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Saturday, January 24, 2026

Contempt

Contempt (pronounced kuhn-tempt)

(1) The feeling with which a person regards anything (or anyone) considered mean, vile, or worthless; disdain; scorn.

(2) The state of being despised; dishonor; disgrace.

(3) An act showing such disrespect.

(4) In most legal systems, willful disobedience to or open disrespect for the rules or orders of a court contempt of court or legislative body; punishable by being cited for “contempt of court”.

(5) In chess engines (the software used in chess games), as an ellipsis of “contempt factor”, a setting that modifies how much an engine values a draw versus a win or loss, making it play more aggressively or defensively based on perceived opponent strength.  The idea is to encourage interesting games by making engines avoid draws against weaker foes or seek them against stronger ones.

1350–1400: From the Middle English contempnen, from the Anglo-French contemner, from the Old French contempt & contemps, from the Latin contemptus (despising, scorn), a noun derivative of contemnere, from contemnō (I scorn, despise).  It displaced the native Old English forsewennes.  The late fourteenth century meaning was “an open disregard or disobedience (of authority, the law etc)” while the general sense of “act of despising; scorn for what is mean, vile, or worthless” was in use by at least circa 1400.  In Latin, there was also the feminine contemptrix (she who despises).  In the technical sense, the codified offence of “contempt of court” (open disregard or disrespect for the rules, orders, or process of judicial authority) dates only from the early eighteenth century but the variants of the concept have been in use almost as long as there have been courts.

Unusually (in terms of construction), the phrase “beneath contempt” really means “extremely contemptible”.  In idiomatic use, “familiarity breeds contempt” suggests “a prolonged closeness or exposure or a profound knowledge of someone or something often leads to diminished respect or appreciation” and a particular form of that is associated with Frederick the Great (Frederick II, 1712–1786, King of Prussia 1740-1786) who observed: “The more I learn of the character of men, the more I appreciate the company of dogs”.  The term “contempt trap” comes from the burgeoning discipline of “relationship studies” (romantic, social or political) and describes situations in which individuals view others as worthless, leading to toxic communication, disconnection, and resentment.  It's a psychological trap where partners or groups focus on flaws, creating a downward spiral in which the “issues fuel themselves”; the best strategy is said to be “empathetic niceness” but, in the circumstances, this can be easier said than done.

The familiar “contempt of court” (plural contempts of court) is conceptually similar to the offences “Contempt of Parliament” & “Contempt of Congress” (ie the act of obstructing the work of a legislative body or one of its committees) and, at law, the noun contemnor describes a party who commits or is held in contempt of a court or legislative body.  The offence is one in which there’s held to have been open disrespect for or willful disobedience of the authority of a court of law or legislative body, typically punishable by such sanctions as a fine or incarceration.  The nature of these punishments varies widely and especially minor transgressions are involved, the penalty can vary from judge to judge; one might ignore the slight while another might send the offender to a cell for a few hours.  The noun & adjective contemptive is rare and used in linguistics to mean “of or pertaining to, or creating a word form denoting the negative attitude of the speaker”.  The negative adjectival form is uncontemptible and incontemptible does not exist although there may be a use for both among those who cherish fine nuances, the former used to mean “not able to be held in contempt”, the latter “incapable of being held in contempt”.  The alternative spellings cōtempt & cõtempt are obsolete.  Contempt, contemnor, contemptibleness, contemptuosity, contemptuousness & contemptibility are nouns, contemptive is a noun & adjective, contemptible & contemptuous are adjectives and contemptibly & contemptuously are adverbs; the noun plural is contempts.

Contempt of Congress

Early in January, 2026, counsel for Bill Clinton (b 1946; US president 1993-2001) and his wife crooked Hillary Clinton (b 1947; US secretary of state 2009-2013) announced they were refusing to comply with a subpoena demanding congressional testimony in matters relating their relationships with disgraced financier and convicted sex offender Jeffrey Epstein (1953–2019 who died in custody while awaiting trial on additional offences; it was determined to be suicide).  The former president and first lady were served the subpoena by the Republican-led House oversight committee which is reviewing the government’s handling of “the Epstein matter”.  As part of their combative statement, the couple also launched an attack on the Republican Party and Donald Trump (b 1946; US president 2017-2021 and since 2025). 

Bill & crooked Hillary Clinton.

In response, committee chairman James Comer (b 1972, Republican-Kentucky) said he would move to hold the pair “in contempt of Congress”.  That was prompted by counsel’s letter which described the subpoenas as “invalid and legally unenforceable, untethered to a valid legislative purpose, unwarranted because they do not seek pertinent information, and an unprecedented infringement on the separation of powers”.  According to the Clintons (both trained lawyers), the committee’s demand they testify (under oath, thereby being compelled to tell the truth) “runs afoul of the clearly defined limitations on Congress’ investigative power propounded by the Supreme Court of the United States”, to which they added “it is clear the subpoenas themselves – and any subsequent attempt to enforce them – are nothing more than a ploy to attempt to embarrass political rivals, as President Trump has directed”.  As well as threatening the pair with being held in contempt of Congress, Mr Comey informed the press: “I think it’s important to note that this subpoena was voted on in a bipartisan manner by this committee.  This wasn’t something that I just issued as chairman of the committee.  No one’s accusing Bill Clinton of anything, any wrongdoing.  We just have questions, and that’s why the Democrats voted along with Republicans to subpoena Bill Clinton.”  Even some Democrats supported the subpoena, one on the oversight committee saying: “Cooperating with Congress is important and the committee should continue working with President Clinton’s team to obtain any information that might be relevant to our investigation.

The Clintons didn’t much dwell on fine legal or constitutional points, preferring to attack the congressional Republicans for their obsequious acquiescence to the president (not so much the MAGA (Make America Great Again) agenda as to Mr Trump personally) including their support of hardline immigration enforcement, the recent killing of a US citizen in Minnesota by an ICE (Immigration and Customs Enforcement) agent and the president’s pardoning of January 6insurrectionists”.  Bringing the Republicans’ cruel agenda to a standstill while you work harder to pass a contempt charge against us than you have done on your investigation this past year would be our contribution to fighting the madness”, the Clintons wrote.  So, the Clintons are running a political campaign in an attempt to solve their latest legal problem and this time they’re putting things in quasi-Churchillian phrases, asserting: “Every person has to decide when they have seen or had enough and are ready to fight for this country, its principles and its people, no matter the consequences.  For us, now is that time.  Clearly crooked Hillary feels her finest hour is upon her but students of her past will variously be amused or appalled at the suggestion she’d do something as a matter of principle rather than base self-interest but she persists in claiming the consequences of refusing to comply with a valid congressional subpoena are “a politically driven process” designed “literally to result in our imprisonment.

HRC: State Secrets and the Rebirth of Hillary Clinton by Jonathan Allen (b 1975) & Amie Parnes (b 1978).  As an acronym HRC can, inter alia, mean “Hillary Rodham Clinton”, “Hazard Risk Category” (science, medicine, engineering etc) or “High-Risk-of-Capture” (US DoD (Department of Defense, known also as Department of War)).  Pleasingly, CHRC can mean “Crooked Hillary Rodham Clinton” or “Criminal History Records Check”.

The “politically driven” argument has before been used by those seeing to avoid answering questions under oath, but despite that former Trump advisor Peter Navarro (b 1949) was in 2023 convicted of contempt of Congress for failing to provide documents and testify about the 2020 election and the Capitol riot.  He also (unsuccessfully) cited executive privilege but that too was rejected; he was jailed for four months.  So the claim a prosecution is a “political weaponization” of the justice system can’t stop a valid legal action like a citation of contempt and Steve Bannon (b 1953 and also a Trump-related figure) served four months in jail for defying a subpoena from the House January 6 committee.  The courts also seem to view such matters as black letter law; on appeal, Mr Navarro’s attempt to stay out of jail while he appealed his conviction was declined while a federal judge rejected a stay on Mr Bannon’s imprisonment and revoked bail.  According to a ruling from the US Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit, witnesses who “willfully refuse” to comply with valid congressional subpoenas can be punished, regardless of the excuse.  As a general principle, it seems to be thought an offence of absolute liability.

