Dixiecrat

Dixiecrat (pronounced dik-see-krat)

(1) In US political history, a member of a faction of southern Democrats stressing states' rights and opposed to the civil rights programs of the Democratic Party, especially a southern Democrat who left the party in 1948 to support candidates of the States' Rights Democratic Party.

(2) In historic US use, a member of the US Democratic Party from the southern states (especially one of the former territories of the Confederacy), holding socially conservative views, supporting racial segregation and the continued entrenchment of a white hegemony.

1948: A portmanteau word of US origin, the construct being Dixie + (Demo)crat.  Wholly unrelated to other meanings, Dixie (also as Dixieland) in this context is a reference to the southern states of the United States, especially those formerly part of the Confederacy.  The origin is contested, the most supported theory being it’s derived from the Mason-Dixon Line, a historic (if not entirely accurate) delineation between the "free" North and "slave-owning" South.  Another idea is it was picked up from any of several songs with this name, especially the minstrel song Dixie (1859) by (northerner) Daniel Decatur Emmett (1815-1904), popular as a Confederate war song although most etymologists hold this confuses cause and effect, the word long pre-dating any of the known compositions.  There’s also a suggested link to the nineteenth-century nickname of New Orleans, from the dixie, a Confederate-era ten-dollar bill on which was printed the French dix (ten) but again, it came later.  The –crat suffix was from the Ancient Greek κράτος (krátos) (power, might), as used in words of Ancient Greek origin such as democrat and aristocrat; the ultimate root was the primitive Indo-European kret (hard).  Dixiecrat is a noun and Dixiecratic is an adjective; the noun plural is Dixiecrats.  The noun Dixiecratocracy (also as dixieocracy) was a humorous coining speculating about the nature of a Dixiecrat-run government; it was built on the model of kleptocracy, plutocracy, meritocracy, gerontocracy etc.

The night old Dixie died.

Former Dixiecrat, Senator Strom Thurmond (1902-2003; senator (Republican) for South Carolina 1954-2003) lies in state, Columbia, South Carolina, June 2003.

Universally called Dixiecrats, the States' Rights Democratic Party was formed in 1948 as a dissident breakaway from the Democratic Party.  Its core platform was permanently to secure the rights of states to legislate and enforce racial segregation and exclude the federal government from intervening in these matters.  Politically and culturally, it was a continuation of the disputes and compromises which emerged in the aftermath of the US Civil War almost a century earlier.  The Dixiecrats took control of the party machine in several southern states and contested the elections of 1948 with South Carolina governor Strom Thurmond as their presidential nominee but enjoyed little support outside the deep South and by 1952 most had returned to the Democratic Party.  However, in the following decades, they achieved a much greater influence as a southern faction than ever was achieved as a separatist party.  The shift in the south towards support for the Republican Party dates from this time and by the 1980s, the Democratic Party's control of presidential elections in the South had faded and many of the Dixiecrats had joined the Republicans.

US Electoral College map, 1948.

In the 1948 presidential election, the Dixiecrats didn’t enjoy the success polls had predicted (although that was the year of the infamous “Dewey Defeats Truman” headline and the polls got much wrong), carrying only four states, all south of the Mason-Dixon line and not even the antics of one “faithless elector” (one selected as an elector for the Democratic ticket who instead cast his vote for Dixiecrats) was sufficient to add Tennessee to the four (South Carolina, Mississippi, Alabama, and Louisiana) won.  Nor did they in other states gain sufficient support to act as “spoilers” as Ross Perot (1930–2019) in 1992 & 1996 and Ralph Nadar (b 1934) in 2000 achieved, the “narrowing of margins” in specific instances being of no immediate electoral consequence in the US system.  With that, the Dixiecrats (in the sense of the structure of the States' Rights Democratic Party) in a sense vanished but as an idea they remained for decades a potent force within the Democratic Party and their history is an illustration of why the often-quoted dictum by historian Professor Richard Hofstadter (1916–1970): “The role of third parties is to sting like a bee, then die” needs a little nuance.  What the Dixiecrats did after 1948 was not die but instead undergo a kind of “resurrection without crucifixion”, emerging to “march through the institutions” of the Democratic Party, existing as its southern faction.

That role was for generations politically significant and example of why the “third party” experience in the US historically wasn’t directly comparable with political behaviour elsewhere in the English-speaking world where “party discipline” tended to be “tight” with votes on the floors of parliaments almost always following party lines.  Until recent years (and this is something the “Trump phenomenon” radically has at least temporarily almost institutionalized), there was often only loose party discipline applied within the duopoly, Democrats and Republicans sometimes voting together on certain issues because the politicians were practical people who wished to be re-elected and understood what Tip O'Neill (1912–1994; (Democrat) speaker of the US Representatives 1977-1987) meant when he said “All politics is local”.  Structurally, that meant “third parties” can operate in the US and achieve stuff (for good or evil) as the Dixiecrats and later the Republican’s Tea Party Movement proved; it just that they do it as factions within the duopoly and that’s not unique, the Australian National Party (a re-branding of the old Country Party) really a regional pressure group of political horse traders disguised as a political party.

US Electoral College map, 1924.

The 1924 Electoral College results were a harbinger of the later Dixiecrat movement and a graphical representation of terms such as "solid South" or "south of the Mason-Dixon Line".  At the time of the 1924 election, slavery in the South was still in living memory.  Although there was fracturing at the edges, the "solid south" did remain a Democratic Party stronghold until the civil rights legislation of the 1960s and it was was the well-tuned political antennae of Texan Lyndon Johnson (LBJ, 1908–1973; US president 1963-1969) which picked up the implications and consequences of the reforms his skills had ushered through the Congress:  "I think I've just lost us the South" he was heard to remark when the Senate passed a landmark voting rights bill into law.

