes as a proper combination of -er with “y” (as in bakery or brewery) but also as a single suffix (such as slavery or machinery).  Puffery is a noun; the noun plural is pufferies.

Mere puffery

In law, the concept of “mere puffery” was created to provide a buffer between the “meaningless” sales pitch and the deceptive or misleading claims which amount to a misrepresentation.  A misrepresentation may be actionable; “mere puffery” is not.  Puffery is used to describe a claim that (1) a “reasonable person” would not take seriously or (2) is so vague or subjective that it can be neither proved nor disproved.  Those two definitions operate in conjunction because even if an assertion can be disproved, if it would be absurd for the “reasonable person” to claim they believed it, it will be held to be “mere puffery”.

Doubling down: Disappointed at losing the case based on their £100 offer, to restore public confidence, they offered £200. 

In contract law, the term “puffery” comes from one of the most celebrated cases in English jurisprudence: Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Company (1892, EWCA Civ 1) before the Court of Appeal.  During the deadly influenza pandemic in the northern winter of 1889-1890, the Carbolic Smoke Ball Company it would pay £100 (equivalent to some £14,000 in 2023) to anyone who became ill with influenza after using their smoke ball in accordance with the instructions enclosed with the product.  Mrs Carlill was concerned enough by the flu to buy a ball which, following the instructions, she used thrice daily for some weeks but nevertheless, caught the flu.  Unable to persuade the company to pay her £100, Mrs Carlill brought an action, in court claiming a contract existed which the company denied.  At first instance, despite being represented by a future prime-minister, the Carbolic Smoke Ball Company lost, a verdict upheld unanimously by the Court of Appeal.  It was a landmark in the development of contract law, refining the long-established principles of (1) offer, (2) acceptance, (3) certainty of terms and (4) payment although it would be decades before the implications would begin comprehensively to be realized in legislation.  Not only did Mrs Carlill secure her £100 but she survived the pandemic, living to the age of ninety-six.  On 10 March 1942, she died after catching influenza.

So, Mrs Carlill, having used the smoke ball three times a day for almost two months before she developed influenza sued for breach of contract and the court held the offer made in the advertisement was not “mere puff” but constituted a valid offer of contract; the Smoke Ball Company’s offer was thus a misrepresentation because, in the particular circumstances detailed, a “reasonable person” would be likely to believe that they would receive £100 and thus, relying on the claim, be persuaded to purchase the product.  However, all the circumstances must be considered on a case-by-case basis and an individual’s simple reliance on a claim they sincerely believe to be true is not sufficient to for something to be held a misrepresentation.

In the famous Red Bull lawsuit in 2013, the court noted the company’s advertising slogan “Red Bull gives you wings” was “mere puffery” in that no reasonable person would believe ingesting even many cans of the stuff would mean they would “grow wings and fly” but the lawsuit claimed that implicit in the slogan was the allegedly deceptive and fraudulent suggestion that the drink was a “superior source of energy”, something not backed up by scientific evidence.   Heard in US District Court for the Southern District of New York, the class action was lodged by someone who had been drinking Red Bull for a decade-odd.  His claim was not that he expected feathers to sprout but that idea drinking Red Bull would increase performance and concentration (as advertised on the company's television, on-line and marketing campaigns) was “deceptive and fraudulent and is therefore actionable”.  The scientific basis for the action was research which found energy drinks gained their “boost” through caffeine alone, not guarana or any other ingredient, adding although there was no academic support for the claim Red Bull provides “any more benefit to a consumer than a cup of coffee, the Red Bull defendants persistently and pervasively market their product as a superior source of ‘energy’ worthy of a premium price over a cup of coffee or other sources of caffeine.”  Red Bull, while denying any wrongdoing or liability and maintaining its “marketing and labeling have always been truthful and accurate”, the company settled the lawsuit “to avoid the cost and distraction of litigation”.  As part of the settlement, anyone resident of the US who claimed to have purchased a can of Red Bull at some time after 1 January 2002 was eligible to receive either a $US10 reimbursement or two free Red Bull products with a retail value of approximately $US15, a webpage created to enable those affected to lodge their claim.  To avoid any similar claims, the company “voluntarily updated its marketing materials and product labeling".

Advertising is often a mix of puffery and specific claims which can be actionable, depending on the circumstances, either in damages or restitution.