In mid January, a Republican-led House panel recommended Bill & crooked Hillary Clinton be found in contempt of Congress; although the pair had offered “to co-operate with the House Oversight Committee, that did not extend to answering questions under oath (ie, by implication, “telling the truth”).  The committee conducted separate votes on what technically were two cases, voting 34-8 to cite Bill Clinton for contempt while the vote on crooked Hillary Clinton was 28-15; As predicted, all 25 Republicans backed the recommendations to cite for contempt and the degree of support from the Democratic members is an indication of the public & press pressure now being applied as a result of suspicions there are rich and well-connected individuals whose involvement with Jeffrey Epstein is being “covered up”.  In the US, the lessons from the Watergate scandal have never been forgotten: it's the cover-up which matters most.

House Oversight Committee chairman James Comer's Facebook profile picture.

Should Congress elect to pursue the matter (as was done with Mr Navarro and Mr Bannon), the brief will then be passed to the DoJ (Department of Justice) for prosecution and the potential consequences include fines of up to US$100,000 and as long as a year in jail.  Obviously, neither is a compelling prospect but the problem for crooked Hillary is that should she comply and testify, she’ll be under oath and thus compelled to tell the truth.  That novel possibility would attract a big audience but her problem is she has no way of knowing in advance what questions will be asked and, being under oath, she’d have to either be truthful or “take the fifth” to avoid self-incrimination.  Paying a US$100,000 fine would seem a very cheap “get out of jail free” card and even some time behind bars may be a better long-term option.  While in the past crooked Hillary probably has used the phrase “no one is above the law” she’d never have imagined it applied to her but some in Congress suspect the Clintons will use "every trick in the book" (and they known them all) to avoid being questioned under oath, one Californian Democrat predicting: "If we launch criminal contempt proceedings, we will not hear from the Clintons.  That is a fact.  It'll be tied up in court".

Presumably, the strategy will be to "string things along" until the mid-term elections in November when the Republicans may lose control of the Congress.  Of course, as a last resort, there remains the “Pinochet option”.  After avoiding trial for crimes against humanity because of his allegedly frail mental and physical state, General Augusto Pinochet (1915-2006; dictator of Chile 1973-1990) boarded his aircraft in England from a wheelchair, looking something like a warmed-up corpse, only to make a miraculous in-flight recovery; the moment he set foot on the tarmac at Santiago, in rude good health, he strode off.  All crooked Hillary would need is a “medical episode”, one not serious enough to kill her but just enough to permit physicians to fill out the forms saying she’s not well enough to be questioned.  Depending on this and that, her condition would need to linger only until the threat of prosecution has been evaded.  One intriguing potential coda to legal action could be that Donald Trump might well grant the pair a pardon.  What's often unappreciated about Mr Trump is he doesn't waste time or effort running grudges against those who were merely opponents as opposed to those who actually tried to damage him or present an on-going threat.  Although he'd spent the 2016 campaign threatening crooked Hillary with jail and encouraging the MAGA faithful to chant "Lock her up!", interviewed after the election, when asked if he'd be taking legal action against the Clintons, he brushed off the the question with a dismissive: "No, they're good people" and moved on.  Should that happen, darkly, some might mutter about him having reasons why he'd not want the pair questioned about Jeffrey Epstein but, like disgraced former congressman George Santos (b 1988), crooked Hillary will not be one to look a gift horse in the mouth.    

The Brutum Fulmen

The practical significance of a court or other institution holding an individual “in contempt” relies on the body having a means of enforcing its order.  While that order can extend (variously) to a fine, a term of imprisonment or a burning at the stake, if no such means exist (or are, in the circumstances, not able to be used), then, at law, the order is a brutum fulmen (plural bruta fulmina) which historically, appeared also as fulmen brutum.  The term entered the language as a construct of the Latin brutum (stupid) + fulmen (lightning), picked up from the title of a pamphlet (the word then used of documents distributed publicly and discussing political and related matters) published in 1680 by Thomas Barlow (circa 1608-1691; Lord Bishop of Lincoln 1675-1969) who derived the phrase from the passage hinc bruta fulmina et vana (these senseless and ineffectual thunder-claps) in Naturalis Historia (Natural History) by the Roman author (and much else) Pliny the Elder (Gaius Plinius Secundus, 24-79).  Pliny literally was describing the natural phenomenon of lightning (which, having never been struck by one, he dismissed as “harmless thunderbolts”) but the term entered legal jargon meaning “a judgement without effect” and was for a while learned slang for “an empty threat” before fading from use in the late eighteenth century.

Bishop Barlow's original publication, 1680.

So, at law, brutum fulmen is used to refer to a judgment, decree, edict, order etc that while (on paper) is valid and nominally enforceable, is in practice ineffective either because it cannot be enforced or is directed at someone or something beyond the court’s effective power.  There’s a long history of such paperwork, Dr Joseph Goebbels (1897-1975; Nazi propaganda minister 1933-1945) with typical acerbity noting in his diary on 3 April 1945 the pointless bureaucratic output still flowing from the desk of Martin Bormann (1900–1945; secretary to the Führer 1943-1945; head of the Nazi Party Chancellery 1941-1945), even as the Reich was being diminished to an enclave: “Once more a mass of new decrees and instructions issue from Bormann.  Bormann has turned the Party Chancellery into a paper factory.  Every day he sends out a mountain of letters and files which the Gauleiters [the party’s district leaders], now involved in battle, no longer even have time to read.  In some cases too it is totally useless stuff of no practical value in our struggle.  Even in the Party we have no clear leadership in contact with the people.  Goebbels may have been evil but his mind was well-trained and he was a realist, understanding the “great danger” in the “diminution of authority” likely to be suffered by the party.  Adolf Hitler (1889-1945; Führer (leader) and German head of government 1933-1945 & head of state 1934-1945) called the devoted Bormann “Dear Martin” but interestingly, one author has written works claiming that by late April even Bormann had become a realist and was complicit in having the Führer murdered by his valet (Heinz Linge (1913–1980)), thereby removing the one obstacle preventing the pair’s escape from the Führerbunker.  The author is a well-credentialed medical doctor and although his earlier theory about the Rudolf Hess (1894–1987; Nazi Deputy Führer 1933-1941, who spent 46-odd years in Allied custody) being a “doppelganger” has recently been disproved by DNA analysis, his recounting of how Hitler may have been murdered is well written and, in a sense, the ultimate “the butler did it” tale; it’s not necessary to be convinced to enjoy what may be a tall tale.

From the Vatican, there would have been many popes who would have understood Goebbels’ frustrations because there’s quite a list of Papal Bulls and decrees that proved to be “casting rhetoric to the winds of history”.  Pius V (1504–1572; pope 1566-1572) in 1570 issued Regnans in Excelsis (Reigning on High) which, as an order of excommunication against Elizabeth I (1533–1603; Queen of England & Ireland 1558-1603) was intended to depose the queen by releasing her subjects from obedience but, “having no divisions” in England, the Holy See could not there exercise temporal authority and Elizabeth merely “changed teams” becoming Supreme Governor of the Church of England.  Of course, she remained excommunicated from the Church of Rome but that’s hardly as serious as being burned at the stake.  Less dramatically, papal interdicts issued against secular rulers on matters less consequential routinely were ignored, kings, princes and dukes aware their thrones (and sometimes their necks) might be better preserved by pleasing their many subjects than the bachelor Bishop of Rome.