In recent years, what has changed in the US is the Republicans and Democrats have become the captive organizations of a tiny number of dedicated political operatives pursuing either their own ideological agendas or (more typically), those providing the funding.  The practical implication of that is the elections which now most matter are the primaries (where candidates for the election proper are selected) and because primary contests are voted on by a relative handful, outcomes are easier to influence and control that in general elections where there are millions to nudge.  Party discipline has thus become tighter than can often be seen on the floor of the House of Commons in the UK, not because the ideological commitments of politicians within parties have coalesced but because they’re now terrified of being “primaried” if they vote against the party line.  Re-election is a powerful inducement because the money politicians make during their careers is many, many times what might be expected given their notional earnings from their salary and entitlements.  There are few easier ways to get rich, thus the incentive to “toe the party line”.  This behavioural change, mapped onto something which structurally remains unchanged, is one of the many factors which have produced a country now apparently as polarized as ever it has been.  The nature of that polarization is sometimes misunderstood because of the proliferation of “red state, blue state” maps of the US which make the contrast between the “corrupting coastlines” and “flyover states” seem so stark but each state is of course a shade of purple (some darker, some lighter) but because of the way the two parties now operate, politics as it is practiced tends to represent the extreme, radical elements which now control the machines.  So while in the last twenty-odd years there’s been much spoken about “the 1%” in the sense of the tiny number of people who own or control so much, it’s political scientists and historians who much fret over the less conspicuous “1%” able to maintain effective control of the two parties, something of even greater significance because the state has put in place some structural impediments to challenging the two-party political duopoly.

In the US, the state does not (in a strict legal or constitutional sense of the word) “own” the Republican or Democratic Parties because they are “private” organizations protected by the constitution’s First Amendment (freedom of association).  However, over the years, something biologists would recognize as “symbiosis” has evolved as the state and the parties (willingly and sometimes enthusiastically) have become entangled to the extent a structural analysis would recognize the parties as quasi-public although not quite at the status familiar elsewhere as quangos (quasi autonomous non-government organizations).  Despite being “private concerns”, the parties routinely conduct state-regulated primaries to select candidates and in many cases these are funded by tax revenue and administered by state electoral instrumentalities.  Beyond that, it needs to be remembered that to speak of a “US national election” (as one might of a “UK general election”) is misleading because as a legal construct such events are really 50 elections run by each state with electoral laws not wholly aligned (thus the famous (or dreaded, depending on one’s position) Iowa caucuses) and in many states, it’s state law which regulates who can voted in party primaries, some permitting “open” primaries in which any lawfully enrolled voter is allowed to cast a ballot while others run “closed” events, restricting participation to registered members of the relevant party.  What that means is in some places a citizen can vote in each party’s primary.  That done, those who prevail in a primary further are advantaged because many states have laws setting parameters governing who may appear on a ballot paper and most of them provide an easier path for the Republican and Democratic Party candidates by virtue of having granted both “major party” status.  As objects, the two parties, uniquely, are embedded in the electoral apparatus and the interaction of ballot access laws, debate rules and campaign finance rules mean the two function as state-sponsored actors; while not quite structurally duopolistic, they operate in a protected environment with the electoral equivalent of “high tariff barriers”.

Elon Musk (left) and Donald Trump (right), with Tesla Cybertruck (AWD Foundation Series), the White House, March, 2025.  It seemed like a good idea at the time.

Given all that, Elon Musk’s (b 1971) recent announcement he was planning to launch a “third party” (actually the US has many political parties, the “third party” tag used as a synecdoche for “not one of the majors”) might seem “courageous” and surprised many who thought the experience of his recent foray into political life might have persuaded him pursuits like EVs (electric vehicles), digging tunnels (he deserves praise for naming that SpaceX spin-off: “The Boring Company”) and travelling to Mars were more fulfilling.  However, Mr Musk believes the core of the country’s problems lie in the way its public finances are now run on the basis of the “Dick Cheney (born 1941; US vice president 2001-2009) doctrine: “Deficits don’t matter” and having concluded neither of the major parties are prepared to change the paradigm which he believes is leading the US to a fiscal implosion, a third party is the only obvious vehicle.  In Western politics, ever since shades of “socialism” and “capitalism” defined the democratic narrative, the idea of a “third way” has been a lure for theorists and practitioners with many interpretations of what is meant but all have in common what Mr Musk seems to be suggesting: finding the middle ground and offering it to those currently voting for one or other of the majors only because “your extremists are worse than our extremists”.  Between extremes there’s much scope for positioning (which will be variable between “social” & “economic” issues) and, given his libertarian instincts, it seems predicable Mr Musk’s economic vision will be “centre-right” rather than “centre-left” but presumably he’ll flesh out the details as his venture evolves.

Mr Musk can’t be accused of creating a “third party” because he wants to become POTUS (president of the US).  As a naturalized US citizen, Mr Musk is ineligible because Article II, Section 1, Clause 5 of the constitution restricts the office to those who are a “natural born Citizen” (Article II, Section 1, Clause 5).  Because the US Supreme Court (USSC) has never handed down a definitive ruling on the matter it’s not absolutely certain what that phrase means but the consensus among legal scholars is it refers to someone who was at birth a US citizen.  That need not necessitate being born on the soil of the US or its territories because US citizens often are born in other countries (especially to those on military or diplomatic duty) and even in international waters; indeed, there would appear no constitutional impediment to someone born in outer space (or, under current constitutional interpretation, on Mars) becoming POTUS provided they were at the time of birth a US citizen.  Nor does it seem an interpretation of the word “natural” could be used to exclude a US citizen conceived through the use of some sort of “technology” such as IVF (In Vitro Fertilization).

Lindsay Lohan, potential third party POTUS.

As a naturalized US citizen, Elon Musk can’t become POTUS so his new party (tentatively called the “America” Party) will have to nominate someone else and the constitution stipulates (Article II, Section 1, Clause 5): “No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President; neither shall any Person be eligible to that Office who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the United States”.  The age requirement is unambiguous and in his Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (1833), Justice Joseph Story (1779–1845; associate justice of the Supreme Court of the USSC 1812-1845) explained the residence requirement was “…not an absolute inhabitancy within the United States during the whole period; but such an inhabitancy as includes a permanent domicil in the United States.”  That means Mr Musk can consider nominating Lindsay Lohan for president.  She’d apparently flirted with the idea of running in 2020 but at that point would have been a few months too young; on all grounds she’ll be eligible for selection in 2028 and many would be attracted to the idea of Lindsay Lohan having her own nuclear weapons.

Whether or not it’s “courageous” (or even “heroic”), to build a new third party in the US time will tell but certainly it’s ambitious but Mr Musk is also a realist and may not be planning to have a presidential candidate on the ballot in all 50 states or even contest every seat both houses of Congress.  As he’ll have observed in a number of countries, “third parties” need neither parliamentary majorities nor executive office to achieve decisive influence over policy, some with comparatively little electoral support able to achieve “balance of power” status in legislatures provided those votes are clustered in the right places.  Additionally, because the polarized electorate has delivered such close results in the House & Senate, the math suggests a balance of power may be attainable with fewer seats than historically would have been demanded and under the US system of fixed terms, an administration cannot simply declare such a congress “unworkable” and all another election (a common tactic in the Westminster system); it must, for at least two years, work with what the people have elected, even if that includes an obstreperous third party. Still, the challenges will be onerous, even before the “dirty tricks” departments of the major parties start searching for skeletons in the closets of third party candidates (in a rare example of bipartisanship the Republicans and Democrats will probably do a bit of intelligence-sharing on that project) and the history is not encouraging.