So every case is decided on its merits.  A case before the Federal Court in Australia in 2017 held that a false assertion an app had “the most property listings in Sydney” was a misrepresentation because uncontested evidence proved otherwise although the court note were the app to claim it was “the best” app of its kind that would be mere puffery because, in that context, the phrase “the best” means nothing in particular because it’s not something which can be reduced to a metric or precisely defined.  More intriguing for those who like to speculate when grey turns black or white was the Pepsi Points Case which was in many ways similar to Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Company.  PepsiCo’s advertising included a point system which customers could use to redeem prizes and one campaign had offered a military jet fighter (then invoiced by the manufacturers at US$23 million odd) in exchange for 7 million "Pepsi Points" (then worth US$700,000).  Mailing a $700,000 cheque to PepsiCo, a customer asked to collect his jet.  The court held the offer was “mere puffery” on the basis of (1) aspects of the campaign which clearing indicated “its jocular nature”, (2) that no reasonable person would believe a US$23 million jet could be obtained by exchanging US$700,000 and it was (3) anyway impossible for the company to deliver a military fighter jet in operable condition to a civilian customer.  It was an interesting case because it might have been decided differently if the object had been closer in value to the points mentioned and been something there was no legal impediment to supplying (such as a US$1 million car).  Were it a US$143 million car (there is one), the promotion would presumably still be judged puffery but at some point, it must be that the relative values would be close enough to for the “reasonable person” test to apply.  That however is something impossible to reduce to an equation and each case will be decided on its merits.  Just to be sure, PepsiCo bumped up by several orders of magnitude the points required to start one’s own air force up and added some text to make it clear the whole thing was just a joke.

In the matter of Tyrrell’s Crinkly Crisps.  Often packaging & advertising will contain a number of claims, some of which will be mere puffery (even if it’s easy to prove blatantly they’re untrue) while others need to be verifiable:

2 Pack: Not puffery; every pack must contain two packets.  There have been instances when customers have complained they’ve received more than was advertised and paid for but it’s rare.  Usually, such things are treated as “windfalls”.

Vegan: Not puffery; the contents must be vegan (as defined in the regulation of whatever jurisdiction in which they’re sold).

Triple Cooked: Probably puffery because it’s doubtful the term has any legal definition although were it possible to prove the production process is essentially the same as for any other crisp (chip), it might be actionable.  Because “triple” does have a defined value, were it proved the goods were cooked only twice as long as the practice of other manufacturers, that would presumably compel a change of text to “Double Cooked”.

More Crunch: Probably puffery because the measure of such things is so subjective and there is a point at which to increase crunchiness becomes self-defeating because other desired qualities will be lost.

Crinkly Crisps: Not puffery; the crisps must to some extent be crinkly although it might be fun to have a judge explore the margins and tell us how slight a corrugation can be while still being called “crinkly”.

No Artificial Nasties: Not puffery; these packets probably contain artificial ingredients because they’re almost impossible to avoid in the industrial production of food.  What constitutes a “nasty” is however a thing of quantity as well as quality; something millions every day harmlessly (even beneficially) can be a toxic “nasty” in large quantities so what’s included in the packet will be safe as supplied.  If potential “nasties” are found to exist in a quantity above a certain point, it’s actionable.

Gluten Free: Not puffery; unless there is an allowable quantity (ie trace amounts) permitted by regulation, there must be no gluten.

Sea Salt & Vinegar: Not puffery; sea salt is a particular type of salt so it must be used and there must be evidence of the use of vinegar.

165 g Net: Not puffery; each pack must contain 165 g of edible content +/- the small % of production line variation a court would deem acceptable.

Content guide (fat, energy et al): Not puffery; again, what’s claimed must be a reliable indication of the products within whatever small variation is acceptable.

Photograph with giant crisp: Puffery and an example of how the “reasonable person” test works in conjunction with an objective test of truth.  The packs do not contain crisps as large as is represented in the image (indeed, such would be too big even toi fit in the pack) and no reasonable person would believe this is what they’re buying.

Only

Only (pronounced ohn-lee)

Adverb

(1) Without others or anything further; alone; solely; exclusively.

(2) No more than; merely; just.

(3) As recently as.

(4) In the final outcome or decision.

Adjective

(5) Being the single one or the relatively few of the kind.