Papal Bull issued by Urban VIII (1568–1644; pope 1623-1644).  By the mid-fifteenth century, papal bulls had ceased to be used for general public communications and were restricted to the more formal or solemn matters.  The papal lead seals (the spellings bulla & bolla both used) were attached to the vellum document by cords made of hemp or silk, looped through slits.

As well as being appalled by the thought of heretical Anglicans, Pius V disapproved of bull-fighting, calling the tradition “alien from Christian piety and charity, “better suited to demons rather than men” and “public slaughter and butchery” fit for paganism but not Christendom and word nerds will be delighted to note Pius’s ban on bullfighting was technically a “papal bull”.  De Salute Gregis Dominici (On the Salvation of the Lord’s Flock) was issued on 1 November 1, 1567 as a formal proclamation with a bulla (the papal lead seal) attached (hence such edicts being known as the “Papal bulls”), the seal authenticating the document and, as an official decree, it was binding upon the Church and Christian princes.  Disgusted by the cruelty inflicted on one of God’s noble beasts, Pius called bullfighting “a sin” and condemned the events as “spectacles of the devil”, prohibiting Christians from attending or participating under pain of excommunication.  However, like many papal though bubbles down the ages which never quite make it to the status of doctrine, his ban was soon ignored and, after his death the, edict quietly was allowed to lapse.  Predictably, in Spain and Portugal, where bullfighting had deep cultural & political roots, the bulla was either ignored or resisted and Philip II (1527–1598; King of Spain 1556-1598), while as devout a Catholic as any man, was known as Felipe el Prudente (Philip the Prudent) for a reason and quietly he turned the royal blind eye, allowing bullfighting to continue.  Within the Holy See, the king's disobedience of an edict from the Vicar of Christ on Earth would have been disappointing but unsurprising and it was the world-weary Benedict XIV (1675–1758; pope 1740-1758) who best summed-up the church's chain of command: “The pope commands, his cardinals do not obey, and the people do what they wish.”  What is still not always recognized is that Rome’s authority on matters both spiritual and temporal did often depend on consent; in Medieval Europe there were a number of interdicts (such as that against the Republic of Venice in 1606) which indisputably were binding in canon law but had no force because the target solved the legal quandaries by ignoring them.

Secular courts too sometimes have issued orders that look authoritative but are void for want of jurisdiction.  The British Empire is a rich source of such bruta fulmina because, especially in the nineteenth century when expansion (as expressed by land being colored pink on maps) often exceeded control “on the ground”.  A practical exercise in (1) the establishment of trading & coaling stations and (2) theft of the resources of others, what the British Empire did to a greater extent than other European colonial powers was secure what were essentially coastal beachheads and tracks of communication (rivers, roads, railway lines) while leaving vast swathes of territories in the hands of native authorities, some of which were cooperative, some not.  While the Colonial Office understood this was how thing were done (the British Empire in particular something of a well-executed confidence trick because there were never the resources effectively to control all that was claimed on the map), colonial courts, for many reasons, felt compelled to issue orders to what were, in effect, sovereign foreign territories; even at the height of the British Raj, the means did not exist always to enforce judgements or rulings purporting to bind tribal authorities or princes in their palaces.  A post-colonial example is the operation of the “Supremacy Clause” in US jurisprudence.  As a simple constitutional fact, under the Supremacy Clause, a state court has no power to enjoin a federal officer acting in federal capacity; even if correct in every aspect of construction, any such injunction will be held to be a brutum fulmen because it cannot be enforced, the classic example being Tarble's Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1872), in which the USSC (Supreme Court) held state courts could not issue writs of habeas corpus to federal military officers; such writs legally void.  What the case settled was that the US Constitution was the supreme law of the land, “anything in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.  That an order may be perfectly valid under state law was irrelevant and this doctrine has of late been again discussed because of certain actions being taken by the federal government during the second Trump administration.

There is also the matter of orders those who enjoy legal immunity.  Historically, when the concept of “sovereign immunity” was effectively absolute (before “restrictive immunity” emerged in the wake of the modern “commercial exception”, courts would enter judgments against sovereign states; the judges were carrying out a type of “black letter law” but the value of such rulings was purely political or symbolic.  A subset of such things was the matter of declarations unsupported with any mechanism of enforcement and that was one of the several structural flaws which doomed the League of Nations (1920-1946), an institution something of a case study in characterised as a brutum fulmen, whatever it’s noble goals.  However, the judicial model established by the League of Nations (essentially one of “moral authority”) carried over into post-war institutions, the ICJ (International Court of Justice) having often issued advisory opinions states routinely have ignored.

A special case of brutum fulmen concerns domestic statutes struck down by courts but never repealed.  Known as “dead letter” laws, these, ghost-like, remain on the books even after invalidation.  This happens apparently for two reasons: (1) in the technical sense it matters not whether the words are removed from the books or (2) governments retain them because they retain a certain symbolic force as an expression of disapprobation for one thing or another, an example being Section 3 of the US DOMA (Defense of Marriage Act) after the decision handed down by the USSC in US v Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013)).  New technology has also created a whole new field of potential bruta fulmina.  Although instances of material banned from publication in one place appearing in another have for centuries been documented, the advent of the internet and its inherently global availability has meant the injunctive and contempt orders which once were such a potent means of preventing or punishing proscribed publication now are of less use because so many potential subjects lie beyond a court’s reach.

Not exactly contemptible, just less desirable: The Alfa Romeo 2600

Brigitte Bardot (1934-2025) in Contempt (1963), perched on an Alfa Romeo 2600 (Tipo 106) Spider.  Note her fetching toe cleavage.

While Ms Bardot was a vision of haunting loveliness, the 2600 is less fondly remembered than its smaller stable-mates.  Whereas in its era Mercedes-Benz and most US-built cars tended to improve as the cylinder count and engine displacement increased, in the post-war years, the most admired and successful Alfa Romeos were the smaller, four-cylinder models renowned for their balance and agility (certainly in the company’s illustrious, pre-FWD (front wheel drive) era).  Tellingly, although imagined as a flagship, the 2600 was in production only between 1962-1968 and despite being offered with a range of coachwork (Berlina (sedan), Sprint (coupé) & Spider (roadster) as well as a typically quirky fastback coupé (the 2600 SZ (Sprint Zagato)) by Zagato), it was not a success; sales were never close to expectations, the high price and nose-heavy, “un-Alfalike” driving characteristics usually cited as reasons for the muted demand.  In its six-odd years of availability, unusually, it was not the sedan which was most successful but, with almost 7,000 sold, the Sprint and even the 2,255 Spiders out-sold the 2,092 Berlinas; the 105 Sprint Zagatos an expensive footnote.

1964 Alfa Romeo 2600 Spider.

Whatever the 2600’s flaws, the engine was a gem.  An all-new, all aluminum 2.6 litre (158 cubic inch) DOHC (double overhead camshaft) straight six, it was very much in the company’s pre-war tradition but, in a way, the image of Alfa-Romeo had been captured by the wildly successful 1900 range (1950-1959) which featured relatively small-displacement, four-cylinder engines.  So seductive did Italians and others find the 1900 that it quickly came to be thought of as the definitive “Alfa Romeo”.  However, the platform which as the 1900 (and subsequent 2000) had been a model of well-balanced agility, didn’t adapt so well to the longer straight six and it was the subsequent 105/115 range (Gulia, 1962-1968) which was the 1900’s true successor, the incomparable 105 coupé among the company’s finest achievements.  The 2600 proved to be the last of Alfa Romeo’s classic DOHC straight-sixes.