It was the Republican party which in the 1850s was the last “third party” to make the transition to become a “major” and not since 1996 has such a candidate in a presidential contest secured more than 5% of the national vote.  In the Electoral College, not since 1968 has a third-party candidate carried any states and 1912 was the last time a third-party nominee finished second (and 1912 was a bit of a “special case” in which the circumstances were unusually propitious for challenges to the majors).  Still, with (1) the polls recording a general disillusionment with the major parties and institutions of state and (2) Mr Musk’s wealth able to buy much advertising and “other forms” of influence, prospects for a third party may be untypically bright in 2028 elections and 2030 mid-terms.  There are no more elections for Donald Trump (b 1946; US president 2017-2021 and since 2025) and it seems underestimated even now just what an aberration he is in the political cycle.  While his use of techniques and tactics from other fields truly has since 2016 been disruptive, what he has done is unlikely to be revolutionary because it is all so dependent on his presence and hands on the levers of power.  When he leaves office, without the “dread and awe” the implied threat of his displeasure evokes, business may return to something closer what we still imagine “normal” to be.

Faction

Faction (pronounced fak-shun)

(1) A group or clique forming a minority within a larger body, especially a dissentious group within a political party, government or organization.  The terms “splinter group”, “breakaway”, “reform group”, “ginger group” etc are sometimes used as factional descriptors depending on the circumstances but the more familiar (and sometimes formally institutionalized) are forms like “right”, “left”, “wet”, “dry” “moderate”, “conservative” etc.

(2) Internal organizational strife and intrigue; discord or dissension (applied mostly to political parties but used also to describe the internal workings of many institutions).

(3) As a portmanteau word, the construct being fact + (fict)on), in literature, film etc, a form of writing which blends fact and fiction (though distinct from the literary form “magic realism); in journalism, elements of faction are seen in variations of the technique sometimes called “new” or “gonzo” journalism.  In reportage, it should not be confused with “making stuff up” and it’s distinct from the “alternative facts” model associated with some staff employed in the Trump White House.

1500-1510: From the fourteenth century Middle French faction, from the Latin factionem (nominative factiō) (a group of people acting together, a political grouping (literally “a making or doing”)), a noun of process from the perfect passive participle factus, from faciō (do, make), from facere (to make, to do), from the primitive Indo-European root dhe- (to set; put; to place or adjust).  The adjective factious (given to faction, turbulently partisan, dissentious) dates from the 1530s and was from either the French factieux or the Latin factiosus (partisan, seditious, inclined to form parties) again from factionem; the related forms were the noun factiousness and the adverb factiously.  In ancient Rome, the factions were the four teams which contested the chariot racing events in the circus, the members distinguished by the colors used for their clothing and to adorn their horses and equipment.  Because politics and the sport soon intertwined the meaning of faction shifted to include “an oligarchy, usurping faction, party seeking by irregular means to bring about a change in government”.  Even after the fall of Rome, the traditional Roman factions remained prominent in the Byzantine Empire and chariot racing went into decline only after the factions fought during the Nika riots in 532 which saw some thirty-thousand dead and half of Constantinople razed.  Faction, factioneer, factionist & factionalism are nouns, factionalize is a verb, factional & factionless are adjectives, factionally is an adverb, factionary is a noun & adjective, factionate is a verb & adjective; the noun plural is factions.

The use of the word to describe the literary device which blends facts with fiction faction is said to date from the late 1960s although some sources suggest it had earlier been used in discussions held in conferences and meetings but the most usual descriptor of such works was the earlier “non-fiction novel” which by the mid century (especially in the US) had become a popular (and in literary circles a fashionable) form although, as such, it was not originally directly related to post-modernism.  Critics trace the origins of the form to the years immediately after World War I (1914-1918) and distinguish the works produced then from earlier texts where there was some use of dubious material presented as “fact” in that in the twentieth century the author’s made their intent deliberate.

William Shakespeare (1564–1616) was well acquainted with the earthly lusts and frailties of men and in Coriolanus (1605-1608) act 5, scene 2, at the Volscian camp when Menenius is halted by sentries who refuse to allow him to see their generals he knew what to say though it did him little good.

First sentry: Faith, sir, if you had told as many lies in his behalf as you have uttered words in your own, you should not pass here; no, though it were as virtuous to lie as to live chastely. Therefore, go back.

Menenius: Prithee, fellow, remember my name is Menenius, always factionary on the party of your general.

Second sentry: Howsoever you have been his liar, as you say you have, I am one that, telling true under him, must say, you cannot pass.  Therefore, go back.

Menenius: Hath he dined, canst thou tell? for I would not speak with him till after dinner.

The Baader-Meinhof faction

Founded in 1970, the Rote Armee Fraktion (Red Army Faction (RAF)) was a left-wing, armed militant revolutionary group based in the Federal Republic of Germany (The FRG or West Germany (1949-1990)) which, for almost thirty years, undertook assassinations, kidnappings, robberies and bombings and although actually less active than some other terrorist cells, the RAF was better known and most influential in the early-mid 1970s.  The RAF was dissolved in 1998 although, in the nature of such things, some members continued to use their skills in criminal ventures including drug-trafficing as a form of revenue generation.  The RAF always used the word Fraktion, translated into English as faction.  The linguistic implications never pleased RAF members who thought themselves the embedded, military wing of the wider communist workers' movement, not a faction or splinter-group.  In this context the German doesn’t lend well to translation but closest single-word reflecting the RAF’s view is probably “section” or “squad”.  German journalist Stefan Aust (b 1946) also avoided the word, choosing Der Baader Meinhof Komplex (the  Baader-Meinhof Complex) as the title of his 2008 book because it better described how the organization operated.

