Propinquity (pronounced proh-ping-kwi-tee)
(1) Nearness in place; proximity.
(2) Nearness of relation; kinship.
(3) Affinity of nature; similarity.
(4) Nearness in time (technical use only).
1350-1400: From the Old French propinquité (nearness in relation, kinship (and emerging in the
early 1400s) nearness in place, physical nearness), from the Latin propinquitatem (nominative propinquitas) (nearness, vicinity;
relationship, affinity) ," from propinquus
(near, neighboring), from prope (near),
the loss of the second -r- by
dissimilation, from the primitive Indo-European propro (on and on, ever further), source also of the Sanskrit pra-pra (on and on), the Ancient Greek pro-pro (before, on and on), from the root
per- (forward), hence "in front
of, toward, near". The
signification of the suffix -inquus remains
mysterious and the old synonym appropinquity is thankfully obsolete. Propinquity is a noun and propinquitous & propinquitous are adjectives; the noun plural is propinquties.
In social psychology, propinquity is considered one of the
main factors leading to interpersonal attraction. Propinquity can mean physical proximity, a
kinship between people, or a similarity in nature between things. Two people working in the same office should
tend to have a higher propinquity than those working further apart, just as two
people with similar political beliefs should possess a higher propinquity than
those whose beliefs differ. The
propinquity effect is the tendency for people to form friendships or romantic
relationships with those whom they encounter most often. The emergence of virtual social environments
on the Internet has not necessarily reduced the effects of propinquity where it
exists but online interactions have facilitated instant and close interactions
with people despite a lack of material presence. The changes in physical proximity people have
begun widely to experience during the COVID-19 pandemic are thus one part of
the many science experiments currently conducting themselves, affording
researchers possibilities on a scale never seen before.
The Ball Rule: Nothing propinks like propinquity
It was the author Ian Fleming (1908-1964) who coined the phrase “nothing propinks like propinquity”, using it as a chapter title in Diamonds are Forever (1956) but it was George Ball (1909–1994), an undersecretary of state in the Kennedy (1961-1963) and Johnson (1963-1969) administrations who translated it to power-politics as the “Ball Rule” which states that “the more direct access one has to the source of power, the greater one’s power, no matter what ones title may actually be”.
Dr Henry Kissinger (b 1923; US national security advisor (NSA) 1969-1975 & secretary of state 1937-1977) was a fine student of history and a fast learner of the low skullduggery needed to succeed in Washington DC. Although among the most influential of the national security advisors, he resented the independent advice coming from the State Department which he regarded as ill-informed, ineffectual and wrong-headed. Although foreign policy under Richard Nixon (1913-1994; US president 1969-1974) was during his first administration (1969-1973) something of a "battle of the memoranda" as Kissinger and William Rogers (1913–2001; US secretary of state 1969-1973) struggled for supremacy, what proved ultimately most effective for Kissinger was that he was able to ensure the secretary's access to the president became limited while his proximity remained constant. In 1973 Kissinger replaced Rogers as secretary while continuing to serve as NSA; he had no interest in there being competition because he knew what could happen.
Pre-dating Ball and even Fleming, an understanding of the relationship between someone’s proximity to the table of power and their gathering of its crumbs was useful in understanding the exercise of power in many systems and especially helpful to historians of the Third Reich in understanding the fluidity of actual authority in the Nazi state which transcended the constitutional structure. Indeed, in some cases it wasn’t for some years after the end of the war that some of the implications of the ever-shifting power relationships came to be understood, tracked not only in terms of the influence exercised by Adolf Hitler's (1889-1945; Führer (leader) and German head of government 1933-1945 & head of state 1934-1945) paladins but as a measure of the decline in the Führer’s authority as the fortunes of war turned against him. There are many examples from the strange world of Hitler and his government which illustrate the operation of Ball’s rule. While the accretion of power was not mono-casual and influenced by the personalities, their circumstances and ambitions, it was almost always the closeness to Hitler, real or merely perceived, which most dictated one's position in the ever-shifting power structure, something usually more important than actual titles or appointments.
Field Marshall Wilhelm Keitel (1882–1946; Head of OKW (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, the armed forces high command)) enjoyed (sic) close proximity to Hitler for the entire war yet such was his character and subservience to the Fuhrer that his standing in the military was progressively diminished, his authority never seen as anything but the conduit through which Hitler’s order’s passed. Although on paper a power figure in the military and the state his power was illusory, it’s exercise dependent entirely on his closeness to the leader. He was a cypher but Hitler, who after the devious machinations (typical of the Nazi state) which had removed other prospective candidates, had appointed himself commander-in-chief of the army and would have tolerated no other attitude.
Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring (1893–1946; leading Nazi, Hitler's designated successor 1939-1945) was never under any illusion that all that he was in the Nazi State was due to his relationship with Hitler but it was enough for him that it be known; unlike many he never attempted to become part of the social entourage, the Fuhrer’s inner circle, apart for all else he found the food served "much too rotten for my taste" and the so many of the regulars "too dull". His His authority declined as his failings in his many roles became obvious and he came to avoid being in Hitler’s presence to avoid recriminations. As his distance from the leader became obvious, his powers, real and perceived, diminished and while he retained may impressive-sounding titles, even by the mid-point of the war, his actual authority to influence much was minimal.
Martin Bormann (1900–1945; Nazi Party functionary 1927-1945, Secretary to Führer or Deputy Fuhrer 1933-1945) is the classic example of Ball’s Rule. Along with Reichsführer SS Heinrich Himmler (1900–1945, head of the Schutzstaffel (SS) 1929-1945), Bormann was feared even by the most loyal Nazis, simply because his closeness to Hitler was notorious. For most of the war, he was the one most often in Hitler’s presence and he controlled the access of others, few had the opportunity to increase their propinquity without his approval. In the post-war years Bormann has often been depicted as "the secretary who manipulated Hitler" and while that contains some elements of truth, Hitler was not unaware of what was going on and there's little to suggest he was ever nudged in a direction he was reluctant to travel and the degree of isolation Bormann imposed he found most convivial because those excluded were those he had little wish to hear from.
Albert Speer (1905–1981; Reich Minister of Armaments 1942-1945) became close to Hitler while court architect in the pre-war years. He claimed, quite believably, that he was as close as Hitler ever came to having a friend and in his memoirs, actually documented the effect of Ball’s Rule, noting the waxing and waning of his authority as his relationship with the leader became increasingly distant. His tale of the way others reacted to the way he and Hitler played out their strange association during and after Speer’s prolonged illness in 1944 is the definitive case study of the dynamic force the perceptions of an individual's degree of propinquity to the source of power can exert. A number of historians have alluded to a particular tinge they found in the relationship between Speer and Hitler: what they called the "homoerotic". There is something in this but it was certainly nothing sexual, just an understanding that to the very end (indeed for Speer, even after) the need for each of these emotionally stunted characters to feel the affection of the other was uniquely important for both.