The Kaiser and the Old Contemptibles

His Imperial Majesty, Kaiser Wilhelm II (1859–1941; Emperor of Germany & King of Prussia 1888-1918). in one of his many uniforms.  On one of Wilhelm's visits to England, his grandmother (Victoria (1819–1901; Queen of the UK 1837-1901) was much amused to learn his entourage included one servant whose sole duty was the “waxing and curling of the imperial moustache”.

Whether inside courtrooms or beyond, the word “contempt” and its derivatives is not rare but one of the most celebrated instances of use may have been based on a lie.  In August 1914, just after the outbreak of World War I (1914-1918), the British government began to circulate propaganda claiming Wilhelm II had issued an order to his army to “exterminate the treacherous English and walk over General French's contemptible little army”.  The people of the UK were well-acquainted with the character of the Kaiser and it certainly must had sounded “like something he would have said”, hence the success as piece of propaganda.  Later, the survivors of the British Army’s BEF (British Expeditionary Force), proud of their record in battle, happily dubbed themselves the “Old Contemptibles”.  Wilhelm denied ever having made the statement and it has long been suspected the British “put words in his imperial mouth” because Oliver Cromwell (1599–1658; Lord Protector of the Commonwealth 1653-1658) had in 1657 used a similar turn of phrase in a speech to the Long Parliament (1640-1660).

One of the British government's propaganda posters, 1914.

No document has ever been found confirming the Kaiser used the phase the British propagandists spread with such glee and it’s thus almost certainly apocryphal but historians have concluded that, in discussions, he probably did dismiss the British as a military threat on the European mainland on the grounds their army was “so contemptibly small”.  In that, he has a point in that compared to the land forces in the standing and reserve armies of France, Germany, Austria and Russia, the British Army genuinely was small; as a maritime empire with its military strength based on the Royal Navy being the world’s most powerful, the British Army was designed for remote colonial engagements rather than big, set-piece invasions of European countries.  So, from the Kaiser’s point of view it was a reasonable observation; since the time of Otto von Bismarck (1815-1989; chancellor of the German Empire (the "Second Reich" 1871-1890), the dark joke told in continental chancelleries was that while most countries “had an army”, Prussia was unusual in that its army “has a country”.  All he really got wrong was the British did have some contemptibly poor generals, one of who was the Field Marshal Sir John French (1852–1925) mentioned in his alleged statement.  Not for nothing are the “Old Contemptibles” remembered as “lions led by donkeys” but in the way the British ruling class does things, after being asked to resign, Sir John was elevated to the peerage and died laden with titles and imperial honours.

Lindsay Lohan, contempt, and the matter of intent

Lindsay Lohan's adorned fingernail in court, 2010.

Fingernails don’t often hit the headlines but in 2010 one did during one of the Lindsay Lohan's appearances in court during her “trouble starlet” phase: close-up photographs of the relevant (and very colourful) nail (on the middle finger) revealed the text “fuck U”.  In the US of the twenty-first century a fingernail so decorated would be usually unexceptional and uncontroversial but on the digit of a defendant sitting in court to receive a sentence, it was at least taking a risk and defence counsel, had they noticed the artwork, doubtlessly would have insisted on a strategically applied band-aid.  The risk posed by what may have been a misguided manicure was that were the judge to conclude the apparently unambiguous message was directed either at court or judge, Ms Lohan could have been cited for contempt of court on much the same the basis as had she mouthed the words.  Lawyers asked to comment on the matter confirmed that in such circumstances a defendant cannot rely on rights guaranteed by the First Amendment (a component of which is freedom of speech) to the Constitution but what was an intriguing legal question was the matter of intent.  All agreed the judge was sitting too far away to read the distant and tiny “fuck U” so it couldn’t be argued Ms Lohan intended it to be read thus but if the judge saw the paparazzi’s photos, would a “retrospective” citation of contempt be possible?  Given all that, it was at least a gray area but the matter was never pursued.  Ms Lohan clarified things with a tweet on X (then known as Twitter) denying the text was a message for the court or anyone else: “It had nothing to do w/court.  It’s an airbrush design from a stencil”.  According to Fox News (a famously reliable source), the nails were “part of a joke with friends”.

Before, during & after: Lindsay Lohan and her bandaged finger, 2016.

Not until 2016 would one of Lindsay Lohan’s fingers again attain such notoriety.  During an Aegean cruise in October that year, in dreadful nautical incident, the tip of one digit was severed by the boat's anchor chain but details of the circumstances are sketchy although there was speculation that upon hearing the captain give the command “weigh anchor”, she decided to help but, lacking any background in admiralty jargon, misunderstood the instruction.  Despite the grossness of the injury to what in the Western tradition is "the ring finger", she did later manage to find husband and stitched-up digit now sports a wedding ring so all's well that ends well.

Self contempt

The terms “self-hatred”, “self-loathing” and “self-contempt” are familiar in general discourse and pop psychology texts but none are formally distinguished as separate diagnostic constructs or appear in either the American Psychiatric Association's (APA) Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) or the World Health Organization’s (WHO) International Classification of Diseases (ICD).  However, the concepts encompassed do appear in theories and research papers as well as being part of clinical discourse and between the three terms are denoted different self-directed attitudes, largely along affective versus evaluative lines. 

Self-hatred is thought a core quality, an intense, hostile feeling directed at one’s self and the affective tone may be one of disgust, anger or revulsion.  Typically, this can appear as a form of self-hostility and may manifest as wishing to self-harm, a feeling of deserving of punishment and a general rage turned inwards.  Self-hatred is often discussed in connection with (1) major depressive disorders, (2) borderline personality pathology, (3) trauma and internalised abuse and (4) self-harm including suicidality.  Self-loathing can perhaps (if not wholly satisfactorily) be characterized as “self-hatred lite” in that it’s treated usually as a pervasive aversion to the self and associated with shame, disgust and revulsion.  There’s obviously some overlap (to the extent the terms probably can be used interchangeably without causing confusion for most) but as used by clinicians, self-loathing conveys the idea of something less aggressive and more avoidant, the emphasis on being repelled by one’s own traits, body, or identity rather than contemplating self harm; commonly it’s linked with shame-based self-schemas, eating disorders, body-image disturbance, depression and social anxiety.  The convenient distinction between the two is that while self-hatred summons the thought: “I should be punished”, self-loathing says “I am repulsive”.  The point about self-contempt is that often it can be transitory (sometimes styled as “transactional”) and related to a particular event or one’s reaction to that event.  In that sense, self-contempt can be seen as something is more cognitive and judgmental than emotional although, obviously, there too there can be overlap.

There is a special case within internal Jewish discourse of a certain flavor where the term “self-hating Jew” overwhelmingly is more commonly used than the superficially similar “self-loathing Jew”.  “Self-hating Jew” became a standard phrase (and in doing so sacrificed some of its original meaning in favour of becoming a still-potent slur) in Jewish polemical writing and was once most associated with political debates (not always between intellectuals), especially if the matters involved anti-Zionism or internalised anti-Semitism.  The term gained popularity after Der jüdische Selbsthaß (Jewish Self-Hatred (1930)) by German Jewish philosopher Theodor Lessing (1872-1933) was translated into English and the choice of “self-hatred” rather than “self-loathing” “locked in” the English idiom.  What Lessing did was construct a subtle argument in which he attempted to explain the (apparently uniquely European) phenomenon of Jewish intellectuals who incited anti-Semitism against the Jewish people and who regarded Judaism as the source of evil in the world.  The translator’s preference was thought to be a considered choice which reflected a certain conceptual emphasis: Whereas “self-hatred” implies hostility, repudiation, and active rejection of Jewish identity or interests, “self-loathing” suggests inward disgust or shame, which is psychologically plausible but rhetorically weaker for polemical purposes.  In other words, the former is of the political, the latter the personal.  The term has become especially controversial because, within Judaism, it had become a convenient weapon to use against any Jew who criticizes some aspect of the conduct of the government of Israel.