Andreas Baader & Ulrike Meinhof

In the era they were active, a common descriptor in the English-speaking word was the Baader-Meinhof Group or Gang, named after two of its members Andreas Baader (1943–1977) and Ulrike Meinhof (1934-1976) and the media’s choice of “gang” or “group” may have reflected the desire of governments for the RAF to be depicted more as violent criminals and less as revolutionaries.  The popular press however certainly preferred Baader-Meinhof to RAF because of the drama of the story, Meinhof having been part of the gang which freed Baader from prison.  Both later killed themselves and, although they were never the star-cross'd lovers some journalists liked to suggest, it added to the romance and the Baader-Meinhof name survived their deaths and although the media, politicians and security agencies adopted the eponymous title, it was never used by the RAF.  In the tradition of Marxist collectives, the members regarded the RAF as a co-founded group of many members and not one either defined by or identified with two figureheads, apart from which, the dominant female of the group was actually Gudrun Ensslin (1940-1977).

Andreas Baader and Gudrun Ensslin in court, "Department store trial" (Galeria Kaufhof GmbH), Frankfurt am Main, FRG, 14 October 1968.

The early years of Gudrun Ensslin would have given little hint of how her life would unfold but at 16 comrade Stalin (1878-1953; Soviet leader 1924-1953) entered the Tiflis Theological Seminary to train as a Russian Orthodox priest at the Tiflis Theological Seminary so things can change.  In her youth, Fräulein Ensslin had been a scout leader and assisted her parish priest in work such as organizing Bible studies; her school reports all record her as a diligent, well-behaved student but according to her father (who, as a priest may have some bias), all that changed when “she became erotized” and discovered the charms of dating boys.  By 1967 she was engaged and had given birth to a son when she met Andreas Baader who had arrived in Berlin four years earlier to evade the attention of the Munich police force which had shadowed his dissolute life of petty crime, youth detention centres and prison.  He'd also gone "underground" to escape conscription and rapidly he and Ensslin became lovers; she abandoned her child and with some other discontented souls, the pair decided to escalate their fight against the system, their early attempts to undermine bourgeois capitalism involving fire-bombing the Galeria Kaufhof department stores they considered citadels of "consumerist materialism".  Later they would expand their activities to include kidnappings, bank robberies, bombings & murder and it was in 1968 the German journalist, Ulrike Meinhof, “joined the fight”, writing in the Konkret (published by her husband Klaus Rainer Röhl (1928–2021)):  “Protest is when I say it does not suit me.  Resistance is, when I make sure that what does not suit me, no longer happens.”  The German konkret can be translated as “concrete”, “specific” or “tangible”, depending on the context.  In the sense of Herr Röhl’s (who styled himself “K2R”) magazine, “Konkret” carried the connotation of “real” or “practical”, a nod to Marxist revolutionary principles which tended to discount abstract theoreticians or those who dreamed of utopias; the focus was on what should be done and what could be achieved.  Herr Röhl certainly had a practical understanding of German accounting law because Konkret provided him with a Porsche 911 as a company car.  Because the KPD (German Communist Party) was banned in the FRG (Federal Republic of Germany, the old West Germany, 1949-1990), Herr Röhl's membership was clandestine, as were the payments Konkret received from the GDR (German Democratic Republic, the old East Germany, 1949-1990) and Moscow although funds also came from the FRG.  It must have amused him that Moscow was, in effect, paying for his Porsche, villa and pleasant lifestyle while simultaneously Bonn was contributing to what might be its own overthrow.

Police inspecting the stolen Porsche 911S Targa, Frankfurt, June 1972.

Although a left wing revolutionary, Andreas Bernd Baader liked fast cars owned usually the class enemy and that he never held a drivers licence didn’t deter him from stealing or driving these status symbols of the system he planned to destroy.  His favorite cars by the early 1970s were the Porsche 911 and the BMW E9 coupé and one note in the police reports on him notes that he liked to have a tennis racquet on the passenger seat, the thinking apparently that it was such a middle-class symbol that just the sight of it would make him less suspicious to police.  At the time the Baader-Meinhof gang were active, his automotive taste clearly had been imposed on his fellow revolutionaries because “BMW” came to be understood as “Baader-Meinhof-Wagen” (ie Baader-Meinhof car), the vehicle of choice for the senior gang members whereas newcomers were permitted to drive nothing more elevated than an Audi 100.  Baader-Meinhof had its own class structure and the proletariat was relegated to FWD (front wheel drive), surely as demeaning a humiliation as any inflicted by the plutocracy.

The stolen Iso Rivolta IR300, Frankfurt, June 1972.

For someone trying to avoid the attention of the authorities, Porsches and the big BMW coupés may seem a curious choice given one could more inconspicuously move about in a beige VW Beetle but Baader also affected his style in other ways, his fondness for velvet trousers and designer sunglasses (a thing, even then) mentioned in police reports.  Nor was his taste restricted to German machinery because he also stole an Italian Iso Rivolta IR 300, another inadvisable choice for someone with habits which would have been better pursued with a low profile because of the 800-odd made between 1962-1970, only a reputed 50 were in the FRG when one fell into his (legal but unlawful) possession in 1972.  Apparently he was about to inspect the Rivolta (which he’d yet to drive since the theft) when he was arrested, emerging from the purple (aubergine in the Porsche color chart) Porsche 911S Targa which had been painted its original yellow when he’d stolen it some months earlier.  He and two fellow terrorists had made themselves quite an obvious target, sitting in the aubergine 911, parked facing the wrong way in a middle-class neighbourhood where nobody ever parks in an unapproved manner.  Pleased with the opportunity presented, a police marksman ensconced in a building across the street shot Baader in the thigh and the trio were arrested. Stashed in the Porsche and the garage in which sat the Iso were self-made hand grenades, a bomb in the form of a welded cash box, ammunition, detonators and cables.

Ulrike Meinhof (left) and the cover art for Marianne Faithfull’s album Broken English (1979, right).

Ulrike Meinhof came to public attention for her part in the operation which freed Baader from custody and the escape vehicle used was a silver-grey Alfa Romeo Giulia Sprint GT, a model in which he’d never expressed any interest but which he presumably came to hold in high regard.  Subsequently, for years, Meinhof, the Baader-Ensslin couple and the rest of the RAF left a bloody trail of attacks and bank robberies in their wake and, as a footnote, most of their prominent victims drove Mercedes-Benz, a coincidence of economic circumstances and market preferences.  The title track of Marianne Faithfull’s (1946-2025) album Broken English (1979) was inspired by the life and death of Ulrike Meinhof.

Broken English by Marianne Faithfull, Dave Genn, Matthew Good, Joe Mavety, Barry Reynolds, Terence Stannard & Stephen York.