(6) Having no sibling or (less common) no sibling of the same sex (also a noun in this context).

(7) Mere (obsolete).

(8) Single in superiority or distinction; unique; the best.

Conjunction

(9) But (introducing a single restriction, restraining circumstance, or the like).

(10) Except (frowned upon by some).

Pre 900: From the Middle English oonly, onli, onlych, onelich & anely, from the Old English ānlich, ānlīc & ǣnlich (like; similar; equal; unique, solitary, literally "one-like”), from the Proto-Germanic ainalīkaz (one + -ly).  It was cognate with the Old Frisian einlik, the obsolete Dutch eenlijk, the German ähnlich (similar), the Old Norse álíkr, the Old High German einlih, the Danish einlig and the Swedish enlig (unified).  Synonyms include solitary & lone in one context and peerless & exclusive in the other.  Only is a noun, adjective, adverb & conjunction, onliness, onlyer & onlier are nouns and onliest & onlest are adjectives ; the noun plural is either onlys or onlies (both rarely used).

Only’s use as an adverb (alone, no other or others than; in but one manner; for but one purpose) and a conjunction (but, except) developed in Middle English.  In English, the familiar distinction of only and alone (now usually in reference to emotional states) is unusual; in many languages the same word serves for both although Modern German has the distinction in allein/einzig.  The mid fifteenth century phrase "only-begotten" is biblical, translating Latin unigenitus and Greek monogenes; the Old English word was ancenned. The term "only child" has been in use since at least the early eighteenth century.  The derived forms were once in more frequent use than now.  Someone who only adheres to the particular thing mentioned, excluding any alternatives. Onlyism (definitely non-standard) used to be quite a thing in Christianity in matters where there were different versions of documents and among Church of England congregations (often in the same parish) some were once adamant that only a certain edition of the Book of Common Prayer was acceptable and the others represented revisionism, heresy or, worse of all, smelled of popery.  Thus there were 1549-onlyiers, 1559-onlyiers, 1562-onlyiers etc.  The same factionalism of course continues to exist in many religions (and in secular movements and institutions too) but onlier has faded from use.  The adjectives onliest & onlest (a superlative form of only used almost exclusively in the US) are now rare and onlest is used mostly in African American Vernacular English (AAVE).  

The construct of the Old English ānlīc being ān (one) + -līc (-ly), only is thus understood in Modern English as on(e) + -ly.  One was from the Middle English oon, on, oan & an, from the Old English ān (one), from the Proto-West Germanic ain, from the Proto-Germanic ainaz (one), from the primitive Indo-European óynos (single, one).  It was cognate with the Scots ae, ane, wan & yin (one); the North Frisian ån (one), the Saterland Frisian aan (one), the West Frisian ien (one), the Dutch een & één (one), the German Low German een; the German ein & eins (one), the Swedish en (one), the Norwegian Nynorsk ein (one), the Icelandic einn (one), the Latin ūnus (one) & Old Latin oinos and the Russian оди́н (odín); doublet of Uno.

The –ly prefix was from the Middle English -ly, -li, -lik & -lich, from the Old English -līċ, from the Proto-West Germanic -līk, from the Proto-Germanic -līkaz (having the body or form of), from līką (body) (from whence Modern German gained lich); in form, it was probably influenced by the Old Norse -ligr (-ly) and was cognate with the Dutch -lijk, the German -lich and the Swedish -lig.  It was used (1) to form adjectives from nouns, the adjectives having the sense of "behaving like, having a likeness or having a nature typical of what is denoted by the noun" and (2) to form adjectives from nouns specifying time intervals, the adjectives having the sense of "occurring at such intervals".

The different phonological development of only and one was part of the evolution of English.  One was originally pronounced in the way which endures in only, atone and alone, a use which to this day persists in various dialectal forms (good 'un, young 'un, big 'un et al), the long standard pronunciation "wun" emerging around the fourteenth century in southwest and west England.  William Tyndale (circa 1494–1536), who grew up in Gloucester, used the spelling “won” in his translations of the Bible which were first published between 1525-1526 and the form slowly spread until it was more or less universal by the mid-eighteenth century.  The later use as indefinite pronoun was influenced by the unrelated French on and Latin homo.

Tyndale, before being strangled and burned at the stake in Vilvoorde (Filford near Brussels).  Woodcut from The Book of Martyrs (1563) by John Foxe (circa 1516-1587).