The thoughts of Bill Buckley on the thoughts of John XXIII

By the time in 1961 conservative US writer (and leading lay Catholic) William F Buckley (1925–2008) responded to John XXIII’s (1881-1963; pope 1958-1963) encyclical Mater et magistra (Mother and Teacher), the days were gone when the Church could have heretics burned at the stake (perhaps a source or regret to at least one pope) so suggesting the document “…must strike many as a venture in triviality” didn’t trigger the sort of risk such a critique might in previous centuries have provoked.  Still, what was seen by theologians and the laity alike as a casual dismissal of a work of 25,000 words was thought quite a slight and even an expression of contempt; that Buckley’s objections were less theological than political was a distinction understood by the cardinals and archbishops but that didn’t make them less unhappy.  Buckley was writing during the High Cold War and in the immediate aftermath of comrade Fidel Castro’s (1926–2016; prime-minister or president of Cuba 1959-2008) communist guerrillas taking over Cuba and what most disturbed him was John XXIII’s focus on the inequities of modern capitalism and seeming disregard for the oppressive conduct of various communist regimes.  In that, Buckley was right because arguments in Mater et magistra were striking and the choice of words provocative, the pope noting the “immeasurably sorrowful spectacle of vast numbers of workers in many lands and entire continents who are paid wages which condemn them and their families to subhuman conditions.  Rejected was the notion prices working people paid should be “left entirely to the laws of the market” rather than being “determined according to justice and equity.  The encyclical recommended profit-sharing and other “radical” reforms pursued in the name of “socialization”.

John XXIII waving to the faithful, Loreto Ancona, Italy, October, 1962.

The car is a 1961 Mercedes-Benz 300d Landaulet, built by the department responsible for the Spezial coachwork and made on a separate assembly line.  The one delivered to the Vatican including not only the folding soft-top atop the rear passenger compartment but also an elevated roof which extended the “greenhouse” by 100 mm (4 inches).  The 300s of the era (W186: 300, 300b & 300c; 1951-1957 & W189: 300d 1957-1962) came to be referred to as "the Adenauer" because several were used as state cars by Konrad Adenauer (1876–1967; chancellor of the FRG (Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Federal Republic of Germany; the old West Germany, 1949-1990) 1949-1963).  In the days of John XXIII, the Vatican's parade vehicles were not dubbed “Popemobiles” and did not feature armor-plating or bullet-proof glass.  For good reason, all that would come later.

It can now be difficult to understand how controversial once was the participation of Roman Catholics in the upper reaches of US political life; in the nineteenth century the warnings against voting for them was they would visit upon the country: “Rum, Romanism and Ruin!  When the Catholic Al Smith (1873-1944; Governor of New York 1919-1920 & 1923-1928) in 1928 ran on the Democratic ticket in the presidential election, campaigns against him included the suggestion the pope was already packing his bags in preparation for a move to the White House.  After Smith (in a landslide) lost the election to the Republican’s Herbert Hoover (1874–1964; POTUS 1929-1933), the joke circulated that his first act was not the usual concession speech but wiring a telegram to Pius XI (1857–1939; pope 1922-1939) saying: “Unpack!

Amusingly, the slur wouldn’t have survived the scrutiny of modern fact-checkers because between the unification of Italy in 1870 and the signing in 1929 of a concordat (the Lateran Treaty) with Benito Mussolini’s (1883-1945; Duce (leader) & prime-minister of Italy 1922-1943) fascist state, in protest at the the loss of the Papal States (756-1870), no pope set foot outside the Vatican.  The status of the popes in these years as prigionieri del Vaticano (prisoners of the Vatican) was unusual in that it was a kind of “self-imposed exile” in reverse, but the Church insisted it was not a matter of choice (ie “self-restraint”) because it was held to be a “coercive curtailment” (“constructive imprisonment” probably the closest expression of the legal theory) of freedom of movement, consequent upon the Italian state’s annexation of the Papal States and Rome itself.  The argument was that were a pope to set foot on the soil of the annexed territories, that might be held to imply recognition of the Italian state’s sovereignty.  Even at the time, outside the Roman Curia, the legal basis of that was thought at least dubious and the consensus remains the self-imposed “imprisonment” was an act of diplomatic and political symbolism.  Since then, no political figure has exactly replicated what the five “imprisoned pontiffs” did and even old Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek (1887-1975; leader of the Republic of China (mainland) 1928-1949 & the renegade province of Taiwan 1949-1975), while to his dying day denying he’d lost the sovereignty of the mainland to the CCP (Chinese Communist Party), did on occasion travel beyond his renegade province, though obviously he never visited the mainland. 

Buckley: The Life and the Revolution That Changed America by Sam Tanenhaus (b 1955).  A highly recommended book.

Religion was an issue still in 1960 when the presidential contest was between the Roman Catholic Democrat John Kennedy (JFK, 1917–1963; US POTUS 1961-1963) and the Quaker Republican Richard Nixon (1913-1994; US VPOTUS 1953-1961 & POTUS 1969-1974).  In the campaign, two prominent evangelical Protestant preachers who would now be regarded as something like “celebrity TikTok churchmen” (Billy Graham (1918–2018) and Norman Vincent Peale (1898-1993) both cast aspersions about JFK and the nature of his allegiance to Rome to which the candidate responded by saying: “I believe in an America, where the separation of church and state is absolute, where no Catholic prelate would tell the president, should he be Catholic, how to act, and no Protestant minister would tell his parishioners for whom to vote.  The idea of “Rome pulling the president’s strings” may have brought a wry smile to the pope who well knew it was often difficult to get his own bishops to follow his instructions, let alone the president of the US.  Buckley took an well-sharpened intellectual axe to Peale but seemed to regard Graham as little more than a vulgarian with a peasant’s view of God.

As it transpired, KFK did, “by an electoral eyelash” win the presidency and his wife (Jacqueline Kennedy (1929-1994; US First Lady 1961-1963) admitted to being baffled by the objections, saying "I don't understand why people are opposed to Jack being elected as a Catholic because he's so poor a Catholic".  Buckley certainly agreed JFK "wasn't Catholic enough" (something like the later complaint from activist African Americans that Barack Obama (b 1961; US president 2009-2017) "wasn't black enough"), unlike his more devout brother, the intense, driven, Robert F Kennedy (RFK, 1925–1968; US attorney general 1961-1964) who Theodore Roosevelt’s (TR, 1858–1919; US president 1901-1909) daughter Alice Lee Roosevelt Longworth (1884–1980) compared to “a seventeenth century Jesuit priest”.  Buckley understood why his family and the Kennedys often were compared (essentially because both were “rich, Catholic and political”) but liked to stress the difference, pointing out the “lace curtain, Irish cultural upbringing” of the Kennedys while his father had not set foot in Ireland until he was sixty and that was “to attend the Dublin Horse show”.  One of his friends observed the very American Buckley should really be understood as “a Spanish Catholic aristocrat” and although it has become customary to speak of the Kennedys as “American Royalty”, Buckley would have though the family a bit common.

Crooked Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump, Alfred E. Smith Memorial Foundation Dinner, New York City, October, 2016.