Could have come through

Anytime

Cold lonely

Puritan

What are you

Fighting for?

It's not my

Security

 

It's just an old war

Not even a cold war

Don't say it in Russian

Don't say it in German

Say it in broken English

Say it in broken English

 

Lose your father

Your husband

Your mother

Your children

What are you

Dying for?

It's not my

Reality

 

It's just an old war

Not even a cold war

Don't say it in Russian

Don't say it in German

Say it in broken English

Say it in broken English

 

What are you fighting for?

What are you fighting for?

What are you fighting for?

What are you fighting for?

What are you fighting for?

What are you fighting for?

Factionalism

Factionalism is probably inherent to the nature of organizations and it really needs only for a structure to have two members for a faction to form.  Factions can be based on ideology, geography, theology, personalities (and factions have been formed purely as vehicles of hatred for another) or just about basis and the names they adopt can be designed to denigrate (redneck faction), operate euphemistically (centre-left (just right wingers who didn’t want to admit it)) or indicate a place on the spectrum (left vs right, liberal vs conservative etc).  They can also be modified by those wishing to demonize (lunar-right, hard-right, religious right etc).  The labelling can also be linguistically productive  In the UK during the 1980s, “the wets” was an epithet applied within the Conservative Party to those who opposed the government’s hard line policies, on the model of the slang “a bit wet” to describe those though effete or lacking resolve.  The wets responded by labelling their detractors “the dries” to which they responded with “warm and dry”, words with positive associations in a cold and damp country.  The names constantly evolve because fissiparousness is in the nature of organizations.

Of human nature

Cady's Map by Janis Ian.

The human race does seem inherently fissiparousness and wherever cultures have formed, history suggests divisions will form and folk will tend to coalesce (or be allocated or otherwise forced) into factions.  Usually, this is attributed to some defined or discernible difference (ethnicity, skin color, language, tribal affiliation, religion etc) but even among homogeneous groups, it's rare to identify one without sub-groups.  It does seem human nature and has long since become institutionalized and labelling theory practitioners can probably now build minor academic careers just by tracking the segregation as it evolves (boomers, gen-X, millennials etc).  The faction names of the cliques at North Shore High School (Mean Girls, Paramount Pictures 2004)) were Actual Human Beings, Anti-Plastics, The Art Freaks, Asexual Band Geeks, Asian Nerds, Burnouts, Cheerleaders, Cool Asians, Desperate Wannabes, Freshmen, Girls Who Eat Their Feelings, J.V. Cheerleaders, J.V. Jocks, Junior Plastics, Preps, ROTC Guys, Sexually Active Band Geeks, The Plastics, Unfriendly Black Hotties, Unnamed Girls Who Don't Eat Anything, and Varsity Jocks.  Given the way sensitivities have evolved, it’s predictable some of those names wouldn’t today be used; the factions' membership rosters would be much the same but some terms are now proscribed in this context, the threshold test for racism now its mere mention, racialism banished to places like epidemiological research papers tracking the distribution of morbidity. 

The factions of the Anglican Church

Fissiparousness is much associated with the modern Church of England, factions of which some time ago mostly abandoned any interest in God or the message of Christ for the more important matters of championing or decrying gay clergy, getting women into or keeping them out of the priesthood, and talking to or ignoring Rome.  Among those resistant to anything beyond the medieval, there's even an institutional forum, the Global Anglican Future Conference (GAFCON) which holds meetings at which there is much intrigue and plotting; it's sort of an anti-Lambeth Conference though the cucumber sandwiches are said to be much the same.  Under the stresses inherent in the late twentieth-century, fissiparousness saw the Anglicans coalesce into three factions, the low & lazy, the broad & hazy and the high & crazy.

Overlaps in the Anglican Church factions

The Low & Lazy

Like the high churchers, the low lot still believe in God but, their time not absorbed plotting and scheming or running campaigns to stamp out gay clergy and opposing the ordination of women, they actually have time to pray, which they do, often.  The evangelical types come from among the low and don’t approve of fancy rituals, Romish ways or anything smelling of popery.  Instead, they like services where there’s clapping, dancing and what sounds like country & western music with sermons telling them it’s Godly to buy things like big TVs and surf-skis.

The Broad & Hazy

The broad church is more a club than a church, something like the Tory Party at prayer.  The parishioners will choose the church they (occasionally) attend on the same basis as their golf club, driving miles if need be to find a congregation acceptably free of racial and cultural DEI (diversity, equity and inclusion).  They’re interested not at all in theology or anything too abstract so sermons need to be brief and sufficiently vague to please the bourgeoisie.  The broad church stands for most things in general and nothing in particular; finding most disputes in Anglicanism baffling, they just can't see what all the fuss is about.

The High & Crazy

The high church has clergy who love dressing up like the Spice Girls, burning incense and chanting the medieval liturgy in Latin.  They disapprove of about everything that’s happened since the 1662 edition of the Book of Common Prayer and believe there’d be less sin were there still burnings at the stake.  Most high church clergy wish Pius IX (1792–1878; pope 1846-1878) still sat on the throne of Saint Peter and some act as though he does.

Schism

Schism (pronounced siz-uhm or skiz-uhm)

(1) Division or disunion, especially into mutually opposed parties.

(2) Parties or groups so formed.

(3) In ecclesiastical matters, a formal division within, or separation from, a church or religious body over some doctrinal difference.

(4) The state of a sect or body formed by such division.

(5) The offense of causing or seeking to cause such a division.

1350-1400: From the Church Latin schisma, scisma (and in the Medieval Latin as cisma), from the Ancient Greek σχίσμα (skhísma) (genitive skhismatos), (division, cleft), from σχίζω (skhízō) (I split), the stem of skhizein (to split), from the primitive Indo-European root skei- (to cut, split).  The word replaced the French and Middle English cisme scisme & sisme (a dissension within the church producing two or more parties with rival authorities) all of which were from the Old French cisme or scisme (a cleft, a split), again ultimately from the Ancient Greek σχίσμα (skhísma).  By the late fourteenth century, scisme (dissention within the church) had emerged although in the New Testament, schism (or an equivalent from the stem of skhizein) was applied metaphorically to divisions in the Church (eg I Corinthians xii.25).  The classical spelling was actually restored in the sixteenth century but pronunciation may have remained unchanged and the general sense of “disunion, division, separation” became common in the early fifteenth century, and within a few years the adjective schismatic (the original spelling being scismatik) was coined in the sense of “pertaining to, of the nature of, or characterized by schism”, something which referred specifically to “an outward separation from an existing church or faith on difference of opinion:, on the model of the Old French scismatique & cismatique (which endures in Modern French as schismatique), from the Church Latin schismaticus, from the Ancient Greek skhismatikos.  The adjective was used also as a noun in both the Old French and Late Latin and had actually been used thus in English in the late fourteenth century in the sense of “one who participates in a schism”.  In both French & English, the modern spelling was adopted in the late sixteenth century.  Schism is a noun, schismatic & schismatical are nouns & adjectives and schismatically is an adverb; the noun plural is schisms.