The cardinals and bishops in England probably neither much noticed nor cared about Tyndale’s phonological choice but they certainly objected to his choice of words in translation (church became “congregation” and priest became “elder”) which appeared to threaten both the institution of the Church and the centrality to Christianity of the clerical hierarchy.  Tried for heresy in 1536, he was pronounced guilty and condemned to be burned at the stake although, for reasons not documented, he was, after a ceremonial defrocking, strangled until dead while tied to the stake, his corpse then burned.

Activist herbivore Tash Peterson (b circa 1995, centre) at a vegan protest, Perth, Australia.

Although a thing which pedants enjoy correcting, the placement of “only” as a modifier matters only if putting it one place or the other would hinder clarity; there’s never been an absolute grammatical rule and, as long as the meaning is clear, it’s probably better to adopt whatever is the usual conversational style.  Strictly speaking, although “We only fuck vegans” means an assertion of a life consisting of nothing else, most would understand it as a statement of one who is prepared to contemplate intimacy only with vegans.  The best compromise to adopt is probably that recommended for handling the split infinitive: Use the more exact “We fuck only vegans” in formal use such as in writing and the more natural, conversational “We only fuck vegans” otherwise.  Note that a sign held aloft at a protest, although obviously something “in writing” is not an example of formal use; it’s just part of the conversation.

No ambiguity: Lindsay Lohan in sweatshirt from the I Only Speak LiLohan range.

Care must be taken to avoid ambiguity, especially in writing because the intonations of speech and other visual clues are not there to assist in the conveying of meaning.  Were one to say “She only fucks vegans after midnight”, quite what is meant isn’t clear and the sentence is better rendered either as “she fucks only vegans after midnight" (ie carnivores need not apply) or “she fucks vegans only after midnight” (ie vegans must wait till the midnight hour).  In informal English, only is a common sentence connector but again, this should be avoided in formal writing where “only” should be placed directly before the word or words that it modifies.

Wiglomeration

Wiglomeration (pronounced wig-glom-uh-rey-shuhn)

Needlessly or pointlessly complicated, time-consuming legal wrangling (listed by most sources as “always derogatory” but it’s presumed within the profession it’s sometimes an expression of admiration).

1852: The construct was wig + (agg)lomeration.  Wiglomeration is a noun, the noun plural is wiglomerations.  Although some must have been tempted, there seems no evidence anyone has ever created derived forms such as wiglomerative, wiglomerating, wiglomerator etc.

Wig (a head of real or synthetic hair worn on the head (1) to disguise baldness, (2) for cultural or religious reasons, (3) for fashion, (4) by actors better to resemble the character they are portraying or (4) in some legal systems by advocates or judges during court proceedings) was a shortened form of periwig, from the Middle French perruque which was probably borrowed from the western Lombard perrucca & parrucca which are of uncertain origin, the Oxford English Dictionary (OED) suggesting there may be some relationship with the Latin pilus (hair) but, noting the phonetic variations, ponder that instead it could be related to parrocchetto (parakeet), the reference being to the bird’s feathers.  Linguistically, the process might have been similar to the phonetic changes of the intervocalic “L” into “R” of Italian parlare and Sicilian parrari.  Among fisherman, a wig was also “an old seal” although that use is now rare.  The meaning “to reprimand” is thought related to the slang term “bigwig” (that dating from the seventeenth century fashion in England of wearing big (and in the era increasingly bigger) wigs in England, a trend which peaked in early in 1700s) because of the association with aristocrats, nobles, lawyers and judges, the size and grandeur of one’s powdered wig a status symbol used to convey a perception of wealth and social standing.  Fashions however change and during the eighteenth century, the use declined and while among a few they lingered into the early 1800s, the French Revolution (1789) really was their death knell just about everywhere except courtrooms.

Interestingly, academic sources inside the construct was wig + (agg)lomeration rather than the more obvious wig + (g)lomeration, this based on an analysis of the unpublished notes of the author who coined the word.  Glomerate (to gather or wind into a spherical form or mass; to collect certain objects) was from the Latin glomeratus, past participle of glomerāre (to wind or add into a ball; to glomerate).  Agglomerate (the act or process of collecting in a mass; a heaping together; the state of being collected in a mass; a mass; cluster) was from the Latin agglomerātus, past participle of agglomerāre, the construct being ad- (to) + -glomerāre, from glomus (a ball; a mass), from globus (genitive glomeris), (a ball of yarn) of uncertain origin.