Fully to understand Buckley’s reaction to Mater et magistra, it must be remembered it was issued only some three years after the death of Pius XII (1876-1958; pope 1939-1958) and there was at the time, outside of the Church, not a great appreciation of just what an “encyclical” was.  Indeed, in 1927, when asked to comment on Leo XIII’s (1810–1903; pope 1878-1903) 1885 encyclical Immortale Dei, De Civitatum Constitutione Christiana (God Immortal, On the Christian Constitution of States) which reaffirmed the Church’s view on ecclesiastical rights in the apparatus of the modern state, Al Smith had replied: “Will somebody please tell me, what in hell an encyclical is?”  Although he chose only once to vest his words with the authority of “papal infallibility” (indeed, was the last pope to do so), Pius XII (like his predecessor Pius XI) had run “an imperial pontificate” with encyclicals viewed not merely as authoritative but doctrinal; one priest, when asked if they were “binding” stated the orthodox position which held: “the possibility of error in these documents is so utterly remote that it is practically non-existent.  It was in that milieu Buckley commissioned to a scholar of theology to undertake a historic study of the papal encyclical and the conclusion was they were really “pastoral letters, giving counsel,” not official statements of the magisterium, the Church’s infallible teaching.  That does of course make sense because the whole point in the nineteenth century in codifying papal infallibility was to make a clear distinction between undisputable, undebatable statements of dogma and all other thoughts and expressions.

Whether that at the time softened Buckley’s attitude towards Mater et magistra seems improbable because any document suggesting the state’s social and economic policies should be “pursued in the name of socialization” would have received his condemnation and that the translators chose to interpret the Italian socializzazione (understood as something like European social and industrial democracy rather than the Marxist sense of the collective ownership of the means of production & distribution) as “socialization” (deftly avoiding the politically and historically loaded socialism (socialismo)) is unlikely to have been much assuagement; Buckley would have thought the distinction just “too clever by half”.  So it was his critique of John’s 25,000 words came to be remembered for that one memorable fragment: “venture in triviality”.  In fairness, the passage was more expansive and said: “large sprawling document” would “be studied and argued over for years to come” and that it may one day come to be “considered central to the social teachings of the Catholic Church; or, like Pius IX’s [1792–1878; pope 1846-1878)] Syllabus of Errors [1864], it may become the source of embarrassed explanations. Whatever its final effect, it must strike many as a venture in triviality, coming at this particular time in history.”  Popes have been accused of worse but in 1961, to have an encyclical damned as  “venture in triviality” was about as bad as it got.

A depiction of crooked Hillary Clinton being burned at the stake (digitally altered image).

Although heretics, malcontents and other trouble-makers are no longer burned at the stake, in canon law, the Church does have a close equivalent of citing someone for contempt but it chose not to use it against Buckley although many Catholics did make their opposition to his views known; some cancelled their subscriptions to the magazine he edited (the conservative National Review), prompting him to point out the periodical was no more a Catholic publication than the Kennedy administration was a Catholic government “because the President is Catholic”.  One prominent Jesuit priest damned Buckley’s statement as “slanderous” and while in the internal logic of the Jesuits (perfect chastity, perfect poverty and perfect obedience to the pope) that would have been obvious, it must have baffled those more used to legal dictionaries and thesauruses.  In a way the Church establishment might have had the last laugh because, writing decades later, in his distinctly religious memoir Nearer, My God (1997), stridently Buckley defended papal decrees as statements revealing truth immune from challenge, words of “revelation and providentially guided reason” from the “one Voice for whose decisions the people wait with trust” (ie the pope).  Buckley made no mention of Mater et magistra or the controversy he had triggered and whether this constitutes apology or apologia readers can judge but whenever he's discussed, it’s rare for his words of 1961 not to be reprinted while those of 35 years later rarely are mentioned.  If he had his time again, while still critical, he’d likely have phrased things differently.

Saturday, November 29, 2025

Grammatology

Grammatology (pronounced gram-uh-tol-uh-jee)

(1) Historically, the scientific study of systems of writing.

(2) In latter-day use, a critique of orthodox linguistics.

Early 1800s (in its original sense): The construct was gramma(r) + -t- + -ology; the modern (some would say post-modern) re-purposing was first used in 1967.  Dating from the mid fourteenth century, grammar was from the Middle English gramery & gramere, from the Old French gramaire (classical learning), from the unattested Vulgar Latin grammāria, an alteration of the Classical Latin grammatica, from the Ancient Greek γραμματική (grammatik) (skilled in writing), from γράμμα (gramma) (line of writing), from γράφω (gráphō) (write), from the primitive Indo-European gerbh (to carve, to scratch).  It displaced the native Old English stæfcræft; a doublet of glamour, glamoury, gramarye & grimoire.  In English, grammar is used to describe the system of rules and principles for the structure of a language (or of languages in general) but in colloquial use it’s applied also to morpology (the internal structure of words) and syntax (the structure of phrases and sentences of a language).  In English, generative grammar (the body of rules producing all the sentences permissible in a given language, while excluding all those not permissible) has for centuries been shifting and it’s now something policed by the so-called “grammar Nazis”, some of whom insist on enforcing “rules” regarded by most as defunct as early as the nineteenth century.

The suffix -ology was formed from -o- (as an interconsonantal vowel) +‎ -logy.  The origin in English of the -logy suffix lies with loanwords from the Ancient Greek, usually via Latin and French, where the suffix (-λογία) is an integral part of the word loaned (eg astrology from astrologia) since the sixteenth century.  French picked up -logie from the Latin -logia, from the Ancient Greek -λογία (-logía).  Within Greek, the suffix is an -ία (-ía) abstract from λόγος (lógos) (account, explanation, narrative), and that a verbal noun from λέγω (légō) (I say, speak, converse, tell a story).  In English the suffix became extraordinarily productive, used notably to form names of sciences or disciplines of study, analogous to the names traditionally borrowed from the Latin (eg astrology from astrologia; geology from geologia) and by the late eighteenth century, the practice (despite the disapproval of the pedants) extended to terms with no connection to Greek or Latin such as those building on French or German bases (eg insectology (1766) after the French insectologie; terminology (1801) after the German Terminologie).  Within a few decades of the intrusion of modern languages, combinations emerged using English terms (eg undergroundology (1820); hatology (1837)).  In this evolution, the development may be though similar to the latter-day proliferation of “-isms” (fascism; feminism et al).  Grammatology & grammatologist are nous, grammatological is an adjective and grammatologically is an adverb; the noun plural is grammatologies.

Google ngram (a quantitative and not qualitative measure): Because of the way Google harvests data for their ngrams, they’re not literally a tracking of the use of a word in society but can be usefully indicative of certain trends, (although one is never quite sure which trend(s)), especially over decades.  As a record of actual aggregate use, ngrams are not wholly reliable because: (1) the sub-set of texts Google uses is slanted towards the scientific & academic and (2) the technical limitations imposed by the use of OCR (optical character recognition) when handling older texts of sometime dubious legibility (a process AI should improve).  Where numbers bounce around, this may reflect either: (1) peaks and troughs in use for some reason or (2) some quirk in the data harvested.

Grammatology in its re-purposed sense was from the French grammatologie, introduced to the world by French philosopher Jacques Derrida (1930-2004) in his book De la grammatologie (Of Grammatology (1967)).  It may be unfair to treat Derrida’s use as a “re-purposing” because although the word grammatology (literally “the study of writing”) had existed since the early nineteenth century, it was a neologism, one of an expanding class of “-ology” words (some of them coined merely for ironic or humorous effect) and there was prior to 1967 scant evidence of use, those studying languages, literature or linguistics able satisfactorily to undertake their work without much needing “grammatology”.  On the basis of the documents thus far digitized, “grammatology” was never an accepted or even commonly used term in academia and although it seems occasionally to have been used variously in fields related to “the study of writing systems” (apparently as a synonym for paleography, epigraphy, writing-system classification or orthographic description) it was only in passing.  Until the modern era, words “going viral” happened relatively infrequently and certainly slowly and, as used prior to 1967, “grammatology” was attached to no theoretical construct or school of thought and described no defined discipline, the word indicative, empirical and neutral.  If “pre-modern” grammatology could be summed up (a probably dubious exercise), it would be thought a technical term for those concerned with scripts, alphabets, symbols and the historical development of writing systems.  Tempting though it may seem, it cannot be thought of as proto-structuralism.