The East-West Schism of 1054 is sometimes casually referred to as the “Great Schism” but this is best avoided because it can be confused with the Great Schism of 1378-1417 (which followed the “Avignon Papacy” (1309-1376)), known as the “Babylonian captivity of the Papacy”.  The Avignon era was a confused period, presided over by seven popes and five antipopes, something to be recalled by those who think today’s squabbles between the Vatican factions are disruptive.  The schism of 1054 was the break of communion between what are now the (Eastern) Orthodox and (Western) Roman Catholic churches.  There were a myriad of ecclesiastical and theological disputes between the Greek East and Latin West before 1054 covering issues such as whether leavened or unleavened bread should be used in the Eucharist.  More serious perhaps were a cluster of arguments about power; the Pope’s claim to universal jurisdiction and the place of Constantinople in relation to Rome.

By 1053, there was open clerical warfare.  Greek churches in Italy were forced to close or to conform to Romish ways and, in retaliation, the eastern Patriarch closed the Latin churches in Constantinople; and harsh words were exchanged and by 1054 the hierarchies of both factions were busily excommunicating each other.  It’s a little misleading to cite 1054 as the date of the schism because the dispute actually dragged and technically, relationships wouldn’t fully be sundered for almost two centuries but historians accept that year as critical and in many ways, as a point on no return.  Now almost a thousand-years on, there seems no prospect of reconciliation.

Amusing Australian schisms

The Australian Rugby League (ARL), 1995-1997: Australia is well-known for schisms in sport.  The game of rugby league was the product of a schism in the rugby unions ranks, the essence of which was the disagreement about player payments and the amateur status of the game.  That schism happened in England in 1895 but exactly a hundred year later, in Australia, the professional rugby league competition endured its own when News Corp, seeing the game as the perfect content provider for the then novel platform of pay-TV, staged a raid and attempted to entice the clubs to join their breakaway competition, offering the traditional inducement of lots of money.  The established competition responded, backed with money from its broadcaster and a two-year war ensued until corporate realities prevailed and a merged entity divided the spoils between the media organizations.  The dispute and its resolution followed essentially the same path as the schism in Australian cricket a generation earlier.

The Australian Labor Party, 1955: By the mid-1950s, the strongly anti-Communist faction in the Australian Labor Party (ALP) was actively engaged in a campaign to counter communist infiltration of both the political (the ALP) and industrial (the unions) arms of the labour movement.  Had the ALP enjoyed more capable leadership, things might have turned out differently but, handled as it was, the ALP split, the schism most serious in NSW and Queensland but no state was wholly unaffected.  What emerged as a predominately Catholic splinter-party was the Democratic Labor Party (DLP), the existence of which adversely affected the ALP vote for a generation.  Thought exterminated in 1974, the DLP still shows up at the odd election and has won seats before succumbing to its own schisms.

Department of Law, Macquarie University, 1980s: More traditional (black-letter) academic lawyers at Macquarie became concerned at the teachings of others whom they called legal sociologists.  Styling themselves substantive lawyers, they didn’t especially object to the content of their opponents; they just though it had no place in a law school.  A pre-social media schism, the dispute manifested mostly in letters to the editor and bitchy comments in legal journals.  Eventually, the dispute faded as the factions either called a truce or simply ignored each other.

Department of Philosophy, University of Sydney, 1972: John Anderson (1893–1962) was a Scottish philosopher who held the Challis Chair of Philosophy at the University of Sydney from 1927 until retirement in 1958.  His influence continued even after his death and by the early 1970s, faculty were engaged in a quite bitter dispute about subject matter, educational techniques and the very nature and purpose of philosophical study.  The differences proved irreconcilable and in 1974 the department split into two separate units, the Department of Traditional and Modern Philosophy and the Department of General Philosophy.  The latter thought the former little more than a polite discussion group re-hashing the thoughts of last two and a half-thousand years while the former considered the latter politically radical but philosophically barren.  The department eventually reunited some thirty years later.

Mean Girls (2004) is a tale of schism, back-stabbing and low skulduggery. That has attracted those in "media studies" departments and other such places who, drawing perhaps a long bow, have constructed textual analyses aligning the script with William Shakespeare's (1564–1616) The Tragedy of Hamlet, Prince of Denmark (1603), The Tragedy of Macbeth (1623) and The Tragedy of Julius Caesar (1599).

Teal

Teal (pronounced teel)

(1) Any of several species of small dabbling, short-necked freshwater ducks (such as the Eurasian Anas crecca (common teal)), of worldwide distribution and related to the mallard, travelling usually in tight flocks and frequenting ponds, lakes and marshes.

(2) A color, a medium to dark greenish blue, often mixed with traces of azure, beryl, cerulean, cobalt, indigo, navy, royal, sapphire, turquoise & ultramarine, also called teal blue and (rarely) tealturquoise, peacockblue or blueteal.

(3) As TEAl, the abbreviation of triethylaluminium (in organic chemistry, a volatile organometallic compound (Al₂(C₂H₅)₆ or Al₂Et₆) used in various chemical processes and as an ignitor in rockets and jet engines.)

(4) As TEAL, the (historical) initialism of Tasman Empire Airways Limited, the forerunner to Air New Zealand.

(5) A collective descriptor informally adopted to refer to certain nominally independent candidates contesting certain electorates in the 2022 Australian general election.