Wigs galore: Court of Chancery, Lincoln's Inn Hall (1808-1810), a book illustration created by Rudolph Ackermann, WH Pyne, William Combe, Augustus Pugin & Thomas Rowlandson, British Library collection.

Wiglomeration was coined by Charles Dickens (1812–1870) for a bit of a rant by Mr Jarndyce in the serialized novel Bleak House (1852-1853) which told the tale of the fictional probate case Jarndyce vs Jarndyce (spoken as “Jarndyse and Jarndyse” in the conventions of English legal language) which, over the decades it unfolded in the Court of Chancery Court, absorbed in legal fees all of the vast estate which the proceedings were initiated to distribute to the rightful beneficiaries.  The legal establishment at the time of publication criticized the depiction as “an exaggeration” but while it wasn’t typical, nor was it without basis because cases lasting over a decade were known and one famously ended (with the subject estate exhausted in legal costs) only in 1915 after running for 117 years.  Even well into the twentieth century, judicial sluggishness was not unknown: the House of Lords once took almost 19 years to hand down a decision.  In his youth as a court reporter Dickens had witnessed much wiglomeration.

Bleak House Chapter 8 (Covering a Multitude of Sins):

“He must have a profession; he must make some choice for himself. There will be a world more wiglomeration about it, I suppose, but it must be done.”

“More what, guardian?” said I.

“More wiglomeration,” said he. “It’s the only name I know for the thing. He is a ward in Chancery, my dear. Kenge and Carboy will have something to say about it; Master Somebody—a sort of ridiculous sexton, digging graves for the merits of causes in a back room at the end of Quality Court, Chancery Lane—will have something to say about it; counsel will have something to say about it; the Chancellor will have something to say about it; the satellites will have something to say about it; they will all have to be handsomely feed, all round, about it; the whole thing will be vastly ceremonious, wordy, unsatisfactory, and expensive, and I call it, in general, wiglomeration. How mankind ever came to be afflicted with wiglomeration, or for whose sins these young people ever fell into a pit of it, I don’t know; so it is.”

Lindsay Lohan in blonde bob wig, appearing on Late Night with Jimmy Fallon, New York, November 2012.

The word does not of necessity imply complex or intricate legal reasoning or argument although that can be part of things.  In the jargon, the trick to successful wiglomeration is to use the court’s processes to prolong proceedings (barristers are usually paid for each day’s appearance), either by causing delays or requiring the other side to respond to matters raised which may be so arcane as to be irrelevant, even if that’s not immediately obvious.  Obviously, the more time consuming (and thus more lucrative) these maneuvers prove the better and even if cases don’t literally become interminable, to some they must seem so.  There is also the possibility wiglomeration can fulfill a strategic purpose: if one party has access to effectively unlimited legal resources (ie money) while the other party is financially constrained, sufficient wiglomeration (which manifest as another day’s fees to be paid) can compel the poorer party either to end proceedings or settle on terms less favorable than might have been achieved had the case been brought to judgment.  The most egregious examples of the practice can be classified as an “abuse of process” but judges are sometimes reluctant to intervene because (1) the tactics being used are usually technically correct and (2) it might be seen as denying a party their rights.  The problem is the system but a wholly equitable solution is not immediately obvious.

Central criminal court Old Bailey 1840.

The tradition of barristers wearing wigs in English courts began in the seventeenth century when powdered wigs were a fashionable upper class accessory.  Culturally, lawyers tend to identify upwards so the adoption would not have been seen as “aping their betters” but just a natural alignment of style.  The courtroom style persisted even after wigs had elsewhere fallen from fashion and are still worn in many jurisdictions with traditions inherited from England.  The rationale offered is (1) the wig & gown have by virtue of long use become a symbol of formality and professionalism which lends dignity to proceedings and (2) the garb helps create a sense of anonymity and impartiality, presenting the officers of the court as representatives of the law rather than individuals with personal biases or prejudices, once a matter of some significance at a time when, for historic and structural reasons, there were perceptions of a lack of impartiality in the legal system.  They’re now not always a feature of proceedings but in most systems where they’ve been retained, barristers seem still to want to cling to the tradition although in recent years there’s been a tendency for judges to avoid them where possible and some more recently convened courts have reserved them only for ceremonial occasions and the odd photo opportunity.  Some courts (notably the UK’s recently established Supreme Court has made it possible for cases to be conducted without anybody be-wigged or gowned although, in a sign of the times, vegan wigs are now available as an alternative to the traditional horsehair.