The novelty Derrida introduced was to argue the need for a discipline examining the history, structure and philosophical implications of writing, his particular contention that writing is not secondary to speech, a notion at odds with centuries of Western metaphysics.  At the time, it was seen as a radical departure from orthodoxy, Derrida exploring (in the broadest imaginable way), the possibilities of writing, not simply the familiar physical inscriptions, but anything that functions as “trace,” “differance,” or symbolic marking, the core argument being writing is not secondary to speech (although in the narrow technical sense it may be consequent); rather, it reveals the instability and “constructedness” of language and thereby meaning.

De la grammatologie (First edition, 1967) by Jacques Derrida.

Ambitiously, what Derrida embarked upon was to do to the study something like what Karl Marx (1818-1883) claimed to have done to the theories of Hegel (Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831)): “turn things on their head”, a process that can be classified under four themes: (1) Writing as prior to speech (as opposed to the earlier “Writing is derivative of speech”).  What this meant was writing had to be considered as “originary”, implying structures of difference could precede both writing and speech. (2) Writing (the act as opposed to the content) as a philosophical concept rather than a finite collection of technical objects to be interpreted or catalogued on the basis of their form of assembly.  (3) Grammatology becomes a critique (as opposed to the earlier descriptive tool) of science, reimagining it as a critical discipline exposing the logocentrism of Western thought.  Logocentrism describes the tendency to prioritize “logos” (in academic use a word encompassing words, speech or reason), as the ultimate foundation for truth and meaning (with speech often privileged over writing).  Logocentrism was at the core of the Western philosophical tradition that assumed language accurately and directly can express an external reality, the companion notion being rational thought represents the highest form of knowledge.  Derrida labelled this a false hierarchy that devalued writing and other non-verbal forms of communication and feeling. (4) Writing is expanded beyond literal inscriptions.  Whereas the traditional Western view had been that writing was simply the use of an alphabet, cuneiform, hieroglyphs and such, what Derrida suggested was the concept of writing should be extended to any system of differences, traces, or marks; the condition for meaning itself.

So Derrida took grammatology from an dusty corner of the academy where it meant (for the small number of souls involved) something like “a hypothetical technical study of writing systems” and re-invented it as a philosophical discipline analysing the deeper structures that make any representation or meaning possible.  The notion of it as a tool of analysis is important because deconstruction, the word Derrida and other “celebrity philosophers” made famous (or infamous depending on one’s stance on things postmodern) is often misunderstood as something like “destruction” when really it is a form of analysis.  If Derrida’s subversive idea been presented thirty years earlier (had the author been able to find a publisher), it’s possible it would have been ignored or dismissed by relative few who then read such material.  However, in the post-war years there was an enormous expansion in both the number of universities and the cohorts of academics and students studying in fields which would come to be called “critical theory” so there was a receptive base for ideas overturning orthodoxy, thus the remarkable path deconstruction and postmodernism for decades tracked.

Deconstruction in art, Girl With Balloon by street artist Banksy, before, during & after a (successful) test deconstruction (left) and in its final form (right), London, October 2018.

There is an ephemeral art movement but usually it involves works which wholly are destroyed or entirely disappear.  Banksy’s Girl With Balloon belonged to a sub-category where (1) the deconstruction process was part of the art and (2) the residual elements were “the artwork”.  Banksy’s trick with this one was as the auctioneer’s hammer fell (at Stg£1m), an electric shredder concealed at the base of the frame was activated, the plan being to reduce the work “to shreds” in a pile below.  However, it’s claimed there was a technical glitch and the shredder stopped mid-shred, meaning half remained untouched and half, neatly sliced, hung from the bottom.  As a headline grabbing stunt it worked well but the alleged glitch worked better still, art experts mostly in agreement the work as “half shredded” was more valuable than had it been “wholly shredded” and certainly more than had it remained untouched in the frame.  Thus: “meaning is just another construct which emerges only through differences and deferrals”.

From a distance of sixty-odd years, in the milieu of the strands of thought which are in a sense part of a “new orthodoxy”, it can be hard to understand just what an impact Derrida and his fellow travellers (and, just as significantly, his critics) had and what an extraordinary contribution deconstruction made to the development in thought of so many fields.  Derrida in 1967 of course did not anticipate the revolutionary movement he was about to trigger, hinted at by his book starting life as a doctoral thesis entitled: De la grammatologie: Essai sur la permanence de concepts platonicien, aristotélicien et scolastique de signe écrit. (Of Grammatology: Essay on the Permanence of Platonic, Aristotelian and Scholastic Concepts of the Written Sign).  A typically indigestible title of the type beloved by academics, the clipping for wider distribution was on the same basis as Adolf Hitler’s (1889-1945; Führer (leader) and German head of government 1933-1945 & head of state 1934-1945) publisher deciding Mein Kampf (My Struggle) was snappier than Viereinhalb Jahre (des Kampfes) gegen Lüge, Dummheit und Feigheit (Four and a Half Years [of Struggle] Against Lies, Stupidity and Cowardice).  There’s a reasons authors usually don’t have the final say on titles and cover art.

Derrida acknowledged linguistics in the twentieth century had become a sophisticated form of study but maintained the discipline was failing to examine its most fundamental assumptions; indeed his point was those core values couldn’t be re-evaluated because they provided the framework by which language was understood.  What Derrida indentified as the superstructure which supported all was the commitment to the primacy of speech and presence and because the prevailing position in linguistics was that speech was primary, the assumption worked to shape all that followed.  It was the influence of the Swiss philosopher & semiotician Ferdinand de Saussure (1857–1913) which was profound in positioning speech as the natural, original, living form of language with writing as a secondary, derivative (and, in a sense, artificial although this was never wholly convincing) representation of speech.  What made the Saussureian position seem compelling was it sounded logical, given the consensus it was human speech which predated the development of writing, the latter thus the product of the former and so persuasive was the thesis the hierarchy came to provide the framework for other disciplines within linguistics including phonology (the study of the way sounds function in languages) and morphology (the study of the internal structure of morphemes (the smallest linguistic unit within a word able to support a meaning)that can carry a meaning.  What this meant was syntax was also defined by speech (writing a mere convenient means of exchange) with phonetics (the study of the physical sounds of human speech) the true source of the material language.  Thus for generations, in academic discourse, historical linguistics were documented primarily by an analysis of changes in sound with orthography (the methods by which a language or its sounds are represented by written symbols); a mechanical by-product.

Deconstruction in fashion.  Lindsay Lohan in Theia gown, amfAR gala, New York City, February 2013 (left) and after “deconstruction by scissors” (right).

All gowns are “constructed” (some 3D printed or even “sprayed-on”) but sometimes circumstances demand they be “deconstructed”.  On the night, the shimmering nude and silver bugle-beaded fringe gown from Theia’s spring 2011 collection was much admired but there was an “unfortunate incident” (ie the fabric was torn) and, apparently using a pair of scissors, there was some ad-hoc seamstressery to transform the piece into something described as a “mullet minidress”.  That turned out to be controversial because the gown was on loan for the night but such things are just part of the cost of doing business and, with its Lohanic re-imagining, it’s now an artefact.