1275-1375: From Middle English tele (small freshwater duck), probably from the (unrecorded) Old English tǣle and cognate with the Middle Low German tēlink, from the from West Germanic taili, from the West Frisian tjilling (teal) and the Middle Dutch tēling (teal (source of the Modern Dutch taling)).  The Middle Low German tēlink, was from the Proto-Germanic tailijaz, of unknown ultimate origin, with no cognates outside of Germanic.  As the name of a shade of dark greenish-blue resembling the color patterns on the fowl's head and wings, it is attested from 1923 in clothing advertisements, thereby joining the long list of variations of descriptions of the variations in the shades of blue including: blue; Alice blue, aqua, aquamarine, azure, baby blue, beryl, bice, bice blue, blue green, blue violet, blueberry, cadet blue, Cambridge blue, cerulean, cobalt blue, Copenhagen blue, cornflower, cornflower blue, cyan, dark blue, Dodger blue, duck-egg blue, eggshell blue, electric-blue, gentian blue, ice blue, lapis lazuli, light blue, lovat, mazarine, midnight blue, navy, Nile blue, Oxford blue, peacock blue, petrol blue, powder blue, Prussian blue, robin's-egg blue, royal blue, sapphire, saxe blue, slate blue, sky blue, teal, turquoise, ultramarine, Wedgwood blue & zaffre.  Teal is a noun & adjective and tealish is an adjective; the noun plural is teal or (especially collectively), teals.  The spelling teale is obsolete.

Teal sample by Canva.

Teal’s hexadecimal code is #008080 with RGB values of R: 0, G: 50.2, B: 50.2 and CMYK values of C: 1, M: 0, Y: 0, K:0.5, a hue angle of 180^o, a saturation of 100% and a lightness of 25.1%.  According to the authoritative Canva, for Tibetan monks it was symbolic of the infinity of the sea and sky and for Egyptians, the color of truth and faith.  Discussing the color, Adobe’s editors were almost lyrical, suggesting readers “picture the warm ocean waves in Baja California, made of that color that isn’t quite blue and isn’t quite green.  The water brings in the cool side of summer.”  That’s evocative but the website goes on to note before it was a color it was the name of a bird, “teal” adopted for the blueish-green (or greenish-blue) only in 1917, the reference being to the area around the eye of the Eurasian teal duck.

Carmignano Visitation (circa 1529), oil on panel by Pontormo (Jacopo Carucci; 1494–1557), propositura dei Santi Michele e Francesco, Carmignano, Italy.

The artist’s use of a startling tealish blue for the robe is thought a deliberate choice to emphasize Mary's exalted place in Christian theology.  In Christianity, the Visitation of the Blessed Virgin Mary (clipped usually in general use to “the Visitation”), refers to the visit of Mary, the pregnant with Jesus, to Elizabeth, pregnant with John the Baptist, the story told in the Gospel of Luke (1:39–56).  Traditionally, the Christian feast day commemorating this visit appeared in ecclesiastical calendars on 2 July (Western) or 30 March (orthodox) but in some churches in the West it’s now celebrated on 31 May.

1996 Lancia Y LX-in Grigio Steel over teal Alcantara.

Historically, blue pigment was both expensive and rare; while in the natural environment sources of green were, it was difficult for chemists to create dyes and pigments in blue which did not rapidly (and often inconsistently) fade.  In commerce, because both blue and green pigment were needed to make teal, the blend came to be considered a color of elevated status (and thus price).  The special place of blue (in its time Prussian blue was revolutionary) was reprised in the electronic age when the blue LED (light emitting diode) proved an elusive target.  Although a blue LED had been created as early as 1972 (US Patent US3819974 A granted in 1974), the glow was faint because the materials used in the 1960s & 1970s for red & green LEDs (gallium arsenide (GaAs) or gallium phosphide (GaP) lacked the necessary width in bandgap (in physics the energy difference between two allowed ranges of electron energy in a solid).  Not until the early 1990s did researchers find the method of growing high-quality Gallium Nitride (GaN) at scale on sapphire substrates did the blue LED become technically and commercially viable and with it came the white LED (made possible by combining blue light with yellow phosphor).  That gained the researchers the 2014 Nobel Prize in Physics and the white LED has revolutionized illumination (for birth screens and lighting) and achieved massive energy savings worldwide.

TEAL Lockheed L-188 Electra ZK-TEB 1963 (left) & 1965 (right).  The TEAL livery was retained when the corporate name was changed in 1965, the aircraft not immediately re-painted, “Air New Zealand” replacing “TEAL JET PROP” on the fuselage as required by the rules of the Convention on International Civil Aviation (1944).

The airline TEAL (Tasman Empire Airways Limited) emerged from the Tasman Sea Agreement, an intergovernmental treaty between the Australia, New Zealand and the UK, concluded in London early in 1940.  The purpose of the operation was to provide for the trans-Tasman traffic of passengers, cargo and mail, something which had been disrupted by the outbreak of hostilities in 1939.  In the manner of a number of wartime agreements, the treaty contained a sunset clause which stipulated a termination within three months of the end of the war with Germany but such was the state of post-war civil aviation that arrangements were carried over and pre-war practices did not return to the trans-Tasman route until 1954.  As part of that re-organization, the shareholdings, which previously had been spread between the New Zealand Government (20%), Union Airways (19%), BOAC (38%) and Qantas (23%), were dissolved and the two governments assumed co-ownership until 1961 when both decided to maintain separate national carriers, TEAL and Qantas, the relationship having been strained since the Australians had insisted TEAL order the turboprop Lockheed Electra to maintain fleet standardization with Qantas while the New Zealanders wanted to upgrade to jets.  In 1965, TEAL was re-named Air New Zealand.

Lindsay Lohan in teal, Nickelodeon Kids' Choice Awards (2004, left), publicity shot in Greece (2019, centre) & premiere of Mean Girls (2004).

Trooping the color: The teal mafia out campaigning in the Wentworth electorate, Australian general election 2022.

The so-called “teal independents” are a number of nominally independent candidates contesting certain electorates in the 2022 Australian general election.  The teal candidates on which there has been much focus are almost all professional women drawn from outside professional politics, contesting nominally “safe” Liberal Party seats in which there’s a higher than average interest in progressive issues, especially climate change.  The use of the color teal is thought an allusion to the mixing of blue and green, blue a reference either to the “blue-blood” demographic profile of the electorates or it being the traditional color associated with conservative politics and green the environmental consciousness which the teals are making a focus of their campaigns.  Former Liberal Party prime-minister John Howard (b 1939; prime-minister 1996-2007) was not impressed by the practice of styling the teals as “independents”, claiming it was misleading given the source of some of their funding and logistical support from entities which would in the US be understood as PACs (political action committees), entities which combined lobbying with activism on specific issues.  Mr Howard suggested the teals were merely “…posing as independents” and were really “…anti-Liberal groupies”, their aim being “…to hurt the Liberal party, not to represent the middle ground of their electorates” adding “They don’t represent disgruntled Liberals.  They represent a group in the community that wants to destroy the Liberal government. It’s as simple as that.”