The opinion the younger Dickens formed of the ways of lawyers has been shared by many.  Adolf Hitler’s (1889-1945; German head of government 1933-1945 & head of state 1934-1945) movement in its early days had much need of the services of lawyers and their efforts saved many Nazis from the consequences of their actions but Hitler showed little gratitude to the profession, declaring more than once “I will not give up until every German realizes that it is shameful to be a lawyer.”  Hitler’s own lawyer was Hans Frank (1900–1946) who in 1939 was appointed Governor General of occupied Poland where his rule was corrupt and brutal by even the Nazi's standards of awfulness and few have ever doubted he deserved the death sentence handed down by the International Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg (1945-1946).  Even in 1946 Frank was still describing Hitler as “…that great man” and regretted his one “…conspicuous failing…” was his mistrust of both the law and lawyers.  What Frank wanted was an authoritarian state but one under the rule of law; he was appalled not by the mass murder which would come to be called genocide but by it not being authorized by a duly appointed judge.  In Nuremberg he claimed to have undergone a number of religious experiences and was received into the Roman Catholic Church, apparently anxious either to atone for his sins or avoid an eternity of torture in Hell.  Of his death sentence he remarked “I deserved it and I expected it.” and of Hitler’s “thousand year Reich” he observed “…a thousand years will pass and still this guilt of Germany will not have been erased.”

There’s a popular view William Shakespeare (1564–1616) shared the general disapprobation of the profession because one of his most quoted phrases is “The first thing we do is, let’s kill all the lawyers.”  However, the context is rarely discussed and quite what the bard was intending to convey is open to interpretation.  The words were given to a character Dick the Butcher and spoken in Act IV, Scene II of Henry VI, Part II (1596-1599).

JACK CADE: I am able to endure much.

DICK [aside]: No question of that; for I have seen him whipp’d three market-days together.

JACK CADE: I fear neither sword nor fire.

SMITH [aside]: He need not fear the sword; for his coat is of proof.

DICK [aside]: But methinks he should stand in fear of fire, being burnt i’ th’ hand for stealing of sheep.

JACK CADE: Be brave, then; for your captain is brave, and vows reformation. There shall be in England seven half-penny loaves sold for a penny: the three-hoop’d pot shall have ten hoops; and I will make it felony to drink small beer: all the realm shall be in common; and in Cheapside shall my palfrey go to grass: and when I am king,– as king I will be,–

ALL. God save your majesty!

JACK CADE: I thank you, good people:– there shall be no money; all shall eat and drink on my score; and I will apparel them all in one livery, that they may agree like brothers, and worship me their lord.

DICK: The first thing we do, let’s kill all the lawyers.

Dick is a villain and the henchman of Jack Cade, who is leading a rebellion against King Henry and their view is that if they kill all who can read and write and burn all books then they’ll find a population easier to rule.  Knowing that, the more generous interpretation is that civilization depends for its fairness and tranquillity on the protection afforded by law and administered by lawyers, Shakespeare representing the rule of law as society’s most fundamental defense against those hungry for power at any price.  Lawyers of course support this version of Shakespeare’s intent, Justice John Paul Stevens (1920–2019; associate justice of the US Supreme Court 1975-2010) even discussing it in a dissenting opinion (Professional Real Estate Investors Inc vs Columbia Pictures Industries Inc (1993)) when he noted “As a careful reading of that text will reveal, Shakespeare insightfully realized that disposing of lawyers is a step in the direction of a totalitarian form of government.”  However, as many a neo-Marxist would point out “He would say that, wouldn’t he.”  If one’s world view is a construct in which the law and lawyers are agents acting in the interests only of the ruling class (the 1% in the popular imagination), then Dick the Butcher and Cade the labourer in seeking to overthrow an unfair, oppressive system are victims whose only hope of escaping their roles as slaves of the nobility is to revolt, a part of which will be the killing of the lawyers because, as the profession offers their skills only to those who can pay, those with no money have no choice.