Derrida didn’t dispute the historic timelines; his point was that in defining linguistics based on this hierarchy, it became impossible to question the orthodoxy from within.  In a classic example of how deconstruction works, he argued the hierarchy was based not on the historical sequence of events (ie writing coming after speech) but was a culturally defined attachment to the idea of presence, voice and authentic meaning; with speech entrenched in its primacy, no discipline within linguistics was able fully to study writing because of this structural prejudice positioning writing as an auxiliary system, a mere notation of sounds encoding the pre-existing spoken language.  That didn’t mean writing couldn’t be studied (as for centuries it had been) but that it could be considered only a tool or artefact used to record speech and never a primary object of meaning.  While there were all sorts of reasons to be interested in writing, for the reductionists who needed to get to the essence of meaning, writing could only ever be thought something mechanistic and thus was philosophically uninteresting.  So, if linguistics was unable to analyse writing as (1) a structure independent of speech, (2) a fundamental element of thought processes, (3) a source of new or changed meanings or (4) a construct where cultural and philosophical assumptions are revealed, that would imply only speech could create meaning with writing a mere form of its expression.  Daringly thus, what Derrida demanded was for writing to be seen as conceptually prior to speech, even if as a physical phenomenon it came later.  In 1967, linguistics couldn’t do that while maintaining the very foundations on which it was built.

Never has there been published a "Grammatology for Dummies" but there is The Complete Idiot's Guide to Literary Theory and Criticism (2013) by Dr Steven J. Venturino.

At this point things became more technical but Derrida did provide a simplified model, explaining linguistics existed as the study of signs and not of traces, his work depending ultimately on certain distinctions: (1) Signs assume stable signifieds and (2) traces imply meaning is always deferred but never present.  For orthodox linguistics to work, the assumption had to be that signs enjoy a stability of meaning within a system; this Derrida dismissed as illusory arguing (1) meaning is just another construct which emerges only through differences and deferrals, (2) no signified is ever (or can ever fully be) “present” and (3) speech is no closer to meaning than writing.  By its own definitions in 1967, linguistics could not accommodate that because (1) its methods depended on systematic relations sufficiently stable to permit analysis, (2) it needed constant objects (definable units such as phonemes, morphemes and rules of syntax), syntactic structures) and (3) it relied on signs which could be described with the required consistency (ie “scientifically”).  Any approach grounding in trace and difference lay beyond the boundaries of orthodox linguistics.

So the conflict would seem irreconcilable but that’s true only if viewed through the lens of a particular method; really, linguistics was empirical and grammatology was philosophical and in that were alternative rather than competing or even parallel paths.  If linguistics was a system of codification, then grammatology was a critique of the foundations of linguistics and Derrida made clear he was not attempting to reform linguistics simply because that couldn’t be done; any attempt to interpolate his ideas into the discipline would have meant it ceased to be linguistics.  He wanted a new discipline, one which rather than empirically describing and categorising language and its elements, stood back and asked what in the first place made such systems possible.  That meant it was a transcendental rather than empirical process, one studying the conditions of representation and the metaphysics implicit in the idea of signification.  Writing thus was not merely marks on a surface but a marker of a difference in being.

The twist in the tale is that although De la grammatologie was highly influential (especially after an Edition appeared in English in 1976), grammatology never became a defined, institutionalised academic field in the way Derrida envisioned it at least supplementing departments of linguistics, anthropology and philosophy.  That was due less to the well-documented phenomenon of institutional inertia than it proving impossible for any consensus to be reached about what exactly “grammatological analysis” was or what constituted “grammatological research”.  Pleasingly, it was the structuralists who could account for that by explaining grammatology was a critique of the metaphysics underlying other disciplines rather than a method for generating new empirical knowledge.  Fields, they noted, were likely organically to grow as the tools produced were picked up by others to be applied to tasks; grammatology was a toolbox for dismantling tools.

Jacques Derrida with pipe, deconstructing some tobacco.

Even if Derrida’s concepts proved sometimes too vague even for academics the influence was profound and, whether as a reaction or something deterministic (advances in computer modelling, neurology and such), the discipline of linguistics became more rather than less scientific, the refinements in the field of generative grammar in particular seen as something of a “doubling down” of resistance to Derrida’s critique, something reflected too in anthropology which came even more to value fieldwork and political economy, philosophical critiques of writing thought less helpful.  So the specialists not only clung to their speciality but made it more specialized still.  Grammatology did however help create genuinely new movements in literary theory, the most celebrated (and subsequently derided) being deconstruction where Derrida’s ideas such as interpretation being an infinite play of differences and the meaning of texts being inherently unstable created one of the more radical schools of thought in the post-war West, introducing to study concepts such as paratext (how academics “read between and beyond the lines) the trace (the mark of something absent, a concept that disrupts the idea of pure presence and self-contained meaning) and marginalia (used here as an abstract extension of what an author may have “written in the margins” to encompass that which may seem secondary to the main point but is actually crucial to understanding the entire structure of thought, blurring the (literal) line between what lies inside and outside a text).

Derrida for Beginners (2007) by Jim Powell (illustrated by Van Howell).  On has to start somewhere.

The movement became embedded in many English and Comparative Literature departments as well as in post-structuralism and Continental philosophy.  Modern beasts like media studies & cultural theory are (in their understood form) unthinkable without deconstruction and if grammatology didn’t become “a thing”, its core elements (difference, trace etc) for decades flourished (sometimes to the point of (published) absurdity) and although not all agree, some do argue it was Derrida’s subversion in 1967 which saw the field of semiotics emerge to “plug the gaps” left by the rigidity of traditional linguistics.  Of course, even if grammatology proved something of a cul-de-sac, Derrida’s most famous fragment: “Il n'y a pas de hors-texte” (literally “there is no outside-text”) endured to underpin deconstruction and postmodernism generally.  Intriguingly for a concept from linguistics, the phrase took on a new life in the English-speaking world where it came to be understood as “everything is text”, an interpretation which created a minor publishing industry.  In English, it’s a marvellously literalist use and while it does to an extent overlap with the author’s original intention, Derrida meant there is (1) no access to pure, unmediated presence and (2) no meaning outside interpretation and no experience outside context.  In using texte he was referring to the interplay of differences, traces, relations, and contexts that make meaning possible (ie not literally the words as they appear on a page).  What that meant was all acts were “textual” in that they must be interpreted and are intelligible only within systems of meaning; the phrase a philosophical statement about signification and mediation, not characters printed on page.

Fiveable's diagram of what we need to know to understand literature.  Hope this helps.

However, demonstrating (in another way) the power of language, the “everything is text”) movement (“cult” may once have been a better word) in English came to be understood as meaning no reality could exist beyond language; everything (literally!) is text because it is words and discourse which both construct and describe reality.  That notion might have remained in an obscure .ivory tower were it not for the delicious implication that values such as right & wrong and true & false are also pieces of text with meanings able to be constructed and deconstructed.  That meant there was no stable “truth” and nothing objectively was “wrong”; everything just a construct determined by time, place and circumstances.  That Derrida never endorsed this shocking relativism was noted by some but academics and students found so intoxicating the notion of right & wrong being variables that “everything is text” took on a life of its own as a kind of selective nihilism which is, of course, quite postmodern.  Again, language was responsible because the French texte was from the Latin textus, from texō (weave) and while in French it can mean “text” (in the English sense), among philosophers it was used metaphorically to suggest “weave together”; “an interconnected structure” in the sense of the Latin textus (woven fabric); it was this meaning Derrida used.  Had the English-speaking world remained true to the original spirit of Il n'y a pas de hors-texte it would have entered the textbooks as something like “There is nothing outside the interplay of signs and contexts; There is no meaning outside systems of interpretation” and perhaps have been forgotten but “everything is text” defined and seduced a movement.  Thus, it can be argued things either were “lost in translation” or “transformed by translation” but for the neo- Derridaists there’s the satisfaction of knowing the meaning shift was an example of “grammatology in action”.