Flags of the Liberal Party of Australian and Australian Labor Party (ALP).

Mr Howard was right in that the consequences really are simple as that: if a sufficient number of teals are successful, they will hurt the Liberal party and destroy the Liberal-National coalition government but where the teals would differ from the former prime-minister is in not conflating cause with effect.  The teal candidates have well expressed (if not especially detailed) policy objectives and are seeking to destroy the government because they wish to see alternative policies pursued and about that, voters will agree, disagree or remain indifferent.  What attracted most attention however was Mr Howard’s choice of the word “groupies” to refer to the (mostly female) teals, one critic noting an analysis of the composition of the four ministries he formed while prime-minister did suggest he was inclined to appoint women to the “touchy-feely” portfolios dealing with people while the men got the meatier appointments.

On the books of the central Arizona town of Sedona is an ordinance banning brightly colored signs or buildings, an admirable law intended to limit the jarring intrusions of commerce on the visual environment.  In Sedona, the "golden arches" of McDonalds are teal-blue.

That aside, he does have a point about the word “independent” being misleading.  Historically, in Australia, it’s been understood as meaning a candidate for or member of a parliament who is not a member of a political party (within the legally-defined meaning).  That the teals are not but, though not a conventional party, the teal thing is clearly a concept, a movement or something else beyond a mere state of mind and parts of it are a framework providing the candidates with financial and administrative assistance in a more structured way that that of local volunteers.  The teals (not all of whom use the color in their advertising, one in particular running a “pink” campaign) have also been the victims of some ambush marketing, complaining that others were now muddying the waters by sending out teal-colored flyers.  They might have some difficulty in enforcing an exclusivity of right on a color, about the only restriction enforced is on purple which can’t be used in circumstances where it might be confused with something from the Australian Electoral commission which most jealously guards its purple.  Nor is some fluidity of meaning unknown in Australian politics.  During the 1970s and 1980s, in the Victorian Labor Party, although an apparent contradiction in terms, a faction was formed called the “Independents”, a faction self-described by its members as being a faction for those “who disliked factional politics”.  It was novel then and unthinkable now but happened at a time when the Left had been neutralized by federal intervention and the Right was still obsessed with the DLP (the Democratic Labor Party, the even more right-wing Roman-Catholic breakaway which was until the emergence of One Nation the worst form of political excrement to enjoy significant electoral success) and the Cold War.  There was a gap in the market.

Flags of the Australian National Party & the Australian Greens.

Teal as blend of blue and green imparting political meaning works in Australia because the use of the colors red (of the left), blue (of the right) & green (of the greenies) is well understood.  Even the historic association of the National Party with green doesn’t cause confusion.  The National Party (originally the Country Party and briefly in some places the National-Country Party), had always used green to reflect their agrarian origins but adapted well in the 1980s to the emergence of formalized Green parties (which of course chose green for semiotic purposes).  Pragmatists, the Nationals, operating as usual like horse-traders, settled on a slightly darker shade with gold lettering, the traditional Australian sporting livery.  Briefly, the Nationals had flirted with shades of brown, the idea being to convey “the people of the soil” but the idea was quickly abandoned, not because brown was so associated with the Nazis (the Braunes Haus (Brown House)) was their early Munich headquarters and the Surmabteilung (the SA and literally "Storm Detachment" but usually called storm-troopers) were street thugs known as the “brownshirts” because of their uniform) but because brown is such an unappealing colour and difficult for graphic artists to handle.         

Crooked Hillary Clinton (b 1947; US secretary of state 2009-2013) liked teal pantsuits and retained a fondness for the shade, even as the cut of her clothes became more accommodating.

The origin of red being associated with the politics of radicalism and revolution is generally assumed to date from the use in the French revolution where the idea was to represent the blood spilled in the overthrow of the ancien régime although the shade used should perhaps have been darkened a little in the years that followed as the revolution began “to consume its children”.  Around the planet, colors are widely used as political identifiers and, with different traditions of use and history of origin, there’s a wide divergence of meaning; what a color in one country conveys can mean the opposite in another.  There’s also the point that at one, important level, a color is just a color and the choice, even for political purposes, may be purely on aesthetic grounds:  Hitler made no secret that he choose red, white and black as for the early depictions of the swastika and other Nazi imagery because his ideological opponents, the communists, had used it with such success.  Among the best known color adoptions are orange and green in Ireland, yellow and red in Thailand and black by the so-called Islamic State (داعش, Dāʿish) and a number of Islamist and Islamic fundamentalist movements (as a symbol of jihad), saffron in India because of the traditional association with Hinduism and the Hindu nationalist movement.  The association of certain blue & red with political parties or ideologies is fairly consistent in the English-speaking world except for the curious pattern of use in the United States.

Flags of the US Republican Party (Elephants) & US Democrat Party (Donkeys).

In the US, although the idea of blue states (Democrats) and red states (Republicans) is now entrenched as part of the political lexicon, it's been that way only for two decades odd.  Red and blue had long been used to illustrate the US electoral map but there was never any consistency in how they were allotted to the parties and in some elections, different television networks might use them differently or even use different colors entirely, one of the considerations being what worked best on the then novel medium of color television.  The other influence was possibly political culture, there being in the US little tradition of a mainstream, radical party of the left so the red-blue contrast as it was understood elsewhere in the English-speaking world didn't register in the same way.  It was in the 2000 presidential election that the television networks agreed to standardize the red and blue designations for Republicans and Democrats, the incentive simply one of convenience in the reporting of the drawn-out Electoral College numbers that year.  As the red and blue imagery flowed across screens for weeks before the numbers were settled, the color associations became set in stone.

Shades of purple, the US 2004 presidential election: outcomes from Electoral College represented by state (left) and county (right). 

The idea of the US as a divided society of red states (emblematically the fly-overs) and blue states (with populations on the corrupting coastlines) is graphically illustrated when the states are colored according to the winner-takes-all system electoral college system but if the red-blue map is instead constructed county by county, a more nuanced spectrum emerges as one that is in shades of purple (purple a mix of red & blue as teal is of green & blue).  The US is a country of divisions and many of the cleavages are cross-cutting but the state by state maps do exaggerate the extent of the political polarization.

2021 McLaren GT Coupé in teal (Serpentine in the McLaren color chart).